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Abstract 
 
 My dissertation examines everyday understandings of citizenship as expressed by 
voluntary Dutch language coaches in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Based on thirteen months of 
ethnographic research, the primary methods used in this study were in-depth semi-structured 
interviews and participant observation. These methods were complemented by archival research 
examining policy documents, key discussions in mainstream Dutch media, and promotional 
materials developed by the voluntary organizations studied. Adopting a Foucauldian approach to 
governmentality informed by the work of Tania Li, Mitchell Dean, Ann Laura Stoler, and Aihwa 
Ong, this study considers how volunteer Dutch language coaches both reproduce and challenge 
contemporary discourses around citizenship and belonging in Dutch society.  
 Since the 1990s, in the Netherlands and across the European Union, concerns over 
increasing cultural diversity and diminishing social cohesion have centred on marginalized, non-
Western (Muslim) newcomers and their descendants. These concerns have developed 
concurrently with neoliberal interventions that have included the downloading of social service 
provision – including immigrant integration – to lower levels of government, private and not-for-
profit civil society organizations, and individual citizens as volunteers. Cross-cutting historical, 
colonial calculations of ‘Dutchness’ and more recent expressions of  neoliberal “active” 
citizenship (Ong 1996; Muehlebach 2012), the Dutch language has emerged as a key symbol of 
belonging, and technique for teaching the technology of government to newcomers. In this 
context I argue that Amsterdam’s Dutch language coaching volunteers fill an important role as 
front-line citizenship educators, offering a unique perspective through which to study citizenship. 
Alongside teaching newcomers the language skills required to naturalize, coaches convey their 
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own ideas of citizenship and belonging as an everyday ethic and practice of community building. 
Through their voluntary work and expressions of meaningful social integration and citizenship, 
these research participants consent to and extend the reach of government into the private lives 
of (potential) citizens. The tensions, practices, and contradictions around belonging revealed by 
these participants underscore the “awkward continuities” (Dean 2010:57) with the powerful 
grammar of difference and Dutchness developed through the experience of empire, and how 
entangled discourses of cultural difference and neoliberal “active” citizenship shape state and 
everyday notions of morally and culturally attuned citizenship practice.  
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Introduction: Foregrounding questions of citizenship in the Netherlands  
 
The ball is in the hands of the citizen. In the face of countless social problems, 
people today look expectantly to the citizen. Policy makers do it, as do politicians 
from all points on the political spectrum, directors of civil society organizations 
and organizations of citizens themselves: all lay the ball at the feet of the citizen. 
If a problem surfaces, the searchlight is quickly directed to citizens and their 
organizations: civil society. The citizen is respected, invited, stimulated, begged, 
seduced to become an active citizen. (Tonkens 2006:5; my translation) 
 
So began Evelien Tonkens in her inaugural lecture on the occasion of her appointment to the 
special post1 of Professor of Active Citizenship in 2006 at the Universiteit van Amsterdam 
(University of Amsterdam, UvA). Tonkens took up this position at a time when citizenship was 
being connected by politicians, policy makers, in the media, by scholars, and by citizens 
themselves to notions of “active participation” in society (cf. Hurenkamp et al. 2011). This 
notion of “active” participation has been expressed in many guises, and from a wide variety of 
sources: from federal and municipal governmental actors, media commentators, among 
educators, policy makers, academics, and many citizens in their everyday lives.     
Among these various articulations, the figure of the volunteer is uncontested as a true 
expression of “active” citizenship. While Tonkens remarks upon the vaunted position of the 
volunteer as the “caring” (zorgzame) citizen, the volunteer arguably embodies all of the positive 
qualities that “active citizenship” is thought to cultivate in Dutch society: responsibility 
(verantwoordelijkheid), decency (fatsoen), and deliberation (deliberatie)2 (Tonkens 2006:5). 
“Active” citizens take responsibility for the care of themselves, their physical and social 
surroundings, and work with other citizens (and/ or the government) to build society together 
(Tonkens 2006). These notions of “active” citizenship practice reflect contemporary 
understandings of Dutch sociality – of being sociaal – as an expression of socially-oriented 
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behaviour and personal responsibility that helps to build (civil) society.3 Being sociaal, as 
sociologist Jan Willem Duyvendak has indicated,4 is considered the foundation of Dutch culture. 
This local conception of Dutch sociality encompasses not only positive normative social 
behaviours, but also societal (as in civil society; maatschappelijk) practices and relationships. 
Being sociaal expresses ideas about how to behave in public and the role of personal 
responsibility in civil society. 
 With this notion of citizenship and its connection to Dutch sociality in mind, the trend of 
looking to citizens – especially to volunteers – to solve what are seen as the problems of both 
government and society has become increasingly common since the mid-1990s (cf. Putnam 
1995). This has been the case not only in the Netherlands, but across Europe and around the 
world (cf. Muehlebach 2012; Hemment 2012; Erickson 2012; Cattelino 2004; Kidd 2002). These 
changing expectations have occurred alongside shifts in the meaning and practice of citizenship, 
which in turn have been tied to broader social, political and economic processes. Since the late 
1990s, anthropologists and other social scientists have been attentive to how globalizing 
processes have affected notions of belonging and citizenship practice in relation to the nation-
state and local societies. These studies have focused on how such processes – for instance, inter- 
or transnational migration and settlement, the state’s internalization of neoliberal logics – have 
transformed people’s lived realities (cf. Ong 1999, 2006; Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001; 
Mosher 2006; Mandel 2008; Geschiere 2009; Duyvendak 2011; Muehlebach 2012; Hemment 
2012). These changes have affected how social issues, boundary markers, and practices – 
including citizenship – are conceptualized and articulated by governments, policy makers, civil 
society organizations, the media, and by people in their everyday lives. The change in the 
relationships between citizens, the state and civil society have produced transformations with 
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regard to the very meanings of citizenship. 
As Tonkens asked in her inaugural lecture, “since we expect so much of citizens, mustn’t 
we ask what they themselves think might be expected of them” (2006:18; my translation)? In this 
dissertation, I refocus and expand upon this question to ask not only what can be expected of 
citizens, but what citizens expect of one another. In particular, what is it that ‘native’ Dutch5 
citizens expect of newcomers to Dutch society? In asking such questions, I examine the ways in 
which contemporary citizenship practices come to be understood by (‘native’ Dutch) citizens, 
and how these in turn shape what it means to belong in the Netherlands today. How one 
participates in and contributes to society, that is, how one is “active” as a citizen has been 
increasingly discussed as more important in how belonging is calculated in the everyday than 
other identity markers – including legal status, but also race, religion, migration trajectories, 
class, cultural difference. However, further examination of the idea and practice of citizenship at 
national and local levels, and through specific practices reveals how these markers resurface and 
continue to matter in the context of the everyday in the contemporary Netherlands. In following 
these processes of nation-building and citizenship practice through diverse historical, colonial, 
state and everyday contexts in the Netherlands, my ethnographic research explores how the turn 
to “active citizenship” and the reconfiguring of the relationships between citizens, the state, and 
civil society reveal processes of governmentality.  
From a Foucauldian perspective informed by the work of Tania Li, Mitchell Dean, Ann 
Laura Stoler, and Aihwa Ong, my ethnography speaks to how governmentality operates through 
the everyday experiences and explosive events or interventions that reveal the elisions around 
difference in the Dutch context. These elisions contribute to the messiness around contemporary 
understandings and management of Dutchness. Locating these processes in citizenship, I trace 
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how older discourses of difference morph into new, even more powerful divisions in the 
contemporary context, how such conceptions of difference are reproduced, changed, challenged, 
reconciled, and normalized through processes of “subject-ification” (Ong 1996:737). The ways 
in which Dutch citizenship practice has developed in relation to “common sense” ways of 
thinking and being have enabled certain sets of problems to emerge. In examining how Dutch 
citizenship practice has been ‘problematized’, I trace how citizenship and the criteria that inform 
this status and practice have developed as an object of thought and a technical arena for 
governmental intervention. Understanding particular relationships, processes, and agents as 
problems has helped to rationalize particular kinds of interventions in the direction of the 
conduct of the self and others (Dean 2010:27, 31). In attending to the historical development of 
morally and culturally attuned Dutch citizenship practice, I examine “how programs take hold 
and change things, while keeping in view their instabilities, fragilities and fractures, and the 
ways in which failure prepares the ground for new programming” (Li 2007a:279). Of particular 
interest to my research are the moral and cultural dimensions of citizenship that impact notions 
of belonging in both national and local societies (cf. Tonkens et al. 2008; Hurenkamp 2011; 
Schinkel 2008, 2010; Duyvendak 2012; Muehlebach 2012; Mandel 2008).  
 As critical scholars, we employ an analytic of government “to understand how different 
locales are constituted as authoritative and powerful, how different agents are assembled with 
specific powers, and how different domains are constituted as governable and administrable” 
(Dean 2010:40). In pursuing such questions we seek to make sense of the ways in which “we are 
formed as various types of agents with particular capacities and possibilities of action” (Dean 
2010:40). To begin from this point of problematization is to ask how both the ‘governors’ and 
‘the governed’ in a particular context (are directed to) conduct themselves (Dean 2010:38). In 
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their attempts to direct the conduct of others, governors or experts (such as policy makers, 
academics, or local leaders) often contribute to governmental interventions through operating on, 
as Li says, “population in the aggregate, or on subgroups divided by gender, location, age, 
income or race, each with characteristic deficiencies that serve as points of entry for corrective 
interventions” (2007a:276).  
 An examination of government therefore requires us to explore the ways in which 
governmental rationality is expressed through programs that direct (or reform or redirect) the 
assemblage of processes, relations, practices, ways of thinking and doing, strategies and 
techniques to achieve specific goals (Li 2007a:279; Li 2007b:266). These programs depend upon 
rendering particular domains technical, as bounded populations that can then be linked not only 
to a problem but to mechanisms and measures through which such problems are then able to be 
addressed and success evaluated. By investigating citizenship practice as a technical arena, a 
number of important effects are observed, including the ways in which the nuances and tensions 
that allow and prompt assemblages to form in relation to citizenship as a bounded domain are 
discursively erased (Li 2007b:270). The assemblage or (national) ‘community’ that coheres 
around contemporary notions of citizenship often appears more coherent than is necessarily the 
case on the ground (cf. Sunier and van Ginkel 2006; Anderson 1991; Handler 1989; McDonald 
1989; Mackey 1999; Beriss 2004). In part, this erasure is a product of the ways in which various 
elements of an assemblage are positioned in fields of power, in relation to one another, and 
through programs that render certain grammars of difference “easy to think,” “common sense,” 
or literally unthinkable (Foucault 1991:103; Stoler 2011:129-130; cf. Gilroy 2004). These 
grammars – for instance, those circulating around notions of “active”  or “good” citizenship 
practice in the Netherlands – also extend to the ways in which sentiment is distributed, assessed 
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and managed in the pursuit of program goals (Stoler 2009:58).  
In following the various threads of how citizenship is understood and valued through my 
engagement with a particular group of “active” Dutch citizens – volunteer Dutch language 
coaches and their coordinators – my ethnography underscores how studying citizenship as moral 
and cultural practice rearticulates historical discourses and incorporates new discursive 
techniques for belonging in the contexts of Amsterdam and the imagined national community of 
the Netherlands (cf. Anderson 1991). This study necessarily traces the genealogy of Dutch 
‘civilizing missions’, and the uneven reassembling of these governmental programs as they relate 
to the cultivation of the “good” citizen in the contemporary Netherlands. The genealogical 
method, understood from a Foucauldian perspective, tasks us as critical scholars  
 
to sort out what we take to be necessary and contingent in the ways in which we 
think and act in regard to the ‘conducting’ of our lives and those of others, and to 
discover what problematizations of this are possible. Further, it is the attempt to 
discern which of these problematizations indicate the lines of fracture and 
transformation and which indicate a consolidation of regimes of government. 
(Dean 2010:56) 
  
The programs I trace in this dissertation unfold through the complex expressions of morally and 
culturally attuned citizenship practice in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. These expressions now 
draw on discursive threads of neoliberal “active” participation in Dutch society (Ong 1999; 
Tonkens 2006; Muehlebach 2012), which I locate in the support for voluntarism and the 
development of immigrant and minority integration projects. Through an ethnographic lens, I 
explore how these citizenship education programs are envisioned and engaged by various actors, 
at the level of the state, of local organizations, and of individual participants.  
As a flexible and opaque category, a political technology that draws on and masks many 
other powerful frames of reference (including race or ethnicity, gendered or sexual norms, 
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considerations of class), my research highlights the continued significance of ‘culture’ in the dual 
processes of making the (national, local) self and marking Others as on the precarious edges of 
‘imagined community’, or beyond it. These discussions are revealed in many less controversial 
or visible conversations about immigration and the role of “cultural” difference in the 
Netherlands today, especially as articulated through Dutch language use and ability. They find 
traction in the increasingly normal or “common sense” exclamations from the Dutch populist 
Right, and erupt in the context of the now annual controversy over the practice of ritualized 
black-face in the Dutch winter children’s holiday, Sinterklaas. The tense discussion around the 
holiday figure Zwarte Piet (Black Peter) is a striking example of the ways in which the expansive 
will to govern can produce a range of unplanned and indirect effects that require the assemblage 
to adjust or compromise to continue to hold together (Li 2007a:280; Li 2007b:279). I explore 
such clashes as part of a much larger and ongoing set of processes and discussions about the 
changing nature of difference and Dutchness. The “Zwarte Piet discussion” and other points of 
tension evident through my examination of the politics of the everyday illustrate the gaps 
between different domains of knowledge – what can be known, spoken or thought – and the 
ways in which boundaries of belonging in Dutch society come to be differently configured by 
diverse socially-situated subjects (Stoler 2011; Li 2007a:275). Controversial national discussions 
and the more nuanced contestations that occur in everyday interactions or utterances underscore 
how fields of knowledge and the power relations that it reflects have an uneven impact across the 
population to be governed. These processes have had profound impacts on the morally and 
culturally attuned expressions of citizenship practice in contemporary Dutch society. 
 The question of ‘cultural’ difference and Dutchness is also entangled in contemporary 
discourses that draw upon emerging neoliberal technologies of government. The shrinking of the 
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welfare state, and the downshifting of responsibility for social service provision to lower levels 
of government, private and non-governmental organizations and individuals has imprinted all 
other spheres of daily life with the logic of market-mechanisms. The nature of belonging in the 
local or national community has been transformed, as citizens are required to reduce their 
demands on the state and operate as “self-enterprising,” risk-managing citizen-subjects (cf. Ong 
2006; Holmer Nadesan 2008; Muehlebach 2012). By tracing the ways in which neoliberal forms 
of governmentality in the Netherlands have been grafted onto existing liberal forms, I show how 
even when the criteria for belonging have been substantially rearticulated, the foundations of 
difference and Dutchness laid out during the colonial period continue to matter (Li 2007b:244-
245). My detailed historical and ethnographic analysis draws out important tensions and 
continuities between this view of citizenship with culturalized notions of belonging in the 
Netherlands, underscoring how governmental programs build upon and rework the past. A potent 
example of this is explored in how, unlike the languages spoken by many ‘non-Western’ 
newcomers (e.g. Turkish, Arabic), the English language is a powerful symbol of cultural 
commensurability and “active” citizenship practice in Amsterdam and elsewhere in the 
Netherlands. English was frequently read by my ‘native’ Dutch interlocutors and others in Dutch 
society as signifying notions of “cultural” resemblance to the Dutch through associations with 
acceptable behaviours and values, civilizational, racial, religious, classed, and other forms of 
‘culturalized’ similarity. Even in volunteers’ progressive conception of “good” citizenship 
practice, the English language is the exception that proves the rule of Dutch citizenship.  
The power of these discourses, practices of calculation, and modes of perception to 
influence and shape the “conduct of conduct” of the national population is revealed through 
expressions that show how socially-situated subjects variously consent to, challenge, or reconcile 
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these governmental techniques that inform citizenship as a practice. My ethnography shifts the 
focus of study from the often marginalized subjects of integration frequently studied by 
anthropologists – non-Western immigrants – to those framed as ‘native’ Dutch (cf. Silverstein 
2005; Herzfeld 1987; Gupta and Ferguson 1997). Tracing the messiness and unevenness of these 
fields in everyday life, the ways in which these relationships and “common sense” conditions are 
experienced by a particular group of socially-situated subjects – voluntary Dutch language 
coaches in Amsterdam – is an important contribution of my research to the study of the nation. 
While these research participants can provide only partial insights into what it means to be Dutch 
or a “good” Dutch citizen, their experiences and expressions flag some of the many tensions in 
contemporary calculations of belonging in the Netherlands.  
 
Language coaching in Amsterdam: Teaching the technology of government in everyday life  
 
 As Li (2007a:276) has observed, governmentality operates not through a monolithic state, 
but through a dispersed and diverse array of socially situated actors, organizations, institutions 
and other elements that assemble to regulate the conditions of life at the level of the everyday. In 
this dissertation, I argue that Dutch language coaching volunteers provide a unique lens into 
understanding these processes in Amsterdam. Though their voluntary labour is informal, as front-
line citizenship educators, these language coaches effectively extend the reach of government, its 
will to educate the desires of newcomers to Dutch society, to shape their aspirations, habits, and 
beliefs (Li 2007a:275). Through the perspectives of my key research participants – language 
coaches, volunteers working in administrative capacities for language coaching programs, and 
program directors – and through my own perspective as a language learner in one of these 
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programs, this ethnography draws out some of the subtle, banal or benign ways in which 
government insinuates itself in the private lives of (potential) citizens, is (re)articulated, 
reconciled, and/ or challenged in people’s lived experience. 
 The nature of the language coaching that volunteers provide situates their views and 
experiences as a unique point of entry for examining questions of governmentality in the 
Netherlands. Unlike formal classes (cf. Björnson 2007; Schiffauer et al. 2004) that rely on the 
teaching of a specific curriculum as well as or through language learning, volunteer language 
coaches and their partners are guided to discuss different topics, questions, or address social 
etiquette through their own interests or needs-based requests made by the non-native speaking 
partner. The relative independence of these conversation partnerships from governmental bodies 
and oversight raises ethnographically interesting questions about the ideas of belonging and 
“good” (that is, morally or culturally attuned) citizenship practice that may be conveyed during 
these sessions from volunteers to their partners. Through my ethnography, I explore how the 
ways in which contemporary citizenship is understood by ‘native’ Dutch citizens shape what it 
means to belong in the Netherlands today. From this guiding research question I explore several 
other key concerns: What is it that immigrants to the Netherlands are being asked to integrate 
into? Who and what kinds of practices are now considered ‘Dutch’, and by whom? Who 
participates in the construction, negotiation, and dissemination of these concepts at the level of 
lived experience, and in what ways is this accomplished? 
 What emerges from this study is a picture of belonging and citizenship practice that is 
questioned, considered, and built through volunteers’ social relationships and in everyday life. 
The experiences and views of voluntary Dutch language coaches underscore how what it means 
to belong in Dutch society today, to be Dutch, is not a question with a simple answer. Rather, 
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many differing opinions on this issue surfaced throughout my research, signalling important 
tensions in contemporary Dutch society over the place of newcomers to the Netherlands, the role 
and meaning of racial or ethnic difference, religious belief, gendered and sexual cultural 
difference, language, classed differences and labour participation, parenting and education. In my 
historical and ethnographic analysis, I explore how these tensions are the result of diverse, 
socially-situated subjects’ engagement in non-linear processes of problematization (cf. Li 
2007a:280). These volunteers and the integration projects in which they are engaged are part of a 
complex assemblage that draws together a particular set of socially situated subjects (like these 
volunteers and their student-partners), objectives (integration, the cultivation of “good” or 
“active” citizens), and a constellation of knowledges and discursive practices (e.g. ways of 
thinking about Dutchness, difference, social participation, citizenship), institutions (including 
schools, charitable organizations, community centres, municipal or national legislatures), laws 
and regulatory regimes (such as those related to immigration or citizenship acquisition). The 
views of language coaching volunteers show how people are actors in complex fields of power 
relations who may simultaneously occupy different positions or roles, consenting to or 
reconciling certain techniques to direct their conduct, while challenging or rearticulating others. 
This emerges very clearly in some of the ways in which volunteers express a sense of Dutch 
cultural norms, values, behaviours and etiquette as keys to belonging and “good” citizenship 
practice. 
 As proponents and implementers of “good” citizenship, volunteer language coaches 
relate to their newcomer-clients in ways that reflect, and also differ from how they are framed in 
policy, in the rhetoric of (populist Right) politicians, and other ‘native’ Dutch. How they interpret 
and articulate their work as volunteers, and the role of their work in Dutch society reveals how 
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connections between social belonging, active participation, and communication influence 
language coaches’ ideas of “good” Dutch citizenship practice. My observations show that while 
these views resonate with those held more widely across mainstream Dutch society, they also 
rearticulate some of the key criteria for belonging in the neighbourhood, city and nation in ways 
that envision a more inclusive society. Among the most striking of these rearticulations is the 
consistent downplaying or denial of ‘culturalized’ criteria for belonging that continue to draw 
from colonial categories of difference. Language coaching volunteers reject arguments about the 
problems caused in Dutch society by immigrants’ “backwards” cultures and difference from 
mainstream, ‘native’ Dutch society. Instead, language coaches favour criteria for belonging more 
closely associated with neoliberal logics, where individuals are understood as “rational, self-
responsible/choosing agents” (Holmer Nadesan 2008:32). They point to structural impediments 
(e.g. poorly designed or implemented integration policy) and individual barriers (e.g. lack of 
initiative or support in learning Dutch) that hinder newcomers in accepting personal 
responsibility in “different spheres of everyday life” to reduce their burden on the state and 
fellow citizens (Ong 2006:14). Echoing important policy interventions for immigrant integration, 
the Dutch language is viewed as key to accessing the socially-productive forms of participation 
that language coaches and other research participants view as central to “good” citizenship 
practice. In engaging with processes of inclusion without necessarily disrupting structures of 
hierarchy, this understanding of “good” citizenship practice is part of an intricate constellation of 
signifiers that both connects to and challenges ideas of belonging in the Netherlands today.  
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Organization of the dissertation 
 
 I begin this dissertation by outlining this project’s theoretical, contextual, and 
methodological framework. In Chapter 1, “Anthropological contributions to the study of the 
nation,” I position my work in relation to this body of scholarship, outline how I approach 
citizenship, and theoretically ground the examination of governmentality I undertake through my 
ethnography. Chapter 2, “Navigating ‘the field’: Selecting field sites and methods,” addresses my 
methodological choices. My experiences as a volunteer and a Dutch language learner lead me to 
focus on voluntary Dutch language coaching projects in Amsterdam as a key point of 
ethnographic entry. My positionality not only shaped the specific actors and issues on which my 
project came to focus, but how my interlocutors interacted with me as front line citizenship 
educators. In this chapter I also give attention to Amsterdam’s historical experience as a site of 
religious and cultural diversity through immigration, and how this history affects what it means 
to conduct research into citizenship practice in this city. I address how the questions at the heart 
of this research are not determined by any one factor, but variously and unevenly by the many 
different attitudes, events, and historical phenomena that have shaped the city of Amsterdam, its 
place in and in relation to the rest of the Netherlands, as well as the lives and experiences of my 
research participants.  
 These two preliminary chapters are important to situate and ground my ethnographic and 
historical analysis in the context of existing scholarship, and my specific choice of field site and 
key participants. Building upon this foundation, the analysis I undertake in the rest of my 
dissertation examines how key connections, concepts, and practices have been problematized. I 
do this through tracing key threads of continuity – such as the importance attributed to the Dutch 
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language – and identifying moments of fracture, reassembly, and the incorporation of new 
elements and rationale into the assemblage that coheres around Dutch citizenship. Informed by a 
Foucauldian theoretical perspective, as in the ethnographic work of Stoler and Ong, this 
necessarily includes an examination of these threads and breaks through the space of empire and 
into the present, as observed in the politics of the everyday. 
 In Chapter 3, “Imagining Dutchness: Tracing programs of social difference through 
empire,” I examine the ways in which the role and mutability of categories such as religion, race 
or ethnicity, language, class, gendered and sexual norms developed through the engagements of 
empire as particular ‘problems’ for government. In this chapter, I follow how certain practices 
and criteria came to be framed as ‘Dutch’ or ‘European’, serving an important role in early 
Dutch nation-building. Drawing together a vast array of religious, racial, linguistic, gendered, 
sexual, and classed signifiers, these notions of difference and acceptability in the space of empire 
came to be thought of as ‘cultural’. This chapter lays the groundwork for understanding how 
grammars of Dutchness developed during empire continue to have lasting impacts for what it 
means to be Dutch today, even as the vocabulary used to mark these differences has changed. 
Following the end of World War II and the collapse of empire, changes in migration 
patterns marked by the arrival of culturally diverse, ‘non-Western’ newcomers to the 
Netherlands created supposedly new ‘problems’ for nation-building. In Chapter 4, “‘What do 
you mean by allochtoon?’ Everyday grammars of difference,” I examine how through policy 
interventions to remedy the problems associated with newcomers to Dutch society, the imperial 
preoccupation with ‘cultural’ difference has been rearticulated in the late twentieth- and early 
twenty-first centuries. Recognizing the language of autochthony as a new term in the Dutch 
grammar of difference, this chapter speaks to how the successes of government are contingent on 
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the particular ways in which socially-situated subjects consent (or not) to its strategies in specific 
times and places. Demonstrating that government is not totalizing, my research participants 
challenge and reconcile aspects of the underlying exclusionary categories of Dutchness 
embedded in the language of autochthony (Li 2007a:276). 
 Chapter 5 continues to unpack how ways of knowing connected to culturalist discourse 
are engaged not only in government policy or by my research participants, but among many 
other actors in Dutch society, such as politicians in mainstream and populist Right parties, 
commenters in the news and other Dutch media, and anti-racism activists. In attending to the 
ways in which diverse, socially-situated actors imagine the national community, and some of the 
problems it is thought to face, Chapter 5, “Configuring the new ‘savage slot’: Effects of 
immigration to the Netherlands,” addresses how the Dutch grammar of alterity “operates at 
different levels and moves not only between different political projects but seizes upon different 
elements of earlier discourses reworked for new political ends” (Stoler 1995:72). Drawing on the 
rise of the populist Right and the now annual “Zwarte Piet discussie”  (Black Peter discussion), I 
show how the flexible and unevenly engaged nature of powerful discourses around difference 
can be understood as part of structures and expressions of ‘cultural racism’. Through analysis of 
these case studies, I highlight how certain understandings and ways of talking about difference 
and Dutchness have become “common sense.” Importantly, these taken-for-granted ways of 
defining and defending the discursive boundaries of the Dutch national community are not 
uncontested. While the ethnographic moments explored in this chapter are useful for showing the 
“awkward continuities” (Dean 2010:57) with the past, they also underscore how assemblages are 
fragile, subject to fragmentation and require compromise and adjustment in order to cohere (Li 
2007b:279). 
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The processes and engagements tied to the ‘civilizing mission’ of the imperial Dutch that 
have contributed to how ‘cultural’ differences are understood today have also profoundly 
impacted the ways in which neoliberal rationale has settled in the Netherlands. In Chapter 6, 
“Activating citizens: Neoliberal governmentality and the rise of voluntarism,” I trace the 
genealogical connections between the early self-positioning of the Dutch as a ‘guiding nation’ 
(gidsland), its ‘civilizing mission’, and contemporary understandings of “active” participation, 
integration policy, and civil society initiatives like voluntary language coaching projects. The 
conception of the Dutch as moral exemplar to the rest of the world shaped how people were seen 
as targets for religious charity or mission overseas and among the poor in Europe. As such, 
Dutch social service provision, ideas of “social uplift,” and voluntary labour are deeply 
connected to a history of religious and charitable giving. This chapter shows how the promotion 
of voluntary labour in the twenty-first century is part of these broader, historical processes and 
relationships of power, deeply connected to a rationale that educates and configures the “conduct 
the conduct” of contemporary Dutch citizens. In this context, aspects of neoliberal rationale and 
understandings of “active” citizenship (Ong 1999; Muehlebach 2012) have become “easy to 
think” as they resonate with pre-existing social norms, relationships, moral expressions, and 
current experiences of the ‘withdrawal’ of the welfare state. Neoliberal rationale, which directs 
citizens to become “free, self-managing, and self-enterprising individuals in different spheres of 
everyday life” (Ong 2006:14) extends to Dutch citizenship education projects that support and 
promote the integration of all members of Dutch society. However, such programs particularly 
target newcomers and their descendants who are framed – especially through their Dutch 
language ‘deficit’ – as having diminished capacity to meet the expectations of “active” 
citizenship practice. 
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How neoliberal rationale is reworked and articulated through local ideas and everyday 
experiences of citizenship is examined through my ethnographic lens in Chapter 7, “Citizenship 
as practice: Volunteer ethics and Dutch sociality.” Informed by their position as volunteers, my 
research participants invoke aspects of neoliberal rationality alongside and in the capacity of 
Dutch cultural norms and values – as through behaving in a sociaal manner – to speak about 
what it means to belong and participate in building Dutch society as “good” citizens. Through 
this discussion, where local understandings of sociality are used to make sense of citizenship as a 
moral and cultural practice, this chapter traces the flexible contours of these citizen-subjects’ 
agency as subjects of government.  
In Chapter 8, “On the front lines of citizenship education,” I show how Dutch language 
facility has become a central technique in teaching the technology of government to potential 
citizens, and affirming consent to the aims of government among all citizen-subjects. Throughout 
this chapter, I explore how volunteers’ conceptions of citizenship as a practice contributes to 
these participants’ criteria for integration and goals in helping their language learning partners.  
While these coaches agree with the requirements set out by the federally-mandated ‘civic 
integration’ (inburgering) courses, they nonetheless contest the inflexible ‘social’ criteria 
immigrants are required to learn to become eligible for naturalization. In drawing on neoliberal 
rationale and Dutch cultural ideas of sociality, language coaching volunteers reject the 
exclusionary, xenophobic criteria for belonging given voice and popularized by the populist 
Right. Through their position as front line citizenship educators, volunteer language coaches 
extend the reach of government. Yet, in this capacity these same non-governmental actors 
contribute in powerful ways to how citizenship and integration are problematized. Acting in 
ways that express their own self-interest as “active” or “good” citizens, volunteers not only teach 
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newcomers how to communicate, but direct them to “do as they ought” as active participants in 
Dutch society (Li 2007a:275).  
The thread of continuity represented by the role of language in defining “good” 
citizenship practice among language coaches and other volunteers, policy makers, politicians and 
media commenters is further explored in Chapter 9, “Exceptions to the rule in the Dutch 
language of integration.” This chapter examines an important tension observed in relation to the 
significance of the Dutch language for newcomer integration as active citizen-subjects: the role, 
value, and meaning attached to the English language. I found that most ‘native’ Dutch believed 
that unlike other newcomers, English speakers need not necessarily learn to speak Dutch. 
Associations made between fluency in English and ideas of cultural similarity, having the skills 
deemed necessary to express an ethic of “active” participation, meant that for many in Dutch 
society English speakers were often thought to already be integrated enough. Significantly, these 
associations reveal the ongoing impact of the kinds of ‘cultural’ criteria for belonging that 
language coaches reject in their discussions of “good” citizenship practice. 
Throughout this ethnography, a key concern is to underscore how governmentality 
operates through diverse channels, and is subject to critique as well as consent by the many 
parties and actors involved in regulating the conditions of life (Li 2007a:276). In showing the 
messiness of how governmentality works through “practices of compromise and 
accommodation, resistance or outright refusal” (Li 2007a:279), this ethnography reveals the 
complexities of power in lived experience. I conclude this dissertation by reiterating the strength 
of ethnography in the study of the nation through making sense of these broader processes on the 
ground and through lived experience. I close with a consideration of where these reworked 
discourses of citizenship may be taking the Netherlands in terms of nationalism, and introduce 
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potential future directions in research. 
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1. Anthropological contributions to the study of the nation 
 
Over the course of the past few centuries the nation-state has flourished, to the extent that 
it is recognized as a principal form of political, social and economic organization the world over. 
Many scholars writing on the phenomenon of the nation, its historic rise and defining contours 
have regarded Europe as the birthplace of the nation. This literature places European nation-
states in a unique, often archetypical position in the study of nationalism. Europe’s status as the 
privileged site of ‘universal history’ (Segal and Handler 1992:52) underlies powerful beliefs that 
have greatly informed how the nation has been imagined, engaged, and deployed as a site of 
identity politics and government, especially from the perspective of European or Western 
scholars (cf. Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003:578-580).  
Contributions to this body of literature often sought to define the nation-state formation 
as a distinct unit of analysis. The nation as a ‘container model’ for society is common across 
many of these classic studies of nationalism, where the nation-state compartmentalizes the 
economy, polity, culture, and historical experience of a particular social (national) group 
(Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003:579). Ernest Gellner (1983) has described nationalism as a 
“theory of political legitimacy.” In this view, the nation (conceived as a distinct ethnic group, or 
‘people’) and state (the site of politics) should align, and power over the state is held by the 
members of the ethnic or national group (1983:1). The nation-state configuration therefore 
organizes a specific population (such as an ethnic group) through a centralized agency for 
maintaining order over that population (Gellner 1983:5-7). The ways in which nation-states 
formed in Europe has led to a widespread assumption that national peoples are not only 
homogenous (for instance, in terms of ethnicity, race, language, religious belief, etc.), but natural 
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and even primordial social formations (cf. Comaroff 1996:166). Thus, beyond a fluctuating, 
minimal threshold, social difference in the key forms associated with any particular national 
imaginary is often considered (theoretically and often empirically) intolerable (cf. Bunzl 2004; 
Comaroff and Comaroff 2001; Geschiere 2009; Hage 2000).  
 These views and the study of the nation were impacted by the ways in which Western 
scholarship organized the division of intellectual labour across different scholarly disciplines 
during the early twentieth century; the disciplines of history, political science, sociology, 
economics, and anthropology each addressed only a slice of the various phenomena connected to 
the institution of the nation-state (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003:578-579). Since the laying of 
these scholarly foundations, significant global shifts, interventions, and developments in 
political, economic, social, and scholarly relationships have had profound effects on the (study of 
the) nation-state. These shifts have also revealed some of the ways in which each of these 
scholarly fields maintain particular methodological assumptions around the study of the nation. 
This has certainly been the case during the latter half of the twentieth century, where numerous 
interconnected developments have reorganized populations and impacted government programs 
and practices. These have included (but are not limited to): the two World Wars; the fall of 
European empires and the independence of new postcolonial nation-states; nationalist 
movements and conflicts within the borders of established nation-states; the increased and 
accelerated pace at which people, goods, ideas, and money traverse the globe; increasing 
(cultural, religious, racial) diversity among nation-state populations due to international 
migration processes; the rise of new non-national scales of rights and identification (such as the 
supranational European Union), or ways of imagining belonging and political entities 
incongruous with the geographical borders of the nation-state.  
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These various developments challenge many long-held assumptions about the nature and 
working of the nation-state, including those among scholars. The task of studying contemporary 
nationalism thus benefits from insights gained from those interrogating these various shifts. This 
includes not only insights gained from literature written by postcolonial scholars, and in the 
context of postcolonial and ‘settler society’ nationalisms, but also the theoretical perspectives and 
methodology of anthropology. Across these interconnected bodies of literature, scholars have 
drawn attention to how the institution of the nation-state has been constructed, and the 
assumptions embedded in the nation-state concept in relation to Eurocentric traditions of 
scholarship and government.  
In the following literature review, I provide a brief examination of how anthropological 
scholarship has addressed the study of nationalism and situate my research in relation to this 
body of knowledge. I first address the concerns of the disciplinary tradition of ethnographic 
research and the insights gained through a focus on cultural particularities. Building on these 
foundational studies, I examine how the consideration of emerging processes and phenomena 
have brought new insights from anthropologists to the study of nationalism. Given its 
significance for my research in Amsterdam, I focus on scholarship that has considered the effects 
of multiculturalism, globalization, and the rise of supranational state bodies. Finally, this review 
draws connections between the study of nationalism and governmentality.  
 
Cultural particularities: ethnographic attention to national detail 
 
A significant contribution to the study of nationalism has been the examination of nation-
building through ethnography. This has meant looking at the nation as a powerful social 
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construct in the same ways that anthropologists have already considered a wide range of social 
phenomena, such as kinship, sexuality, economic or medical practices, ethnicity and race. 
Stressing cultural particularities, the strength of anthropology’s ethnographic approach has been 
to show the relationships between wider processes and their rootedness in local practice and 
belief. As in the study of other topics that have long interested anthropologists, turning the 
ethnographic lens toward the study of nationalism and processes of the nation-state reveals the 
importance of culture, relationships of power, and how local and historical experiences can both 
shore up and contradict or critique accepted explanations of sociopolitical phenomena.  
While blatant examples of nationalist sentiment catch our attention in the media, become 
talking points for politicians, and points of entry for critical social researchers, following the 
more “banal, routine, almost invisible” national expressions allows us to probe deeper into the 
processes and structures that underlie the nation-state (Billig 1995). Ethnographic methodology 
provides a unique lens to understanding how nationalism operates discursively through a 
protracted and careful analysis of cultural experience in daily life. Complex relationships and 
assumptions about who belongs and how in the neighbourhood, city, and the nation-state are put 
into daily discourse by citizens as well as those in positions of power in the state. Social 
scientists trace how the language used by those we study not only describes, but reproduces (or 
challenges) these social realities (cf. Baumann 2004; Anderson 1991[1983]). This is precisely 
because ideas of belonging, as in the nation, are articulated through “the embodied habits of 
social life,” through the common sense ways of “thinking and using language” (Billig 1995:8). 
Richard Handler’s Nationalism and the politics of culture in Quebec (1988), Maryon 
McDonald’s “We are not French!” (1989), and Hobsbawm and Ranger’s collection, The 
Invention of Tradition (1983) are important early contributions to the anthropological study of 
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the nation. Giving special attention to (minority) nationalist movements that draw on notions of 
culture and language, Handler and McDonald’s ethnographies – in Quebec and Brittany, 
respectively – resonate in many ways with my own research in the Netherlands (cf. Beriss 2004). 
These works trace how notions of a national language and culture are mobilized and engaged (to 
often differing ends) by the various local peoples and organizations at the hearts of these studies.  
These ethnographies are not only important contributions to the study of nationalism, but 
also to the discipline of anthropology more generally. Ethnographic studies of the nation-state, 
national identity politics and related phenomena were, at the time that Handler and McDonald 
conducted their research, still rather novel in anthropology. Developed as a colonial science, 
anthropology attended to the empire and people framed as decidedly Other in relation to the 
Western scholar (cf. Blok and Boissevain 1984:335-336). When European empires began to 
deteriorate, anthropologists began to turn their scholarly attention ‘homeward’ to the study of the 
peoples of Europe and of the West. Yet, where sociology, political science, history and 
economics studied a ‘Europe’ characterized by the most powerful nation-states (France, 
Germany, Great Britain), the margins came to represent ‘Europe’ in the anthropological 
imagination. Anthropology’s ‘Europe’ was composed of the ‘exotic’ or ‘marginal’ culture areas 
of “the Mediterranean” with its “vulnerable underbelly, the South European countries of Italy, 
Spain and Greece” (Goddard et al. 1994:2), the “Celtic fringe,” remote Alpine regions (Rogers 
1998:25), or the Balkans (Todorova 1997).  
As isolated, or in some way on the peripheries of Europe and the Western world, 
ethnographic subjects in the Anthropology of Europe were chosen for how they reflected the 
anthropological tradition of studying non-Western peoples (Herzfeld 1987:6). As is clear in 
McDonald’s work especially, the decision to study Breton nationalism runs counter to the ideas 
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of anthropology prevalent at the time (cf. Herzfeld 1987; Boissevain 1975; Gupta and Ferguson 
1997). In addition to situating her work in Western Europe (albeit among the ‘disappearing 
world’ of a ‘Celtic’ people), McDonald writes that: 
 
Most metaphors of traditional anthropological expression run counter to the 
inclusion of intellectuals in the ethnography, whether in the guise of administrator, 
tourist, activist, or academic. For social anthropology, urban and educated people 
have not seemed sufficiently traditional and ‘native’, or sufficiently and 
authentically real, to constitute a fit object of study. (McDonald 1989:23). 
 
 
One of the strengths of anthropology as a discipline has been to provide nuanced, 
ethnographic accounts of how broader social and political processes affect the people we study at 
the level of everyday experience. This contribution is no less valid when anthropologists look to 
perhaps ‘non-traditional’ topics and sites of study, as McDonald and Handler’s work 
demonstrates. Works such as these have helped to broaden scholarship on the nation, which has 
been afflicted by what Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2003) identify as a problem of 
‘methodological nationalism’. In the history of scholarship on the nation, the nation-state’s 
“principles were so routinely structured in the foundational assumptions of theory that they 
vanished from sight” (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2003:579).  
 
Ethnographic and historical realities 
 
In ethnographic texts, scholars such as Handler and McDonald point to the very real 
process of constructing or building the nation and the complexities of national identity politics, 
situating their research participants in their broader historical, economic and political contexts. 
This approach underscores how nationalist discourses are embedded in complex fields of power 
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relations. It also points to how such discourses have been used, for instance, to objectify national 
cultures as both distinct and potentially threatened. In understanding how a distinct ‘Breton 
culture’ was conceptualized and deployed by her various research participants, McDonald has 
usefully suggested that anthropologists seek to study the boundaries of ‘culture’ (1989:308). 
These boundaries are sites of rich ethnographic detail that reveal the discursive tensions, 
contradictions and confluences between these various actors, their aims and understandings of 
minority national identity. These boundaries also point out the multiple intersections of 
identification that shape the lived experience of the culture in question.  
In conceptualizing the nation as part of a discursive process, anthropologists flag how 
processes of ‘cultural objectification’ enable certain actors to privilege and control particular 
threads of nationalist discourse. For Handler, “seeing culture as a thing,” that is, as “a natural 
object or entity made up of objects and entities (“traits”)” (1988:14) emerges clearly in how an 
urban elite mobilize the notion of a Québécois patrimoine seated in an imagined rural 
agricultural past existing undisturbed into the present. McDonald reveals similar processes at 
work in the relationship between Breton’s “militant” nationalists learning a standardized version 
of Breton and native-Breton speaking peasants speaking the (often distinct) dialect of their 
village or region. In both of these studies, the authors underscore how the individuals posed by 
nationalist groups as the ideal ‘folk’ may not share the nationalist visions for which they have 
become symbols. Moreover, these works show how Breton peasants’ and Québécois farmers’ 
lived experiences and interests may directly contradict nationalist imaginaries. These points of 
contact, located at the boundaries of culture, provide fertile ethnographic sites for the study of 
nationalism. Importantly, these studies turn on the messiness of social realities, drawing attention 
to how the nation – a powerful and pervasive institution – is constructed, contingent, subject to 
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individual agency, and changes over time (cf. Li 2007b:264).  
The nature of these points of contact with difference shape how national communities are 
‘imagined’, and national traditions and symbols are ‘invented’ (Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm and 
Ranger 1983). For minority nationalisms, such as those studied by Handler and McDonald, the 
notion of a distinct national culture “was constructed in the spaces of conceptual opposition, and 
its character and homogeneity imposed from without” (McDonald 1989:309). This conceptual 
opposition has been important in many nationalist projects, regardless of their position vis-à-vis a 
state. This includes nationalisms associated with established nation-states in Western Europe. 
Where the most important sources of opposition for minority nationalisms might be the nation-
states in which the minorities live, for many established nation-states the sources of conceptual 
opposition might be internal as well as external: other nation-states, political formations or 
movements (including those they may be part of, such as the European Union); differences 
conceptualized through notions of race, religion, civilization, language, sexuality stemming from 
contact with Others, as through empire; minority nationalist movements; other internal 
“deviants,” for example envisioned along the lines of class, race, or sexuality (cf. McClintock 
1995; Mosse 1985; Bunzl 2004; Stoler 1995). The nature of such opposition has ranged widely 
given the cultural context of the nationalist discourse invoked. For this reason, anthropologists 
and other social scientists have emphasized how important it is to look both to the larger contexts 
in which nations have developed, as well as local instances where these ideas are worked out in 
daily life.  
These cultural processes do not take place in an eternal ethnographic present. Rather, 
anthropologists studying the nation have addressed the supposed timelessness and self-evident 
nature of nationalist projects through an examination of the historical processes and relationships 
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that have contributed to their present configurations (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 1992; Comaroff 
1996). Examples of this social constructionist approach are found in the work of scholars such as 
Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), Hobsbawm (1997[1990]), as well as Benedict Anderson 
(1991[1983]) and Michael Billig (1995). These works underscore how the powerful institution of 
the nation-state and national cultural traditions and symbols are discursively constructed, 
invented, imagined, and reaffirmed through banal as well as explicit events.  
The importance of understanding historical context in the study of nationalism flagged in 
the earlier works discussed above continues to echo throughout the anthropological literature on 
the nation. In part, this attention to history comes from the focus on the nation(-state) itself. As 
McDonald states pace Radcliffe-Brown, in studying the nation (perhaps especially in Europe), 
there is  
 
no divorce of anthropology and history, or of ethnographic and historical reality. 
We are dealing throughout with ‘peoples’ from a nation with a long, strong, and 
well-documented historical tradition. There can be no question here of ignoring 
history because “In the primitive societies that are studied by social anthropology 
there are no historical records.” (McDonald 1989:18) 
  
Concerned with how contemporary nation-building can only be made sense of in relation to the 
genealogies of key markers and processes of governing, Ann Laura Stoler has deepened and 
extended this argument. This necessitates, as in the case of European nation-states, looking at the 
nation-state in the same analytical field as empire (Stoler 1995:xi). The importance of ‘imperial 
formations’ to nation-building comes clearly into view for Stoler in that empire is a process that 
generates historically and culturally situated effects, criteria for social membership and 
exceptions (Stoler et al. 2007:xii). As processes, imperial formations “create new subjects that 
must be relocated to be productive and exploitable, dispossessed to be modern, disciplined to be 
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independent, converted to be human, stripped of old cultural bearings to be citizens, coerced to 
be free” (Stoler and McGranahan 2007:8). 
The contextual approach advocated and exemplified by anthropologists studying the 
nation seems to become only more important as we address how contemporary experiences of 
migration, identification, affiliation and obligation may challenge modes and practices of 
national belonging thought to be traditional. In my work, important and interconnected late-
twentieth century interventions that have had a profound impact on the operation of the nation-
state include: processes of globalization, the development and spread of neoliberal governmental 
rationale, the emergence of ‘multicultural’ governance structures, and the growing significance 
of supranational state configurations, such as the European Union.  
 
Spaces and scales of the ‘national’ field 
 
  Since the 1990s, social scientists have become increasingly interested in ‘globalization’ 
(cf. Tomlinson 1991; Appadurai 1996). Advances in technology, changes in global politics and 
economies, all drove the flow of ideas, images, money/ economic practices and people across 
borders at a rate and scale unknown throughout history. In historical perspective, these 
transformations are not entirely new. These flows frequently continue to trace the contours of 
long established power relationships, such as along the corridors of European empires, even as 
they reveal new or strengthen existing but minor relations of exchange (cf. Leichty 2003). 
Anthropologists have shown interest in how these shifts have changed the structures and 
experiences of people’s daily lives, including in relation to the nation-state. For an ethnographer, 
these shifts represent the boundaries where culture (including norms, values, practices, beliefs 
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and etiquette) is produced, negotiated, contested, and reconciled by the ‘assemblages’ (of people, 
things, institutions, objectives, knowledges, discourses, laws and regulatory regimes) that we 
study (Li 2007b:266; cf. McDonald 1989).  
 This dissertation is situated ethnographically and historically in relation to citizenship and 
related questions of national belonging in the Netherlands. In this context, the historically high 
rates of international migration and settlement during the latter half of the twentieth century is of 
particular importance. The international migration and settlement that governments saw as 
necessary for economic and/ or demographic growth frequently had the effect of increasing the 
diversity of the population living in the nation-state along cultural, ethnic or racial, linguistic, 
and religious lines. This was the case, for example, in both Canada and the Netherlands, 
especially following the Second World War as these economies recovered. For Canada, 
immigrants arriving from ‘traditional’ source countries – Western European countries sending 
“white,” Christian individuals and families – dwindled during the post-WWII period. Instead, 
increasing numbers of people sought to immigrate to Canada from the global South and spaces 
of former empire (cf. Sharma 2006). For many countries, whose nationalist discourses have 
figured around shared traits like ethnicity or race and language, these shifts have unsettled many 
assumptions about national culture and belonging (cf. Gilroy 1987; Hall 1988). As Canada has 
shown, this has been the case even in countries that have been traditionally understood as 
‘immigration countries’ or ‘settler societies’ (Mackey 1999; cf. Hage 2000). At the same time, 
those who immigrate (and their descendants) may express affective sentiments that traverse 
nation-state borders and pose potential challenges to nationalist projects. This might include the 
development of diaspora communities that form (more) meaningful cultural and political sites of 
identification and action alongside the nation-state in which their members live. It may also 
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encompass the building of transnational relationships that span one or more nation-states in a 
single affective and/or political field, regardless of legal affiliation through formal citizenship 
status (cf. Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001; Brah 1996; Appadurai 2006; Baubock 1994; Castles 
1994; Ong 1999; Mosher 2006). Diaspora communities or transnational practices, especially 
those facilitated by the ability to hold multiple citizenships, have led some nationalists to fear for 
the creation of divided loyalties among these citizens. 
 These phenomena have been identified by anthropologists as spaces for inquiry about 
nation-building processes. In studying the national imaginary, ‘local’ sites for ethnographic 
research may now be connected to or encompass geographically distant or even virtual spaces 
(cf. Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001; Bouchard 2014). This has 
led anthropologists to innovate, adapt and incorporate new strategies of transnational, multi-sited 
and digital fieldwork into their ethnographies. The insights from these studies have also lead to a 
reconsideration of how we, as social scientists, approach and conceptualize the nation-state in 
our work. With echoes of Stoler’s call to address the legacies of history and empire, Wimmer and 
Glick Schiller (2004) appeal to anthropologists to consider the nation in a broader analytic field. 
 Anthropologists and other social scientists have discussed how the increased cultural 
diversity experienced by those living in contemporary nation-states has often challenged or 
conflicted with existing national imaginaries (cf. Mackey 1999; Hage 2000; Holmes 2000; 
Wikan 2002; Povinelli 2002; Prins 2002; Beriss 2004; Bunzl 2004; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 
2007; Mandel 2008; Duyvendak 2011). In the wake of these changes, citizenship has become an 
important way of policing the boundaries of the nation-state, which has in turn had important 
impacts on the ways in which the nation has been imagined and governed. Through citizenship, 
people living within the borders of the nation-state become target populations for government. 
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They are rendered as citizens or foreigners subject to specific sets of rights and obligations based 
on their status in relation to the state.1 In the wake of cultural diversity wrought by late twentieth 
century migration, there have typically been two responses by states to the incorporation of 
newcomers.  
For some countries, for instance Germany (until recently), Switzerland, or Israel, a very 
strong ‘ethno-nationalism’ has been used to deny the majority of newcomers the rights of 
citizenship or full access to the polity (cf. Mandel 1994, 2008; Koopmans et al. 2005; Shapiro 
2013). For instance, newcomers able to claim ethnic or religious affiliation with the nation are 
entitled to citizenship, for example Germany’s policy around “Aussiedler” or ‘ethnic Germans’ 
(Mandel 2008), whereas other non-EU citizens (without German spouses) are only able to 
naturalize after eight years’ residency.2 In these countries, newcomers may have been recruited 
on a temporary basis as labourers to fill industry shortages, or arrived as asylum seekers. In the 
cases of these particular types of migrants, newcomers are rarely granted citizenship. Even 
among those who are granted citizenship status in these countries, they may remain discursively 
positioned outside or on the margins of the nation. This may even be the case for immigrants’ 
descendants who may have been raised in the host country, and perhaps have no other citizenship 
status due to a misalignment of jus soli and jus sanguinis provisions (cf. Shapiro 2013).  
Alternatively, many countries (especially ‘settler societies’ like Canada or Australia), 
have responded to demographic and economic dilemmas through the recruitment and 
incorporation of newcomers as productively labouring citizens. In the face of a heterogeneous 
citizenry, these nation-states have reworked governance structures to incorporate aspects of 
cultural diversity into the national imaginary. Older notions of national (Western, Enlightenment, 
liberal) ‘core values’ have become embedded in legal apparatuses (e.g. Canada’s Charter of 
33 
 
Rights and Freedoms), while minority rights and expectations for cultural tolerance have shifted 
understandings of nationhood away from notions of shared ethnicity, race, language, religion, 
etc. (cf. Hage 2000; Mackey 1999; Povinelli 2002; Thomas 2004; Beriss 2004; Bunzl 2004). As 
Mackey (1999) has shown in her work on Canadian identity, and Beriss (2004) illustrates in his 
ethnography of Antilleans in France, these shifts reveal unintended effects of new programs of 
government. Older strategies and discourses governing affective sentiment around national 
belonging are shown to uneasily resurface in new discourses, for instance as cultural racism 
(Silverstein 2005). Ethnography shows how calculations of belonging based on criteria of 
difference that are no longer supposed to matter in nationalist discourse continue to affect the 
ways in which people envision and experience the nation (cf. Stoler 2011). Beriss’ Antilleans 
(French citizens from the overseas départements) find that their claims to Frenchness in the 
‘metropole’ are challenged by recent waves of racialized migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and 
elsewhere. Suddenly, Antilleans’ legal and cultural claims to Frenchness – appealing to 
Republican values, through shared language, history, educational and bureaucratic institutional 
experiences – are overshadowed for (white or ethnic) French citizens by unspoken racial 
difference. Analogously, Mackey’s “Canadian-Canadians” – white, middle-class, Anglophones – 
stress how the tolerance of cultural difference is a foundational Canadian value, while 
simultaneously (and without irony) challenging and censuring the expression of minority cultural 
rights by “ethnic-Canadians.” 
 The increased and changing patterns of migration and settlement have also shown how 
the nation-state and its borders may be troubled by affective relations, sociopolitical rights, 
obligations and polities operating on scales beyond that of the nation-state. Glick Schiller and 
Fouron (2001) have outlined the ways in which the migration of Haitians (e.g. to New York City 
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in the USA) has created a translocal space of Haitian national identification. Incorporating the 
perspectives of Haitians in New York, in Haiti, and from the auto-ethnographic perspective of 
Fouron himself, the ethnography underscores how Haitian transnational practice creates and 
imposes a new set of obligations on Haitians to support and build the nation-state – regardless of 
their formal citizenship status or place of residence. That the Haitian government also supports 
this “long-distance nationalism” is an important challenge to the concept of the nation-state from 
the perspective of early scholars of nationalism. As Aihwa Ong (1999) has shown in her work on 
‘flexible’ citizenship, the nation-state and nationalist practices are rearticulated elsewhere as 
well. Ong’s ethnography examines how the transnational strategies of Chinese refugees and 
business migrants is a reaction by these migrants and by the industrializing Southeast Asian 
states to globalization. While operating in a transnational field, Ong maintains that “the nation-
state—with its supposed monopoly over sovereignty—remains a key institution in structuring 
spatial order” (1999:215). Especially attentive to the role of the state, Ong discusses how in spite 
of a plethora of changes that many have heralded as leading to the erosion or demise of the 
nation-state, these changes may in fact speak to ‘mutations’ in the nation-state and its modes of 
governing.  
Similarly, scholars studying the supranational European Union have shown how this 
multi- level governance system has added another dimension to the study of the nation-state. The 
EU may figure in people’s lives as a way to challenge legislation in individual member states, 
give greater voice to (transnational and local) regional interests, serve as another source of 
difference against which to define the national self, or support and encourage the spread of 
certain ideas, policies, and discourses (cf. Bellier and Wilson 2000; Borneman and Fowler 1997; 
Shore 2000; Stacul et al. 2006; Amselle 2003; Bunzl 2004; Geddes 1999; Gingrich 2006; 
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Holmes 2000). The EU may also fulfill each of these (and other roles) simultaneously, as citizens 
of member states are at the same time citizens of the European Union. 
 Anthropologists have also shown how ideas and practices that travel and settle in 
different nation-states have affected the conception and practice of citizenship and national 
belonging on the ground. The transformation of meaning around citizenship practice is clear in 
the work of Andrea Muehlebach (2011, 2012) in Italy. Her ethnography traces the impacts of the 
transition from a Fordist to a neoliberal economic model on the lived experience of citizenship. 
Muehlebach shows how in the face of these pervasive changes, especially the withdrawal of the 
state from social services, some citizens now struggle to redefine their participation as morally-
attuned and productively labouring citizens through voluntarism (cf. Hemment 2012; Erickson 
2012; Cattelino 2004; Welty Peachey et al. 2011). In her work on neoliberalism, Ong’s (1999, 
2006) ethnographies on ‘flexible’ and ‘mutated’ citizenship practice reflect similar 
transformations in the ways in which citizens make claims to belonging through labour.  
 In each of these ethnographic studies, it is clear that broader processes and developments 
– from increased cultural diversity or migration practices to processes of globalization and the 
rise of supranational or non-national sites of rights, obligation and identification – affect how 
people engage with and build the nation. Yet, what remains key for anthropologists in the study 
of the nation-state is  
 
how, when, and why these and other categories of identity recruit people into 
them, and appear to demand the behaviour that they do. It is the way in which 
these identities are constructed, their capacity to persuade or repulse, the ideas and 
actors they evoke, which interest us here. (McDonald 1989:22) 
 
While the disruptions and developments encountered by the nation-state at the end of the 
twentieth century and beyond offer anthropologists novel sites for exploration, we are still 
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engaged in examining how boundaries of national culture are created, negotiated and acted upon 
in the everyday by people, institutions, and organizations.  
Anthropological research offers new insights to the study of the nation-state through the 
careful ethnographic and historical consideration of people’s everyday lives vis-à-vis this 
powerful social institution. The ways in which the field has been conceptualized in the 
transnational study by Glick Schiller and Fouron (2001), the multi-sited work of Beriss (2004), 
or the virtual sites of Russian nationalism studied by Bouchard (2014) certainly appear to differ 
from the earlier ethnographies of Handler or McDonald. Despite these new methodological 
challenges and contextual considerations, recent ethnographic studies of the nation nonetheless 
appear to continue the task of following the processes of nation-building exemplified by 
McDonald and Handler. Where more recent studies of the nation appear to make their greatest 
contributions, building on the foundational work of earlier scholars, is through the researchers’ 
analytical insights, connections and explanations drawn between the nation-state and other 
powerful processes and practices at local, national, and transnational scales. This has ranged 
from exposing the continued power of colonialism or the transfiguration of older forms of 
exclusion in contemporary nation-building to showing the importance of citizenship as a way of 
exerting individual agency in the face of processes such as globalization and the spread of 
neoliberal governmentality.  
 
Locating the boundaries of national culture in citizenship 
 
I recognize citizenship as one of the sites of entry for the ethnographer, a boundary where 
national culture is negotiated and deployed in discourse. In my ethnographic work, I trace 
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aspects of contemporary processes of citizenship with an awareness of the historical patterns and 
concepts that took root in colonial Dutch discourses of social difference. These ongoing patterns 
come into view through everyday discussions and observations, which reveal how “[n]ationalism 
is simultaneously obvious and obscure” (Billig 1995:14). 
Where scholarship on the nation has often avoided discussions of the state, scholarship on 
citizenship has frequently omitted the importance of the nation in how citizenship is lived. The 
focus on state rights and obligations is of vital importance to understanding citizenship. Yet, this 
emphasis often obscures the ways in which the criteria for citizenship have been developed, and 
how these remain deeply entangled with historical processes and notions of national belonging. 
In this respect, the literature on citizenship, like that on the nation-state, has benefitted from the 
more recent interest shown by anthropologists. Many scholars now contest the predominant, 
myopic view that examines citizenship only as a formal legal status in relation to the nation-state 
(cf. Ong 1999, 2006; Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001; Beriss 2004; Mandel 2008; Tonkens et al. 
2008; Duyvendak 2011; Mosher 2006). Such scholars question long-held scholarly and political 
assumptions about the nature and function of the rights and responsibilities located in the 
relationship between the individual citizen and their nation-state. 
I situate my research project in relation to the ethnographic work of scholars such as Ong 
(1996, 1999, 2006), Muehlebach (2012), Mandel (2008), as well as that of Dutch scholars 
working on questions of citizenship; notably the work of Dutch “culturalization of citizenship” 
scholars associated with the Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR, 
Universiteit van Amsterdam): Tonkens et al. (2008), Duyvendak (2011), Verkaaik (2009), 
Hurenkamp et al. (2011), Schinkel (2010), as well as Geschiere (2009). These scholars consider 
citizenship as a cultural process of national subject-making, rather than a taken for granted legal 
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status. Their work attends to how such processes are played out in daily negotiations between 
individuals and nation-states, in the media, in relation to policy, as well as among one another as 
claims are made to belonging within multiple spaces, from the neighbourhood or city to the 
nation-state, and beyond. 
Methodologically, Hurenkamp (et al) have framed their investigations through an 
understanding of citizenship as “a discursive practice in the sense that citizens actually talk 
citizenship into being – by defining, including, and excluding certain people and practices” 
(2011:211). Drawing explicitly on Foucault, Ong views such banal practices of subject-making 
(“subject-ification”) as cultivated through complex and pervasive power relations (Ong 
1996:737). She elaborates on this understanding in her discussion of “cultural citizenship” as:  
 
the cultural practices and beliefs produced out of negotiating the often ambivalent 
and contested relations with the state and its hegemonic forms that establish the 
criteria of belonging within a national population and territory. Cultural 
citizenship is a dual process of self-making and being-made within webs of power 
linked to the nation-state and civil society. (Ong 1996:738) 
 
While not explicitly drawing on Ong’s work, Dutch scholars (particularly those 
mentioned in connection with AISSR’s work) have developed a “culturalized” understanding of 
citizenship that echoes Ong’s approach. These scholars argue that in the Netherlands (and 
Europe) in recent years, discussions of citizenship have become increasingly framed through 
cultural or moral concepts, rather than considering citizenship as a strictly judicial- legal category 
of belonging. In my work, powerful discursive practices around citizenship have been expressed 
particularly through ideas connected to communication in the Dutch language, as well as local 
expressions of Dutch sociality, of being sociaal. According to Tonkens (et al) this “culturalized” 
understanding of citizenship has come to dominate the discourse and experience of citizenship 
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from the perspectives of policy makers and politicians, discussions within the media and among 
their research informants. Ethnographically, this discourse clearly underscores the struggle to 
control the boundaries of national culture in the presence of a culturally diverse citizenry. 
Tonkens (et al) describe this phenomenon as “a process in which more meaning is attached to 
cultural participation (in terms of norms, values, practices and traditions), either as alternative or 
in addition to citizenship as rights and socio-economic participation” (Tonkens et al. 2008:6). 
This process of culturalization has also contributed to the (re)moralization of citizenship, through 
which formal citizenship is “discursive[ly] suspend[ed] through a problematization of moral 
citizenship, which turns citizenship into a possibility instead of an actuality, and which turns it 
into a virtue” (Schinkel 2010:266). This process is identifiable in Muehlebach’s (2012) work 
with volunteer care-givers in Italy, but also has much broader reach for many newcomers and 
their descendants whose belonging in the nation-state is discursively questioned, regardless of 
their formal claims to citizenship (cf. Beriss 2004; Mackey 1999; Hage 2000; Ong 1999). 
This understanding of citizenship as a complex and even messy expression of power 
relations underscores the role and operation of governmentality in lived experience. Through the 
site of citizenship it is possible to discern the processes and relationships that “regulate the 
conduct of subjects as a population and as individuals in the interests of ensuring the security and 
prosperity of the nation-state” (Ong 1996:738). 
 
Educating citizens: an exploration of the will to govern 
 
 In this dissertation, I examine the will to govern (Li 2007a) as a way to understand local 
processes of nation-building. Drawing on theoretical perspectives informed by Foucauldian 
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governmentality, as in the ethnographic work of Ann Laura Stoler and Aihwa Ong, and in the 
critical and programmatic studies of these processes by Tania Li and Mitchell Dean, this 
dissertation traces how “government operates by educating desires and configuring habits, 
aspirations and beliefs” (Li 2007a:275) of the national population, so that people do as they 
ought. Theoretical lenses employing governmentality have frequently been more popular in 
analyses of non-Western and colonial contexts, especially in anthropological work on 
development (cf. Ferguson 1994[1990]). This is clear in Li’s (2007b) work on community forest 
management in Indonesia, as well as Stoler’s work (1995, 2009, 2011) on the colonial archive, 
how colonialism resonates in the national societies of contemporary Europe. In Western contexts, 
there has been a tendency to favour the Foucauldian notion of ‘discipline’, directing studies 
toward the analysis of specific institutions – as in Foucault’s own work using the cases of the 
asylum and prison. The concept of discipline is useful in examining specific groups, for instance 
the education of students in schools or specific courses (e.g. Dutch ‘civic integration’ classes). 
These are groups of people that have been rendered into technical subjects of specific education 
or reform through detailed supervision (Li 2007a:275). Governmentality instead concerns how 
populations at large are governed, with particular attention to these populations’ welfare and 
improvement.  
 I focus on voluntary Dutch language coaching partnerships and their organizations in 
Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Given that these are educational programs and are part of the wider 
Dutch project of immigrant integration, it may seem that this dissertation should more rightly 
employ the lens of discipline than that of governmentality. It is therefore important to consider 
how, in spite of the specificity of some governmental interventions, the bounded populations that 
governmentality targets differ from the fixed groups that are targets of disciplinary control. 
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Studying power relations in the delimited space of a prison or school differs from the study of 
the “whole society” where the target “is a set of processes and relations always in motion” (Li 
2007a:279). This difference means that the techniques of government (such as statistics, 
planning, monitoring) operate quite unlike those of disciplinary regimes. Processes of 
governmentality operate through relationships of power at a distance, rather than direct force; 
they operate through the cultivation of consent, setting the conditions for people to follow their 
self-interest in line with the calculations of government (Li 2007a:275). Where newcomers to 
Dutch society undertaking ‘civic integration’ courses (known as inburgering) or working with 
language coaches may indeed be subject to disciplinary techniques, these directed interventions 
are situated within the much broader processes operating at the level of Dutch society at large 
through a technical field of citizenship practice. From this perspective, it becomes less clear 
which agents may be considered ‘governors’ and which ‘the governed’, as both groups are 
subjects whose conduct is shaped and conducted to certain ends (Dean 2010:38; Li 2007a:276). 
Even as language coaches or policy makers may intervene in the conduct of language learners 
and potential citizens, the former too are part of wider processes to cultivate “active” or “good” 
Dutch citizens (cf. Tonkens 2006; Hemment 2012). 
The citizenship education that occurs through programs connected to the inburgering 
policy or voluntary language coaching is, in fact, part of a much broader program that seeks to 
educate not only newcomers, but also ‘native’ Dutch volunteers and the members of Dutch 
society at large about moral citizenship practice. Through everyday “forms of power, the 
channels it takes, and the discourses it permeates in order to reach the most tenuous and 
individual modes of behavior [sic]” (Foucault 1990:11), everyday experiences are impacted by 
the practices and effects of governmentality (Stoler 1995; Ong 1996; Li 2007a). Volunteers are 
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shown to be implicated in and impacted by the same governmental rationalities as the 
newcomers with whom they work as frontline citizenship educators. Through acknowledging 
these discursive techniques it becomes possible to discern how people may both seek to resist 
and yet continue to be implicated in a particular way of working within, understanding, and 
(re)making their social worlds (Foucault 1990; cf. Hall 1988). 
I speak specifically to the messy and contingent operation of the will to govern through 
what could be conceptualized as an assemblage, regime of practice, or technology of government 
that centres on citizenship as a technical field for intervention. Li’s usage of the concept of the 
‘assemblage’ is a useful heuristic tool for thinking through the ways in which socially-situated 
subjects, objectives, and “an array of knowledges, discourses, institutions, laws and regulatory 
regimes” are drawn together in the project of government (Li 2007b:266). Agency, contingency, 
temporality and spatiality come to the fore as the successes of an assemblage are shown to be 
unstable, subject to critique, and malleable. These characteristics derive from how assemblages 
are perpetually reworked by various parties to keep them not only coherent, but governable (Li 
2007a:279; Li 2007b). The various policies and regulations, political bodies, discourses and 
images prevalent in the media, the practices of volunteer organizations (language learning and 
immigrant integration) and the people who engage in these fields, the objectives, motives, and 
opinions they express in relation to citizenship practice enables an analysis of how 
governmentality operates.  
As I show through my ethnography, the messiness of such assemblages on the ground has 
important effects for how ‘problems’ develop, persist, change over time, and are envisioned by 
different actors and institutions. This messiness also contributes to how specific solutions are 
conceived to fix these problems, and their effects evaluated (Dean 2010:20,41). The ways in 
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which certain subjects, behaviours, affective sentiments, relationships, or processes become 
objects of thought and sites of governmental intervention does not follow a linear progression. 
Rather the development of governmental problems are in themselves highly problematic, 
revealing contradictions and contestations as governmental programs attempt to correct, redirect 
or reform the conduct of the self and others in daily life. In acknowledging that there can be “no 
divorce of anthropology and history, or of ethnographic and historical reality” (McDonald 
1989:18), it is necessary to situate the ethnography in an historical analysis of Dutch colonialism 
and its impacts. In particular, I address colonial and twentieth century government policies 
pertaining to citizenship, immigration, and cultural integration. Addressing these historical 
precedents, allows for a recognition and exploration of the tensions inherent in the Dutch nation-
building project as terms gain traction and recede in the Dutch grammar of alterity historically, in 
policy, and ethnographically across Dutch society. Across the development of the various 
regimes of practices of government I trace in this dissertation, language – the Dutch language in 
particular – is revealed as an important site of continuity, as a key technique in teaching subjects 
the strategies of government (Dean 2010:269-270). By focusing on voluntary Dutch language 
coaches in my ethnography, I examine how these differing governmental discourses are 
synthesized by specific socially-situated subjects in their everyday practice. This dissertation 
therefore offers 
 
an ethnographic inquiry into government that combines analysis of governmental 
interventions (their genealogy, their diagnoses and prescriptions, their boundaries 
and exclusions) with analysis of what happens when attempts to achieve the “right 
disposition of things” encounter─and produce─a “witches’ brew” of processes 
and practices that exceed their scope. (Li 2007a:279) 
 
This “witches’ brew” must be understood, as anthropologists studying the nation have shown, 
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through situating it in its cultural and historical context.  
 First, however, I address how I came to access the ethnographic context at the heart of 
this research. In the following chapter I attend to some of the key events and processes that 
guided me to focus on voluntary Dutch language coaches as a way to understand Dutch 
citizenship practice. In the recounting some of the key processes through which I came to settle 
on this particular site the significance of the Dutch language as a technique for teaching subjects 
how to conduct themselves as “good” citizens is also clear. In outlining these methodological 
choices, I place Amsterdam in its wider national context. 
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2. Navigating “the field”: Selecting field sites and methods 
 
 In this chapter, I discuss how my choice of field site and key research participants 
evolved from the directions taken as my ethnographic research unfolded during my initial year of 
fieldwork. This dissertation draws on my thirteen months of fieldwork in Amsterdam, conducted 
between August 2009 and August 2010, with follow up research conducted during May 2011. 
The ethnographic data in this dissertation comes primarily from semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews with key informants, as well as participant observation in selected sites. My 
ethnography of the politics of the everyday is given focus through the lens of voluntary projects 
and volunteers connected with language coaching programs geared towards newcomers. As such, 
my key informants were mainly ‘native’ Dutch volunteers (and their coordinators) involved in 
Dutch language speaking partnerships as language coaches (taalcoaches). Interviews were 
conducted in Dutch or English at the discretion of the participant. All individual participants 
have been given pseudonyms, while the names of the organizations and their projects appear in 
the text. Participant observation was carried out over the course of fieldwork in voluntary 
projects as both volunteer and student, but also at significant public events in Amsterdam and 
elsewhere in the Netherlands. This data is complemented by an engagement and reflection on 
key news stories and issues that circulate in the Dutch mainstream and social media, as well as 
digital archival research on Dutch policy and governmental social research reports. 
 The focus of my ethnographic work on the politics of the everyday presented particular 
challenges of identification and access to research participants. I begin this chapter with a 
discussion of ethnographic points of entry to the field, and how I came to focus my interest and 
energy in certain sites. Following this discussion, I elaborate on how voluntarism and the 
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language coaching projects I study are part of a unique lens to the study of citizenship and 
governmentality. This entails a discussion of who volunteers as language coaches, and a survey 
of the various language coaching organizations in Amsterdam that became my key site. I 
conclude this chapter by situating these research sites and questions within the wider context and 
complexities offered by the city of Amsterdam as a site for research into issues of cultural 
diversity, immigrant integration, and meanings attributed to citizenship. Amsterdam’s unique 
social, economic and political history, the experiences and attitudes of its inhabitants developed 
through the city’s relationships with the rest of the Netherlands, across Europe, and through its 
prominence as an imperial hub all impact and shape, but do not determine, what it means to be 
Dutch.  
 
Points of ethnographic entry: language learning and voluntarism 
 
 During my early months in the field, how to locate my research questions in a particular 
locale or site in Amsterdam was a pressing question that was considerably influenced by issues 
of access. From the understanding of dynamics around national belonging I gathered from the 
existing literature, news media, and my observations and discussions with ‘native’ Dutch people 
during these early weeks, I intended to locate my research in a site associated with immigrant 
integration projects. However, locating such a site where those involved were open to speaking 
or working with me presented a significant hurdle. I discovered that the process of identifying 
and accessing my field site was deeply entangled with my position as a Dutch language learner. 
This position greatly influenced how I chose to navigate barriers to recruiting research 
participants and how I came to understand the politics of the everyday. 
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  Without a more narrowed focus through particular community hubs or through a network 
of key contacts, my initial fear in the field was that I might find that, like Erin Martineau, I was 
“the only person lingering around outside, with no one to observe” (2006:12). In her dissertation 
research, Martineau was frustrated to find that the informal socialization she had anticipated 
being a key research method for her work in Amsterdam Noord was instead a misguided 
assumption connected to her “deeply held idealization of fieldwork.” Informal socialization has 
worked well for researchers conducting fieldwork in particular types of communities, as shown 
in McDonald’s (1989) work with Breton peasants. In her work in this rural, insular Breton 
village, McDonald was recognized as an outsider, and through her work became a point of 
community interest whom locals often sought to engage. Yet, as Martineau’s experience of 
research in a diverse neighbourhood in Amsterdam shows, informal socialization may not be 
productive as an initial or key research strategy without first identifying a more focused point of 
entry. Reflective of the research McDonald conducted with Breton militant groups in a larger 
urban centre as part of the same study into Breton nationalism, Martineau soon found that she 
was required to schedule appointments and interviews, attend committee meetings and other 
publicized gatherings in order to meet potential research participants. Seeking out particular 
points of engagement and community organization around specific issues – i.e. Martineau’s 
hangjongeren (hang around youth), or McDonald’s Breton nationalists – facilitates ethnographic 
continuity across a smaller group, while speaking to issues concerning a broader population.  
 Given my research interest in the politics of the everyday, my decision to learn the local 
language of my field site was guided by professional concerns for first accessing research 
participants, and for understanding the detailed social cues and discourses of everyday life in the 
Netherlands. It was also obvious from my preliminary review that knowledge of the language 
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would enable access to the considerable Dutch language scholarship, news and popular media 
connected to my field of study, to which many Anglophone scholars do not have access. Many of 
the important discussions that have occupied public discourse in the Dutch media that I raise 
throughout my dissertation have been little reported upon in English language media, or even in 
English- language Dutch news publications (which tend to be oriented toward the community of 
‘expatriates’ in the Netherlands, e.g. RNW). In a similar vein, competency in Dutch has also been 
instrumental in accessing historical and policy documents, social research reports, and other 
archival material. Access to these documents has proven vital not only to grounding my 
understanding of the key issues I engage throughout this dissertation, but to tracing the 
emergence of particular discursive formations and vocabularies. Like news and other media, 
many of these documents are freely available through online databases, for instance through 
Dutch ministry offices, the WRR (Netherlands Scientific Research Council), and SCP (Social and 
Cultural Plan Bureau). While these documents often have English-language summaries, the 
majority of the data is still presented in Dutch making knowledge of the language essential. 
Similarly, even as Dutch scholars increasingly publish in English, there is a significant volume of 
literature on the Netherlands that is only accessible in the Dutch language. This includes not only 
important historical analysis, but also more recent social science scholarship on questions of 
immigration, voluntarism, and citizenship. 
 When I arrived in Amsterdam in August 2009, I had completed beginner- level Dutch at 
the University of Toronto (advanced beginner or A2 level according to the Council of Europe’s 
Framework of Reference for Languages). I undertook an intensive intermediate- level course 
during my first three weeks living in the city (Amsterdam-Maastricht Summer University, B1 
level). Over the course of my year in the field my facility with the language strengthened, and I 
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was able to comfortably interview research participants in their choice of Dutch or English, 
follow casual conversations, and keep up with Dutch language media. Yet, learning Dutch has 
proven important for the way my research unfolded far beyond my ability to communicate in the 
language. In a city where most locals I encountered spoke English, learning Dutch helped to 
shape the ways I was seen as a foreigner and researcher by my research participants, even when 
we spoke in English. It also facilitated contact with certain groups of people in Dutch society in 
ways that English- language communication did not. Many ‘native’ Dutch people I met were 
surprised and pleased that  I was learning Dutch – especially given my position as an English 
speaker without Dutch heritage. These initial conversations about my language learning often 
became an opening to speak with people about my research and to gauge their opinions on issues 
or questions related to my work. In this way, I learned about key Dutch terms and ideas, public 
events, political dramas, and policy issues that resonated with everyday understandings of 
citizenship practice, immigration, integration, difference and Dutchness. Knowledge of the local 
language brought to light more nuanced understandings of key discussions about Dutchness and 
difference, pointing me in directions and flagging questions, tensions, and contradictions in day 
to day life. As I discuss later in this chapter, the significance of my learning Dutch was especially 
clear as my research came to centre on voluntary Dutch language coaches. 
 My decision to learn Dutch was also driven by the knowledge of how important the 
language has become to the questions of immigrant integration and citizenship I planned to 
study. Even before I arrived in the Netherlands it was clear that given its position as an important 
tool for teaching citizenship, learning Dutch would be an important dynamic in my field research 
(cf. Björnson 2007; Entzinger 2004; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2009; Lechner 2007). For 
instance, the inburgering (‘civic integration’) policy enacted in 1998 requires newcomers to 
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undertake 500 hours of Dutch language training and pass a series of exams in order to qualify for 
Dutch citizenship. In trying to identify possible points of ethnographic entry before I arrived in 
the field, some contacts I had made in the Netherlands had suggested I begin my research among 
the neighbourhood centres (buurthuizen, wijkcentra) scattered across Amsterdam and other 
Dutch cities. These centres were identified as places where newcomers and other neighbourhood 
residents came together for sports or other activities, and where newcomers may learn about how 
to ‘integrate’ in the Netherlands through language or skills classes. While these sites seemed to 
offer promising entry points for my research, those that I contacted for meetings either did not 
respond, or denied my request (indicating that they were too busy with the daily running of their 
centre to speak with me). These initial messages had been written in English. Faced with the 
dilemma of locating a new prospective point of entry to the field, a colleague in Amsterdam 
suggested that I pursue volunteer work as a way to facilitate connections with potential research 
participants. Still concerned about my limited knowledge and confidence in speaking Dutch, 
finding volunteer programs – especially those that required little knowledge of Dutch – became 
my next obstacle. I began volunteering in two projects in Amsterdam: the English- language 
coaching program, the Native Speaker Project, on Monday mornings; and on Wednesday 
afternoons helping to run a nursing home’s art therapy project, the painting club.  
 The Native Speaker Project was organized by Hart voor Amsterdam, a not-for-profit 
organization concerned primarily with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).1 It relied on 
English-speaking volunteers to help students aged 11-13, in the lowest academic stream in the 
Dutch education system (VMBO, voorbereidend middelbaar beroepsonderwijs, preparatory 
middle-level applied education) to improve their English speaking skills. Hart voor Amsterdam 
worked with several international corporations in the city to provide opportunities for their 
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employees to give back to the local community. Many volunteers (particularly ‘native’ Dutch 
participants) were drawn from this CSR initiative. Most other volunteers were recruited through 
English- language media (such as the monthly publication, Time Out Amsterdam), through 
communication channels at the American Embassy, English or American business clubs, or 
international schools. I found the program through Amsterdam’s central volunteering website 
(VCA, Volunteer Centre Amsterdam, www.vca.nu), in an advertisement indicating that little or no 
knowledge of Dutch was required of volunteers. The program asked for a minimum of three 
weeks’ of participation, one day a week, at one of the three schools in which the program 
operated. The target schools all taught at the VMBO level, and were considered colloquially as 
zwarte scholen (‘black’ schools), that is, characterized by their disproportionately high number of 
‘non-native’ or ‘non-Western’ Dutch students. The students we met with were considered behind 
in their English-language skills, and our participation in this project enabled the students to 
receive an extra hour of conversational English practice that they would not have had otherwise.  
 I decided to participate with the Native Speaker Project because it dealt with language 
(albeit English), socially/ educationally marginalized youth, and from practical concerns related 
to my then limited comprehension of Dutch. Although this was not a Dutch-language program, 
the privileged position of English among ‘native’ Dutch, especially in Amsterdam, and that its 
target group were ‘non-Western’ Dutch youth suggested to me that it might expose some of the 
interesting tensions and ideas around social belonging in the Netherlands. It was a space where 
questions of language butted against questions of integration, as foreigners like myself were 
positioned as teachers and privileged contributors to Dutch society over (often) Dutch-born 
students, who were seen as falling behind in their studies, and faced a language ‘deficit’. 
 Through VCA, I was also able to apply to a position with an art therapy program in a 
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nursing home that indicated little knowledge of Dutch was required. I had hoped that this might 
mean I would be able to converse in English with senior Amsterdammers about their experiences 
in Amsterdam and how the city and its inhabitants had changed over the course of their lives. 
Through my failure to discern the important distinctions between the terms for senior’s home 
(bejaardenthuis) and nursing home (verpleeghuis), I found myself working at the latter with 
elderly people who often suffered from some form of dementia. Many did not (or could no 
longer) understand English, and illness often slurred their speech in Dutch, meaning that even 
Astrid, my ‘native’ Dutch supervisor and the art therapist sometimes had difficulty understanding 
the painting club participants. Among the staff and other volunteers I found that few people 
working at the home spoke English or were comfortable speaking English with me, and I had to 
mainly rely on speaking Dutch in this space.    
 The nursing home that I volunteered at was part of a much larger network of care 
facilities (for elderly patients, as well as people with mental disabilities). Volunteers were an 
active part in many aspects of life at these care facilities: from helping the staff to care for 
residents, to organizing outings and activities. These included things as varied as helping to feed 
residents at nursing homes, or taking one resident who lacked the capacity to ride a bicycle 
herself on outings using a special tandem-bike so that she could “feel the wind in her face.” In 
the wake of cuts to the welfare state throughout the 1990s, volunteers have become essential 
providers of Dutch social services (Knijn 1998; cf. Muehlebach 2012). My involvement in the 
painting club was mainly composed of simple tasks: helping the coordinator with the set up and 
clean-up of the art room, helping to escort the elderly participants to their rooms afterwards, 
retrieving the beverage cart from the cafeteria, serving the club members coffee or tea, or helping 
participants with their paintings. While Astrid, the art therapist and my supervisor, could have 
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done these tasks herself (and did before I began volunteering), my assistance helped the club to 
run more efficiently. On occasion, it also allowed Astrid to spend more time with particular 
participants, as I supervised the larger group. 
 Participating in the Native Speaker Project was a rather different experience than my 
work at the nursing home, but both projects revealed important continuities around practices of 
voluntarism. My experiences in these sites were important in constructing a broader 
understanding of voluntarism in the Netherlands: who volunteers (and who does not), the 
motivations of those who volunteer, and the role of volunteers in the daily operation of certain 
organizations, or during special campaigns or events. These experiences also highlighted the 
increasing importance of voluntarism in the context of a receding welfare state. The deep 
connections between voluntary work and notions of “good” or “active” citizenship (Ong 2006; 
Tonkens 2006) practice came into greater focus after I had enrolled as a client in a voluntary 
Dutch language coaching program. This realization, coupled with the central importance of 
Dutch language learning for newcomers’ access to Dutch citizenship (cf. Björnson 2007; 
Entzinger 2004; Scheffer 2000), directed me to focus on voluntary language coaching projects. 
As a site where concerns about immigrant integration, citizenship practice, the role of 
voluntarism, and everyday meanings of belonging in Amsterdam and the Netherlands coalesce, 
these Dutch language coaching projects presented a potentially rich site for my ethnographic 
research.  
 It was primarily in order to improve my Dutch language speaking and comprehension 
that I first came into contact with voluntary Dutch language coaching projects. In early January 
2010 I registered as a client (non-native speaking participant, anderstaliger) in the voluntary 
language coaching project run by Gilde Amsterdam (Guild Amsterdam) known as SamenSpraak 
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(Speaking Together). The SamenSpraak, like the Native Speaker Project and my work at the 
nursing home, filled a gap in service provision. This program, and other such programs in 
Amsterdam provided conversation partnerships that paired volunteers as language coaches with 
newcomers to the language, and often city or country. As I learned more about these language 
coaching projects I found that many, if not most, of the language learners in these programs 
sought out the free services to help improve their Dutch language skills in order to pass the 
mandatory inburgering tests and become eligible for Dutch citizenship. Language coaching 
volunteers often took on the role of front-line citizenship educators and integration workers for 
their immigrant partners, helping them to make sense of everything from letters from the 
municipality to everyday Dutch social etiquette. For many of the immigrants in these programs, 
their language coach may be the only ‘native’ Dutch person with whom they have regular and 
meaningful contact. Clients who were not pursuing Dutch citizenship – for example temporary 
residents or EU citizens, often English speakers like myself – sought out these programs as a 
way to better connect with the local society through learning the language. Through weekly, 
informal conversations, language coaches became “gatekeepers” to Dutch society for the 
newcomers with whom they worked. 
 My involvement in each of these projects as a volunteer and client helped to facilitate the 
interest and cooperation of participants when I later sought to organize interviews with 
volunteers and their coordinators. The willingness of these projects’ coordinators to circulate my 
request for interviews strongly contrasted the rejection I earlier faced from the neighbourhood 
centres seeking an introduction and preliminary interview. In addition to having successfully 
cultivated relationships with these projects, I could not help but feel that part of the welcome 
reception I received as a researcher was also due to my requests to volunteers and coordinators 
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having been written in Dutch. (As an English- language project, my communications with the 
Native Speaker Project were in English.) In contrast, my earlier introduction to the community 
centres had not been facilitated by previously established connections, and had been written in 
English. 
 My ability and willingness to speak Dutch with prospective interviewees appeared to add 
another layer to their interest in my work and comfort in speaking with me. As I would learn 
from these interviews and through participant-observation, learning to speak Dutch was often 
considered to show commitment to living in and understanding Dutch society. In meeting each 
potential research participant, I offered to conduct our interview in either Dutch or English. 
While many people chose to take this opportunity to practice their English with a native speaker, 
others felt more comfortable speaking in Dutch. Even when research participants and I spoke 
English, there were moments when my knowledge of Dutch helped to carry or explain their 
point. For instance, when a participant forgot or was unsure of the English translation for a Dutch 
term, we were able to puzzle it out together. I was frequently invited to meet research 
participants in their homes to speak over cups of tea. I met other research participants in their 
places of work or voluntary work, such as a meeting room in the Gilde Amsterdam offices or in 
the cafeteria at the nursing home. Some research participants were also helpful in arranging 
interviews with other volunteers or coordinators in their programs. 
 What became especially clear in speaking with language coaches, whether in English or 
Dutch, was that these participants were interested in: a) helping me – as a researcher and 
language learner or volunteer – with my project, and; b) the questions I asked about integration 
and citizenship practice in the Netherlands. These were clearly topics on which these volunteers 
had opinions which they were happy to share with me. For many volunteer language coaches, 
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helping newcomers in Amsterdam to “find their way” through learning or improving their Dutch 
language skills was discussed as a personal or professional interest and commitment. As a 
language learner, I was interestingly implicated in these concerns, occupying a particular 
position in relation to the ways my participants understood these questions and goals, and the 
questions I posed through my research. This emerged most clearly in my meetings with José, a 
volunteer with Gilde Amsterdam. In arranging our first interview (my first formal interview with 
a language coach), I had expressed my hesitancy in speaking Dutch with her, but indicated that if 
she preferred we could conduct the interview in Dutch rather than English.2 In her friendly email 
response, José wrote to me in Dutch telling me not to 
 
worry about this. My English is reasonably good and your Dutch is better than 
reasonable! (With Swahili or Urdu we can always fill in the details). But I 
understand very well that with research like this the nuances can be important, so 
I will really do my best. 
 
During our interview – as during my meetings with my own Gilde Amsterdam language coach – 
José made me feel comfortable speaking Dutch. She spoke clearly, corrected my mistakes, and 
offered clarifications for her answers where needed. As I interviewed José, her experience as a 
language coach was clear not only in our interaction during the interview, but in her experience 
and views of issues related to belonging in Amsterdam and the Netherlands, “good” citizenship 
practice, the role of language learning for integration, etc.. In this way, my position as a Dutch 
language learner not only facilitated communication with José and other language coaches about 
the problems newcomers were thought to pose to Dutch society, but communicated some of the 
key discursive tensions and contradictions connected to these issues in this particular time and 
place. 
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Situating volunteers in the study of citizenship  
 
  Throughout my initial year in the field, Wednesdays were particularly busy as I went 
from volunteering in the afternoon at the nursing home to being a client of voluntary services in 
the evening when I met to speak Dutch with my language coach, Frank. I met Frank through 
Gilde Amsterdam’s free language coaching program, SamenSpraak, and every Wednesday 
evening from mid-January 2010 until I left the field, I met with Frank to practice speaking 
Dutch. We covered a wide range of topics, including my voluntary work, with Frank often 
greeting me by asking how the elderly (bejaarden) were doing that day. On one evening we 
discussed how common it has become for young people to move across the country (or even 
across the EU or the world) to find work. Frank himself had moved from elsewhere in the 
Netherlands to work in Amsterdam. In Frank’s opinion, these new patterns of movement and 
settlement made institutions like nursing homes much more important than in generations past, 
when families relied on one another for care in illness or old age. Referring to a common Dutch 
adage, Frank explained that it is “better to have a good neighbour than a far friend” (beter een 
goede buur dan een verre vriend). Volunteers, Frank implied, were examples of contemporary 
“good neighbours” in Dutch society (cf. Tonkens 2006; Putnam 1995; Muehlebach 2012; 
Erickson 2012).  
 This understanding of the role of the volunteer as a “good” neighbour or citizen is widely 
shared across the Netherlands, and in other (especially Western liberal democratic) countries. For 
many, the connections between voluntarism and morality also elicit important affective 
sentiments. Among my research participants, it was clear that voluntarism is understood as 
selfless, a good deed, an expression of giving, and as cultivating positive and meaningful 
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connections with one’s neighbours or fellow citizens in working toward a shared goal. Among 
my research participants examples of shared goals had a wide range, for instance putting together 
a neighbourhood block party, working for the promotion of animal welfare, helping to keep the 
neighbourhood safe, volunteering time for a professional cause or interest, or helping out with 
activities at a school, church, or nursing home (cf. Muehlebach 2012; Putnam 1995). Volunteers 
were thought of as freely choosing to commit their time, effort and expertise to helping others. I 
was frequently commended by acquaintances when they learned of my work as a volunteer. 
Some people I met even expressed self-reproach that they too should be volunteering their time 
to a cause or service. 
 In spite of the critical lens I applied to my fieldwork among voluntary programs, I too 
found myself implicated in and consenting to the powerful web of deeply held moral and 
affective sentiments widely understood to be connected to this form of labour (cf. Stoler 2009; Li 
2007b:269). Notions of voluntarism as selfless and good work often gave me momentary pause 
as I reflected on my decidedly self-interested motivations for volunteering. That my participation 
as a volunteer was driven by my research rather than as a selfless good deed sometimes made me 
feel uneasy. These feelings were somewhat reconciled by the idea that this labour was also a way 
of “giving back” to the community I studied. For instance, my work at the nursing home helped 
Astrid organize the routine tasks of the painting club, as well as in preparation for special events 
(like our spring art exhibit during the home’s open day). The people I worked with appreciated 
my participation, and I felt good about these contributions even if they were done out of self-
interest as part of my research strategy. My voluntary labour helped to fill the service gaps 
recognized by certain social programs or added something valuable to the experiences of the 
programs’ clients. These feelings, alongside knowing that without my help the service gap would 
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be reintroduced, contributed to the commitment I felt to the programs for which I volunteered. 
Even during moments when the usefulness of these particular programs to my research seemed 
less clear, the sense of social obligation I felt to them was part of why I continued to work for the 
Native Speaker Project and nursing home. My long term engagements with these projects, 
however, have been important in grounding my understanding of the connections between 
voluntarism, belonging, and “good” or “active” citizenship through extended immersion and 
observation of the politics of the everyday. 
 My interviews with volunteers, my participant observation across these voluntary 
programs, and my personal reflections on the experience of voluntarism, revealed that 
voluntarism offers a point of ethnographic entry in a way I had not considered when I first sought 
out these programs. The ways in which citizenship, service and morality have coalesced around 
voluntarism in the Netherlands points to voluntarism, even generally speaking, as an 
ethnographically challenging site through which to examine how “good” citizenship is 
conceived, negotiated, and practiced (cf. Muehlebach 2012; Hemment 2012; Erickson 2012; 
Cattelino 2004). In the case of volunteer language coaches, I argue that their unique positioning 
in the process of immigrant integration, embedded within notions of increasingly culturalized 
citizenship, marks them as important “gatekeepers” to understanding the meanings attributed to 
“good” citizenship practices in Amsterdam and the Netherlands. Considered models of “good” 
citizenship practice themselves, language coaches’ voluntary work in projects that facilitate the 
integration of newcomers to Dutch society through language learning provides a unique and 
powerful lens on questions of citizenship – as a practice, understood through lived experience, 
and as a legal status (cf. Erickson 2012). In the course of informal meetings between 
conversation partners, much more than the Dutch language is communicated. Speaking partners 
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learn about each other’s lives, experiences, and their ideas about how to live in Dutch society and 
Amsterdam, including when and how Dutch norms and values are learned, challenged, 
confronted, or upheld. Through interviews with these informants, as well as through participation 
in various public, national events and numerous encounters over the course of my fieldwork, I 
examine how multiple, shifting signifiers of belonging and exclusion – ranging from citizenship 
status, to language, religion, race and culture – are imagined by these individuals in their 
discussions and views of an immigrant presence and the question of their integration in the 
Netherlands. While my informants frequently questioned or challenged the normative 
understandings and discussions circulating within the popular media and from politicians and 
policy makers about what it means to be Dutch, their participation as voluntary Dutch language 
coaches also reveals how certain aspects of the Dutch nation-building project have themselves 
become common sense, discursively implicated in “a whole complex of savoirs” (Foucault 
1991:102-103). 
 Voluntary Dutch language coaching programs are of particular importance in the project 
of immigrant integration, precisely because of the high value placed on immigrants’ learning the 
Dutch language in the current civic integration regime. In Amsterdam, at the time of my 
research, there were five different organizations offering free, volunteer-based Dutch language 
coaching services. The first of these programs, the Gilde Amsterdam SamenSpraak (Guild 
Amsterdam’s Speaking Together), had been launched in 1999 becoming a model for those that 
have since sprung up across Amsterdam and the Netherlands. As many of my research 
participants and their program websites indicated, these projects were not intended to provide 
formal language training; volunteers were not so much teachers as language coaches, 
conversation partners, neighbourhood resources, and friendly faces. Although many different 
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factors motivate their choices, language coaching volunteers nonetheless contribute their time, 
expertise, and experience to the broader project of social and cultural integration through the 
Dutch language in the Netherlands, through the locus of their city or own neighbourhood in 
Amsterdam. Voluntary language coaches are placed in a unique position in the context and 
landscape of integration in Amsterdam as citizenship educators. This role, normally the purview 
of the state, is reconfigured as individual volunteers communicate what they think is important 
about living and belonging in Amsterdam and the Netherlands to newcomers and potential 
citizens. In this way, volunteers reveal the ways in which their conceptions about citizenship 
practice are impacted by and resistant to the governmental rationality of the Dutch state. These 
volunteers act as local ambassadors and resources for particular people in the city or 
neighbourhood who are framed, to varying degrees, as outsiders or strangers by a number of 
different social and political actors: politicians and policy makers, media commentators, 
language coaching programs, other neighbours, even the volunteers themselves. In these 
calculations, the significance of the Dutch language in questions of belonging and “good” 
citizenship practice is not to be underestimated. The many layers of meaning attributed to the 
Dutch language today is a key reason why Dutch language coaching organizations and their 
volunteers in Amsterdam form the primary lens through which my research explores questions of 
‘being Dutch’ in the contemporary Netherlands.  
 All language coaches and program coordinators I spoke with stressed the importance of 
spoken, not written Dutch in these programs3; correct grammar is less important than just helping 
newcomers to the Dutch language feel comfortable enough to “dare” to speak Dutch in the 
public sphere. This goal is reflected in the kind of training volunteer language coaches received. 
Regardless of their program of participation, volunteers typically attend an orientation session 
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before they begin to work. For language coaches, this orientation may be the only training that 
they receive from the language coaching organization before they meet their partners and begin 
coaching. In May 2011, I attended one such orientation session organized by Mixen in Mokum 
(Mixing in Amsterdam) in preparation for the launch of their next six-month cycle of language 
partnerships in the Amsterdam West neighbourhoods. In this combined recruitment and 
orientation meeting, both potential clients (language learners) and volunteers (language coaches) 
met with the program director to learn about the project. At this initial meeting, the director 
explained the mission of the program, what was expected of participants, and some of the 
activities that the program organized to facilitate speaking Dutch between the partners. Those 
attending the session interested in joining the project’s upcoming cycle as volunteers were given 
an information packet that contained a short handbook4 that provided tips for being a successful 
language coach, a list of resources, and a strippenboekje (a small booklet) of ideas for topics and 
activities to facilitate conversation during sessions at home and around the neighbourhood. 
According to the Mixen in Mokum director, much of the handbook that the organization provided 
to their volunteers is borrowed from the program booklet put together by Gilde Amsterdam. This 
resource includes general rules for language coaching volunteers, such as: speaking clearly, 
simply, and slowly; being careful to build trust between the partners so that the student is not 
afraid to make mistakes; how to correct your student in a way that encourages further 
conversation. The final “golden rule” given to language coaches in the Mixen in Mokum 
handbook addresses the commonly shared idea across language coaching organizations that 
communication is more than just learning the language: communication “forms the basis for 
further contact and integration, and language acquisition” (my translation). 
 The Mixen in Mokum handbook and strippenboekje also provided language coaches with 
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suggestions for discussion topics and activities during conversation sessions. This included many 
different low-cost or free activities such as: sharing and describing photos from ‘home’ with one 
another; visiting one of the partners’ social clubs, church or mosque, or a local neighbourhood 
centre (buurthuis or dienstencentrum) listed in the booklet; taking a walk through the park; or 
participating in special outings sponsored by the organization, such as a boat tour of the canals, a 
tour of the central library, visiting the cinema, theatre, or museums. Other organizations, such as 
the Gilde Amsterdam, also provide their volunteers with a special pocket dictionary specifically 
designed for use by Dutch as a Second Language (NT2, Nederlands als tweede taal) learners. 
This dictionary provides simple definitions of words, including pictures. Further resources for 
session topics and activities (or lesson material, in the case of the two organizations mentioned 
that do provide language lessons) are often linked or available for download on the 
organizations’ websites or on the central Amsterdam site for language coaching projects 
(TaalcoachWijzer Amsterdam). Administrative volunteers or employees at these organizations 
may also be contacted to help resolve any issues that might arise for language coaches and 
learning participants.  
 My experiences meeting with Frank, my language coach at Gilde Amsterdam, appeared to 
reflect the kinds of meetings described by other language coaches with whom I spoke, as well as 
the topics suggested in the Mixen in Mokum training and activity booklets. Frank and I were put 
into contact by Gilde Amsterdam about two weeks after I had registered with the organization as 
a language learning client (anderstaliger). During my intake meeting with the organization, I had 
been asked a number of questions (in Dutch) about my age, nationality, education, employment, 
marital status, whether I had children, hobbies and interests, where and for how long had I lived 
in the city, my reasons for moving to Amsterdam, as well as my usual mode of transportation. I 
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was also asked about my reasons for learning Dutch and what classes I had taken, as well as 
whether I preferred to speak with a man or a woman.5 The intake interview was also a moment to 
assess the level of Dutch possessed by non-native speaking applicants. After we covered this 
information, the administrative volunteer I spoke with explained more about the nature of the 
Gilde Amsterdam speaking partnership program. My partner and I would be expected to meet for 
one or more hours each week, normally for a year. After one year, we would be able to continue 
if we wanted, find a new speaking partner, or stop participating. Other organizations asked for 
similar time commitments of their participants (with program cycles running from six months to 
a year). I was told by Gilde Amsterdam that they would try to set me up with someone who lived 
close by, and with whom I might have something in common. (This criteria for matching 
language couples was common among other programs as well.) Some people who volunteer as 
language coaches might also express an interest in speaking with someone from a particular 
country, or who speaks a particular foreign language. Others might only be able to meet on 
particular days or at certain times.  
 Frank was a young professional in his late twenties, who lived an easy distance from me 
– about ten minutes away by bicycle. We set up our first meeting in late January, which we 
agreed would take place at his home after he finished work. For other language coaches – such as 
Anouk or Susanne, both ‘native’ Dutch women in their late twenties – it was customary to meet 
in the homes of their partners, or perhaps to arrange a meeting in a public place such as a library 
or café. In our first meeting at Frank’s house, we spent an hour and a half chatting. Over several 
cups of tea we covered a range of topics, including our work, my research, where I was from in 
Canada, the new laws affecting the Red Light District in Amsterdam where I lived, tourism and 
prostitution, and the old Dutch stand-by, the weather.  
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 For the rest of my time in the field we met regularly to spend two hours or so chatting 
over tea. As the weeks went on, the topics varied, often connecting to local or national events 
such as the 2010 winter Olympics, holidays like Christmas, Queen’s Day or the 
Dodenherdenking (Remembrance Day), the Dutch elections, Canadian politics, or my research, 
or voluntary work at the nursing home. One week, after Frank had returned from a vacation with 
some of his friends to the US, he dug out his old school atlas. We spent two hours poring over 
different maps, describing his trip, places we had been, lived, or wanted to see, geography and 
travel in general. Another week we talked for almost two hours about cooking and food, or 
different animals. Some evenings when the weather was clear we might sit by the windows of 
Frank’s eighth-floor apartment and describe what we saw across the city, talking about different 
places and things to do in Amsterdam. We usually spoke about things we did that week, and 
sometimes we talked about for the future, what I would do after I left the Netherlands. I found it 
both challenging and refreshing to have someone with whom I never spoke English. When I 
found myself searching for a word or concept, Frank patiently tried to help me find it, offering 
descriptions or definitions in Dutch. In most of the conversations I attempted to have with others, 
it would be at this point of hesitancy or confusion that the conversation would naturally lapse 
into English. With Frank this was never the case, although I soon realized that like many other 
‘native’ Dutch in Amsterdam, and given his education, profession, and travel stories, he spoke 
English fluently. Once or twice we also met for dinner at his house with his girlfriend, and when 
it was nice enough outside I was invited to join Frank and Jolande for a picnic and tour of the 
Amsterdam canals on their boat. 
 Other language coaches also took their partners on outings in their neighbourhood or 
around the city. Anouk (who worked with the women-only group) had described trying to 
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“activate” her partner more by introducing her to her local community centre. This was a 
resource where her partner could practice her Dutch while participating in free or low-cost 
classes, for instance on sewing or crafting. José, a coach in her sixties who worked with Gilde 
Amsterdam, described taking one of her partners to see a special exhibition of Orthodox 
Christian art at a local museum that she felt would be interesting to her partner, an Egyptian 
Coptic Christian. Going on outings during meetings was especially common among Mixen in 
Mokum participants, as this project sought to be “more practical” by situating learning in the 
neighbourhood and doing daily activities together. Marjolein, a language coach and ambassador 
for the Mixen in Mokum project, had been invited to the May orientation session I attended to 
talk about her experiences with the program. She began working with Mixen in Mokum after she 
had retired, and when we met worked simultaneously with three different language learning 
partners. Two were Muslim Moroccan women who were ‘civic integration’ (inburgering) 
students living in the Nieuw-West neighbourhood. The third partner, a Christian Egyptian 
woman, had a higher level of Dutch than the other two, which presented its own challenges as 
they usually held their sessions jointly. They would frequently walk together in the park and play 
games intended to help develop their language skills. Marjolein described the activities she did 
with her partners as being as simple as walking through the park and describing what they saw 
and where they went. They had also made excursions to the buurthuis (neighbourhood 
community centre), the market, and to their local library. One of the women did not know how to 
use the OV chipkaart (the public transport payment) system when they first met, so this was the 
subject of one of their sessions. Marjolein was pleased to communicate to the Mixen in Mokum 
orientation attendees that her partner had become completely independent (helemaal 
zelfstaandig) in this, and was able to use the public transit system to meet elsewhere in the city. 
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Marjolein discussed how she often used children’s books with simple text that she had purchased 
from a thrift store in her sessions, suggesting that this was a good way to help her partners learn 
and improve their Dutch. She also described a language game they often played, where they tried 
to give words starting with a particular letter. Other activities they did together were intended to 
help them get to know their neighbourhood and the city better by exploring these places. On one 
occasion, Marjolein took her partners and some of the other Moroccan women from their ‘civic 
integration’ classes to Amsterdam’s famous Jordaan neighbourhood. They went to a particular 
canal where the historic canal houses are decorated with many different types of gables (gevels). 
She asked the women to describe them as best as they could in Dutch, and recounted the outing 
as a great success.  
 My sessions with Frank and the experiences of Marjolein generally reflected the sessions 
described by other language coaching volunteers. One notable exception that I heard from 
different participants, for instance José and Anouk, was the important role that many language 
coaches played in advising language learners on answering letters to the municipality, dealing 
with the bank or other bureaucratic institutions, or proof-reading job applications and other 
important texts. For many of the people who seek out language coaching services it was clear – 
from my interviews and from the organizations’ websites and materials – that language coaches 
were often the only ‘native’ Dutch people that newcomers might regularly come into contact 
with, and on whom they could rely for this kind of advice.  
 The reality that nearly all language coaching volunteers, as informal “gatekeepers” of 
Dutchness, are ‘native’ Dutch is important to consider in this study. Instead of reflecting the 
demographic diversity of Amsterdam or the Netherlands,6 most language coaching volunteers fit 
a particular profile: while volunteers ranged in age from students in their twenties to retirees in 
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their seventies, reflected a wide variety of occupations (from carpenter to teacher and civil 
servant), most volunteers were well-educated (with a university or college degree) and nearly all 
were ‘native’ or ethnic Dutch. 
 That non-‘native’ Dutch Amsterdammers rarely volunteer as language coaches is not 
directly attributable to the formal selection criteria of language coaching organizations in 
recruiting their volunteers. All five of the language coaching projects operating in Amsterdam 
during the time of my research stipulated few qualifications for participation as a language 
coach. From interviews with language coaching coordinators and these organizations’ websites, 
the advertised or desired qualities of potential language coaches included fluency in spoken 
Dutch, interest in other cultures, enthusiasm for the work, and patience. These programs also 
required a certain level of time commitment to the program (usually a few hours per week for a 
period ranging between six months and a year). One program coordinator remarked7 that when 
talking about processing new volunteers: “We don’t ask any information about education, 
background or previous volunteer experience from our volunteers. The ‘old Amsterdammers’ 
[volunteers] should know the Dutch language well.” On the one hand, it was not apparent that 
special efforts were being made by any of these organizations at the time of my research or 
earlier to reach out specifically to Dutch speakers who were not ‘native’ Dutch.8 On the other 
hand, through my extended experiences in one of these language coaching projects as a language 
learner, my interviews with volunteers, project coordinators, and other participants, as well as in 
my study of years’ of promotional, recruitment, and other documents from these various 
organizations it was clear that all qualified applicants were generally accepted for training as 
volunteer language coaches.  
 Language coaching  programs, including the two that did provide more formal lessons, 
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therefore delivered these lessons in ways that were different than regular, classroom-based study. 
Formal, classroom-based courses tended to focus on specific evaluable outcomes, particularly 
the mechanics of grammar, vocabulary, writing, and written comprehension. This was the case 
for the intensive course I undertook when I first arrived in Amsterdam, as well as the courses 
described by my research participants and other scholars (cf. Björnson 2007). Unlike these 
classes, the free language coaching services provided by volunteers are intended to be fun and 
relaxed, giving newcomers a chance to practice and improve their spoken Dutch. The partners 
usually meet in a place they agree upon, such as in their homes or elsewhere in their own 
neighbourhoods.  
 In spite of the apparent openness of the criteria and broad reach of recruitment strategies, 
there was an over-representation of ‘native’ Dutch volunteer language coaches. The Mixen in 
Mokum coordinator told me that although there were but a handful of non-‘native’ Dutch 
language coaches currently participating, she hoped that in the future those who came to the 
program as language learners would eventually return to the program as coaches. José, who also 
worked at Gilde Amsterdam as a volunteer coordinator mentioned that there were indeed some 
volunteers who were not ‘native’ Dutch. She had met with “a young Turkish gentleman,” who 
she described as “an excellently good civil servant [ambtenaar]. He is a Turk. And a really good 
guy.” Casper, another volunteer coordinator who had worked at the Gilde Amsterdam 
SamenSpraak for several years, told me that in his experience he had only met with one 
Surinamese volunteer, and another who was English but had lived in the Netherlands for many 
years. In May 2011, I attended an information session for the launch of a new Mixen in Mokum 
cycle where there was only one non-‘native’ Dutch woman (who identified as Surinamese) 
present in the capacity of a new volunteer language coach, or “oud Amsterdammer” (old 
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Amsterdammer). All of the other people of colour were present at the meeting as “nieuwe 
Amsterdammers” (new Amsterdammers, language learners). This division of new participants at 
orientation sessions is both anticipated by these organizations (as is clear in their promotional 
materials, see figures 2.1 to 2.11), as well as borne out in the experience of coordinators running 
such programs. For instance, when the “oud” and “nieuwe” Mixen in Mokum participants were 
asked to separate into two groups to discuss their questions and expectations, the program 
coordinator again asked the Surinamese-Dutch ‘oud Amsterdammer’ if she was in the right group 
for the discussion.  
 The patterns for formal volunteering among members of ethnic minority groups have also 
been shown to differ from those of ‘native’ Dutch. In Amsterdam during 2010, figures indicated 
that ‘non-Western’ Dutch volunteer less frequently than ‘native’ Dutch (as well as Western 
immigrants, also called “expats”) (Houben-van Harten and te Riele 2011:10).9 Frequently, as 
Dekker indicates, the types of ethnic community organizations and initiatives that attract “non-
Western allochtonen” as formal volunteers are directed at  
 
improving the social-economic position of minorities, activities that can ground 
and promote their own identity (especially in the form of participation with their 
religious organizations, such as mosque and Islamic associations), and assistance 
to relatives and members of their own ethnic group. (1999:209, fn 3; my 
translation) 
 
 While volunteer coordinators at Dutch language coaching programs talked about the 
diversity of their volunteers, it was clear in my interviews and other materials that the langua ge 
coaching program spoke to the individual personal or professional interests (e.g. enjoying 
language, teaching, interest in meeting and learning about people from different cultures), and 
motivations for volunteering (e.g. helping others, sharing their city, sharing their expertise) of 
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some Dutch more than others. Language coaches also talked about volunteering as a way to fill 
some of their time, whether the volunteer in question was retired, working, or a post-secondary 
student. Although the amount of time language coaches committed to volunteering each week 
was not generally seen by my informants as burdensome (usually 1-4 hours each week), most 
programs required volunteers to participate for cycles of six months (e.g. Mixen in Mokum) to a 
year (SamenSpraak). Clearly, this level of time commitment is only possible for some potential 
volunteers. 
 
Amsterdam’s Volunteer Language Coaching Initiatives  
 
 The five prominent volunteer language coaching organizations in Amsterdam through 
which I contacted my key research participants could be found (in Dutch) via Taalcoachwijzer 
Amsterdam (Language coach compass Amsterdam, www.taalcoachwijzer.nl) a website developed 
by the city of Amsterdam as well as the main volunteering website, Vrijwilligers Centrale 
Amsterdam (VCA; www.vca.nu). These projects are the outcome of complex layers of 
governmental intervention, “pulled together from an existing repertoire, a matter of habit, 
accretion and bricolage” (Li 2007a:276) that have been directed toward the cultivation of what I 
identify as “good” citizenship practice. 
 The SamenSpraak (Speaking Together) program that had arranged my speaking 
partnership with Frank was the first of these projects in the Netherlands. According to the 
director of Gilde Amsterdam (Guild Amsterdam), when it was first developed in 1999, the local 
SamenSpraak project was organized to fill a perceived need in the city rather than in relation to 
the national inburgering (‘civic integration’) program which had become law the year before. 
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The early success of this local program to tackle the taalachterstand (Dutch language deficit) of 
city residents from a foreign background prompted the federal Minister of Large Cities- and 
Integration-Policy (Grote Steden- en Integratiebeleid) Van Boxtel, in 2001 to recommend the 
development and spread of these initiatives through the national umbrella organization, under the 
name Gilde SamenSpraak.10 In terms of both structure and funding the SamenSpraak program 
became a template for other Dutch conversation and integration projects developed in 
Amsterdam and across the country, including those operating independently of the Gilde 
organization. The minister’s enthusiasm for these voluntary initiatives as a supplement to formal 
Dutch as a Second Language education for adults led to the government’s financial support of 
the projects (Gilde Nederland 2012). The success of these programs has become linked to the 
funding structure and concerns for the ‘civic integration’ program at the federal and municipal 
levels. For instance, much of the funding for Amsterdam’s SamenSpraak program comes from 
the City of Amsterdam’s Living, Care and Society department (Dienst  wonen, zorg en 
samenleven, which is also responsible for inburgering programs in the city) and Work and 
Income department (Dienst Werk en Inkomen) (Gilde Amsterdam 2010:10, 15). Additional funds 
may be granted through non-governmental charitable organizations and trusts, such as the 
RCOAK (Roman Catholic Old Poor Foundation) which financially supported a special 
SamenSpraak initiative during 2011. 
 These voluntary programs offer an informal way of learning Dutch, intended by these 
organizations to complement (rather than replace) the formal learning required of ‘civic 
integration’ or other language students. A common goal across these different conversation 
partnership and language coaching programs is providing a safe and encouraging space for 
newcomers to “dare to speak” Dutch, and thereby to improve their fluency and comfort in terms 
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of the Dutch language, as well as knowledge of Dutch society and culture. While any non-native 
Dutch speaker is welcome to take advantage of such opportunities to practice their spoken 
Dutch, these language-coaching programs mainly draw their non-native speaking participants 
from the pool of usually non-Western inburgeraars (students completing the inburgering or 
‘civic integration’ course). As such, volunteer language coaches provide an important service for 
people who want to continue to improve their fluency and confidence in spoken Dutch outside of 
the classroom, whether that of the inburgering course or private lessons for well-educated 
“expats.” Although less common, some of these language programs do provide the space for 
formal lessons to vulnerable or marginalized people who cannot participate in other language 
classes (e.g. due to legal status, cultural, financial, or time constraints). Language coaching 
programs in general are something that the non-native speaker (anderstaliger) and volunteer 
pursue from a personal ethic of social engagement and improvement. In this way, these projects 
express some of the ways in which neoliberal governmentality has informed the development of 
particular savoirs relating to “active” or “good” citizenship practice (cf. Foucault 1991:103; 
Muehlebach 2012; Stoler 2009). 
 Gilde Amsterdam, established in 1984, is a not-for-profit organization that is both 
volunteer-run and service-oriented. This is clear in their mission statement, where Gilde 
Amsterdam explains that “Amsterdammers, young and old, with knowledge and (life) experience 
are committed to their fellow townsmen. This is for the promotion of participation of these 
Amsterdammers and their townsmen” (Gilde Amsterdam 2010:2l my translation). The director of 
Gilde Amsterdam indicated in our interview that when this organization began in 1984, part of its 
mission was to provide volunteer opportunities for people over sixty years of age, who were seen 
as having valuable knowledge to share with others gained from their professional careers, 
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hobbies, and life experiences. Over the past decades this organization has grown and changed. 
Although most of the Gilde Amsterdam volunteers continue to be older individuals, this is no 
longer a requirement. The organization still offers advice, for example, on starting small 
companies and career support (Advice and Guidance), but has also branched out into other areas. 
This includes the popular Mee in Mokum (Come along in Mokum) city walking tours, and 
Language Guidance (Writing and Speaking). Language Guidance encompasses a range of 
activities: from organizing volunteers to read with children, to language help (writing and 
presentation) for non-native speakers attending higher education (university, WO, and college, 
HBO), and the well-known SamenSpraak language coaching program. In 2010, more than a 
thousand volunteers were directly affiliated and actively participating with Gilde Amsterdam: 
This included 38 volunteers working at the offices of Gilde Amsterdam to help coordinate its 
various projects, 165 Advice and Guidance advisers, 107 Mee in Mokum walking tour guides, 
and 417 volunteers working in the area of Language Guidance – of which 317 were active in the 
SamenSpraak program working with 333 non-native speakers11 (Gilde Amsterdam 2010:4, 10). 
Just over 400 more volunteers participated in programs run in partnership with the organization 
(Gilde Amsterdam 2010:4).12 The most popular activity among new volunteers in 2010 (40 of 
156 new volunteers) was to work as a language coach with the SamenSpraak program (Gilde 
Amsterdam 2010:3). 
 Mixen in Mokum (Mixing in Mokum) was organized through Mozeshuis (Moses House), 
an organization with the mandate to support community building and adult education with a view 
to promoting tolerance, civic participation, and social cohesion in Amsterdam (Mozeshuis 
2012a).13 Mozeshuis operated through the Mozes en Aäronkerk (Moses and Aaron Church), a 
former Roman Catholic church. The church building, no longer used for religious services, was 
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used by the organization for their various programs, which included things such as different adult 
education courses, remembrance services, an inter-religious Christmas celebration, art 
exhibitions, and a regular concert series (making use of the former church’s impressive organ). 
Mozeshuis’ own voluntary language coaching project, the Mixen in Mokum program, operated on 
a neighbourhood-basis, bringing together ‘old’ Amsterdammers (Dutch speakers, usually ‘native’ 
Dutch) and ‘new’ Amsterdammers (non-native speakers) into speaking partnerships or groups for 
six month cycles. Similarly, SamenSpraak Oost (Speaking Together East; an initiative supported 
by Opbouwwerk van Dynamo) is neighbourhood oriented, but operates only within Amsterdam 
Oost whereas Mixen in Mokum organized cycles in each district of the city.  
 The ABC (Amsterdam Buurvrouwen Contact, Amsterdam Neighbourhood Women 
Contact) began in 2000 as a project under the then named Diaconie van de Hervormde Gemeente 
(Diaconate of the Reformed Church), but has been an independent organization since 2004 
(ABCAmsterdam 2012c). The organization operated in partnership and with sponsorship from 
many diverse organizations and governmental departments. During 2011, some of these included 
the centre for refugees, youth and education services, community centres, the VCA, church 
organizations (the Protestant Parish of Amsterdam and the Evangelical Lutheran Parish of 
Amsterdam), the City of Amsterdam’s Department for Work and Income, the European 
Integration Foundation, and the royal charitable organization Oranje Fonds (ABCAmsterdam 
2012d). The ABC language coaching program differs from the other projects in that its volunteers 
and participants are exclusively women. The mandate of this organization is to help “migrant 
women” who are otherwise isolated from mainstream Dutch society to become more self-reliant 
and less vulnerable through learning the Dutch language (ABCAmsterdam 2012a). Unlike the 
conversation partnerships organized by Gilde Amsterdam, Mixen in Mokum and SamenSpraak 
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Oost, ABC volunteers do offer more formal lessons in Dutch, help for the non-native speakers 
with daily matters they may find difficult to navigate in the city (e.g. finding work or activities 
outside of the home, helping with forms or contact with officials), as well as speaking 
partnerships similar to those of the other programs (ABCAmsterdam 2012b).14  
 The Stichting Vluchtelingenwerk Amstel tot Zaan (SVAZ, Foundation for Refugees Amstel 
to Zaan) is first and foremost a resource for refugees and asylum seekers in the Netherlands, 
helping with a broad spectrum of issues that concern this vulnerable population. It is the 
Amsterdam regional branch of the national Dutch Council for Refugees (Vluchtelingenwerk 
Nederland). Many asylum seekers in the Netherlands find themselves waiting for extended 
periods of time before a decision is made by the state on their case. During this time, refugees are 
unable to access the formal Dutch classes offered to people wishing to inburger (undertake ‘civic 
integration’ courses). The SVAZ notes that “[m]any refugees ... have indicated that they wish to 
have more contact with Dutch people and more possibilities to learn the language” (SVAZ 
2011:11; my translation). To this end, SVAZ has organized voluntary language coaching 
partnerships that pair a refugee with a volunteer for the course of six months, meeting “at least 
one and a half hours a week together to practice the Dutch language and explore the society” 
(SVAZ 2011:11; my translation).  
 Although these kinds of projects now operate across the Netherlands, it is important to 
get a sense of how and why they may have first developed in Amsterdam. I conclude this chapter 
by considering some of the particular experiences, relationships, and attitudes that developed in 
Amsterdam, and how these dynamics shaped the study of questions of immigration, citizenship, 
and Dutchness that I examine through the lens of voluntary language coaching programs.  
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A city “used to immigration”: researching nationalism and citizenship in Amsterdam 
 
 The city of Amsterdam can simultaneously be considered exemplary of Dutchness and 
unusual in terms of attitudes and experiences of living in the Netherlands. As a prominent site of 
immigrant and migrant settlement across the centuries, Amsterdam is a place where the benefits 
and drawbacks of migration are magnified and normalized in ways that they are not in many 
other places in the Netherlands. The city’s inhabitants have effectively been pioneers and pilot 
study subjects for interventions into citizen practice that have since spread across the rest of the 
country. The development of voluntary Dutch language coaching projects as well as service 
learning initiatives in secondary schools are examples of this phenomenon. While the Dutch 
adage “just be normal, because that’s crazy enough” (doe maar gewoone, dan doe je gek genoeg) 
exemplified an attitude I heard frequently expressed by my informants in Amsterdam, the very 
notion of what is normal for Amsterdammers was not necessarily applicable for Dutch from 
other cities or villages in the country. Alternatively, as the historical economic and cultural centre 
of the Netherlands, Amsterdam has often strongly influenced what would later become 
widespread norms and values across the Netherlands. This occurred in spite of important 
regional differences, such as along the lines of religious and political belief. Even in the 
religiously mixed north-western region of the Netherlands in which the city is located, 
Amsterdam represents a space apart. This has much to do with its economic prosperity. 
 At least since the sixteenth century, economic prosperity was the primary concern of 
Amsterdam’s administrators (and arguably, continues to be highly valued among their 
contemporaries). Thus, religious minorities and migrants were considered tolerable insofar as 
they were economically productive residents of the city. This concern for the creation of wealth 
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is what has given Amsterdam its historical reputation for openness and tolerance, and its Yiddish 
pet name, Mokum.15 The tolerance of Jews and other (often oppressed) minorities in Amsterdam 
– and in other wealthy cities, particularly in the provinces of North and South Holland16 – 
stemmed from the attitude of the city administrators toward the tolerance of religious and 
political minorities. Indeed, Amsterdam and other Dutch cities competed to bring skilled 
labourers to work in their industries. This practical tolerance was extended to other so-called 
minority groups (such as wealthy Catholic merchants prior to the emancipatory constitution of 
1848), and was further developed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, where 
powerful consociational pillars encompassed all aspects of Dutch social and political life. 
Conversely, (foreign) individuals and groups who were not considered economically productive, 
who were thought of as a drain on Amsterdam’s (and, more broadly, Dutch) society faced strict 
and punishing social, political, and economic controls. A selective remembrance of these 
historical attitudes toward newcomers continues to under-gird the idea of Mokum today as a 
cosmopolitan space of tolerance, openness, and diversity. This experience has shaped the city 
differently than other regions in the Netherlands, especially with regard to politics and attitudes 
toward immigrants. 
 In addition to Amsterdam’s historically strong economy, the city also boasts a rich culture 
of arts and learning as the national capital. Beginning in 1900, the normative understanding of 
Dutch national culture began to take shape through the circulation of print media, as well as the 
establishment of important nationally-oriented public institutions and exhibitions. The use of 
private and (to a lesser degree) public funds to found such institutions in Amsterdam made the 
state capital “the undisputed cultural capital of the Netherlands” (Bossenbroek 1996:18; my 
translation). All sought to raise the cultural capital of Amsterdam and the Dutch people more 
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generally, such as through the “social uplift” of the working classes. These and other 
developments situated Amsterdam as a significant focal point for the formation of a nationally 
‘imagined community’ (Bloembergen 2006:52-53). With time, the Netherlands in general 
succumbed to the dominance of Holland’s urban cultural norms, which contributed to the erosion 
of regional specificities of norms, behaviours, and celebrations.17 
 As the economic and cultural centre of the Netherlands, Amsterdam’s history has made 
the city into a space where living together in diversity has become the norm – an experience that 
is perhaps very different than for people living elsewhere in the Netherlands. People in 
Amsterdam often told me about the centuries’ long history of migration to the city, and how 
living together with people from different religious and cultural backgrounds has always been an 
accepted part of life. José, one of my research participants in her sixties, drew on the special 
history of Amsterdam as a centre for immigrant settlement when giving me her opinions (in 
Dutch) about whether or not newcomers (allochtonen) could ever become “real 
Amsterdammers” (echt Amsterdammers). Newcomers, said José, “can be better Amsterdammers 
than Dutch. Because Amsterdam is,” she stressed, “used to immigration. Throughout the ages.” 
 
And we’re less cramped than a lot of other Dutchmen. For instance, Rotterdam. I 
am sorry to say, but that’s true. Rotterdam is a bit crazy. In this aspect, I think. So, 
I think yes. SamenSpraak has a few times a year, what they call a theme-day and 
we have a professor or a journalist, or someone to speak about society and 
language or non-native speakers [anderstaligen] or immigration. And, 
coincidentally, we had this past November [2009] a professor who elaborated on 
how this aspect of immigration has been in Amsterdam throughout the centuries. 
Is it new? No. It is not new. It is old. How old? Eight centuries old. Amsterdam 
has always been an immigration city. So here it is not so crazy and is only being 
made ridiculous by politicians. It was never crazy. Never.  
 
 Undoubtedly, the impact of and attitudes toward immigration and the nature of diversity 
has changed over the centuries in Amsterdam and across the country. From the late nineteenth 
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century into the years following the Second World War, Dutch society was organized through 
consociational pillars (verzuiling). In this context, social difference in the Netherlands was 
mainly thought of in terms of the different sects of Christianity, and the different secular 
corporate pillars, thus, class. Other forms of difference – notably racial or cultural difference – 
became a fixture of daily life during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, at first through the 
colonies and later in the Netherlands itself. This occurred in relation to the arrival of newcomers 
from the former colonies, new labour migrants (e.g. low-skilled Turks and northern Africans, 
highly-skilled and mobile ‘expats’ from elsewhere in the West), and new political refugees from 
around the globe. These recent newcomers have dramatically expanded the meaning of diversity 
in the Dutch context, unsettling the criteria for belonging. In many ways, these changes have 
been more intensely focused in Amsterdam than in other parts of the country as these newcomers 
predominantly settled in this city, and in the other large cities in the Randstad (i.e. Rotterdam, 
Den Haag, and Utrecht). 
 While many of these changes have happened gradually, some shifts have occurred within 
people’s lifetimes. This has especially been the case for those who have lived through the latter 
half of the twentieth century, with the Second World War, the collapse of the empire, the 
implementation of international guest worker programs, the secularization and social 
‘emancipation’ of the 1960s and 1970s, and the rise of the European Union. Each of these shifts 
and events had repercussions for Amsterdam and the nature of social diversity in the city. For 
instance, Bart, another language coaching volunteer, a life- long Amsterdammer in his sixties 
talked about the differences he experienced in his city during the twentieth century:18  
 
The sort of people living where has changed a lot. Outside of the ring [road] there 
are more people and allochtonen. Inside the ring there are also more Surinamese, 
people from Ghana, Dutch people too. The poorer regions of course. But 
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changes— [Amsterdam]’s gotten bigger. ... You see in the paper, more middle-
class people moving to Almere and lower middle-class Dutch people going to 
Almere and so on. But essentially we have always changes, had some 
arbeiderswijken [workers’ neighbourhoods] ... That stratification of population of 
Amsterdam. Yes, half of the people of Amsterdam, almost, is foreigner. Or not 
from Dutch origin. Now it is. And for me it’s normal. I don’t see it anymore. But 
my wife’s mother, when she used to live, she’s dead now for five years, but she 
lived in Zeist, which is a bourgeois [area]. You know Zeist? It’s east of Utrecht. ... 
But, it’s a typical, classical white region. Was. Anyway, when her mother was 
here, came in Amsterdam, she was astonished there were so many coloured 
people and foreigners! But it changed, of course. When I was born everyone was 
white. Coloured was very, very special. So that’s the change you notice. Really, 
you notice! 
 
As Bart indicates, white-flight from Amsterdam to regions peripheral to the city (such as the new 
city of Almere, about thirty kilometres east of Amsterdam) was the response of many of the 
people who negatively experienced these contemporary shifts in the meaning and realities of 
social and cultural diversity in the city.   
 By 2010, the population of Amsterdam had grown to 767,773 (documented) residents, 
with a population density of 4,648 people per square kilometre (City of Amsterdam, Research 
and Statistics 2010:6). Through the census data and policy categories, this population has been 
constructed and represented in a particular field of power relations to which we must be attentive 
as researchers (Asad 1994). Among these residents, the city and national research organizations 
classify 385,009 (50.1% of the local population) as “native Dutch” (autochtonen) whereas 
218,108 (28.5%) of these Amsterdammers are “first generation people with a foreign 
background,” and 164,656 (21.4%) are “second generation people with a foreign background” 
(both latter groups are known as allochtonen) (Gemeente Amsterdam 2010b).19 The City boasts 
of this diversity (over 170 different nationalities making a home in Amsterdam) in different 
publications and campaigns with pride, but also notes that it represents unique challenges. These 
challenges are coloured not only by the demography of the Amsterdamse population, but also by 
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the political approach to solving the problems that such differences pose. These are problems that 
have often been discussed by policy makers, politicians, academics and my interlocutors as 
issues of “social cohesion” and (through the language of neoliberal governmentality) the 
promotion of “active” or “good” citizenship. 
 The ways in which these “challenges” have been approached by the municipal 
government, and the people of Amsterdam itself are shaped by the city’s particular political 
legacy. Of the cities in the Netherlands, Amsterdam is especially famous for its radical politics in 
the post-World War Two period. As Uitermark notes, you can still see traces of the protests and 
demonstrations that rocked the city centre during the 1970s in some of the monuments around 
the Nieuwmarkt (2009:348). During the 1970s, residents of the city and members of these protest 
movements (e.g. Provos, squatters) sought to make the city both “just” and “liveable,” and the 
preservation of the historic Nieuwmarkt became a symbol of these values.20 Although the 
brilliance of this passion and radicalism has faded, it is clear that it still is a significant part of the 
image many of my informants have about Amsterdam as a city space, its cultural and political 
legacy.  
 The rhetoric and debate that dominated much of the 2010 federal election campaign 
between the populist Right politician Geert Wilders and Job Cohen (who had recently taken over 
as leader of the national labour party, PvdA) is illustrative of the political sentiments and special 
position of Amsterdam in the Netherlands. One of Wilders’ favourite attacks on his PvdA 
opponent was to denigrate his approach to the ‘problems’ of multicultural society during the 
latter’s nine-year tenure as mayor of Amsterdam.21 Cohen’s reputation for bringing people 
together, and forging unity through communication and conciliation was proven through many 
difficult moments in the city’s history, such as the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004 by a radical 
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Muslim Moroccan-Dutch man, the ongoing issues of criminality among youth (especially those 
of Moroccan heritage), and a bomb scare during 2009. This approach is epitomized by Cohen’s 
motto to “keep the things together” (de boel bij elkaar houden). As José explained to me, 
Cohen’s goal as mayor was to involve the diverse stakeholders and residents of the city in 
communicating both perceived problems and collectively producing potential solutions. Under 
Cohen, the City’s answer was to promote dialogue between the different ethnic and religious 
groups, seen as creating a stronger sense of community, social cohesion, and through that, 
security.22 The weight of Cohen’s approach is better understood when one considers the 
contemporary demographic make-up of Amsterdam. As mentioned, the city’s residents are 
almost equally ‘native’ Dutch (Dutch by ethnicity) and allochtone or non-‘native’ Dutch. Among 
the ‘non-native’ population in Amsterdam the largest ‘ethnic’ groups23 are Surinamese, as well as 
of Moroccan and Turkish origin (most of whom are Muslim). To put this in perspective in terms 
of the wider Amsterdam population, between 2006 and 2010 approximately 9% of Amsterdam’s 
residents were Surinamese by ‘ethnic origin’, another 9% Moroccan, and about 5% were Turkish 
(Gemeente Amsterdam 2010e).   
 It is with ‘non-Western’ Dutch in mind that many integration-oriented services and 
policies (such as ‘civic integration’) have been developed in Amsterdam and elsewhere in the 
Netherlands. The diverse network of religious groups that have long provided support to 
marginalized groups now frame immigrants and refugees as in need of such outreach and 
services.24 Such historic resources are part of a much larger constellation of contemporary 
programs, many of which are volunteer-supported initiatives aimed at helping immigrants. Some 
of these now nation-wide programs, developed and supported by non-governmental or non-profit 
organizations, have had their roots in Amsterdam, only later to be adopted in other Dutch cities. 
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Amsterdam’s large and diverse immigrant presence, especially since the end of the twentieth 
century, has meant that government, non-governmental and non-profit organizations have been 
key in establishing and delivering services to help support these newcomers, and their integration 
into the neighbourhood, city, and nation. As some of my research participants relayed, the 
relatively strong economy of Amsterdam has also acted as a buffer against some of the hostility 
toward immigrants experienced in other Dutch cities, such as Rotterdam. The long established 
reputation of Amsterdam as a cultural hub has also been thought to facilitate an openness to 
cultural and social difference, drawing many foreigners to the city on both temporary and more 
permanent bases as tourists, temporary migrant labourers (including highly skilled “expats” and 
lower-skilled manual labourers), and immigrants. All of these factors – which have uneven 
impact – make Amsterdam a particularly rich space for ethnographic research into questions of 
citizenship and belonging in the Netherlands today. These factors also contribute to the 
messiness of how certain people and processes are made and re-made into problems for 
governmental intervention, and how such interventions are contested or reconciled by actors like 
my research participants in their everyday practice of citizenship. 
 With these factors in mind, the following chapters address the ways in which citizenship 
practice has been problematized in the Dutch context. The significance of locating my research 
among these language coaches – informal, frontline citizenship educators – in Amsterdam will 
become increasingly clear to the reader as I trace the ways in which notions of ‘cultural’ 
difference have developed historically and are (re)configured today.   
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Figure 2.1  Gilde Amsterdam - Kletskoppen, 
Chatterbox campaign (2011) 
 
Figure 2.2  Gilde Amsterdam - Kletskoppen, 
Chatterbox campaign (2011)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Image from the Gilde Amsterdam’s 
website (2012)  
 
(http://www.gildeamsterdam.nl/taalbegeleiding/
nederlands-spreken) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Amsterdams Buurvrouwen Contact (ABC) banner (2012) 
 
 
  Figure 2.5 ABC Dutch 
language student 
Figure 2.6 ABC Dutch 
language student 
Figure 2.7 ABC Dutch 
language student 
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Figure 2.8  Mixen in Mokum: “Let new Amsterdammers see 
your city, and see it yourself from another side.” (2012) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9 Mixen in Mokum 
(http://www.mozeshuis.nl/main.php?obj_id=523236195) 
 
 
Figure 2.10 Photo from the SamenSpraak 
Oost website (2012) 
 
 
(http://www.wijkopbouworgaanoost.nl/acti
viteiten/samenspraak) 
 
 
Figure 2.11 Photo from the De Stichting 
VluchtelingenWerk Amstel tot Zaan (SVAZ) website 
(2012) 
 
(https://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/amsteltotzaan/) 
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3. Imagining Dutchness: tracing programs of social difference through empire  
 
 The production of the modern nation and its subjects relies not only on the production of 
Otherness, but also on the myths surrounding the self through the careful control of knowledge 
and safeguarding the invention of the past (cf. Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). As anthropologists 
have shown, a full understanding of these processes requires an examination of the colonial past; 
nation-building and empire-building were mutually constitutive projects (Stoler and Cooper 
2007:22; Dirks 1992:15, 22). The history of European nation-states is built on the fact that  
 
[e]mpire primed the modern state through expectations, habits, and tribulations. 
Bureaucracy, sovereignty, nationalism, and other attributes of the modern state 
were developed—at least in part—through imperial practices abroad and in 
response to the anxieties they often generated in Europe. (Stoler and McGranahan 
2007:29)  
 
These anxieties and practices stem, at least in part, from how social difference was constructed, 
normalized and deployed through processes of governmentality. Such expectations for behaviour 
and belief also mark the boundaries of national ‘culture’, sites where meaning about national 
communities and belonging are generated (McDonald 1989:308). These imperial experiences 
continue to undergird “common sense” ways of living, and relating to others in contemporary 
nation-states. 
 In this chapter, I trace how the Dutch have been rendered as a national people through 
examining some of the techniques and strategies that fostered this imagined community, drawing 
boundaries that defined what it was not. The genealogy of the program(s) that I begin to trace 
through the experience of empire is crucial for understanding the ways in which the individuals 
and voluntary projects central to my ethnography negotiate, reconcile, and challenge citizenship 
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practice in their lives and work with newcomers. Volunteers’ perspectives and experiences of 
“good” citizenship practice in Dutch society come into focus only through a comprehensive 
understanding of the historical processes and policy interventions that have shaped the cultural 
and political landscape in which my participants live.  
 I begin this exploration by addressing some of the ways in which ‘cultural’ difference has 
been historically problematized among the Dutch (as with management of internal religious 
minorities and the treatment of labour migrants or refugees), through the intimate relationships 
generated through the experience of empire (cf. Stoler 2011; McClintock 1995). This dissertation 
approaches empire in the sense of Stoler’s (2006) “imperial formations”: as 
 
macropolities whose technologies of rule thrive on the production of exceptions 
and their uneven and changing proliferation. Critical features of imperial 
formations include harboring and building on territorial ambiguity, redefining 
legal categories of belonging and quasi-membership, and shifting the geographic 
and demographic zones of partially suspended rights. (2006:128) 
   
Empire in this sense, is not usefully thought of in terms of a clearly defined geopolity or 
historical period, but as a system of knowledge and processes that enabled particular 
relationships of explotiation and social hierarchies to develop as “common sense.” Such projects 
or modes of governance were continually forming and transforming across time and space. Even 
so, many scholars (and political pundits) connect empire to a specific time in the past: Western 
European rule over colonies located around the world from the sixteenth century (earlier for 
Portugal and Spain) until the mid-twentieth century, with the height of European empire 
occurring during “the long nineteenth century” (Stoler 2006:127; Bossenbroek 1996; cf. Thomas 
1994:12-13). This dissertation traces the Dutch imperial experience through the ideas, affective 
ties, and relationships built since before the end of the Eighty Year’s War (1568-1648), as Dutch 
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mercantile interests expanded into the Indonesian archipelago and elsewhere. Importantly, as 
Cooper has discussed in relation to the French empire, the Dutch empire “was not located in the 
colonies,” but should be understood as a “single but differentiated” Netherlands (Stoler 
2006:138). The loss of the Dutch East Indies in 1949 may be considered a decisive moment in 
the diminuation of the Dutch empire, yet technologies of rule formed through empire continue to 
resonate in contemporary questions around meanings connected to belonging in the Netherlands 
and “good” Dutch citizenship.  
 In understanding empire in this way, it is analytically important to examine empire’s 
profound effects on the ways in which questions of social difference, management, and nation-
building were answered and configured ‘at home’ (Stoler and Cooper 1997:5). This analysis 
shows how powerful discourses around social difference developed through the translocal space 
of empire. The people and processes that came to be considered ‘problems’ for government in 
Europe and overseas formed in relation to the same processes of problematization, drawing on 
the same systemic ways of thinking and knowing the world (Stoler 1995:93). Understanding this 
national narrative and Dutch genealogies of social difference are essential to laying the 
foundations for an analysis of the contemporary reactions, tensions, and contradictions extending 
from late twentieth century immigration and settlement patterns in the Netherlands, as well as the 
roles of sociality, social service provision, and (voluntary) labour in contemporary citizenship 
practice. 
 In this chapter, I outline some of the key markers of difference that were engaged in the 
Netherlands and in encounters between the Dutch and Others through mercantile and later 
colonial endeavours. As I show here, the notion of ‘cultural’ difference has developed as new 
problems emerged through the experience of empire. Relationships with faraway peoples and 
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places were particularly important for the development of ideas of the Dutch as a national 
people, a civilizing force, and moral exemplar to the rest of the world. These conceptions of 
‘Dutchness’ were importantly impacted by of ideas of racial difference and the paternalistic role 
of the Dutch vis-à-vis the ‘family of man’ that developed through encounters in the colonies. 
Building on these historical foundations, I trace some of the ways in which notions of ‘culture’ 
drew on and reconfigured older notions of difference and Dutchness in combination with 
expectations for behaviour and affective relations in both public and private spheres. I analyze 
how these ‘cultural’ forms emerged as an important grammar for understanding difference and 
the problems facing colonial governors. These developments are especially clear in the 
experiences of the Dutch in the East Indies (cf. Stoler 1995), but are echoed across the Dutch 
empire (cf. Van Lier 1971[1949]; Oostindie and Paasman 1998), and re-echoed in other colonial 
and nationalist projects (cf. McClintock 1995; McClintock et al. 1997; Thomas 1994; Stoler and 
Cooper 1997; Stoler 2011). Across these spaces and times, the Dutch language is recognized as 
an important thread of continuity in how problematic categories of culturally different subjects 
have been recognized and managed. I close this chapter by alluding to some of the ways in which 
considerations of difference, and governmental strategies for the management of problematic 
classed, religious, racial, and other differences traverse the space of empire. Ways of thinking 
about and managing the difference of Dutch East Indies or Surinamese subjects (or Indians in the 
British East Indies, or Algerians in French Northern Africa) bear striking parallels to how poor or 
working class Dutch (or English, or minority language ‘French’ peasants) in Europe were 
approached as in need of charity, mission, and discipline. The notions of difference developed 
through empire have had lasting effects for contemporary understandings of how boundaries are 
and should be drawn around the Dutch national community. 
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Developing a grammar of difference and Dutchness 
 
 Questions of diversity have had a long history in the Netherlands. This history of 
diversity management was often a point of national pride for many ‘native’ Dutch with whom I 
spoke. In these conversations, in scholarship, policy, political rhetoric, and discussions in the 
media certain signifiers of difference have been pivotal in defining cultural (or civilizational or 
national) similarity and difference among the Dutch.  
 The historically central role of religious difference in the lives of the Dutch was shared 
by others across Europe as regional ‘peoples’ were progressively consolidated through appeals to 
religious authority into larger political entities (the beginning of modern nations). Conflict, 
especially due to religious persecution, prompted large-scale population movements that shaped 
the geopolitical space of Europe during this early period of state formation. For instance, the 
Reformation and Counter-Reformation movements of the sixteenth century split the people and 
powers of Europe on issues of religion, as Protestantism and Catholicism divided the continent. 
Protestantism, especially the churches established by Luther and Calvin, took hold in much of 
what are today Germany, Switzerland, Scotland, and the Netherlands. This schism played an 
integral role in many of the conflicts in Europe for centuries – including the Eighty Year’s War 
(1568-1648) between the Holy Roman Empire and what would become an autonomous, 
Protestant Netherlands. Since their break with the Holy Roman Empire, the northern, Protestant, 
wealthy, coastal provinces – especially Holland – have been dominant in the political, economic 
and cultural life of what would become the contemporary Netherlands.25 With the independence 
of the Netherlands from Spain at the end of the Eighty Year’s War, Calvinism was instituted as 
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the state religion, and the practice of all other religions was outlawed (until the constitutional 
changes of 1848). Unsurprisingly, the question of religious difference was important in 
establishing the power dynamics between the different regions within the Netherlands, 
particularly between the north and predominantly Catholic south. Such differences were 
significant in the formation of the country, in the politics of national identity, and the 
organization of social difference. 
 Significantly, Dutch engagements with religious and other forms of difference have often 
been tempered by economic concerns. This is clear in the reception of migrants and refugees 
throughout the history of the Netherlands. This was certainly the case for those living in the 
larger and wealthier urban centres, as I have discussed in Chapter 2 with regard to Amsterdam. 
Since the early 1600s, the Dutch often had contact with foreigners, from migrant labourers 
working in sea-faring, agricultural or skilled industries to religious and political refugees.26 
Indeed, among the (northern) economic centres, cities competed with one another to recruit and 
secure skilled newcomers. Even so, many were not welcomed. Religious or political beliefs – 
especially those differences not softened by wealth or desirable skills – could just as easily be 
framed as objectionable qualities and used to bar the entry of certain groups (such as Jesuits), or 
individuals (particularly notable political refugees, such as the English King Charles II) 
(Lucassen and Penninx 1997:79). 
 The accumulation of wealth was in other ways a defining factor in early Dutch nation-
building. Although the relationships with faraway places like the Indonesian archipelago, the 
Caribbean and South America were first fomented by non-state mercantilism, exploitative 
relationships between the Netherlands and these sites and peoples evolved with the establishment 
of empire (cf. Dirks 1992:19). As the Dutch provinces fought for independence from Spanish 
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rule at the end of the sixteenth century, Dutch merchants became increasingly involved in 
mercantile and colonial expansion overseas. With the founding of Batavia (later, Jakarta) in 
1619, the imperialism of the Dutch began in earnest; significantly earlier than other modern 
imperial powers (namely England and France, the Portuguese and Spanish empires were by this 
time beginning to wane) (cf. Helgerson 1992:49). The Netherlands’ relatively minor status as a 
European state was thus amplified through its positioning on the world stage as a great imperial 
power by the end of the 1870s (Kuitenbrouwer 1991:25). Among the Dutch people, it was 
through the overseas colonies of “the Indies and South Africa [that] the Netherlands strengthened 
its national self-consciousness and enriched its national culture” (Bossenbroek 1996:10; my 
translation). As self-described leaders of global commerce, the Dutch trading empire – 
dominated by the northern, coastal province of Holland27 – spanned for over three centuries from 
the East Indies (Indonesia), to the Boer Republics (South Africa), to the New World of the 
Caribbean (the Dutch Antilles) and South America (Surinam). In 1900, Holland was, as the 
Dutch historian Martin Bossenbroek (1996) writes, “at its broadest” (op zijn breedst) in terms of 
its influence around the world. The empire brought the small European country of the 
Netherlands immense wealth, but also contributed significantly to how the Dutch came to view 
themselves as leaders in the world. 
Through empire, the Dutch – politicians, the monarchy, missionaries, and academics – 
saw themselves as cultural and moral teachers, a ‘guiding nation’ (gidsland) for those 
encompassed by the territories of the empire, and, indeed, the rest of the world (Kuitenbrouwer 
1991:322). These sorts of national sentiments, cultivated and refracted through the lens of 
empire, were commonly shared among European imperial powers (cf.  McClintock 1995; 
Smedley 1999; Thorne 1997; Comaroff 1997; Chakrabarty 1997; Conklin 1998; Colonna 1997; 
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Wildenthal 1997). While the work of the Dutch overseas as a guiding and civilizing leader was 
important for building a Dutch national identity, the realities of this mission were sanitized for 
public consumption. In the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe, this has been observed in the 
how the relationship with the colonies was presented through popular media (e.g. Christian 
missionary groups’ illustrated periodicals), museums or monuments (highlighting the nationalist 
triumphs of imperial industry, wealth, and sovereignty), or through federal budget reports (where 
violence against indigenous workers in the colonies was balanced against the prospect of a 
national surplus or deficit) (Bossenbroek 1996; Stoler 1989; Taussig 1992).  
This understanding of the role of the Dutch and other Europeans overseas as a benevolent 
civilizing force for the rest of the world was, paradoxically, used to justify the grim and often 
brutal realities of imperial relations with the colonies (cf. Taussig 1992:164). In the Netherlands, 
and in other Western European nation-states, the discourse of the nation relied on “a hierarchy of 
moralities, prescriptions for conduct and bourgeois civilities that kept a racial politics of 
exclusion at its core” (Stoler 1995:93). These sentiments grew from generations of encounters 
with Others, a striking example which is clear in the “[c]ynical pragmatism and blatant contempt 
[that] dominated Dutch and Dutch colonial perspectives towards Africans and their Caribbean 
offspring” (Oostindie and Paasman 1998:353; cf. Van Lier 1971). Necessary to the Surinamese 
plantation colony, the enslavement and inhumane treatment of Africans here and elsewhere was 
morally justified by the Dutch and other Europeans. These colonizers understood Africans and 
their Afro-Caribbean descendants as lesser humans, who were “by nature course, lascivious, not 
prone to civilization,” but who may in time (and with their benevolent removal by the Dutch 
from the “brutality of Africa”), improve through the adoption of Western cultural forms, such as 
conversion to Christianity (Oostindie and Paasman 1998:353, 354; cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 
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1992:258; McClintock 1995; Smedley 1999).  
Religion, as a marker of Europeanness or civilization, became important for calculations 
of social difference and legal privilege in relations between Dutch merchants and others abroad 
during the colonial period. However, in the colonies, unlike in the Netherlands, racialized and 
linguistic markers of difference increasingly came to matter in determining who was European or 
Dutch and who was not.28 These ideas, like religion, were tied to culture during the VOC era 
(Verenigde Oostindische Compangie; Dutch East Indies Company). In fact, during this period 
religion and culture came to be viewed by colonial administrators as more or less inseparable, 
and Christianity – particularly Protestantism – was considered a sign of political allegiance to the 
Dutch in the East Indies (Smith Kipp 2003:87).29 Connections made between culture and religion 
allowed East Indies Christians to be given the same legal status as VOC employees. In Surinam, 
religious belief and practice was also associated with Dutchness but with different effects: a 
“black’s ability to be Christianized and to stick to ‘the true faith’ became a yardstick for 
measuring his or her civilization or even for establishing the sheer possibility to civilize any 
black person” (Oostindie 1990:234; Goldberg 2000:160). Telling of the complexity and power of 
culturalized difference in both colonies, adherence to Christianity did not always translate into a 
parallel social status with Europeans. This was clear in the ways in which local (‘native’ or 
‘mixed race’) East Indies women classified as ‘European’ through marriage to European men 
(VOC employees, Batavian bureaucrats, Dutch traders) were nonetheless barred from migration 
to the Netherlands with their husbands (unless their husbands were of considerably high rank in 
the VOC) (Smith Kipp 2003:87-88; Stoler 1997:217-218; cf. Van Lier 1971:76-78). While the 
VOC was distinct from the Dutch state, the kinds of discourses and legal boundaries developed to 
define ‘Europeans’ and colonial Others during this early period would later inform nationalist 
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discourse in the empire and the Netherlands. 
As European overseas empires continued to strengthen and expand, one of the questions 
that began to trouble imperial powers was that of just how ‘Dutch’ (or ‘French’ or ‘German’ or 
‘European’) colonial subjects should be (Colonna 1997; Conklin 1998; Wildenthal 1997; cf. 
Beriss 2004). Moreover, upon what basis should ‘Dutch’ or ‘European’ status (at minimum, in 
the legal sense) be recognized and defined? Emerging ideologies in Europe during the late 
eighteenth century (the Enlightenment, liberalism, revolutionary ideals, and classical economics) 
were part of a powerful discourse that influenced these questions as they applied to the colonies. 
Processes of conquest, exploitation and subjugation in the colonies occurred in tandem with the 
deployment of these universal ideas ‘at home’ in Europe (Stoler and Cooper 1997:1; cf. Colonna 
1997; Thorne 1997). Debates about citizenship and the ‘rights of man’, as during the French 
Revolution, extended to questions of how these principles should apply to the peoples of the 
conquered, overseas territories. For European imperial powers, the colonies “did more than 
reflect the bounded universality of metropolitan political culture: they constituted an imaginary 
and physical space in which the inclusions and exclusions built into the notions of citizenship, 
sovereignty, and participation were worked out” (Stoler and Cooper 1997:3). The colonies and 
their peoples were a tool in the European construction and management of social difference 
based on evolving categories, such as race, religion, class, gender, sexuality. These categories of 
the imperial order were connected to and articulated through notions of “culture” which was, as 
Stoler writes,  
 
harnessed to do more specific political work; not only to mark difference, but to 
rationalize the hierarchies of privilege and profit, to consolidate the labor [sic] 
regimes of expanding capitalism, to provide the psychological scaffolding for the 
exploitative structures of colonial rule. (1995:27) 
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Thus, colonial peoples served as a distant, yet intimate site of alterity against which ideas of 
national, civilizational, cultural, and individual selfhood could be built, tested, and deployed 
across the space of empire, from the overseas colonies to the European nation-state. The 
organizing grammars developed during this period and across the space of empire have had 
profound and lasting effects on how difference and citizenship has come to be understood and 
experienced in the contemporary Netherlands.  
 
Technical drift: refining problems and sites for governmental intervention 
 
The working out of these logics reflected multiple and dynamic practices of boundary 
making. The ways in which certain categories of difference became objects of thought and 
problems requiring intervention developed alongside the changing conditions of empire. To take 
the example of the Dutch East Indies, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a growing 
mestizo society, born of relationships between European men and Asian women, had become 
central to economic, political and social life in this colony. The conditions for the production of 
this ‘mixed’ society, concubinage (and to a lesser extent marriage) between Batavian officials, 
VOC men, and other Europeans with local, Asian women had to a certain degree been previously 
condoned. From the 1770s, similar practices of concubinage had occurred in Surinam between 
prestigious white men and free, middle-class creole women. Yet, the social and legal 
implications of “marriage Surinamese-style” were far different than concubinage in the Dutch 
East Indies. In Surinam, while the social and financial status of concubines and their families 
might rise through such intimate relationships, these women and their children remained barred 
from attaining legal status equivalent to Europeans (Van Lier 1971:102). In the East Indies, on 
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the other hand, ‘European’ was a legal status that applied to people living in the colony who had 
come directly from Europe, but also for people born in the Dutch East Indies who were 
recognized by a father who held this status, and for women who married men of ‘European’ 
status. By the nineteenth century, the potential legal ramifications of concubinage in the East 
Indies had contributed to the increasing anxieties over ‘miscegenation’ and the question of race 
(and racial mixing) was understood as ever more problematic. The legal and political tensions 
surrounding ‘mixed marriages’ and a growing population of ‘mixed’ race children were not 
limited to the Dutch. French (Conklin 1998) and German (Wildenthal 1997) colonial and 
national governments were also faced with the problem of racial mixing or ‘degradation’. It was 
in this context that discourses of eugenics, racial degeneracy, and social hygiene among the 
white, European populations emerged across the space of empire(s) (Pattynama 1998:98-99; cf. 
Stoler 1995:41; Conklin 1998; Thorne 1997; Wildenthal 1997).30 In the Dutch East Indies, the 
administration was particularly uneasy over “the children of European fathers and Asian 
mothers, for whom a carefully constructed educational curriculum and vocational environment 
would be devised to make them into what one Dutch official called ‘perfected natives, not 
imitation Europeans’” (Stoler and Cooper 1997:7). Where these people fit into the categories of 
the empire, of European Self and colonized Other was considered by colonial powers as a serious 
problem among the groups of people who were ‘mixed’, no longer purely ‘indigenous’ or 
‘European’.  
Considerations of language, culture, and race were of utmost importance in such 
calculations for the Dutch, yet these preoccupations crossed empires, and connected with 
politically-charged debates about difference circulating in Europe at the time (cf. Anderson 
1991; Gilman 1986; McClintock 1995; Mosse 1985; Viswanathan 1995). The national discourse 
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cultivated among the Dutch thoroughly connected a vision of the Netherlands as a ‘guiding 
nation’ (gidsland) and a moral exemplar. The civilizing mission of the Dutch was clearest in the 
East Indies, in part because of the colonizers’ understanding of different colonial subjects’ 
position within the ‘family of man’. This understanding of humanity had rather different 
consequences for the indigenous and Afro-Caribbean slave populations of Surinam and Curaçao, 
whose cultures were seen by the Dutch as so primitive that they were not worth acknowledging 
or preserving. It was debated whether these peoples could indeed be civilized, a position that no 
doubt justified the brutality of the New World extractive and plantations colonies (Oostindie and 
Paasman 1998:353). Such beliefs about the inferiority of other “races” were widely shared by 
other European peoples. In eighteenth century America, for instance, Africans especially were 
considered “culturally backward, primitive, intellectually stunted, prone to violence, morally 
corrupt, undeserving of the benefits of civilization, insensitive to the finer arts and … 
aesthetically ugly and animal- like” (Smedley 1999:695; cf. Goldberg 2000). Alternatively, the 
Dutch considered indigenous peoples of the East Indies to have distinct cultures that were to be 
respected, even if not considered the equal of European cultures (cf. Cohn 1983; Dirks 1986; 
Chakrabarty 1997). Reflecting other European imperial discourses regarding the colonies, Dutch 
schoolchildren learned to frame “Indonesians, the elite in particular, … as part of the family of 
man but still a younger generation or as creatures occupying a lower rung on the evolutionary 
ladder, waiting to be educated by their Dutch tutors” (Locher-Scholten 1998:133; Bossenbroek 
1996:274; cf. McClintock 1997:91; Viswanathan 1997; Oostindie and Paasman 1998; Smedley 
1999). The presentation of the Dutch East Indies in Dutch schools at the turn of the twentieth 
century highlighted the colony as a place of idealized ‘ethical’ imperial politics. Nowhere was 
this moral commitment to the East Indies more clearly stated than in development of the so-
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called ‘Ethical Policy’ of Kuyper’s Calvinist Antirevolutionary government (Kuitenbrouwer 
1991:32; 319-322).  
As a key figure in Dutch politics during this period, Kuyper’s Ethical Policy was a 
response to the problems in governing the Dutch East Indies. Drawing strongly on his views and 
position as an orthodox Calvinist minister, Kuyper’s political approach framed the Dutch 
responsibility toward this colony as part of a civilizing mission rooted in religious and racial 
stewardship, which heavily reflected what has elsewhere been called the “white man’s burden” 
(cf. Pattynama 1998:89; Gouda 1998; McClintock 1995). First articulated in 1874 (though not 
officially implemented until 1901), the “self-consciously parental discourse” of the 
Antirevolutionary Party toward the Dutch East Indies considered the (Christian) moral duty of 
the colonial government to instruct, develop, and guide the indigenous population (Gouda 
1998:237; Pattynama 1998:89; Locher-Scholten 1998:133). (Notably, such tactics became 
observable in policy for governing Surinam only following the abolition of slavery (Van Lier 
1971; Oostindie 1990; Oostindie and Paasman 1998).) This ‘ethical’ stance toward the colonies 
reveals how engagements with difference manoeuvred between civilizing mission discourse and 
processes of boundary making between metropole and colony. This tension emerges, as when 
Kuyper 
 
emphasized that the Netherlands East Indies were not an integral part of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands. They were, rather, an obligation inherited from the 
bankrupt United East Indies Company (VOC). Subject peoples in the Netherlands 
East Indies were not Dutch citizens, and had no rights under the Dutch 
constitution. (James and Schrauwers 2003:60) 
 
 
As James and Schrauwers indicate, the impetus for this ‘ethical’ shift in policy toward the 
colonies grew out of the sense that the Netherlands owed the peoples of the East Indies a debt for 
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centuries of abuse and economic exploitation. Through the moral rhetoric of the ‘white man’s 
burden’, the entire ‘family of man’ could, or rather must be brought under the control and 
guidance of the white imperial father-figure (McClintock 1995:232-257; Thomas 1994). Having 
envisaged the world through the language of kinship, Europeans found new ways to justify their 
position of political and cultural domination, including measures of brutal violence, vis-à-vis 
those they colonized. Through programs of education, or actions articulated as educative or 
civilizing, the processes of imperialism continued and intensified (Colonna 1997; Chakrabarty 
1997; Thorne 1997). This was especially true of the ways in which racialized hierarchies were 
normalized in the colonies and the nation through the incorporation of other ‘symptoms of 
modernity’ such as class, gender and sexuality (Conklin 1998:67; Viswanathan 1995; 
McClintock 1995; Mosse 1985).    
 Such hierarchies have been marked by scholars such as Stoler in colonial administrators’ 
deep concerns “around issues of sentiment and their subversive tendencies, around ‘private’ 
feelings and their political consequences, around racial attribution to sensibilities, and around 
assessments of affective dispositions and their beneficent and dangerous political effects” 
(2009:58; cf. Chakrabarty 1997). In policing the murky boundaries of “culture” that drew on 
racial, linguistic, religious, classed difference and affective habits among colonial subjects, 
education and child-rearing played an important role (Stoler 1995; Colonna 1997; Conklin 
1998). However, the diverse contexts of different colonies deeply impacted the ways in which 
such boundaries were conceived and policed, and colonial subjects were understood in relation to 
specific sets of problems for governors. For example, as the Dutch approached emancipation in 
1863, Christianization of the slave population in Surinam – discouraged during previous 
centuries – was promoted as an important tool in creating “an obedient free population” 
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(Oostindie and Paasman 1998:354). Similarly, as the Surinamese population grew culturally and 
linguistically more diverse with the arrival of indentured labourers from the British and Dutch 
East Indies during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, administrators in the 
Netherlands and Surinam sought to promote the “[a]doption of Western cultural elements … via 
primary education in Dutch” (Van Lier 1971:221). The problems that education was intended to 
solve in Surinam reflected its history as an extractive site, rather than a colony where large 
numbers of Europeans settled. Surinam’s marginal and routinely transitory European population 
meant that educational uplift was primarily directed at maintaining the colony’s “Western, 
Christian cachet” by ‘improving’ or ‘civilizing’ the former slave masses, creole population, and 
growing numbers of East Indians – not at making these natives into acceptable ‘European’ 
subjects (Van Lier 1971:193).31  
 In the Dutch East Indies, with its prominent European and mestizo society, the 
relationship between culture, education and upbringing was more fraught than in Surinam. Here, 
the attention to the moral uplift of the empire’s colonial ‘children’ was set directly against 
anxieties over determining and maintaining the legal (and cultural) status of the biological 
children of Dutch or European colonials and indigenous women. At the turn of the twentieth 
century, racial markers superseded (but did not erase) the religious markers prominent during the 
earlier colonial forays of the VOC in the Dutch East Indies in delineating the privileges of 
nationality. In understanding difference in this way, the problem of miscegenation became 
paramount in formalizing legal distinctions between Indies colonial subjects as well as with 
distinguishing them from the ‘real’ Dutchmen of Europe (Smith Kipp 2003:90). This turn of the 
century preoccupation with strictly defined racial categories emerged from the perceived 
dilemmas of the eighteenth century, where lines between race and class were frequently blurred 
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(Stoler and Cooper 1997:34). Terminology that delineated status “equated to” (gelijkgesteld) 
European or indigenous was replaced with the purely racialized categories of ‘European’, 
‘Foreign Oriental’, and ‘Native’ (Smith Kipp 2003:91). Resonating with the experiences of 
German ‘pioneers’ in Southwest and East Africa, and Samoa (Wildenthal 1997), by the twentieth 
century, Dutch colonial authorities too were faced with the difficulty of providing  
 
legal precision to categories that were never pure in any case and were continually 
confounded by the messy realities of life. Whether one was ‘European’ was a 
question most acute, perhaps, for the many Eurasians or Indo-Europeans, some of 
whom had received Western educations and had been raised in a Dutch-speaking 
environment, and others whose families had become dissolved (opgelost) into the 
native population. As the special position for Japanese32 suggests, who was 
legally a ‘European’ had almost as much to do with wealth and politics as it did 
with one’s parentage or ancestry. (Smith Kipp 2003:91) 
 
 By the end of the nineteenth century, religious, racial, as well as linguistic, sexual, 
classed and affective disposition had become conceptually organized around notions of European 
or Dutch civilization or culture. Laws enacted in 1884 stipulated that “access to European 
equivalent status in the Indies required a ‘complete suitability [geschiktheid] for European 
society’, defined as a belief in Christianity, fluency in spoken and written Dutch, and training in 
European morals and ideas” (Stoler 1997:217). Social behaviour in the Dutch East Indies, 
particularly relating to domestic arrangements (how marriage and family were constituted) had 
profound effects on questions of class, nationality, citizenship and ‘whiteness’ or ‘Europeanness’ 
(Stoler and Cooper 1997:25-27; cf. Gouda 1998; Smedley 1999; Wildenthal 1997; Colonna 
1997; McDonald 1989). The terms involved in these legal reckonings were highly discriminatory 
given that “[a]t issue were the means by which European beschaving (civilization or culture) 
would be disseminated without undercutting the criteria by which European claims to privilege 
were made” (Stoler 1997:202). Such legal distinctions between subjects in the colony and those 
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‘at home’ in the Netherlands would become of utmost importance with the dissolution of the 
Dutch empire in the East Indies.33 
 
Definite effects: discourses of Dutchness in imperial power politics  
 
 The development of culturalized notions of difference has historically proven a powerful 
“common sense” way of understanding and problematizing social, political and economic 
relationships. This is especially visible when one contrasts the contemporaneous attitudes toward 
the Boer ‘dream’ colonies in South Africa with the Dutch East Indies at the turn of the twentieth 
century. It was in the context of imperial power politics that the Dutch viewed the Boer Wars as 
a cynical expression on the part of the British Empire of power over justice. Meanwhile, the war 
being fought in Aceh, Sumatra by the Dutch against a Muslim, indigenous sultanate during this 
same period was explicitly not viewed in the same light (Kuitenbrouwer 1991:215). The role of 
culturalized difference – drawing in notions of race, language, religious practice and belief, 
gendered and sexual norms and behaviour – was a key lens through which such distinctions were 
made. These dynamics presented distinct problems for the conception, normalization and 
management of social difference, highlighting the role of different signifiers in how the 
boundaries of respectable Dutchness were developed and conducted across the space of empire. 
 A significant factor in the making of this distinction between the two contexts was the 
“supposed cultural relatedness of the Boers, degenerate remnants of an earlier Dutch diaspora 
during a ‘Golden Age’ of Dutch commercial hegemony” (James and Schrauwers 2003:49). This 
view facilitated notions of the Boers as ‘kin’ (stamgenooten) who were connected by a shared 
religion, language, race and culture as members of an imagined Groter Nederland (Greater 
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Netherlands). As rediscovered close kin to the Dutch in the ‘family of man’, the Boers were seen 
as bearers of ‘authentic’ Dutch culture that had been degraded through generations of cultural 
isolation in southern Africa. This created a moral imperative that the nineteenth century Dutch in 
the Netherlands intervene to help ‘revive’ aspects of Dutch, middle-class sensibilities that had 
been ‘lost’ by the Boers (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:198-204).34 These shared connections 
were, coincidentally, viewed as supporting valuable political and economic connections between 
the Netherlands and the colony, at the time under British control (Kuitenbrouwer 1991:196). 
These interests were promoted through the improvement of material interests (agriculture, 
industry, trade, mining), and a moral conviction among the Dutch to spread enlightenment ideals 
to all of southern Africa (Bossenbroek 1996:244).  
 As with the public support for the Boers, the Dutch administration was concerned in the 
East Indies with the recuperation and maintenance of “Europeanness” among its mixed-race and 
native European subjects in the colonies. As discussed, the centuries- long phenomenon of racial 
mixing in the Dutch East Indies had become a distinct problem for legal status classification, as 
well as a problem of cultural, civilizational, and racial dilution or contamination (Pattynama 
1998: 99; Stoler 1997:211-212; cf. Wildenthal 1997; Conklin 1998). These moral dilemmas were 
amplified by the ongoing threats to Dutch rule and economic interests posed by the indigenous 
population. This concern underscores  how governmental programs are impacted by processes 
that occur beyond their scope. These programs are subject to instability, fracture, and critique by 
those they govern, even as they powerfully educate and shape social conduct (Li 2007a:279).  
By 1900, practices of concubinage and mixed-marriage between Europeans (usually 
men) and Asians (or Eurasians, usually women) in the Indies were seen as more than simply 
undesirable, and became cause for political unrest. More than 70,000 people living in the Dutch 
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East Indies were legally considered ‘European’ and of these, nearly three-quarters were of mixed 
descent. Almost seven in ten knew little to no Dutch, and many outright rejected the norms and 
values of “respectable bourgeois European society” (Stoler 1997:199, 210; cf. Stoler 2009). 
While these conditions echoed those found among the rediscovered Boers, the problems this 
population posed for the colonial administration differed in many important ways. Children from 
mixed-unions were seen as both physically and morally tainted as more rigidly defined 
boundaries were drawn between ‘Indo’ and ‘European’ social and legal statuses (Pattynama 
1998:100). Even “pure-blooded” Europeans who stayed on (or too long) in the colonies (blijvers, 
verindische) were thought to be threatened by the ‘transformative’ and ‘degrading’ power of the 
colonial climate and cultural mixing (Stoler 1997:213, 214; Pattynama 1998:99; McClintock 
1995; Conklin 1998; Wildenthal 1997; cf. Briggs 1996; Salomon 2002; Young 1995; 
Chakrabarty 1997). As Conklin shows in a parallel case in the French empire, there was a 
widespread concern among colonists that white children were especially vulnerable and unable 
to thrive in the ‘dangerous’ tropical climate (1998:79). Compounding anxieties over the threat 
posed by the physical environment of the colonies, further peril was engendered by the 
‘decivilizing’ influences of social mixing with native peoples – especially European men and 
native or mixed-race women (Conklin 1998:78). Among French and Dutch colonial officials of 
this period, there was a pressing concern that “the Europeanness of the métis children could 
never be assured, despite a rhetoric affirming that education and upbringing were transformative 
processes” (Stoler 1997:211; Conklin 1998:77). This fed into the development of a highly 
stratified educational system in the Indies, where the standards for white-collar posts remained 
unattainable for anyone but those Dutch who were from Europe. It was felt, during the ‘Ethical 
Policy’ period, that it was “impossible for persons raised and educated in the Indies to be the 
107 
 
bearers [dragers] of Western culture and civilization” (Stoler 1997:216) and they were therefore 
barred from coveted administrative posts. Similarly, though less explicitly than stated in the 
Dutch ‘Ethical Policy’, were the processes whereby students were evaluated and placed during 
teacher training in Algeria. As Colonna (1997:354) details, “educational performances or 
pedagogical aptitudes had less weight in this evaluation than the so-called personal qualities.” 
Thus, the selection of teachers in French colonial Algeria had less to do with academic 
achievement, and more to do with notions of racialized, classed, and other criteria denoting 
French cultural belonging. Although the form of implementation varied in practice, racialized or 
culturalized segregation between those deemed able to hold the post of administrators and those 
subjects in need of guidance or discipline was a common practice across different European 
colonies (Blom Hansen and Stepputat 2005; cf. Viswanathan 1997). 
Social distinctions of Europeanness existed alongside and in relation to legal ones in the 
East Indies, leading to the circulation of a number of different terms that applied to people 
legally-constructed as European. Someone termed an ‘Indo’ could have European legal status, 
but in everyday discourse, this category included people who had ‘fallen’ from the pure social 
conceptualization of Europeanness. ‘Indo’ was applied to blijvers (literally, stayers) and the 
verindische (Indianized), meaning first generation Europeans who stayed in the colony, and poor 
whites in the colony. Meanwhile ‘Indo-European’ might apply equally to, for example, people 
considered mixed (mengbloeden, mixed-blood; Eurasian), Europeans born in the Dutch East 
Indies but of Dutch nationality, and European blijvers who saw the Indies as a second fatherland 
(Stoler 1997:222). These concerns about colonial wolves in sheep’s clothing were amplified by 
the panic at the turn of the twentieth century over the possibility of European men in the Indies 
taking bribes from local, indigenous people to legally-recognize children, and thereby obtain 
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‘European’ status for them (Gouda 1998:242). Fears over these ‘artificially fabricated 
Europeans’ (kunstmatig gefabriceerde Europeanen) were one and the same with fears about 
blurred distinctions between ruler and ruled, between ‘native’ and ‘European’ cultural fashions 
(Stoler 1997:211). In one sense, ‘Europeans’ were considered ‘white’ – or at least not marked as 
‘native’ or ‘mixed’ – but their ‘whiteness’ was also considered precarious (cf. Wildenthal 1997). 
This is because, as colonial scholars have repeatedly shown, cultural and racial distinctions have 
long operated in tandem, with racial categories drawing from a range of “hierarchies of civility, 
on cultural distinctions of breeding, character, and psychological disposition, on the relationship 
between the hidden essence of race and what were claimed to be its visual markers” (Stoler and 
Cooper 1997:34; McClintock 1995; Thorne 1997; Colonna 1997; cf. Mosse 1985; Jhally 1996; 
Hall 1997; van Nieuwkerk 2004). Through the proliferation and spread of this culturalized 
rationale, the Dutch state extended the techniques of governmentality from the individual body to 
the population as a whole (Stoler 1995:82). 
These considerations were worked out simultaneously with the imperial management of 
the local indigenous populations. Among these populations, as with the Boers, overlapping 
considerations such as religion, race, and culture played a central role in demarcating social 
difference and supporting moral intervention in the Dutch East Indies. Here, Islam (much more 
than local animist beliefs or Hinduism) had historically been viewed as a potentially dangerous 
tool for nationalist and anti-Dutch organizing, and was politically suppressed (cf. Gouda and 
Clancy-Smith 1998; Kuitenbrouwer 1991; James and Schrauwers 2003). The Dutch Islamic and 
Orientalist scholar, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936), famously stated that Islam and 
modernity (that is, Dutchness or Europeanness) were incommensurable, citing the position of 
Muslim women as a measure of the supposed cultural “backwardness” of these colonized 
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peoples and others. These sentiments regarding the dangers of Islam were shared by other 
European colonizers, notably among the French in North Africa (Gouda and Smith-Clancy 
1998:5; Colonna 1997; Conklin 1998). Islam was elsewhere framed as a ‘parasite’ endangering 
the moral authority of the Dutch in the East Indies (Kuitenbrouwer 1991:117). The colonial 
government implemented policy that aimed to ‘depoliticize’ religion (in favour of culture), in 
part because of the negative views of Islam. More than simply a threat to the expansion of 
Protestant missions in the archipelago, Islam was viewed as a dangerous and potentially 
subversive force of nationalist organizing (Gouda and Clancy-Smith 1998:5; Kuitenbrouwer 
1991:153; James and Schrauwers 2003:61, 63). These negative opinions of Islam were no doubt 
also encouraged during conflicts between the Dutch and local authorities, for instance during the 
lengthy wars with the Muslim Sultanate of Aceh (1873, 1874-1880, 1883-1913), or the Muslim 
rebellion – often remembered by Dutch historians as the ‘betrayal’ – at Lombok (1894) 
(Bloembergen 2006:170-173). These conflicts also worsened Dutch perceptions of Muslims in 
the colonies through framing them as culturally, religiously, and morally different than (even 
incommensurable with) European styles of living (cf. Bloembergen 2006:170-173). Due to these 
tensions and ideas connecting religion to other salient markers of social difference, Dutch 
colonial perceptions of Muslims were worse than that of other religious or cultural groups. 
Such conflicts served another important role in the development of Dutch nationalism. 
These conflicts helped to unify the Dutch in the Netherlands as national interest in the affairs of 
the colony was shared by people from all classes and professions, religious sects, and urban and 
rural locales across the different provinces. This was especially important given the powerful 
divisions in Dutch society along religious, regional and classed lines. Protestantism had been the 
state religion of the Netherlands since the Seven Provinces’ independence from the Holy Roman 
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Empire, and this fact powerfully shaped relations and divisions between Dutchmen and their 
provinces. While only Calvinism was openly practiced, other religions were more or less 
tolerated by the state and Catholicism remained a fixture in the Dutch social landscape, 
especially in the southern provinces (Kalb 1997). In 1848, the Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands) underwent a major change that has marked its modern character, 
and continues to reverberate through contemporary discussions of social difference. In response 
to international political pressures, particularly the revolutions in France and Germany (James 
and Schrauwers 2003:54), the Constitution of 1848 ‘emancipated’ the various (non-Calvinist) 
religious groups. With the formal recognition of freedom of all religions and the right to organize 
along religious lines enshrined in the constitution, all religious groups in the Netherlands became 
de facto ‘minorities’.  This changed the landscape of social difference in the Netherlands 
significantly, and set the conditions for the emergence of a new form of social organization in 
response to these shifts: verzuiling, or pillarization (Lucassen and Penninx 1997:25; cf. Lijphart 
1968; Bax 1989). Verzuiling formalized the organization of Dutch society into four 
denominational/ socio-economic pillars (Protestant, Catholic, Liberal, and Socialist), which 
oversaw all aspects of social and political life in the Netherlands for a century.35  
In the face of these deep divisions between the people of the Netherlands, the Aceh and 
Lombok conflicts helped to cultivate and reinforce fledgling nationalist sentiments (Hobsbawm 
1983:14). The East Indian army (Indische leger) was honoured by Princess Wilhelmina when it 
returned from the Lombok expedition (Bossenbroek 1996:211-212; 320). The symbolic 
combination of a young monarch, overseas military heroes and the Dutch flag in heralding the 
efforts of “Onze Kolonialen” (our Colonials) reinforced the national imaginary for the Dutch 
(Bossenbroek 1996:235). The commemoration of this event through media reports meant that 
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people from all over the kingdom could participate in this “highpoint of nationa l unity, the 
elevation of the colonial warriors to the fatherland’s hall of honour” (Bossenbroek 1996:322; my 
translation; Anderson 1991). 
 
Adapting tactics of governmental problematization  
 
 By 1920, although the status of ‘European’ in the colonies was no longer formally 
considered a racial category or defined through racialized criteria, it was still defined and 
supported by an array of cultural traits (e.g. linguistic competence, upbringing in a ‘European 
milieu’) that continued to justify and support racial discrimination (Stoler and Cooper 1997:10). 
This phenomenon – what Silverstein (2005) and others have termed cultural racism – was, of 
course, not limited to the Dutch imperial adventure, but was a strategy shared across multiple 
fields of social difference-making. In British and French colonial arenas in Africa charges of 
‘cultural backwardness’ soon replaced arguments of racial inferiority in colonial discourse 
(Stoler and Cooper 1997:10-11; Stoler 1997:214; Colonna 1997; Conklin 1998; Thorne 1997; cf. 
Goldberg 2000). In French Algeria, turn of the twentieth century education policy began from 
the premise “that civilizing practices had to be imposed since the children are semisavages, 
reduced to a vegetative existence and living, as it were, in a state of nature” (Colonna 1997:361). 
Stoler posits that the reason that this issue became so highly charged at this time among all 
colonial administrations was because it threatened the criteria that governed not only social 
concepts of Europeanness, but also the practical matters of citizenship and nationality (Stoler 
1997:199). By the 1920s, the definition of ‘Dutchness’ was becoming much tighter in the Indies,  
 
creating new cultural boundaries while shoring up its old ones. Racial hate 
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(rassenhaat) and representation were watchwords of the times. A renewed disdain 
for the Indos permeated a discourse that heightened in the depression as the 
nationalist movement grew stronger and as unemployed ‘full-blooded’ Europeans 
found ‘roaming around’ in native villages blurred with the ranks of the Indo poor. 
(Stoler 1997:222) 
 
What emerges quite clearly from these colonial anxieties is that racialized conceptions of 
difference build on, blur, and are subsumed by other meaningful categories, from socioeconomic 
class, to national identification, and the various categories (such as gender, sexuality, religion) 
from which these complex entities are configured. Problems of ‘racial’ degeneracy thus become 
issues for national, or even civilizational, concern. As part of a problem/ solution dynamic, such 
concerns also flag the space of governmental intervention for the ethnographer. 
 While I have focused in this chapter on the space of empire to consider the powerful 
operation of governmental programs, these programs were not limited to Dutch engagement in 
the colonies. The mutability of such grammars of difference can be seen in how they surface 
across the space of empire, defining/ applying to problematic categories in the colonies and 
metropole alike. Colonial civilizing discourse was based on hierarchical notions of race, class, 
and civilization or culture, all of which drew on paternalistic language to make sense of the white 
man’s burden in the colonies. Traces of this civilizing discourse can be observed in the policies 
formulated by the national elites targeting the “internal dangers” posed by European rural or 
proletarian populations around the turn of the twentieth century (Gouda and Clancy-Smith 
1998:12; Stoler 1995:82). 
 Frequent targets of governmental intervention, lower classed and impoverished Dutch, 
French, and English were often described using vocabulary I have discussed thus far in the 
overseas colonies. Thorne’s (1997) work, which traces the work of British Evangelical missions 
overseas and in northern English industrial regions, draws attention to the common sense use of 
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racial descriptions of poor and working class English as “heathens” and “uncivilized.” Colonna’s 
(1997) study of French educational policy underscores the long history of treating peasants and 
language minorities – in Brittany, Flanders and the Basque region – as equally backward and 
uncivilized as Algerian pupils (cf. McDonald 1989). For French administrators  
 
those “citadels” constituted real missionary regions for the school. Those peasants 
in whom “there was no trace of the French language,” who “have barely been 
grazed by the civilization of the French language,” had to be assimilated, first by 
disseminating the French language with French teachers: “Frenchmen are needed 
to make the Bretons French, they won't do it by themselves.” (Colonna 1997:348; 
cf. McDonald 1989) 
 
The connections between classed difference and notions of civilized conduct are also clear in the 
Dutch experimental asowoningen (from asociaal + woningen, anti-social housing) that were 
established between the early nineteenth century until the Second World War in cities such as 
Amsterdam, Den Haag, and Utrecht (Steyaert and van Lanen 2011:36-37). Using the grammar of 
Dutch sociality (being sociaal or asociaal), these projects segregated poor people identified as 
‘unsocialized’ (onmaatschapplijken) or ‘inadmissible’ (ontoelaatbare gezinnen, inadmissible 
families) into self-contained neighbourhoods. The target population for these what can only be 
referred to as ‘ghettos’, were people whom the housing associations identified as in need of 
isolation until such time as they learned Dutch norms and values (Steyaert and van Lanen 
2011:36).  
 As these instances allude, governmental programs developed and covered the entire space 
of empire to conduct the conduct of populations through the education of affective habits, 
aspirations and beliefs (Li 2007a; Stoler 2009). This is clear in how civilizing missions’ 
discursive practice settled not only in the faraway colonies, but in the Netherlands and elsewhere 
in Europe to similarly produce acceptable images of otherwise unpalatable subjects, legitimate 
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differences in power, and frame certain members of the population as targets in need of guidance 
or discipline (cf. Gouda and Clancy-Smith 1998:8, 10; Thorne 1997; Mosse 1985; McClintock 
1995; McDonald 1989). The intervention of experts sought to transform the conduct of the 
population to its own benefit through corrective adjustments, monitoring and administration of 
delimited subgroups, such as the poor (Li 2007a:276). Yet, these interventions impacted the 
population at large by advising the so-called ‘dangerous classes’ on proper social conduct as 
citizens. Through the problematization of certain behaviours, beliefs and attitudes, the emerging 
processes of government targeted the entire Dutch population, recruiting non-state actors to the 
task of directing and intervening in social processes that set the conditions for people to do as 
they ought as sociaal members of the (national) community (Li 2007a:275).  
Building on these foundational processes of problematization, my ethnography explores 
some of the ways that governmental programs developed through the colonial experience have 
been reassembled in the contemporary Netherlands. Tracing these programs and the messy, 
contested, and nonetheless powerful operation of governmentality grounds my exploration of the 
tensions and contradictions around “good” citizenship practice revealed through my research. I 
am particularly concerned with how the thought objects and processes pertaining to social 
difference and national boundary maintenance have been rearticulated, and continue to direct the 
conduct of people and institutional processes in response to immigration and settlement in the 
Netherlands. 
In the next chapters, I address the effects of how the powerful “common sense” ways of 
understanding Dutchness and difference developed during the experience of empire recede and 
resurface in the contemporary grammar of alterity and processes of nation building. Through my 
examination of policy developments, key events and processes, and interactions with my 
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research participants I examine how culture is problematized anew as waves of culturally diverse 
newcomers – especially those from the former colonies and other ‘non-Western’ countries – 
have settled in the Netherlands and adopted Dutch citizenship. These ways of understanding 
difference are also entangled with how research participants, policy makers, politicians, and 
media commenters express a Dutch national cultural ethic through contemporary attitudes to 
local expressions of sociality, labour, and active participation. Throughout my analysis, the 
experiences and views of my research participants and others in Dutch society underscore the 
social fact that not all 
processes and interactions, histories, solidarities and attachments, [can] be 
reconfigured according to plan. To examine those processes, that excess, we need 
to attend to the particularities of conjunctures─specific times, places and sets of 
relations─the terrain of ethnography. (Li 2007a:277) 
 
In following these expressions of governmentality, competing voices are engaged in the 
everyday drawing of boundaries that define, include and exclude particular people and practices 
from the nation-state. 
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4.  “What do you mean by allochtoon?” Everyday grammars of difference  
 
While there are many different ways of speaking about people in the Netherlands 
considered culturally distinct from ‘native’ Dutch, the word allochtoon (allochthon, plural 
allochtonen) has become an anchor term in the contemporary Dutch grammar of difference (cf. 
Cooper and Stoler 1997:3). This term became part of everyday speech after it was first 
introduced by Dutch policy makers in 1989 (Allochtonenbeleid, Allochthons Policy). It has since 
taken on a life of its own as it has been adopted across Dutch society, pulling in notions of 
difference that have grown from the experience of empire. As a word now used in everyday 
discussions – by media commentators and research participants, as well as academics and 
politicians – the label allochtoon communicates a significant amount about what characteristics, 
behaviours, values and attitudes might be seen as not Dutch. This term has become an un/easy 
part of the language of the everyday in Dutch and Dutch society (cf. Geschiere 2009), both 
benignly employed and regularly contested, even by the same individuals. Yet, for all that this 
word conveys in public and policy spheres, the concept of allochthony remains exceptionally 
vague. As several scholars have noted, this fuzziness and flexibility is precisely what makes the 
language of autochthony a powerful technique employed  to differentiate between supposedly 
‘true’ insiders and outsiders (cf. Geschiere 2009; Comaroff and Comaroff 2001; Ceuppens 
2006). 
 In this chapter, I examine how this language has been discursively mobilized in 
Amsterdam and across the Netherlands as part of programs to direct and improve the welfare of 
the Dutch population (cf. Li 2007b:264). These programs respond to what has been considered a 
new problem facing the Netherlands (and indeed many other Western European countries) since 
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the Second World War and the collapse of European empires: the migration and settlement of 
waves of ‘non-Western’ immigrants from the former colonies and elsewhere in the global South. 
I begin this chapter with a selective overview of these processes and the attitudes of ‘native’ 
Dutch toward twentieth century migration and settlement in the Netherlands. I then discuss the 
language of autochthony and its adoption by Dutch scholars, policy makers and the wider public 
as a way of defining not only new “problem groups” in Dutch society, but of conveying often 
unspoken criteria of cultural difference. The introduction and spread of the term allochtoon in 
the Dutch grammar of difference, like other key terms in “vocabularies of rule,” is especially 
important and interesting to track ethnographically. As Dean reminds us, language constitutes 
 
an integral component within ways of doing things; … language shapes what are 
taken to be problem areas of social and political life and how they might be 
addressed. … [W]e should not underestimate the role of language in constructing 
worlds, problems and persons as governable entities. (2010:79) 
 
In examining the language of autochthony in this particular context, this chapter attends to the 
ways in which certain people and behaviours become targets for governmental intervention, as 
well as how attempts to redirect the conduct of the population are variously consented to and 
contested. I underscore how my research participants, especially the Dutch language coaches, 
challenge the cultural and racial underpinnings of the term and deep connections to criteria for 
belonging in the neighbourhood, city and nation. 
 
Unanticipated effects: postcolonial and late-twentieth century migration to the Netherlands 
 
  The events of the Second World War and the independence of the Dutch East Indies1 
(and other colonies) that followed produced wide-reaching effects in the Netherlands in how 
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social difference was experienced and managed. In addition to confronting the loss of this empire 
and the changed nature of the Dutch fatherland in post-War Europe, the postcolonial period 
marked a reversal of migration flows and settlement patterns from the (former-)colonies and 
elsewhere for which the Dutch and other Western European nation-states were unprepared. As 
Willems writes in 2003, “the Dutch nation in the 1950s and 1960s, and still today, considered 
itself unfit for immigrants, and instead actively encouraged emigration” (35). During and after 
the war, living conditions in the Netherlands worsened,2 further contributing to the sense that the 
Netherlands was unfit for immigrants, “overcrowded and faced the prospect of permanent 
unemployment” (van Dalen and Henkens 2007:41). This sentiment was borne out by the 
difficulties of post-War rebuilding as well as overpopulation, rising unemployment, and a 
housing shortage. The negative opinion of the Dutch toward immigration also drew on the long 
history of colonialism, and the morally and politically charged understanding of social difference 
that developed across the space of empire. This is clear in the experience of many of the 300,000 
Dutch nationals (people of Dutch origin, or of Dutch-Indonesian descent) who had ‘repatriated’ 
from the Indonesian archipelago to the Netherlands. Upon their arrival, they encountered such 
deep hostility in ‘their fatherland’ that they continued on to settle in other countries: Canada, the 
U.S., Australia, and New Zealand (Lucassen and Penninx 1997:40; Smith 2003:13; Willems 
2003:45). 
  The immigrants that began to arrive in the Netherlands during the post-War years were 
seen by the Dutch as signalling a distinct, frequently unwelcome change from the previous 
patterns of migration and settlement across Europe (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Lechner 
2007; cf. Silverstein 2005; Gilroy 1987; Beriss 2004; Bunzl 2004; Wikan 2002). People holding 
‘European’ status in the former Dutch East Indies were not the only groups who migrated to the 
119 
 
Netherlands as a result of decolonization, as the case of Moluccan soldiers underscores.3 In the 
decades following the Second World War, new dynamics prompted migration from across the 
remaining parts of the Kingdom to Europe, and from elsewhere. A central factor here was the 
recovering economy, which demanded an influx of labourers ahead of policies in place to deal 
with them, or later, their families (Lucassen and Penninx 1997:54).  
 Many (former) colonial minorities – such as the Surinamese – traded on their citizenship 
or legal recognition within the empire to seek work in the metropole during the 1950s. This was 
often through ‘guest worker’ migration schemes to temporarily solve European labour shortages 
(Pettigrew 1998:79; cf. Smith 2003:10; Beriss 2004). Dutch policy makers hoped that increased 
migration by Surinamese would meet the needs of economic growth. Surinamese were favoured 
at this point because as Dutch citizens of the overseas Kingdom (until 1975) they were 
considered culturally and linguistically compatible with ‘native’ Dutch (Pettigrew 1998:79; 
Lucassen and Penninx 1997:42; Buruma 2006; cf. Oostindie 1990; Van Lier 1971). Indeed, since 
the late eighteenth century many well-to-do Surinamese had routinely sought professional 
education in the Netherlands. Although early twentieth century Surinamese migration to the 
Netherlands was characterized by “shocking ignorance and by ‘benevolent curiosity’” on the part 
of ‘native’ Dutch, the Surinamese were generally not unwelcome. For many ‘native’ Dutch it 
appeared that migrants’ “skin colour didn’t matter much as long as their conduct lived up to 
Dutch standards;” an expectation that middle-class Surinamese routinely met (Oostindie 
1990:238). By the 1990s, Surinamese formed one of the four largest ‘minority’ or ‘ethnic’ 
groups in the country (Lucassen and Penninx 1997:45). In spite of this influx of new labourers, it 
soon became clear that recruits from elsewhere would also be required to make up the shortfall.  
 While the Netherlands (like other Western European states) had at first recruited 
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temporary workers from within Europe and their former colonies, by the mid-1960s Turkey, 
Morocco and Tunisia became the main sources for temporary labourers (Lucassen and Penninx 
1997:54; Pettigrew 1998:79; cf. Brubaker 1992; Rietsteig 1994; Beriss 2002). However, the 
1973 global oil crisis brought an abrupt end to economic prosperity and growth, revealing the 
flaws in the temporary “guest worker” schemes. This period spotlighted how foreign these 
labourers and their families were considered by the Dutch, especially compared to earlier 
Surinamese or Dutch East Indies migrants. Guest workers from the European Community (in 
spite of no longer needing work visas to reside in any other EC country) were drawn home by 
their own nation-states’ improving economies. Turkish and Moroccan guest workers (who came 
mainly from harder hit rural regions) preferred to stay and to bring their families to live with 
them in the Netherlands (Lucassen and Penninx 1997:59). Family reunification (unrestricted in 
the Netherlands until 1981) peaked among these groups in 1992, making them the second and 
third largest immigrant populations after the Surinamese (Lucassen and Penninx 1997:61). 
Accepted on a supposedly temporary basis, these and similar groups had become permanent and 
marginalized figures across various Western European nation-states (cf. Mandel 2008; Bunzl 
2004; Brubaker 1992). 
 This experience with migration occurred alongside another that has had lasting 
repercussions. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s asylum seekers were willingly embraced by 
Western European governments and national populations alike (Martiniello and Rea 1999:167). 
Yet, by the mid-1980s the numbers of asylum seekers in the European Economic Community 
countries rapidly increased from 65,000 (in 1983) to 289,000 (1989), with 700,000 applications 
received in 1992 (Pettigrew 1998:81), contributing to a drastic shift in public opinion among 
EEC citizens: rather than a humanitarian obligation, asylum became seen primarily as “a 
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disguised form of economic immigration” (Martiniello and Rea 1999:168). The Dutch backlog in 
processing asylum applications lasted for years, leaving huge numbers of asylum seekers 
awaiting a decision without access to employment or education, including Dutch language 
training.4  
 While economic concerns have been an important factor motivating policy approaches 
and popular sentiments that discouraged the permanent settlement of newcomers, concerns about 
the place of immigrants in the Netherlands extend far beyond the economic. For many of these 
migrant groups, their arrival in the Netherlands had always been considered by the Dutch 
government as temporary. It was never the government’s intention that these foreign workers or 
asylum seekers be incorporated into the nation; many other European nation-states, like the 
Netherlands, actively excluded such labour migrants and their families from national civic 
enculturation processes (e.g. state education for national citizens) (Mandel 2008; Brubaker 
1992). Echoing anxieties from the colonies only decades before, the differences embodied by 
these post-War migrants – in terms of culture, language, religion, race – were widely considered 
incompatible with Dutch, or even European styles of living. Unlike the European (seasonal or 
skilled) labour migrants and (religious or political) refugees from centuries past, these 
newcomers were considered foreign in ways that their predecessors never had been. These 
differences were exacerbated in the Dutch context as the arrival of these diverse newcomers 
coincided with the deep shift from a staunchly Christian society characterized by conservatism 
and deference to authority, to one considered embracing of progressive ideals (cf. Vuisje 2000; 
van Dam 2011).5 The national values cultivated through the experiences of verzuiling 
(pillarization) – particularly the Dutch orientation to tolerance, personal autonomy and 
permissiveness – were redirected toward the secular values and practices of: freedom of speech, 
122 
 
the acceptance of homosexuality, gender equality, the tolerance of soft-drug use, prostitution, 
and legal provisions for abortion and euthanasia (Sunier and van Ginkel 2006:109; cf. Vuijsje 
2000). The arrival of guest workers and their families after the 1960s from countries considered 
by the Dutch to be socially conservative, and often Muslim, began to challenge these new Dutch 
notions of tolerance. 
 At least since the late 1990s, concerns among the Dutch about unemployment, youth 
criminality, gendered violence, and welfare dependency largely came to centre on ‘non-Western’ 
immigrants – especially former labour migrants who overstayed their visas, transitioning into 
permanent residents and new Dutch citizens (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Scheffer 2000). 
Policy developed to target these issues initially sought class-based interventions, without 
acknowledging the unique structural barriers faced by many of these newcomers. Many ‘native’ 
Dutch began to take issue with what they saw as a preoccupation with “political correctness” 
rather than tackling these issues head on by addressing the inadequacy of civic enculturation 
policies aimed at new immigrants. Public discourse on social problems began then to focus on 
language and educational deficits among ‘non-Western’ immigrants and their descendants, 
viewed as intensifying differences with mainstream Dutch society (Vuisje 2000; cf. Stoler 1995; 
Colonna 1997; Wildenthal 1997). Many of the issues that have arisen in the Dutch context reflect 
similar convergences occurring across the broader context of the supranational European Union 
(cf. Mandel 2008; Bunzl 2004; Beriss 2004; Wikan 2002). These experiences importantly reflect 
the powerful discursive categories of difference and Dutchness or Europeanness developed 
during centuries of imperialism. 
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The language of autochthony: newcomers, new problems, and technical language 
 
 Growing anxieties around immigration were spurred by an absence of procedures to 
integrate newcomers as productive members of European national societies. In the post-War, 
postcolonial Netherlands, domestic social and political pressure produced policy aimed at the 
‘resocializing and integration’ of people from Indonesia, who were considered internal migrants. 
These policy interventions included attention to issues of housing, social counselling and 
spiritual guidance. However, the supposedly temporary guest workers who came in the 1960s 
and after were not eligible for similar integration initiatives. Policies for guest workers and their 
families – conceived as enabling integration ‘while retaining their own identity’ – explicitly 
precluded national integration and sought to facilitate their return to the country of origin 
(Lucassen and Penninx 1997:143; cf. Van Lier 1971:193).6 Pulling from colonial techniques of 
management, these migrants were explicitly problematized by government as ‘not Dutch’ (cf. Li 
2007a). This lack of integration policy was increasingly felt as many Western European nation-
states made fundamental changes to their citizenship laws during the 1980s. Some of these 
changes included making citizenship acquisition easier for newcomers and their descendants, 
reducing the residency period required before eligible for citizenship, and increased tolerance for 
the holding of multiple citizenships (Çinar 1994:62). In spite of such changes to citizenship law 
across many EEC states, there was no comparable development of social or economic integration 
policy. Where these migrants were eligible for integration programs, they were still often 
integrated as foreigners, that is, they were socialized as outsiders living temporarily in the 
European national society. 
 The framing of migration practices through policy language is important in understanding 
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how (non-Western, postcolonial) difference was conceived in the Netherlands and other 
European countries. From the guest worker period until the early 1990s, policy makers and 
politicians in the Netherlands talked about recent immigrants and their descendants through the 
language of ethnic minorities (ethnisch minderheden). Rather than implying all who were not of 
Dutch heritage, in the Minderhedennota (Ethnic Minorities Policy, 1983) ‘ethnic minorities’ 
were specific groups of newcomers and their descendants considered “non-Western” who were 
targeted for policy intervention: former colonial subjects (e.g. the Moluccans, Surinamese, 
Antilleans); guest workers and their families (especially those from Turkey or Morocco); 
refugees and asylum seekers (Lucassen and Penninx 1997:150).  
The perceived need for policy intervention among ‘ethnic minorities’ stemmed from 
various factors, including discrimination in Dutch society, which contributed to the relatively 
disadvantaged situation of “non-Western” minorities compared to the ‘native’ Dutch majority or 
“Western” immigrants. As a category that linked ethnic or national origins with success in Dutch 
society, ‘ethnic minorities’ in the Netherlands were more frequently marginalized, faced higher 
rates of unemployment, lower educational achievement, and higher rates of crime and welfare 
dependency than ‘native’ Dutch citizens. As the language of these policy categories was taken up 
in mainstream Dutch society, the term “ethnic minority” took on additional layers of meaning 
derived from earlier notions of cultural, religious, linguistic, as well as ethnic or racial difference.  
 In light of political and public discourse associated with the term ‘ethnic minority’, policy 
makers were concerned that those who were identified as ethnic minorities were becoming 
irreversibly marginalized and viewed as problem groups, unable to act as “active” citizen-
subjects (cf. Ong 2006; Muehlebach 2012). The discursive shift from ‘ethnic minority’ to the 
now common ‘allochthon’ (allochtoon) has been identified as beginning with the publication of 
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the Wetenschappelijk Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid’s (WRR, Netherlands Scientific Council for 
Government Policy) Allochtonenbeleid (literally, “Allochthons Policy,” 1989, but translated by 
policy makers into English as “Immigrant Policy”). In this document, the authors shifted from 
what they felt had become the discriminatory language of ethnic minorities (stigmatizing certain 
ethnic or racialized identifiers), to the new, “uncontaminated” terminology of allochthony.7 In 
the English summary of the original report, the authors state that “the Council [WRR] believes 
that the government tends to view these groups too much in the light of welfare categories 
instead of providing them with opportunities to stand on their own feet” (WRR 1990:9). As a 
step toward remedying these problems, the authors sought to introduce both a new scope for 
policy intervention and a new term for those it served, allochtonen (allochthons). In this way, the 
category of allochtoon was intended as a new way of thinking about and managing subgroups of 
the Dutch population. 
In the broadest sense, autochthony can be understood as a way of making claims to the 
soil, to naturalized origins (including original settlement) in ways that are reminiscent of 
indigeneity. Autochthony is at once a problematic and powerful concept, deriving both of these 
properties from its flexibility and openness. While the terminology and discourse of autochthony 
has been common among French and Dutch scholars for quite some time,8 the increasing 
resonance of this language among English language scholars owes thanks to anthropologists (cf. 
Comaroff and Comaroff 2001; Geschiere and Jackson 2006; Ceuppens 2006; Ceuppens and 
Geschiere 2005). This is perhaps especially the case with Peter Geschiere, whose seminal text, 
The Perils of Belonging (2009), explores the proliferation of this discourse across (mainly 
Francophone) Africa, and increasingly in (Dutch-speaking) Western Europe. Comparing the 
works and insights of scholars studying autochthony within and across these contexts 
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underscores how this language becomes a powerful instrument in drawing lines between insider 
and outsider status, precisely due to its amorphous and easily shifting nature. 
 With its historical connections to “the soil,” the language of autochthony today continues 
to appeal to notions of community. The question of community and its safeguarding against 
potentially destructive outsiders has taken on a renewed salience in relation to how people 
experience contemporary processes of globalization. Geschiere suggests that the increasing 
reliance on the discourse of autochthony is due to its very emptiness and plasticity: 
“autochthony’s Other can be constantly redefined, entailing new boundary marking for the group 
concerned” (2009:28). As a naturalizing discourse which “makes obvious” the distinctions 
between autochthons and Others (allochthons), the language of autochthony is easily 
incorporated into nation- and other community-building projects. This designation can then be 
used to deny or contest the claims of people framed as newcomers to various resources, from 
land or social welfare benefits to the rights of citizenship. 
The entanglement of multiple and shifting signifiers within the conceptualization and use 
of the language of autochthony has important implications for understanding the ways in which 
Dutchness or integration have been conceived by those with whom I worked. The critique 
levelled by Ceuppens underscores this concern. She indicates that 
 
autochthony relies on sharp distinctions between “us” and “them” that are 
relational insofar as neither identity is ever fixed; “outsiders” can be those who 
compete in any region with the “first” inhabitants over control of resources, a 
political class that allows this to happen, and/or an intellectual class blinded by 
“political correctness” that refuses to acknowledge the problem. Using culture ... 
in order to (re)classify “locals” and “aliens,” citizens as noncitizens, and vice 
versa, autochthony can draw upon existing ethnic categories or set up cultural 
differences within ethnic groups. (Ceuppens 2006:150) 
 
In the “Allochthons Policy,” allochtonen were defined as “generally speaking, people whose 
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parents came from elsewhere to establish themselves in the Netherlands, and their descendants to 
the third generation, insofar as the latter still wish to present themselves as foreign/ non-
indigenous [allochtoon]” (WRR 1989:10; my translation). Elsewhere in the report, this definition 
is expanded to refer simply to anyone “of non-Dutch origin,” implying ethnic heritage (WRR 
1989:15; my translation).  
 Despite the policy authors’ attempt to ‘emancipate’ those newly framed as allochtonen 
from the negative association with welfare categories, negative associations (with aspects of 
cultural, classed, religious, racial, and linguistic difference) were in many ways carried from the 
Minderhedennota (1983) forward into the Allochtonenbeleid (1989). As a socially situated policy 
category, ‘minorities’ (minderheden) were redefined as “allochthonous groups in a 
disadvantaged situation [achterstandssituatie];9 periodically which groups can be considered 
minorities must be reassessed” (WRR 1989:10; my translation). In the Allochtonenbeleid, the 
designation of a person or group as a minority hinges more on the barriers to their social 
participation and economic success in mainstream Dutch society than being necessarily related to 
ethnicity. However, the most marginalized members of Dutch society remain those with a recent 
(family) history of immigration, particularly from non-Western countries. The introduction of 
autochthony into the everyday grammar of alterity strengthens processes of cultural racism that 
were earlier evident in colonial policy, especially when defining the legal, social and political 
boundaries around Dutch status. This is visible in how deep connections between (negative 
forms of) culturalized difference and newcomers surface and recede in the everyday use of the 
language of autochthony by ‘native’ Dutch in the media, politics, in policy and academic circles, 
and among average Dutch citizens like my research participants.   
The problematization of the Dutch concept of the allochtoon has been affected by 
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processes of the culturalization of citizenship: “the search for a more pregnant formulation of the 
cultural consensus that forms the basis of citizenship and must be subscribed to by new citizens 
as proof of their ‘integration’” (Geschiere 2009:24-25; cf. Tonkens et al. 2008; Duyvendak 2011; 
Verkaaik 2009; Schinkel 2010; Ghorashi and van Tilberg 2006). The language of autochthony 
has become common in everyday speech during a time when a revised and romanticized version 
of the historical character of Dutchness has taken root. This image of the Dutch people, praised 
by populist Right politician Pim Fortuyn, has become typical of current discussions: “[n]ew 
accounts of Dutch identity focus on the unity and likemindedness of the nation, and show little or 
no interest in the often centuries-old tradition of regional and religious disputes” (Hurenkamp et 
al. 2011:210). At the heart of this new vision of Dutch culture, is an image of social 
progressiveness especially with regard to supporting gender equality, sexual freedom, freedom of 
speech, personal autonomy and responsibility (cf. Vuijsje 2000). The values and behaviours that 
are now understood to characterize the Dutch are contrasted by those of the culturally, racially, 
religiously, and linguistically diverse newcomers who have settled in the Netherlands since the 
end of the Second World War. This image of a cultural divide has profoundly shaped the use of 
the term allochtoon in daily discourse. 
 
Tracking the language of autochthony in everyday speech 
 
Having found the word allochtonen ubiquitous in its use in Dutch policy documents, in 
academic work, and in the media, I assumed it to be the standard or accepted term to talk about 
ethnic minorities and ‘non-Western’ immigrants in the Netherlands. In casual English language 
conversations, most (‘native’ Dutch) people I met and spoke with about my research would 
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speak about immigrants, or Moroccans and Turks, or Muslims when talking about the questions 
that interested me. When I made it known to those I spoke with that I was learning Dutch and 
knew the term allochtoon, I found that they would often then begin to use this term with me to 
describe the same “problem” groups. In similar conversations I had in Dutch, people spoke about 
these groups as allochtonen, Moroccans (Marokanen), Turks (Turken) or Muslims (moslems), 
but also, as buitenlanders (foreigners) or vreemdelingen (strangers or foreigners). Nonetheless, I 
was aware that not everyone agreed with the use of this language, especially the words 
allochtonen (allochthons) and autochtonen (autochthons, used to describe ‘native’ Dutch). These 
discrepancies and differences in opinion are exactly what made tracking the language of 
difference used during my fieldwork in Amsterdam intriguing.  
The word allochtoon, in particular, shifted meaning depending on who used it and in 
what context. Scientific and governmental bodies (e.g. Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek , CBS, 
Central Bureau for Statistics; Wetenschappelijk Raad voor Regeringbeleid, WRR, Scientific 
Council for Governmental Policy) drew on the Allochtonenbeleid definition, employing 
allochtoon to delineate a particular policy or demographic category within the Dutch population 
Meanwhile, the ways in which the word was used in the media and by my informants was much 
less sharply defined, often had negative connotations, and described a much narrower group of 
people: specifically, non-Western immigrants and their descendants, especially people with 
Turkish or Moroccan backgrounds. The term allochtoon was used to describe these people, 
regardless of their citizenship status. In many ways, the different meanings attributed to the term 
allochtoon reflect the everyday slippages between legal and social status categories in the Dutch 
East Indies, e.g. the use of legal terms such as ‘European’ and ‘Indo’ (Pattynama 1998:100), in 
combination with colloquial terms like blijvers (literally, stayers), verindische (Indianized), or 
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mixed-blood (mengbloeden; Eurasian) (Stoler 1997:222). In the same way that someone with 
‘European’ status in the East Indies might be socially denied this status as verindische or 
mengbloeden, many ‘non-native’ Dutch citizens are frequently referred to as allochtonen. 
Alongside the policy designation (indicating that the citizen is not of Dutch ethnicity), the label 
allochtoon variously conveys layers of cultural, racial, or linguistic difference or incompatibility 
with ‘native’ Dutch, discursively positioning the allochthonous citizen as outside or on the 
margins of the national community. 
 On the other hand, those considered ‘native’ Dutch are people who, similar to Mackey’s 
(1999) self-identified “Canadian-Canadians,” are colloquially considered Dutch by heritage or 
ethnicity in addition to the legal status of being Dutch nationals. Commentators and informants 
talked about these people as undifferentiated Nederlanders (Dutch), or if pressed, as gewoone 
Nederlanders (just Dutch, regular Dutch), sometimes as echte Nederlanders (real Dutch), or 
perhaps by using the official terminology from the CBS or WRR as autochtone Nederlanders 
(autochthonous Dutch). This is markedly different from how citizens framed as non-Western 
allochtonen were consistently discussed, for example, as Kenyan, Turkish-Dutch, or even Dutch 
Moroccans, in the news, by politicians, and by informants. On the other hand, ‘native’ Dutch 
identify and are identified primarily as Dutch, or perhaps from a particular city (Amsterdam) or 
province (North Holland, Brabant) within the Netherlands.  
In my work as a volunteer English language coach with the Native Speaker Project, I 
worked in what was commonly called a ‘zwarte school’ (black school) by my informants, the 
media, and authors of policy and research documents. At the secondary level, these schools 
likely taught students in the lowest academic stream (VMBO).10 As I observed, the students in 
my classrooms and who flooded the hallways between classes, were from a variety of different 
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ethnic and national backgrounds but predominantly Turkish, Moroccan, as well as Surinamese, 
and markedly not “white” or ‘native’ Dutch; in other words, these students were commonly 
referred to as allochtonen. In conversations with informants, in the news, and in the census 
figures collected by the City of Amsterdam and national institutions (e.g. CBS), these schools 
were associated with lower than average educational achievement, as well as with behavioural 
problems among the students – outcomes which often implied a lack of integration (cf. Colonna 
1997; Stoler 1995). In navigating the use of the term allochtoon, I had come to have a sense that 
it had a racialized inflection, in addition to relating notions of classed, linguistic and religious 
difference. I was therefore surprised during conversations with many informants throughout my 
fieldwork – from fellow academics to language coaching volunteers, and many others I spoke 
with about my research – at how differently they conceived of and used the word allochtoon. In 
drawing on the academic and policy definitions, in addition to my own observations of the term’s 
use, I was corrected on more than one occasion for my (mis)use of the term. This was especially 
the case when I had described people with Surinamese heritage as allochtonen, lumping this 
group in with others that government bodies considered in need of policy intervention.  
 “Surinamese are a special case,” I was told on several occasions. “They’re not 
allochtonen.” Or, “They’re not like other allochtonen.” More often than not, this was stated as if 
the reasons governing this distinction were obvious. The most frequently given qualification for 
this difference was that Surinam was a Dutch territory until 1975 and that because of this history, 
these immigrants arrived in the Netherlands already speaking Dutch. Surinamese shared in Dutch 
history and language through the experience of empire (Van Lier 1971; Oostindie 1990). Their 
cultural similarity to ‘native’ Dutch allowed the Surinamese to quickly integrate into the Dutch 
mainstream. Unlike people of Moroccan (or to a lesser degree Turkish) heritage, at the national 
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level  
 
the Surinamese are no longer a ‘problem’. They always speak Dutch, excel at 
soccer, and by and large have been moving steadily into the middle class. ... 
[T]hey are not universally welcomed, but are still recognized as an exotic yet 
integral part of the national culture. (Buruma 2006:20-21) 
 
More importantly, Surinamese were not thought to create the kinds of social problems as other 
immigrants (i.e. Turks, Moroccans or other North Africans) arriving during the same period. 
The ongoing impact of well established ‘cultural’ associations with difference are 
observable in the ways that these differences are omitted or glossed in conversations about 
belonging in the Netherlands today. This is perhaps most clearly evidenced in discussions posed 
by ‘native’ Dutch citizens and politicians that routinely throw the national loyalty of immigrants 
and their descendants into question. In cases of multiple citizenship, the nature of non-Western 
Dutch citizens’ national loyalty can become headline news,11 as is clear from the fracas in recent 
years around Dutch members of parliament who hold dual citizenship. A notable case occurred 
in 2007, when populist Right politician Geert Wilders (PVV, Freedom Party) questioned the 
loyalties of two PvdA (Labour) cabinet members, Ahmed Aboutaleb and Nebahat Albayrak.12 He 
demanded that both members of parliament renounce their non-Dutch citizenship or government 
post. Wilders publicly stated that his objections had nothing to do with their Islamic background, 
rather, “If Mr. Aboutaleb had blonde hair and a Swedish passport, [he] would have said exactly 
the same” (Volkskrant.nl 2010; my translation). Although Wilders’ general behaviour and 
statements clearly give the lie to his words declaring that his views have nothing to do with 
questions of race or religion,13 the incident does point to how certain citizens may nonetheless 
have their claims to belonging in the nation-state easily questioned.  
The reactions to Aboutaleb and Albayrak’s dual nationalities are contrasted by the 
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difference in media and political attention when, during October 2010, it came to light that the 
newly elected State Secretary for Health, Welfare and Sport, Marlies Veldhuijzen van Zanten-
Hyllner (CDA, Christian Democrat) held both Dutch and Swedish citizenships, having been born 
in Göteborg. Prime Minister Mark Rutte (VVD, free-market Liberals) and Maxime Verhagen 
(CDA leader) both had expressed a wish to minimize the number of dual citizenship cases among 
their cabinet members. However, unlike Wilders, they felt that Veldhuijzen’s dual nationalities 
posed no problems for the government (NOS 2010).  
These examples of immigrants’ and dual citizens’ national loyalties coming into question 
(or not) speak to how certain markers of difference (e.g. religious belief or family migration 
history) allow some individuals to be more easily singled out and have the legitimacy of their 
citizenship called into question. In the Dutch context, these differences are formulated and 
flagged through the use of the powerful discourse of autochthony which has implications for 
moral calculations of belonging and considerations of “good” citizenship practice. 
When I returned to Amsterdam in 2011, I made a point of asking many of the Dutch 
people with whom I regularly spoke about what words they habitually used or read to describe 
immigrants and their descendants living in the Netherlands. Consistently, the response was 
allochtoon. It was the “normal word” and most people I asked had not given much thought to 
their use of the term. As part of the commonplace grammar of difference, the language of 
autochthony appeared to be part of a constellation of saviors that had made certain concepts of 
alterity “easy to think,” even when the words themselves remain unspoken (Foucault 1991:103; 
Stoler 2011:129-130). When I asked about using other terms instead, such as nieuwkomer 
(newcomer) or Nieuwe Nederlander (New Dutch), they were dismissed as strange terms that no 
one uses. These assertions about the normality of the term allochtoon were supported by all that I 
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had read or heard from Dutch media sources, as well as politics, policy documents, and 
frequently, in Dutch scholarship. Even so, the definition of this common sense terminology 
seemed to be far less stable, as various signifiers surfaced and receded in importance depending 
on the context. Many people who participated in my research commented on how they felt 
uncomfortable with the language commonly employed to frame discussions of cultural 
difference. The tensions and shifts in meaning as autochthony moves from Dutch policy 
discourse to widespread use in Dutch society draws our attention as critical scholars to “the 
range of parties involved in attempts to regulate the conditions under which lives are lived” (Li 
2007a:276). 
 
Un/easy to think: everyday critiques and slippages in the language of autochthony 
 
The slipperiness of the Dutch language of autochthony, particularly the term allochtoon 
(allochthon), has been discussed by many people in the Netherlands: among my own research 
participants, advocacy and integration organizations, scholars (from whom the policy advisers 
borrowed the term), policy makers, politicians, and media commentators. Many of the reasons 
for this critique have been summarized by the (Dutch-language) Antwerp-based, Belgian 
newspaper De Morgen, which in September 2012 ran an editorial piece explaining why the paper 
would no longer be using the word allochtoon. Among the reasons given for the term’s 
discontinuation were: that it was discriminatory, creating impassable divides between ‘us’ and 
‘them’; that it was excessively vague; that it was limiting; and it lacked nuance (Verschelden, 9 
September 2012). De Morgen’s critiques resonate with Stoler’s insights into how 
 
[r]acial formations distribute specific sentiments among social kinds, assign who 
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are made into subjects of pity and whose cultural competencies and capital are 
deemed inadequate to make political claims. As such, they demand that we ask 
who and what are made into “problems,” how certain narratives are made “easy to 
think,” and what “common sense” such formulations have fostered and continue 
to serve. (2011:130) 
 
When sections from this opinion piece were republished online in the quality Dutch publications 
de Volkskrant and Trouw, they received many different responses from readers. These included a 
broad range of reactions including: agreement that a new, more nuanced and less negative term 
was needed to discuss the problems facing ethnic minorities; concerns for the tyranny of political 
correctness; predictions that whatever new term replaced allochtoon would eventually succumb 
to the same negative associations that currently plagued it; that allochtonen should just come up 
with a new term for naming themselves if that is what they really wanted. I encountered a similar 
range of discussions on the use of this term among my interlocutors.  
Most of those I encountered throughout my fieldwork in Amsterdam unreflectively used 
the language of autochthony to talk about Dutch and immigrants of non-Western heritage. It is 
therefore significant that volunteers and others whose work addressed, at least in part, questions 
of immigrant integration or community building were frequently more critical of the language 
used to describe people and social issues supposedly connected to sociocultural difference. 
Language coaches in particular rearticulated, rejected, or reconciled the commonly unspoken, 
shifting and uneven boundaries (for instance along the lines of race and religion) drawn between 
citizen and stranger that are deployed through the language of autochthony. 
A volunteer for several different initiatives, I met José through her work as a language 
coach and volunteer coordinator with Gilde Amsterdam’s SamenSpraak. I asked José whether, in 
her opinion, allochtonen could really become Dutch (echt Nederlanders worden).14 “Well, yes. 
Certainly, of course!” I found José’s matter of fact response interesting. I noted my observations 
136 
 
about Dutch newspapers’ tendency to name subjects as Turkish or Moroccan, but that the same 
appeared not to be true for those considered ‘native’ Dutch. “Precisely!” exclaimed José. “Yeah, 
very dumb. I am also irritated by that.”  
 
I find it ridiculous. They are Dutch. Dutch! Where does that formal distinction 
come from? The formal separation between— the newspaper must respect the 
formal citizenship. Otherwise that’s a value judgement. And the newspaper is not 
about value judgements. Do you understand what I mean? Yes, value judgement. 
 
Switching from Dutch into English to make sure that I fully understood her point, José 
continued. 
 
An opinion of values. It’s always in the negative. “A Somali who clocked that old 
lady.” Yeah? There’s never been told, “That Dutchman that stole 750,000 bikes.” 
... Or who “killed his wife.” “That Dutchman.” Yeah? Never said. Always in the 
negative way when it’s concerning the other person. The not-Dutch person. 
 
This negative way of talking about people commonly called allochtonen emerged clearly in the 
news and other media, as well as political rhetoric, as José pointed out. But it was also visible in 
many less explicit ways. The ways in which these differences were articulated, in what contexts, 
and by whom referenced and informed notions of citizenship among differently situated subjects. 
As a white, Dutch-speaking Belgian woman living in Rotterdam, Sophie described 
herself as technically an outsider, an allochtoon. Sophie was not a voluntary language coach, but 
when we met she was working with an employment-oriented integration program for immigrant 
women. Sophie was one of the first people I had met who really expressed a problem with the 
Dutch language of social difference. Speaking in English, she described the use of the term 
allochtoon among the Dutch as strange and unnecessarily adversarial:  
 
The negative connotation is really a bit too― It’s, yeah, it’s a strange division. 
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Except I don’t really understand the purpose as well. Just to divide the population 
or to...? ... And now they’re gonna change it to Nieuwe Nederlanders. So, I 
thought, it’s still― No, they’re not new! They’re just Dutch. 
 
Throughout our discussion about her work, it was clear that Sophie found the word 
allochtoon problematic. As our talk turned to questions about the Dutch identity, she commented 
that during a training exercise her clients – immigrant women attempting to transition into the 
mainstream workforce – “thought it was very interesting to talk about allochtoon and 
autochtoon.” She had observed different meanings attributed to these terms in everyday 
discussions versus in policy documents. “The one in the Van Dale, the dictionary,” she said, 
“was also more about the social connotations, and like how people use the word, the term. They 
also said that it’s for people, um―” She briefly hesitated,  
 
Like black people more, or people that who don’t have white skin. Like literally, 
almost literally in there. ... And then the other explanation was the one that the 
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek , they were the ones who created the definition. 
... The real one. Or, the intentional one.  
 
This distinction between the intended use of the terminology and the ways in which it has taken 
on certain meanings and assumptions in its popular usage was troubling to Sophie. In spite of 
what the CBS might have to say, some people, it seems, are not really considered allochtonen. 
Sophie underscored this as she continued, “And, like I also say, ‘I am allochtoon as well.’ And 
people start to laugh sometimes and I say ‘Yeah. But it’s true.’ They’re just laughing because I 
am white.” As she continued to draw out the problematic assumptions she saw in the term she 
brought up the question of the Dutch monarchy, who are “also most of them allochtoon.” If this 
is the case, Sophie questioned why the label allochtoon has in her view taken on such a negative, 
even discriminatory tone.  
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Margriet, a ‘native’ Dutch woman, echoed Sophie’s sentiments during our interview. She 
worked as a volunteer coordinator for one of the institutions in the network of care facilities that 
ran the nursing home where I volunteered. We met over tea on the café patio at her institution. 
While her job had practically nothing to do with immigrant integration, one of her mandates was 
to help bring the local community together with the assisted living complex where she worked. 
This included initiatives such as organizing a celebration with Turkish and Moroccan food to 
bring the centre’s neighbours and residents together. Facilitating the voluntary participation of 
the centre’s neighbours had been essential in pulling this successful event together. In our 
interview15 she expressed her thoughts on the problems with the current language of 
autochthony: “I don’t like the words allochtonen, autochtonen. I don’t think that’s right.” I 
related how as a native English speaker, I personally found the terminology quite strange. “No, 
no. It’s very stupid. It’s very narrow-minded.” I was surprised by Margriet’s emotional response. 
“It means that you are locked in your own things,” she continued. “You don’t open your mind 
for other people. … Everybody who lives here is just native. You can be a born native, or you 
can be an incoming native.” While Sophie had expressed her opinion that the new term, Nieuwe 
Nederlanders, was still problematic and divisive, Margriet welcomed it as a step in the right 
direction: “It’s better. It’s not the same. It,” she paused thoughtfully, “gives a new feeling.” 
The dissatisfaction or uneasiness with the language used to describe social difference in 
the Netherlands also emerged in my discussion about who volunteers as Dutch language coaches 
with Casper. Casper was in his early sixties, and worked as a volunteer coordinator for Gilde 
Amsterdam’s language coaching program, SamenSpraak when I met him in 2011. “Most 
[volunteers] are older than fifty,” said Casper, “are well educated. The majority are women. And 
not allochtoon. We never have allochtonen as supervisors or teachers [begeleiders],” said Casper 
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thoughtfully. “But what do you mean by allochtonen? Also someone who comes from Surinam? 
Or...” This was a difficult question, particularly because of the many different understandings of 
the term I had come across among the different people I had spoken with or observed. I 
responded noncommittally by pointing out the strangeness of the term. “Yes it is as a strange 
word,” agreed Casper. I continued, giving an open-ended definition of the term incorporating 
opinions from other research participants. I noted how some people used the term allochtone 
(allochthonous) to describe people from Surinam or Indonesia, but not from Canada or America. 
Casper seemed to agree with this general definition, and dropped the discussion of who is 
allochtone. He then said, slowly enunciating the word autochthonous (autochtone), “It is actually 
just autochthonous Dutch.” Coming back to his original concern, I again asked Casper whether 
or not the SamenSpraak has had Surinamese or allochtone volunteers as language coaches. 
“Yeah,” Casper replied, “maybe a couple. I have in my experience a Surinamese woman, but 
very few. We have I believe one person from England. And they lived here a very long time. But 
further than that no, hey. It is minimal. Minimal.” 
The ways in which the language of autochthony was used by people I encountered in the 
field was interesting for the ways its boundaries were drawn and redrawn by different people in 
relation to how “good” citizenship practice was articulated. Like Sophie and Margriet, José’s 
comments also took issue with the negative tone given to the language of social difference in the 
Netherlands, especially when fomented by politicians who stood to gain from deepening social 
anxieties and frictions. When we first met, in early 2010, the economic crisis of 2008 was still 
reverberating through the Netherlands, with segments of the evening news and morning papers 
daily devoted to further negative repercussions. José felt that “the certainty of having a good life” 
was fading for many people in the Netherlands. This, she felt, helped create fear for many people 
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across Dutch society. 
 
And the fear, that is exploited by the politicians. The politicians themselves are 
not scared. No. That’s true. They always have a good income. But they exploit the 
fear of those who maybe do not have a good income. Or those who have 
uncertainty about it. I find it highly objectionable. This is naturally not universal, 
but I find it universally objectionable. And in the Netherlands this is rather strong. 
It comes of course, from the one crisis and the other crisis, the fifth crisis and the 
tenth crisis! That strengthens it. And that fear fuels the friction between groups in 
society. Then you look for the scapegoat. ... And the stranger or foreigner 
[vreemdeling] is always the one who has done it. 
 
As many research participants noted, such rhetoric was clearest among the anti-
immigrant, anti-Muslim populist Right in Dutch politics. These parties, notably Geert Wilders’ 
PVV (Partij Voor Vrijheid; Freedom Party) and Rita Verdonk’s less popular Trots op Nederland 
(Proud of the Netherlands), had failed to make much headway in Amsterdam. José attributed this 
to Amsterdam’s relatively stable economy, as well as “the longer tradition of immigration in 
Amsterdam.” Even if this aspect was, as José said, “not so serious in Amsterdam” as elsewhere 
in the Netherlands, the negative tone articulated in relation to the “other person” was palpable. It 
subtly emerged in all of the benign ways that social difference is demarcated from ‘Dutchness’. 
Modes of perception and practices of calculation developed during colonialism resurface in these 
discussions, but in ways that redirect and rearticulate how cultural difference is understood as a 
problem to be acted upon in the contemporary context. 
 
Intricacies of governmental resistance and consent 
 
In contrast to the pervasiveness of the language of autochthony in the spheres of everyday 
life in Amsterdam, I was surprised to realize when reviewing my interview transcripts that 
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language coaches only used the term allochtoon when critiquing the term, or in direct response to 
my own use of it. Instead of using the “normal” language of autochthony to describe the 
volunteers and clients participating in language coaching projects these organizations had 
developed and actively employed a whole array of terms to speak about their participants. This is 
especially noteworthy when one considers that the vast majority of language coaches are ‘native’ 
Dutch, where language learners are newcomers to the language, if not city or country.  
The SamenSpraak (Speaking Together) program of Gilde Amsterdam (Guild Amsterdam) 
described their volunteers as taalcoaches (language coaches) and their Dutch-language learners 
as anderstaligers (other language speakers) or anderstalige stadgenoten (other language 
speaking townsmen). Mixen in Mokum (Mixing in Mokum) used the terms oud Amsterdammer 
and nieuwe Amsterdammer (old and new Amsterdammers, respectively), and called the people in 
these speaking partnerships maatjes (buddies). The Amsterdam Buurvrouwen Contact (ABC, 
Amsterdam Neighbourhood Women Contact) used the feminine term for neighbour, buurvrouw, 
to talk about the people they bring together in their women-only teaching and speaking 
partnerships. Similarly, the neighbourhood-based SamenSpraak Oost (Speaking Together East) 
talked about bringing together buurtbewoners (neighbourhood residents) of different cultures. In 
each of these programs, the language used to name participants is intentionally inclusive. While 
referencing participants’ roles in the partnership, this vocabulary situates both partners as 
members of the city or neighbourhood they share. 
The volunteer language coaches and coordinators who participated in my research tended 
to eschew the language of autochthony and terms for non-Western newcomers and their 
descendants in ways that marked them as outsiders in Amsterdam and the Netherlands. While 
language coaches to varying degrees resisted this terminology and the associated grammar of 
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difference in which it is used, the power of governmentality in shaping knowledge and discourse 
remained clear in our discussions about contemporary social problems in the Netherlands. It 
arose in how certain groups were demarcated from mainstream Dutch society, whether because 
of differences in customs, habits or culture. For instance, Bart gave an example of how “those 
people,” non-Western newcomers, behave in an anti-social manner and remain socially- isolated 
from mainstream Dutch society: “Those people don’t live here. They’re all— All of them have 
satellites— I have one too, but not for Turkish or Moroccan television. But they live in Turkey or 
Morocco at home, with their television.” Susanne (a language coach in her mid-twenties) talked 
about the school she had taught at in a predominantly ‘native’ Dutch populated town as a “white 
school.” José and another language coach, Gerrit, both mentioned the problems with criminality 
associated second-generation Moroccan youth by referring to the perpetrators in a general way as 
Morokaanse klootzakken and the famous kutmarokkantjes.16 While these kinds of terms are used 
in a much more targeted way than the broadly encompassing language of autochthony, they 
nonetheless point to how governmental rationale has made particular ‘problem groups’ and ways 
of speaking of difference easy to think (cf. Eramian 2014).  
Ethnographically, these expressions are understood as part of the much broader practices 
that render fields technical for governmental intervention and to direct affective sentiment 
circulating in relation to practices of citizenship and nation-building (cf. Stoler 2009). How and 
when particular language or ways of defining target groups for intervention is accommodated, 
compromised, resisted or refused is important in flagging individual agency in response to the 
powerful programs of governmentality. The ways in which practices are conducted through, 
around or against a governmental program points the ethnographer to the ways in which power 
operates through social relationships. As such, these everyday practices of language use 
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underscore the ways in which governmental programs, even when highly successful, are subject 
to critique (Li 2007a).  
In the next chapter, I place the expressions and experiences of my research participants 
about difference and Dutchness in the broader context of Amsterdam and the Netherlands. 
“Configuring the new ‘savage slot’: effects of immigration in the Netherlands” further addresses 
some of the ways that the grammar of difference developed during empire has been reassembled 
in the contemporary Netherlands. Echoing ways of marking and making meaning around 
difference in colonies, current discussions about belonging in the Netherlands use the language 
of cultural difference and compatibility, as through the language of autochthony. While race is 
little mentioned or even acknowledged in these conversations, the deep connections between 
racialized and cultural difference continue to matter in how the national community is defined 
and its borders policed in the everyday by a variety of actors.
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5. Configuring the new “savage slot”: Effects of immigration in the Netherlands 
 
As I have shown in the previous chapter, ways of distinguishing social difference in the 
Netherlands today draw on and reshape older ways of thinking about and managing social 
difference. The ways that the language of autochthony is used underscores how problematization 
does not operate in a linear manner, but is replete with contradictions and tensions, as well as 
threads of continuity as governmental programs evolve over time. In this way, the understanding 
of ‘culture’ as a “common sense” way of defining the colonial Dutch or European self has been 
refashioned in the present day Netherlands, becoming a key concept through which life in the 
Dutch national community is lived (Dean 2010:12). As legal and morally-charged categories, 
contemporary Dutch distinctions between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ cultures continue to 
draw upon (rather than simply reproduce) colonial categories of class, language, religion, social 
behaviours, affective associations, as well as aspects of race and national origin (cf. Stoler 1995; 
Bosma 2012:201; Blakely 1993). These patterns are echoed across Europe (and elsewhere in the 
West) as “uncivilized” or “dangerous” populations from the former colonies and elsewhere have 
settled in and adopted the citizenship of European nation-states (Bosma 2012:201; Grillo 1985; 
Schiffauer 2004; Beriss 2004; Stoler 1997; Wikan 2002). Cultural norms, values, and behaviours 
– including language use and ability – are used to question or problematize, assess, extend 
authority over, and direct the conduct of the self and others in contemporary Dutch society (Dean 
2010:18). 
In this chapter, I trace some of the ways in which immigrants are placed in what 
Silverstein (2005) has discussed as the new “savage slot,” a site of otherness that conflates and 
rearticulates multiple processes and terms of social exclusion through the language of culture (cf. 
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Beriss 2004). I build upon the analysis of difference through the concept of autochthony 
addressed in Chapter 4 by tracing some key discussions of difference and Dutchness that 
emerged from the media and ethnographic description. I employ these ethnographic moments as 
a lens through which to analyze cultural racism as a powerful discursive technique in 
contemporary expressions of governmentality. This requires attention to the ways in which 
grammars of difference and Dutchness recognizable from the colonial regime are rearticulated in 
the contemporary context. This chapter flags how even when such formations are unspoken or 
unrecognized, they may continue to impact how fields of vision and affect are marshalled to 
generate understandings of certain subjects as differently situated in (and in relation to) Dutch 
society, with particular or limited capacities and cultural competencies. Throughout this chapter, 
I am concerned with drawing connections between the colonial categories of difference traced in 
Chapter 3 and “who and what are made into ‘problems,’ how certain narratives are made ‘easy to 
think,’ and what ‘common sense’ such formulations have fostered and continue to serve” in the 
Netherlands today (Stoler 2011:130; cf. Stoler 2009). 
 I begin this analysis by examining how contemporary concepts of cultural difference 
have created an environment which enabled the growth of a populist Right presence in the 
Netherlands, and across Western Europe. While the xenophobic and pointedly anti-Islam rhetoric 
of this new political force is contested by many in Dutch society, I show how the ways that these 
politicians have framed the immigrant or allochtoon problem have had wide-reaching impacts 
for everyday conceptions of difference and Dutchness. As I have shown in relation to the 
language of autochthony in Chapter 4, understandings of the boundaries of Dutchness are 
contested and rearticulated by people like my research participants in their everyday lives. 
However, these boundaries are nonetheless deeply embedded in “common sense” modes of 
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perception and practices of calculation that draw on a grammar of alterity with roots in the 
colonial experience. Stoler’s work on “colonial aphasia” (2011; cf. Helsloot 2012) provides 
insight into the current state of affairs in the Netherlands, where racial and cultural difference 
operate in tandem as powerful, yet unspoken, criteria in judging who belongs to the Dutch 
national community. Using the now annual controversy around the black-faced figure of Zwarte 
Piet (Black Peter) in the winter children’s holiday as a case-study, I conclude this chapter by 
exploring how issues of race and (cultural) racism have become an important tension in 
contemporary Dutch identity politics and mark a point of fracture in the assemblage that coheres 
around citizenship practice. 
 
In defense of Dutchness: the national threat of “culturalized” difference  
 
 The ways in which the Dutch grammar of alterity has been rearticulated and reassembled 
has not only made certain ‘cultural’ differences “easy to think,” it has also made powerful 
connections between contemporary processes and categories and their colonial genealogies 
difficult or impossible to recognize for some (cf. Stoler 2011). Recent innovations in late 
twentieth century policy and its language (i.e. the introduction of allochtoon) have done little to 
dispel the older structural problems associated with notions of difference that obscure essential 
categories, such as race, through notions of culture. Importantly, these experiences in the Dutch 
context reflect widespread processes through which migrants in contemporary Europe, New 
World settler societies, and elsewhere have become the site par excellence for national anxieties 
concerning internal and external threats (Silverstein 2005:366; cf. Geschiere 2009). The shift 
from the overt racial hierarchies of the early colonial period to ‘cultural racism’ has often 
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occurred in contexts where race is no longer officially recognized by the state, or is reconfigured 
in relation to a broader notion of cultural difference that may even critique biological concepts of 
race. The power of this strategy is observable in how “race remains salient in the everyday lives 
of immigrants in Europe, as an inescapable social fact whose vitality and volatility only appear to 
be increasing” (Silverstein 2005:364-365; cf. Foucault, 1990:139; Bunzl 2005b; Willinsky 1999; 
Jhally 1996). Gilroy indicates that unlike racisms of the past, cultural racism has grown “just as 
intractable and fundamental as the natural hierarchies they have partly replaced, but they have 
acquired extra moral credibility and additional political authority by being closer to respectable 
and realistic cultural nationalism” (2004:156-157). The subtlety of this form of systemic 
discrimination means that it is often unremarkable or unnoticed by the dominant group, in this 
case white or ‘native’ Dutch.  
 The contemporary appeal to “culture” and the threatening possibility of encountering 
“cultural incommensurability” among ‘non-Western’ newcomers – or allochtonen – has become 
normalized in mainstream discussions in Dutch politics at all levels, within the media, among 
citizens like my interlocutors. Aspects of wide ranging “cultural” difference can become moving 
targets in the highly contextual process of appealing to a “flexible cultural divide” as a way of 
“[distinguishing] between people who are allegedly capable of functioning in our culture and 
those who are allegedly not” (Bosma 2012:201; cf. Stoler 1995). This is clear in how the highly 
flexible language of autochthony operates as a generalizable grammar of alterity in the 
Foucauldian sense of racial “coding”: rather than being limited to the language used in any 
specific historical or cultural context, such a grammar provides “an ‘instrumental space, at once 
discursive and political’ in which each group could infuse a shared vocabulary with different 
political meanings” (Stoler 1995:72; cf. Geschiere 2009; Comaroff and Comaroff 2001; 
148 
 
Geschiere and Jackson 2006; Ceuppens 2006; Ceuppens and Geschiere 2005). Taken-for-granted 
or common sense understandings of difference in turn become powerful factors in the nation-
building project and moral conceptions of appropriate citizenship practice (Geschiere 2009:28; 
Bosma 2012; Stoler 2011). These hegemonic culturalized forms become crucial to how 
belonging is negotiated and recognized at the level of the state and in the everyday, as in 
Amsterdam (cf. Ong 1996:738).  
 The new populist Right in the Netherlands – and similar parties or movements in other 
states of the European Union – has also profited from being able to mobilize cultural difference 
in service of their political agendas. Fears prompted by a growing ‘non-Western’ minority 
presence in the Netherlands, and the move to defend Dutch culture from cultural Others echo 
similar sentiments and actions across Europe, where appeals to uphold the nation, its traditions 
and the rights of its first comers (autochthons) are increasingly normalized. Where (‘non-
Western’) migrants have become the key focus of these national anxieties, in the minds of many 
across Western Europe such fears have often been more particularly embodied by Muslim 
newcomers (Silverstein 2005:366; cf. Geschiere 2009). Islamophobic and anti-Islamic rhetoric 
has come to represent “simultaneously a discourse about religion and a racialized discourse 
about culture” (Glick Schiller 2005:529) that has easily absorbed and reshaped older colonial 
notions of culturalized difference. Across Western Europe, Islam is widely viewed as the religion 
of an oppressive, intolerant, and “backwards” culture originating outside of the field of civilized, 
European conduct (Ong 1996:738; Silverstein 2005; Bunzl 2004, 2005; Wikan 2002; Pratt 
Ewing 2008; Mandel 2008; cf. Gouda and Smith-Clancy 1998; Kuitenbrouwer 1991). This 
discourse has entailed the dual processes of stereotyping all Muslims as beholden to cultural and 
religious norms that deviate from those of the (similarly homogenized) ‘West’, and making Islam 
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a significant touchstone in debates on integration (cf. Verkaaik 2009; Bunzl 2004, 2005; 
Silverstein 2005; Glick Schiller 2005).  
 In discussions on current affairs programs, in magazines, reader commentary on Internet 
news and social media, as well as through conversations with my research participants, I have 
observed fears about ‘non-Western’ newcomers to include everything from: a rolling back of 
free speech rights; changing statutory holidays from Christian or nationa l civic celebrations to 
those of other religious groups (such as Muslims, Hindus or Jews); restricting laws with regard to 
euthanasia or abortion; outlawing homosexuality; unequal rights for women, gendered 
segregation, or even (in a more sensational instance) requiring all women to wear hijab. In these 
expressions, Islam especially has been reified as a culture that clashes with and threatens to erode 
the liberal, democratic cultures of ‘Western’ nation-states. The scrutiny of Muslims in particular 
has been strengthened by news of gendered violence (such as honour killings or female genital 
mutilation) as well as high-profile incidents of violence by Islamic extremists (cf. Wikan 2002; 
Pratt Ewing 2008). These have included the 2001 terrorist strikes in the United States, transit 
bombings in Spain (2004) and the United Kingdom (2005), as well as the murders of Pim 
Fortuyn (2002), Theo Van Gogh (2004), and death threats against Ayan Hirsi Ali (cf. Sniderman 
and Hagendoorn 2007:3-4). Van Gogh’s murder by a young Moroccan Dutch man who had 
turned to radical Islam was a particularly important catalyst for recent debate.1 Unlike 
international incidents, the murder of this high-profile Dutch public figure “fuelled perceptions 
of a schism between immigrant Muslims and the ‘native Dutch’ over basic democratic values 
such as freedom of speech and the position of women in Muslim communities” (Vasta 2007:714; 
cf. Hajer and Uitermark 2008; Stengs 2009; Prins 2002).  
Reactions to these fears by European governments have been varied and wide-reaching. 
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One need only think of the ban on minarets in Switzerland, the laws prohibiting French Muslim 
women from wearing religious headscarves in public places, or panic over “honour killings” and 
“forced marriages” in Norway and Germany (Wikan 2002; Pratt Ewing 2008). An interesting 
Dutch example was observable in the 2011 uproar created by the Partij voor de Dieren (PvdD, 
Party for the Animals) which sought to, and eventually passed (116 to 30) a law in Dutch 
Parliament outlawing the practice of ritually slaughtered, i.e. halal, meat. Most ‘native’ Dutch 
commentators in the media and in Parliament explicitly framed this form of slaughter as an 
aspect of (foreign) culture;2 specifically, it was framed as an aspect that was not in keeping with 
the mainstream Dutch esteem for animal welfare. The leader of the PvdD, Marianne Thieme, has 
been quoted as saying: “In our country, animal welfare is such a big issue that we think freedom 
of religion ends where human or animal suffering begins. ... If freedom of religion causes harm 
to anybody, human, or animal, then freedom of religion must be restricted” (Najibullah 2011). 
These are some of the more controversial examples that circulate, with many less sensational 
instances revealed in the study of public and policy discourse. Such expressions and instances 
expose powerful tensions and sociopolitical structures that shape contemporary identity politics 
in the Netherlands.  
While these views and expressions are common today, they have only gained significant 
traction across Europe since the 1980s and 1990s, as the far Right capitalized upon these 
constellations of nationalist sentiments.3 In Austria, such views took hold during the mid-1990s 
when the Freedom Party shifted from a tradition of Jew-bashing to capitalize on alarm over 
increasing numbers of African, Asian, and Muslim immigrants who were framed as undermining 
not only the Austrian national/ ethnic community, but Europe itself (Bunzl 2005a:506). 
Likewise, neonationalists in France (particularly Le Pen and the Front National) “seized upon 
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the left’s call for recognition of ‘la droit à la difference,’ and had made it their own battle cry. 
Immigrants, blacks, Jews, and the others they detested as ‘unfrench’ indeed had a right to their 
cultural differences,” but in their own countries (Lebovics 2004:132). In the Netherlands, it was 
only during the early 1990s that Frits Bolkestein (leader of the mainstream right-of-centre 
liberals, VVD), was able to raise the spectre of the negative effects of non-Western migrants on 
Dutch society in mainstream politics. Drawing strong connections to a perceived fundamental 
incompatibility between Islam (the religion of the majority of recent ‘non-Western’ migrants) 
and what he described as Western values and achievements, Bolkestein too appealed to these 
nationalist fears (Ghoreshi and van Tilberg 2006:63; cf. Entzinger 2006:125; Penninx 2006:248; 
Pettigrew 1998:95). These groups’ relative successes managed to shift the dialogue of 
mainstream parties on immigration farther to the Right, even when neonationalist groups failed 
to translate their impact into votes (Pettigrew 1998:95-96; cf. Holmes 2000; van der Valk 2003). 
 As the far and populist Right gained traction for their views across Europe, the Dutch 
government enacted the Wet Inbugering Nieuwkomers (Civic Integration of Newcomers Act) in 
1998. This law required all new immigrants wishing to settle in the Netherlands and acquire 
Dutch citizenship to undergo ‘civic integration’ (inburgering) training, which had a heavy 
emphasis on learning the Dutch language. Those exempt from undertaking inburgering courses 
are citizens of EU or European Economic Area countries. Minors who complete Dutch public 
education are also exempt from undergoing these courses and exams. Such courses require the 
completion of 500 hours of language training (A2 level4 of Dutch proficiency) and 100 hours of 
social orientation training. This emphasis on language and social training is strongly reminiscent 
of educational policies that sought to ensure cultural suitability and orientation of ‘Europeans’ 
and other subjects in the colonies vis-à-vis the Netherlands (Stoler 1995; Van Lier 1971:192-193, 
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221). Upon successfully passing a number of oral, aural and written tests,5 contemporary 
newcomers become eligible to apply for Dutch citizenship. Since 2006, the law governing ‘civic 
integration’ has been replaced with two new, more demanding acts: Civic Integration Abroad 
Act (Wet Inburgering Buitenland), and the Civic Integration Act (Wet Inburgering).6 
 As Björnson (2007) has shown, the common and anticipated inburgeraar (inburgering 
student) is the ‘non-Western’ allochtoon. This target population is frequently perceived by 
politicians, scholars, policy makers, and regular citizens like my informants, to have life 
experiences, values, norms and practices very different from mainstream Dutch society, or even 
from the generalized “Western society” (especially as projected onto the space of the European 
Union). Of these targeted individuals, the inburgering project is even more specifically directed 
to the civil enculturation of “traditional women of Muslim origin,” also termed “migrant women” 
by some of my interlocutors. In the Dutch context, this especially implies women of Moroccan 
or Turkish descent. These are people whom the inburgering policy architects Entzinger and Van 
der Zwaan argued might not otherwise have access to language and host-society orientation 
training. According to one of the government’s social policy advisory boards, the inburgering 
course’s goals should be to help “immigrants develop a sense of individual responsibility.” This 
should derive from “a core curriculum that includes knowledge of the Dutch language, society 
and culture and knowledge of democratic values” (Council for Social Development (RMO) 
2003, quoted in Entzinger 2004b:11). 
While many in Dutch society agreed that these policy interventions were a step in the 
right direction, there remained grave concerns about the place and role of immigrants in Dutch 
society. These ideas about non-Western newcomers’ threatening difference resurfaced in early 
2000, in an op-ed in a national daily newspaper that has come to be considered a turning point in 
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the Dutch context by Dutch academics, politicians, and within the public forum of the media. In 
“Het multiculturele drama” (The Multicultural Drama),7 Paul Scheffer invoked the commonly 
drawn line between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ immigrants or allochtonen, echoing 
Bolkestein’s lament of the formation of an ‘ethnic underclass’ (cf. Ghoreshi and van Tilburg 
2006:64; Entzinger 2003:78). Scheffer wrote that while immigrants from ‘Western’ societies 
have proven entirely unproblematic for Dutch society, ‘non-Western’ newcomers had fallen 
behind the standards of the Dutch majority, causing numerous and increasingly serious problems 
(Scheffer 2000). This widely read and controversial article was seen as expressing what many 
had come to view as common, if unspoken, knowledge:  
 
Whomever can see all the available information comes to the same alarming 
conclusion: unemployment, poverty, school dropout and criminality grow among 
ethnic minorities. And the outlook for them in general is not good, regardless of 
individual success stories. There are an enormous number of people who have 
fallen behind and are without chances, who will increasingly burden Dutch 
society. (Scheffer 2000; my translation) 
 
Scheffer’s piece was not only a condemnation of the then current state of national affairs, 
but also a call to consider how things had come to this point, what could be done to begin to 
remedy this situation, and how to keep it from worsening. For newcomers, ‘civic integration’ 
legislation (1998) marked an important policy intervention. Yet, Scheffer’s concerns for 
integration also encompassed those now second and third generations of children from ‘non-
Western’ immigrant backgrounds, particularly allochtone (allochthonous) Muslims of Turkish 
and Moroccan descent. Alongside his allusions to the problems that ‘non-Western’ immigrants’ 
culture poses for their integration into Dutch society, Scheffer also called for ‘native’ Dutch to 
consider the role of their own cultural heritage in finding a solution to the multicultural drama: 
“Let us begin,” he implored, “to take the Dutch language, culture and history much more 
154 
 
seriously” (Scheffer 2000; my translation). As a leftist publicist and prominent former member 
of the Labour Party (PvdA), Scheffer opened the floodgates regarding speaking of these issues in 
public. Yet it was Pim Fortuyn who first succeeded in mainstreaming these ‘populist’ concerns, 
ensuring them a central place on the agendas of all of the major political parties in the 
Netherlands (Margry 2007:125).  
Strongly nationalist, Fortuyn’s unique brand of politics echoed tactics and rhetoric proven 
successful by neonationalist figures and groups that had much earlier gained ground elsewhere in 
Europe. Significantly, Fortuyn’s message to potential voters also echoed the “common sense” 
ways of thinking about differences in the former spaces of empire. Drawing on notions of 
“culture” rather than race or other aspects of social difference, the charismatic Fortuyn argued 
that Muslims’ and other non-Western newcomers’ “backward” and “intolerant” cultures posed a 
serious threat to the Dutch values and way of life. He formulated these arguments not in relation 
to revamped colonial anxieties over ‘miscegenation’ and loss or degradation of middle-class 
ideals, but with great concern for the future of the Dutch liberal values. I consistently heard 
people rank democracy, equality and tolerance (e.g. of gender, sexuality, religion), free speech, 
personal autonomy, permissiveness, and inclusion as key Dutch values that should be upheld 
across society (cf. Vuijsje 2000; Duyvendak 2011; Sunier and van Ginkel 2006:111; Margry 
2007:126; Prins 2002; Lechner 2008:76; Cohen 2011:10). For Fortuyn, further immigration 
(particularly of ‘non-Western’ migrants) was not be tolerated, and those who had already gained 
citizenship in the Netherlands must be (linguistically and culturally) assimilated as quickly as 
possible. He was vocal in expressing his fears that Dutchness itself was under threat from the 
erosive powers of multiculturalism and cultural relativism (Sunier & van Ginkel 2006:115; 
Margry 2007:125). In ways that were unheard of in the past, Fortuyn gave expression to anti-
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immigrant, and especially anti-Islam views that were not only acceptable but supported by a 
wide number of Dutch voters. Through Fortuyn, the threatening incompatibility of Islam with 
Dutch society and European civilization earlier argued by colonial scholars, administrators, and 
Christian missionaries was revived, redirected, and took on a new sense of urgency (Gouda and 
Smith-Clancy 1998:5; Kuitenbrouwer 1991:117; cf. Colonna 1997; Conklin 1998). 
 Since Fortuyn,8 other figures and parties have taken up similar far Right views couched 
in populist terms hinting at the potential for moral panic. The Partij Voor Vrijheid (PVV, 
Freedom Party) led by Geert Wilders has since become a central player in Dutch politics – 
although the increase in populist Right rhetoric has been largely rejected by voters in 
Amsterdam.9 What is more important are the ways in which these politicians have shifted 
mainstream discussion of immigration, social difference and Dutchness to the Right, using Islam 
as a potent symbol of these dangers.  
 
Practicing/ critiquing the everyday “common sense” of social difference  
 
Unlike instances of violence, hostility and blatant discrimination – for example, distinct 
calls from populist Right figures demanding the cultural assimilation of “backwards” immigrants 
– it can be much more difficult to recognize how inequality and prejudice are routinely 
perpetuated through a grammar of difference (Pettigrew 1998). These cultural assumptions and 
expectations nonetheless support hegemonic social relations by shaping more subtle ideas about 
morally acceptable engagement in social, economic and political spheres (Foucault 1990; Stoler 
2011). Through ongoing processes of governmentality, populations internalize ways of thinking 
and being in their social worlds as “common sense.” In the Netherlands (as in other Western 
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countries), poverty is racialized and culturalized through association with ‘non-Western’ 
immigrants. Racialized citizens are discursively denied full membership in the polity as 
legitimate contributors to shaping Dutch tradition and culture. ‘Non-western’ allochtonen 
become specific targets in need of assistance, education, and even discipline. These 
governmental effects are visible not only among policy makers and sensationalist politicians, but 
also in the ways in which other socially-situated subjects frame certain members of the 
population as outside of the mainstream or national community.  
Significantly, the rise to prominence of Islam as a key marker of social difference and 
distance has occurred in the absence of discussions of racism and connected forms of structural 
inequality in the Netherlands. This includes a dearth of scholarship on this topic in the Dutch 
context. The association of multiple, powerful categories of social difference within the flexible 
and dynamic notion of “culture” has been an important factor – but not the only factor – 
accounting for silence on these issues. While this silence is in part due to how few scholars 
beyond the Netherlands learn the Dutch language, scholars like the American Allison Blakely 
also underscore how topics such as imperialism and racism “are not ones which Dutch scholars 
have been comfortable” (1993:xix). Writing two decades after Blakley, Bosma points out how 
former colonial powers like “the Dutch habitually remain silent about the untidy things they dig 
up from their past” (Bosma 2012:197).  
Taken together, these powerfully engrained symbolic, cultural, and historical conditions 
and processes undergird the life worlds even of people who describe an inclusive view of 
immigrant integration and citizenship practice, and the organizations and institutions through 
which such views are practised and expressed. The ways in which the actions and views of 
people like my primary research participants variously resonate with and contradict dominant 
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ideas of Dutch cultural practice (ideas about norms, behaviours, expectations, etiquette, values) 
reveals the power of the will to govern. Where some Dutch people of colour are often viewed as 
acting in ways incompatible with Dutch values, others continue to be denied full membership in 
Dutch society even when they explicitly appeal to key Dutch values and appear to meet social 
expectations for behaviour. In the remainder of this chapter, I ethnographically trace the 
“discursive fact” of cultural racism in contemporary Dutch society. In these descriptions, what 
may be less important than the words spoken is that these differences are spoken about. As Stoler 
remarks, “[i]n the landscape of racialized sentiments, the word race need not be spoken” (Stoler 
2011:129) to operate as a powerful marker in identity politics. 
Regardless of the citizenship status of the person or group in question, banal descriptions 
and experiences of neighbourhood spaces, or opinions about educational and labour practices 
reveal how fundamental, if unspoken, distinctions developed during colonialism have remained 
to everyday understandings of contemporary social issues. Through the following ethnographic 
descriptions, I show some of the insidious ways that governmentality has made certain categories 
“easy to think” or “common sense” in the Dutch context (Stoler 2011). I examine this not only 
through language coaches’ experiences and opinions, but in the controversy around the Dutch 
winter children’s holiday (Sinterklaas) which has raised important questions about the 
relationship between racialized difference and full membership in Dutch society. 
 I found that in many conversations I had or observed throughout my fieldwork and in the 
Dutch news and popular media, many ‘native’ Dutch were critical of newcomers’ cultural 
practices and beliefs. Naming people’s cultural, ethnic or national backgrounds was a common 
way of marking differences, and indirectly pointing to social problems associated with these 
differences. At the same time, my research participants, especially those volunteering as 
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language coaches, were often vocal in their dismissal of discriminatory or divisive practices or 
beliefs. The views voiced by the populist Right were particularly censured by these individuals. 
In a study of governmentality, it is therefore important to address how alongside protests and 
refusals, these informants are nonetheless entangled in these processes in subtle, even 
unconscious ways. 
 Several language coaches and other informants used the racially-charged terms “white” 
and “black” to describe social or cultural distinctions commonly expressed through the language 
of autochthony. These distinctions between black and white Dutch also emerged in how the 
school in Amsterdam West where I volunteered as an English teacher for the Native Speaker 
Project was commonly referred to as a zwarte school, literally a “black school.” The term zwarte 
school was used by my informants, in the media, government statistics and policy to describe 
schools where the majority of the pupils were allochtonen. At the secondary level, these schools 
likely taught students in the lowest academic stream (VMBO). Some schools were even 
considered “too black,” as when figures reported by the City of Amsterdam compared the 
demographic composition of schools to that of the neighbourhoods in which they were located 
and found that the student body did not reflect the local population (City of Amsterdam, 
Research and Statistics 2010:2; cf. Lindeman et al. 2011). These figures highlight the 
phenomenon of “white flight” (wittevlucht) within the school system, where ‘native’ Dutch 
parents opt to send their children to schools outside of their neighbourhood rather than to the 
local institution.  
Discussions about “white flight” from such neighbourhoods in popular magazines, news, 
and television programs underscore the slippery and shifting connections made between multiple 
constructions of “culturalized” difference. For instance, the television program Rondom 10 
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(Round About 10) aired an episode entitled Vreemd in eigen land (Strange in your own 
country)10 that spotlighted the movement of ‘native’ Dutch from “too black” (te zwarte) 
neighbourhoods or schools (cf. Lindeman et al. 2011:55). The majority of the panel participants 
were ‘native’ Dutch residents of so-called “problem neighbourhoods” (achterstandswijken, 
literally “backwards neighbourhoods”) in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, and Den Haag. 
Panellists expressed a range of views from no longer feeling comfortable in their 
neighbourhoods to embracing the cultural diversity that comes with living in a contemporary 
urban space. In these discussions, divergent notions of “Dutch culture” rose to the surface, as did 
panellists’ expectations of how to live together in their neighbourhoods and cities. These 
conversations highlighted how certain behaviours, cultural symbols, norms and values became 
flexible points of contention in how different groups of ‘native’ Dutch felt at home in particular 
social spaces. Throughout the television program, and evident in my interviews and experiences, 
not knowing Dutch (that is, not being able to communicate) signalled a variety of uncomfortable 
‘cultural’ differences that were sometimes thought to threaten the social cohesion of the 
neighbourhood, city or nation. The logic informing these processes of cultural racism is part of 
the same genealogy of difference making and management that emerged from the colonial 
experience. The rationale that makes and has made these understandings of difference easy to 
think, simultaneously contributes to the processes that erase the obvious connections between 
‘cultural’ differences and racism in contemporary Dutch society and Dutch nation-building 
projects (Stoler 2011). The difficulty in recognizing these deeply embedded connections is 
exemplified in the ways that people may both actively contest racially exclusionary notions of 
Dutch citizenship practice and nonetheless employ “common sense” categories of difference and 
Dutchness. 
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A language coaching volunteer in his sixties, Bart had lived in Amsterdam his entire life, 
but had moved between different city districts. When he was a child he had lived in the western 
part of Amsterdam. “You know Amsterdam a little bit?” he asked me in English, while finding a 
map of the city. “In my youth I lived in the West. And this part of Amsterdam,” he said pointing 
to what is known as the Nieuw-West (New West), “didn’t exist. It was built from 1950 on. 
Predominantly, people who lived here came from Friesland. Immigrants. Dutch immigrants. And 
I lived here in this region.” Bart traced out the Bos en Lommer neighbourhood district on the 
map. “It was middle-class. My father was a teacher, and that was the region. And now it’s all 
Moroccan and Turkish.” As our conversation later turned to the rising support for populist Right 
politicians like Geert Wilders and the feelings of national identity crisis they stimulate, the 
significance of the demographic changes across the city resurfaced. Bart explained,  
 
Well, what I recognize myself is that you can feel unease with people you don’t 
understand at all. Not the language, not heritage, customs. It gives some paranoia, 
or— Yeah. And a feeling when there are too much— I don’t live in Amsterdam 
West, but when you live there and subsequently all neighbours become Turkish 
and Moroccan whom you don’t understand, that’s not fine.  
 
For many ‘native’ Dutch, such as those living in working-class neighbourhoods, their 
discomfort in the presence of ‘non-Western’ Dutch seemed to stem, as Bart alluded, from the 
creation of unrecognizable spaces from which they feel excluded (cf. Duyvendak 2011). As I 
observed not only in conversation with research participants like Bart, but in casual 
conversations with other ‘native’ Dutch, in media (e.g. the Rondom 10 episode), and among 
politicians and scholars, these spaces are not uncomfortable because of racial tensions, but 
because of the cultural difference and distance of newcomers from ‘native’ Dutch. This has 
observably been the case for those living in Bos en Lommer and elsewhere in Amsterdam’s more 
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affordable neighbourhoods, such as in the Nieuw-West or Amsterdam Noord. This was clear in 
the experiences of Ilse,11 a life-long resident of the historic working-class neighbourhood, 
Amsterdam Noord. Ilse had seen many demographic changes as more ‘non-Western’ newcomers 
settled in this more affordable part of the city. During our interview just a few weeks before the 
2010 federal elections, Ilse explained that 
 
A lot of people are living here who are Turkish or Moroccan, but they hang onto 
their own culture. So there’s a lot of women still dressed like the Islamic way, and 
well they have cultural differences. And I don’t know if you have followed the 
elections lately, I think a lot of people are a bit fed up with the cultural difference 
who are imposing in our lives, in our cultural things. 
 
Opinion polls at the time of our interview showed that Amsterdam Noord was one of two 
neighbourhood districts in the city where the populist PVV actually garnered significant 
support.12 Echoing the rhetoric of the populist Right, Ilse, like many other ‘native’ Dutch I heard 
speak about integration issues in the Netherlands, was quick to connect the problems of cultural 
difference with Islam, the religion of the majority of ‘non-Western’ newcomers. 
 
So, for instance, some people say Islamic schools need to be closed. Because, 
well, how can they ever be integrated in our cultural life and things, if they still 
keep following the Islamic education and Islamic languages. They never can 
integrate here. I think that is really difficult. I think those schools need to be 
closed, because well else those kids will never really become Dutch, but they 
can’t go to their own country because the cultural differences are too great. They 
are too different. … They end up in-between, and they can’t follow because the 
parents say, well, girls need to be virgin before marriage, and they should marry 
with a nephew or another family member from original country, and that’s why 
also we have more [honour violence]. … There’s no solution. Because they will 
keep hanging on to their culture and we will hang on to our culture. But well, it 
changes slowly, of course. (Ilse) 
 
This view of the challenges ‘non-Western’ newcomers pose to Dutch society and culture 
were broadly shared, even in neighbourhoods in Amsterdam where the populist Right did not 
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make significant in-roads. These everyday experiences draw attention to the ongoing tensions of 
colonial categories of difference in the contemporary Netherlands. While often unacknowledged, 
the mutable cultural criteria for belonging remain saturated with what Gilroy has called “race-
coded common sense” (2004:158; cf. Eramian 2014). Such criteria play an important role in the 
processes of subject-ification whereby citizens are discursively talked into being though a 
powerful grammar of difference that defines, includes and excludes particular behaviours, 
values, beliefs and practices (Hurenkamp et al. 2011:211; Ong 1996:738; Cooper and Stoler 
1997:7). 
These kinds of negative opinions or experiences with regard to ‘non-Western’ Dutch 
were regularly commented on by my other informants and observed in Dutch media throughout 
my time in the field and after. Fears and concerns about these neighbours were especially 
directed toward youth of Moroccan descent. The image of these youth as criminal and disruptive 
of Dutch society emerged in numerous ways throughout my fieldwork: I observed many 
complaints about the asociaal (anti-social) or lastig (nuisance) behaviour of these youth ranging 
from insults hurled in the streets, to the thuggish, criminal behaviour. These were the youth that 
my interlocutors had without hesitation called “Marokkaanse klootzakken” or “kutmarokkantjes.” 
Such complaints were deeply connected to the failure of certain ‘non-Western’ newcomers to 
integrate into Dutch society, behaving as a result in ways that were not sociaal or did not help to 
build society. Gerrit,13 a language coaching volunteer in his seventies, talked about the many 
recent break-ins in his street in the Jordaan (bordering on Amsterdam West) when I asked him 
about how Amsterdam has changed in recent years.  
 
Yes, it has become less enjoyable, comfortable [gezellig]. Absolutely. In 
particular due to the famous kutmarokkantje. Do you not know the 
kutmarokkantjes? The young guys− These guys, they harass people with insults, 
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commit robberies, and such. You know. In the last couple of years, two or four 
businesses have been broken into. … And it is always the Moroccan youth. 
Turkish youth you really don’t have so much trouble from. 
 
It was a small group of Moroccan youth who my flatmate Mena rebuked outside of our 
house one afternoon. We lived in the neighbourhood known as De Wallen, or The Red Light 
District. As I was locking up my bicycle opposite our house, Mena waited for me outside our 
door (adjacent to the ground floor business, a sex shop). While I fumbled with my lock, Mena 
started shouting at a group of six Moroccan youth, probably about fifteen years old. “You 
terrible kid!” she shouted at one of them in Dutch as they walked past. “What makes you think 
you can say that?!” When I had asked her what happened, Mena said that as they walked past her 
they had called her a whore. Mena explained it was quite common that these youth yelled such 
insults at white, non-Muslim women. She usually encountered these reactions outside of the 
Centre where more of these youth lived, and not as one might think so close to our home in the 
Red Light. When I asked her why she thought these kids were different than their ‘native’ Dutch 
peers, her impression was that it was because of the religious and cultural teachings these youth 
received, especially with regard to women.  
The ways in which the associations between morality and particular minority groups are 
“common sense” has also been visible in the organization of the national observance of 
Dodenherdenking (Remembrance of the War Dead) and Bevrijdingsdag (Liberation Day) on 4 
and 5 May. In an interview with Carolien,14 a young woman who worked for Het Nationaal 
Comite 4 en 5 Mei (The National Committee for May 4th and 5th), she talked about how the 
committee wanted to ensure that all Dutch, including ‘non-Western’ Dutch participated in these 
national events. While Carolien observed that many ‘non-Western’ Dutch already do come out to 
celebrate on 5 May at the festivals, some local committees have tried different strategies to 
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encourage greater involvement from this demographic. One festival decided to program specific 
music that they felt would attract more ‘non-Western’ Dutch to the event. This initiative was 
quickly shut down by the police who felt that it would, as Carolien said, “trigger a group of 
young criminals to come and cause crime.” 
Similarly, Clarisa15 related several stories where she had observed or experienced clashes 
between ‘native’ Dutch ‘non-Western’ Dutch in her neighbourhood, especially where the non-
‘natives’ behaved in shockingly asociaal ways. Clarisa held Mexican citizenship, but had grown 
up in the United States and recently married a ‘native’ Dutch man. When we met she said she 
had begun to feel at home in Amsterdam, living in a culturally diverse neighbourhood near the 
Amstel Station. In spite of this, Clarisa pointed to specific problems with some of her Muslim 
neighbours. For instance, she told me about how as a woman with darker skin she felt that 
Muslims in the neighbourhood assumed that she was also Muslim. She often encountered insults 
from these neighbours because she did not veil herself. In another example, Clarisa related how 
one December day she and her husband came across their neighbour, and elderly ‘native’ Dutch 
woman, her coat covered with mud and clearly upset. When Clarisa’s husband asked the woman 
what had happened, she said that she had gone to the store where some (non-Western Dutch) 
youth called her names. When the woman responded to them, they attacked her, yelling “How 
does it feel for your country to be taken over by us?!” 
In 2010 I began reading about a wave of attacks on gay men in Amsterdam. Judith 
Schuyf was interviewed by the Nederlandse Omroep Stichting (NOS; Netherlands Broadcasting 
Foundation) for her research on national police figures from early 2008. She pointedly 
commented on the widespread impressions that the perpetrators were these Moroccan youth, and 
the reality suggested by police reports: “The press has written much on the ethnicity of the 
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perpetrators. ... It gives the impression that most perpetrators of gay violence would be from 
ethnic minorities. The figures are not clear about this” (NOS 2010b; my translation). In spite of 
the reality that perpetrators of anti-gay violence in the Netherlands are both ‘native’ and ‘non-
Western’ Dutch, the impression the public has of the situation is that anti-gay violence is 
primarily an immigrant or minority issue.16  
Informants’ perceptions of minority Dutch citizens’ behaviour, attitudes, and place in 
Dutch society drew on many different, often overlapping threads of difference that have become 
“common sense” through the language of “culture.” What is important to recognize here 
ethnographically are the ways in which race remains unspoken in all of these complaints about 
difference. While notions of racialized difference clearly continue to mark people as potential 
Others, all of these discussions point explicitly to cultural difference, cultural incompatibility, or 
cultural barriers to integration into mainstream Dutch society. These narratives and the 
discourses through which they are cultivated and normalized continue to reflect and support the 
overarching structures though which belonging in the nation-state is conceived and managed. As 
with distinguishing between ‘Dutch’ or ‘Europeans’ and natives or Indos in the East Indies, in 
the Netherlands today shifting notions of linguistic ability, religious affiliation, norms about 
gender and sexuality, socioeconomic class, and racialized difference still impact how the 
boundaries of national community are defined. These blatant and banal experiences and 
expressions support the governmental processes and structures through which non-‘native’ 
citizens (those commonly referred to as ‘non-Western’ or allochtonen) become unrecognizable 
simply as Dutch. Indeed, many ‘non-Western’ Dutch have often expressed that in spite of their 
status as Dutch citizens, they feel they are not treated as full members of Dutch society, or as 
having legitimate voices in discussions of Dutch tradition and cultural practice. One site in which 
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these tensions have become highly visible in recent years is through the growing controversy 
around the practice of ritualized black-face in the figure of Zwarte Piet (Black Pete) in the 
popular Dutch winter children’s holiday, Sinterklaas (Saint Nicolas). 
 
Raw nerves in Dutch society: tensions around race, tradition, and belonging 
 
 Race and racism continue to matter in Dutch society, but remain difficult to speak by 
many ‘native’ Dutch (Stoler 2011). Instead, the language of culture – whose genealogy includes 
a powerful racial logic – has been central to ways of thinking and speaking about difference in 
the Dutch grammar of alterity. Since the 1960s, and with growing intensity since 2011, the 
silence around race and racism in Dutch society appears to be breaking. Surprisingly for many 
‘native’ Dutch, the winter holiday season has become a focal point for these discussions. A 
growing number of increasingly vocal Dutch antiracism activists have drawn attention the figure 
of Zwarte Piet as a remnant of the brutal colonial past and no longer in keeping with 
contemporary Dutch values and society. This holiday and its traditions, so highly valued among 
‘native’ Dutch, mark a site at which multiple processes and discourses of belonging coalesce. It 
is a site that reveals affective sentiment as a powerful technology of government, as these 
debates have occurred in a deeply emotional register (Stoler 2009). It is a site through which 
expressions of national identity confront the lived realities of cultural, religious, racial and other 
forms of diversity in the Netherlands today, and reveal the ways in which certain aspects of these 
processes remain unthinkable for some. As the taken-for-granted traditions of this celebration 
generate frictions between members of Dutch society, and make national and international 
headlines, contradictions and tensions around how the Dutch national community is and should 
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be imagined rise to the surface (Anderson 1991; Billig 1995). Probing the tensions of the annual 
Zwarte Piet discussion underscores how racialized notions, like religious and other differences, 
remain aligned with powerful, historically grounded ideas about Dutch culture, belonging, and 
citizenship deeply rooted in the colonial past (cf. Bal 2002; Ong 1996; Stoler 1995; Stoler 2011).  
Rather than celebrating Christmas as the main winter holiday, the Dutch celebrate 
Sinterklaas (St. Nicolas) and Pakjesavond (Presents Evening, 5 December) on the eve of Saint 
Nicolas’ Day. In the contemporary Netherlands,17 the holiday season begins in mid-November 
with the fanfare of a parade through the canals and streets of a coastal town. Each year, a 
different town is chosen to host the highly orchestrated official arrival parade (Intocht) of Saint 
Nicolas. The patron saint of children and Amsterdam, Sinterklaas is enthusiastically welcomed 
from Spain each year on his iconic steamboat with his white horse, presents for the good children 
whose names are kept in a great book, and his many ‘helpers’ or servants called Zwarte Piet. 
After this initial, nationally-televised event, the festive season continues with smaller, local 
arrival parades throughout towns in the Netherlands, as well as the broadcasting of many 
programs (for children and adults alike) featuring the holiday figures. Over the course of the 
following weeks, the presence of the saint and his black-faced companions is ubiquitous. 
For many Dutch, this is a joyful time of year for consuming festive treats, gift-giving, and 
enjoying the magic of the season. Although it has its roots in the Christian tradition, since at least 
the early twentieth century it has been viewed primarily as a children’s holiday and a Dutch 
national tradition (Helsloot 2001). As I observed during my time volunteering with the Native 
Speaker Project and attending the 2009 Intocht, many non-Christian (including Jews and 
Muslims) and other non-‘native’ Dutch children celebrate alongside their ‘native’ Dutch peers 
(cf. Frank 1986[1947]). The significance of the Saint’s Day festival as part of Dutch national 
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tradition is also visible in gestures by governmental, research, and not-for-profit bodies to 
recognize the holiday. A month before the saint was due to arrive in 2010, the Dutch Centre for 
Folk Culture (Nederlands Centrum voor Volkskunde) published a new book on traditions naming 
the Sinterklaas celebration as the “most important” Dutch tradition (RNW News Desk 2010). 
During 2013, the Sint Nicolaasgenootschap (Saint Nicolas Society) applied to have the 
Sinterklaas holiday officially recognized by UNESCO as part of the “intangible cultural 
heritage” of the Dutch people (Posthumus 2013).18  
When I was first told about the holiday and its figures by my ‘native’ Dutch informants, I 
found that the basic explanations I received were part of how the holiday was now commonly 
explained to children: the blackness of Zwarte Piet was attributed to soot from his going down 
chimneys to deliver presents. I found that the explanation I was given was just one of the origin 
stories for the popular holiday characters, but it was now the dominant narrative in how the 
holiday, its characters and traditions were celebrated. The silly, often buffoonish character of 
Zwarte Piet is typically portrayed skipping about in a colourful costume (reminiscent of 
sixteenth century Spanish livery), with large, gold hoop earrings, a curly black wig, face covered 
in black or more likely brown paint, and red lips (see figures 5.1 and 5.2). The contemporary 
figure is the complex outcome of centuries of ritual tradition, which includes overlapping 
meanings derived through Dutch engagement with difference both in and beyond the 
Netherlands.19 For those familiar with the American history of racism, the commonplace Zwarte 
Piet imagery strongly resonates with that of explicitly racist minstrel shows popularized in the 
late nineteenth century (cf. Riggs 1989). These processes in Europe may differ from the 
experiences of race in the American context, but they also resonate with these struggles and 
tensions in important ways.  
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In both American and Dutch contexts, powerful racial stereotypes and caricatures have 
served as techniques of regularization and control that maintained white hegemony and continue 
to impact racial notions and relationships today (cf. Foucault 1990, 1991; Stoler 1995). 
Developed through popular entertainment – minstrelsy in the US, Zwarte Piet and other symbols 
in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe20 – such imagery was more than simple amusement 
for whites. In the American context, it is clear that these images were potent political tools that 
disempowered and dehumanized African Americans, while supporting and justifying institutions 
and structures of inequality and violence against blacks (cf. Cohen 2011). These deeply-rooted, 
normalized images have also impacted how racialized subjects are positioned in the webs of 
power linked to American national- and civil-society (Smedley 1999; Willinsky 1999; cf. Ong 
1996).  
Unlike the American context, the Netherlands “offers a good example of a society where 
for centuries there was little actual presence of people of color in the metropole, but which then 
suddenly has had to contend with their arrival” (Blakely 1993:xv; cf. Oostindie 1990). Even so, 
the Dutch history of colonialism is deeply entwined with encounters with difference, including 
the transatlantic slave trade, the plantation colony of Surinam that relied on slave labour, and 
popular support of the Boer cause in South Africa that laid the foundations for apartheid 
(Oostindie 2012). Yet, rather than immediately conjuring this brutal history, the imagery and 
symbolism encapsulated by the black-faced character was most often considered by my 
informants as benign, “innocent,” and certainly not (intended as) discriminatory. In making sense 
of this remarkable disassociation, Stoler (2011) draws our attention to how in the postcolonial 
context, some things are in fact unable to be remarked upon, to be recognized. Colonial 
categories, grammars of alterity, and processes are unexamined, unconfronted in contemporary 
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European societies (and elsewhere) not simply because they are uncomfortable dimensions of a 
past that would rather be forgotten. Instead, it is because of “colonial aphasia” that such 
connections to the past cannot be thought: the haunting presence of the colonial past is subject to 
“a dismembering, a difficulty speaking, a difficulty generating a vocabulary that associates 
appropriate words and concepts with appropriate things” (Stoler 2011:125).  
The figure of Zwarte Piet, his place in the celebration and in Dutch society, offers a 
striking example of colonial aphasia’s impact on questions of belonging in the Netherlands.  The 
contemporary portrayal of Zwarte Piet is an example of the ways in which new elements may be 
joined to existing assemblages, and may rework “existing elements for new purposes and 
transpos[e] the meanings of key terms” (Li 2007b:284-5). While a blackened figure has long 
been a staple in the Sinterklaas celebration (Blakely 1993), the figure of Zwarte Piet as practiced 
today is an outgrowth of systemic ways of thinking about racial difference that developed during 
the experience of empire. At the same time, terms explicitly referencing racialized difference 
have receded from everyday usage and ways of thinking about difference by the Dutch. Instead, 
‘problem’ groups and practices are discussed in culturalized terms (e.g. allochtonen). Yet, race 
remains a problematic category in the everyday grammar of difference, used by many in Dutch 
society to flag the potential for cultural difference or distance from the Dutch progressive “moral 
majority” (Duyvendak 2004:10). 
Zwarte Piet is a character that many choose to portray in their local and private 
celebrations of the holiday. As issues of skin colour became more politicized in the Dutch public 
sphere after the 1960s, Zwarte Piet began to be seen as a problematic part of this tradition, 
prompting changes to how the character was performed (Helsloot 2009:255). According to 
Helsloot, 21 Zwarte Piet now speaks Dutch well, but in the recent past he was known to be rather 
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dumb, submissive, and routinely mumbled broken Dutch, often with a Surinamese accent 
(2009:261). Similarly less prominent today is the portrayal of Zwarte Piet as a sort of bogeyman, 
who threatened naughty children with a birch switch, and who might even kidnap the worst 
behaved, taking them back to Spain in his burlap sack (Bal 2002:217-218). Today, the good-
natured Zwarte Pieten22 are more likely to hand children a fistful of candy than brandish a 
switch. In spite of changes to diminish the racial caricature in the official portrayal of the Head 
Pete character during the national Intocht (as an intelligent and efficient manager) (Helsloot 
2009:265-266), the older, more clownish character remains widely performed: in local and 
private celebrations, on the daily children’s television special and other media, and certainly 
during the Intocht.  
I repeatedly witnessed (in news articles, television journals, social media, and among 
some of my interlocutors) many ‘native’ Dutch ardently reject readings of the holiday that 
questioned the appropriateness of this ritualized black-face performance. In contrast to the 
widely espoused views dissociating Zwarte Piet from racialized blackness, Helsloot shows that 
these genealogical connections are decidedly present in the portrayal of the contemporary figure. 
Alongside claims tying the saint’s companion to older pagan traditions around the winter solstice 
(cf. Blakely 1993), the invention of the Zwarte Piet character in the current tradition bears direct 
ties to the darker aspects of the Dutch colonial past beginning with his unambiguous portrayal as 
racially black in Jan Schenkman’s picture book dating from 1850, Sint Nikolaas en zijn knecht 
(Saint Nicolas and his servant) (Helsloot 2008:95; cf. Helsloot 2009:251-252). At this time, a 
black servant was a sign of status befitting the portrayal of the saint (cf. Oostindie 1990:232-
233). Nearly a century after this first instance, Surinamese sailors were recruited to play the part 
of Zwarte Piet in the inaugural national Intocht held in Amsterdam in 1934. It has only been 
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much more recently that Piet’s blackness has been reinterpreted to have more benign or 
“politically correct” origins, distanced (even divorced) from race politics; it is not entirely clear 
how this dissociation occurred. What is clear is that this figure has become a focal point for 
recent discussions about race, cultural racism, and systemic discrimination across Dutch society. 
In scholarly literature as well as in my experience in the field, it became clear that the 
supposedly festive and joyful holiday season could become a “hell” for some members of Dutch 
society (Helsloot 2009:250). Throughout my research, I noted the recurring stories of black 
Dutch children and adults who have routinely experienced racially-charged micro-aggressions as 
they are approached in the street, at work or school with calls of “Zwarte Piet!” (cf. Essed 1991). 
One of my interlocutors was a black British woman who had married a Dutch man and raised her 
children in Amsterdam. When she had first lived in the Netherlands she viewed the Sinterklaas 
holiday as a strange aspect of Dutch culture, but one with which she personally had no qualms. It 
was not until her Dutch-born children came home from school, upset at being teased with calls of 
“Zwarte Piet” by their classmates that she came down against the holiday, refusing to celebrate 
it. I heard similar stories from others with whom I spoke about the holiday over the course of my 
fieldwork, as well as in news and social media before and after my time in the field. While this 
remains an annual problem during the celebration, Dutch people of colour experience other 
challenges to their place in the Netherlands throughout the year. This discrimination may have 
been worse before the main waves of Surinamese migration in the 1960s and 1970s, but a 2014 
article referencing the Zwarte Piet debate in the national Trouw (28 June) highlights the ongoing 
realities of contemporary racism in Dutch society. This experience of racism is exacerbated by 
most instances being hard to pinpoint, as Trouw journalist Jeannine Julen notes: “It is hidden in 
expressions such as: ‘What good Dutch you speak.’ Or: ‘Yes, you were born in the Netherlands. 
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But where are you really from?’” (Julen 2014; my translation). The subtle, persistent inequality 
present in the everyday is exposed in the “common sense” ways of talking about difference, but 
vividly erupts in the uncomfortable discussions around Zwarte Piet. 
Since the late 1960s, waves of protest against the continued portrayal of Zwarte Piet in 
the holiday have been grounded in an understanding of the phenomenon as an expression of 
structural discrimination stemming from the brutal history of Dutch colonialism and slavery. In 
1968, a ‘native’ Dutch woman, M.C. Grünbauer, suggested changes to the normalized, racist 
contours of Zwarte Piet (Helsloot 2009:253). Holiday traditions are important ways in which 
society teaches and reinforces norms and expectations for social behaviour (cf. Etzioni 2001; 
Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Bal 2002). Through the adoption of white-faced Pieten in place of 
the traditional black-faced figures, Grünbauer felt that parents and Dutch society could begin to 
counter the “unjust” and essentializing message embodied by the holiday character (Helsloot 
2009:253). Critiques of the figures, especially in Amsterdam, strengthened throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s as the Surinamese presence grew across the Netherlands.  
However, these protests remained relatively isolated with little impact on the opinions 
and practices of wider Dutch society. Many pointed to the master-slave dynamic between Zwarte 
Piet and the saint, and connected these historical relationships to present day conflict and 
discrimination increasingly expressed in racial or ethnic terms (Helsloot 2009:255-6). Even when 
antiracism activists drew what (to a North American audience) appear to be clear parallels 
between the use of black-face in the American minstrelsy and Dutch Sinterklaas traditions (cf. 
CBC 2013), the connections between Zwarte Piet and processes of racism have been frequently 
(and often vehemently) denied by ‘native’ Dutch. In spite of the progressive social views held 
among the moral majority, I nonetheless heard and read sometimes bewildered or impassioned 
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defences of Zwarte Piet and his continued place within the tradition (cf. Bal 2002; Helsloot 
2009). For many ‘native’ Dutch (and some Dutch people of colour), the obvious connections 
between charges of racism and blackface in the US context are simply incomprehensible or 
something to be dismissed when levelled at the beloved figure of Zwarte Piet (Stoler 2011:125; 
cf. Helsloot 2012). The inability to recognize these connections has been an important factor in 
the widespread controversy that has developed around the holiday character during the early 
twenty-first century. 
Unlike their forebears, more recent campaigns against Zwarte Piet have primarily sought 
to create public discussion and dialogue over the figure and his place in contemporary Dutch 
society. These antiracism movements have had a wide reach through their combined use of the 
Internet (e.g. websites, social media platforms such as Tumblr, Facebook, Twitter) and more 
traditional campaign strategies, such as protest marches and postering. In late November 2009, I 
came across posters plastered across waste bins in a public square in a Rotterdam shopping area 
that explicitly challenged the popular, benign narratives about the holiday (see figures 5.3 and 
5.4). Working under the name Stereopiet, artist Philipp Abbass23 used provocative imagery to 
challenge his audience to critically consider the representations of the traditional holiday figures, 
underscoring the disconnect between the contemporary origins discourse and popular 
representation of the holiday figures. During the summer of 2011, another public antiracism 
campaign began to generate momentum. Quinsy Gario, a performance poet, playwright, radio 
host, and activist began the “Zwarte Piet is Racisme” (Black Pete is Racism) campaign by 
stencilling shirts with the movement’s slogan in parks and at public events. The message was 
supported and spread by the use of online social media (e.g. FaceBook, Tumblr) and real time 
events leading up to the annual Intocht on 12 November 2011, in Dordrecht. Like Abbass’ work 
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two years before, these protestors sought to unsettle and inspire meaningful public dialogue to 
create change in Dutch society.  
The momentum and reach of the Zwarte Piet is Racisme campaign24 continues to 
reverberate in Dutch society (and internationally) as part of the now annual “Zwarte Piet 
discussie” (Black Pete discussion) (cf. AT5.nl 2011; Posthumus 2013; CBC 2013; Grunberg 
2013). Groups have also begun filing formal, legal appeals against Zwarte Piet on the basis of 
discrimination. For instance, on 4 July 2014 a court in Amsterdam ruled that the practice of 
black-face in the portrayal of Zwarte Piet was considered discriminatory, and in violation of the 
private lives of black Dutch based on article 8 of the European Treaty for the Rights of Man 
(NU.nl and Jisca Cohen 2014). An academic and antiracism activist, Patricia Schor discussed 
how while this ruling was historic, it also reveals the ongoing tensions around racial grammars in 
Dutch society. The ruling 
 
does not recognise that racism is more than a matter of hurt feelings on the part of 
racialised and marginalised groups, in this case the Black Dutch. Still, this is a 
major victory for those who endured in a very long struggle. Furthermore it might 
serve as a precedent to the festivities outside Amsterdam as well. The court has 
signalled to the Dutch white establishment that Black people, who are otherwise 
deemed and treated as second category citizens, do have rights. However obvious 
it might seem, it is a novelty to the majority of Dutch society. (Frank 2014) 
 
The other side of this discussion has been the storm of protest, predominantly among the 
white, ‘native’ Dutch majority who ardently reject accusations of racism in the holiday, and feel 
that these campaigns are a threat to Dutch culture and tradition. Such anxieties clearly resonate 
with Fortuyn’s warnings about the erosive effect of multiculturalism for ‘native’ Dutch culture 
and society. These fears also echo the concerns of the colonial administration, especially in the in 
the East Indies. Historically, Dutch cultural values and practices were considered under threat of 
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degradation of loss through contact and mixing with the native Indies population, and a 
reorientation of affective sentiments of Dutch in the colony away from the Dutch ‘fatherland’ 
(Stoler 1995, 2009). In the contemporary Netherlands, the critiques of this holiday tradition are 
often received by ‘native’ Dutch as attacks on Dutch culture, pandering to newcomers to the 
detriment of Dutch national tradition. The tensions that are revealed in this context expose the 
powerful and persistent structural dimensions of racism and other forms of inequality, the links 
between ideology and how such processes are experienced in everyday life (Essed 1991:2). 
Among those I spoke with about Zwarte Piet I found that many had ambiguous or 
conflicted feelings about whether his blackness was problematic. For example, during one of my 
first meetings with Noel25 in 2009 (a student studying history at the Universiteit van 
Amsterdam), he had asked me with a laugh, “How do you like our racist Black Peters?” I was 
then struck, when a year after I left the field (March 2011), I received rather hurt remarks from 
him in response to a conference paper where I critiqued the blackness of Zwarte Piet as an issue 
of racism and banal nationalism bearing traces to the Dutch colonial past. After some discussion 
back and forth, Noel considered why he was so upset by my paper: 
 
There are certain elements [of the holiday] that are a bit racist and part of a darker 
past of our history but it’s also part of our culture by now. … 
But I was talking about why it really bothered me: You’re attacking one of my 
happiest child memories (I mean, c’mon! Presents and pepernoten [ginger nuts]!). 
I really didn’t like that. And the fact that stuff for me that are so normal, for you 
are so strange. I’m a bit scared to read your paper when it’s finished. These are 
things I actually don’t want to know. I don’t want to see things I consider normal 
because they are part of my culture as something strange. 
 
In many of the discussions I have been part of or saw in the Dutch (and increasingly 
international) media, these concerns straddle a line between acknowledging racism in the holiday 
and eliminating an emotionally-meaningful and culturally valued Dutch tradition. Still others I 
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encountered clearly expressed the connections between racism, colonialism, and contemporary 
nationalism in the celebration of what is widely regarded as an innocent holiday (cf. Bal 2002). 
These uncomfortable tensions undoubtedly inform Helsloot’s observation that “Zwarte Piet 
represents a raw nerve in Dutch society” (2008:93; my translation). 
 
Culturalized criteria for belonging 
 
 The ethnographic moments detailed in this chapter explore some of the ways in which the 
grammar of alterity developed during colonialism is unevenly woven through ways of thinking 
about belonging in the Dutch national community today. While the problems that emerged 
during the experience of empire have not been carried wholesale into the present moment, these 
systemic modes of perception and ways of knowing – what Foucault terms savoirs – are 
identifiable throughout my ethnography. These practices represent some of the “awkward 
continuities” (Dean 2010:57) between past governmental programs and how certain subjects, 
their behaviours, competencies, affective sentiments, and beliefs are marked as ‘problems’ for 
the Dutch national community, and demand particular ‘solutions’. 
 The wide spectrum of different readings of Zwarte Piet and his role in the contemporary 
holiday, for instance, speaks to how the processes of problematization are messy in practice, as 
governmental rationality is engaged, critiqued, and reconciled by actors in their daily lives. 
These dis/connections are visible in the many more subtle, day to day experiences that Dutch 
people of colour – allochtonen – encounter in contradiction to their legal status as Dutch citizens. 
This messiness is clear in the disjuncture between criteria for social belonging or access to 
citizenship, and how some citizens struggle for recognition as legitimate and full members of 
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Dutch society, as contributors in shaping Dutch culture (Helsloot 2002:60).  
 The ethnographic insights provided here are part of a much larger and ongoing set of 
processes and discussions about the changing nature of difference and Dutchness, different 
domains of knowledge – what can be known, spoken or thought – and the ways in which 
boundaries of belonging in Dutch society come to be differently configured by diverse, socially-
situated subjects (Stoler 2011; Li 2007a:275). In framing the discussions around Zwarte Piet, 
‘native’ Dutch draw on the same discursive frameworks that have allowed the populist Right to 
become a powerful voice in the Netherlands since the early 2000s. Echoing fears voiced by 
Scheffer in Het multiculturele drama (2000) and others in Dutch society, ‘native’ Dutch are 
victims whose culture needs to be defended (especially against ‘non-Western’ newcomers), and 
in which the Dutch should take pride. It is precisely because these antiracism activists protest the 
holiday figure through an expression of their cultural competency and place as members of 
Dutch society that the discussions around Zwarte Piet bring focus to the wider, more subtle 
processes of Dutch nation-building in which colonial categories like race continue to matter. 
Such categories, however, are impacted by, reconfigured and rearticulated in relation to other 
powerful discourses and processes.  
 In the following chapter, “Activating citizens: Neoliberal governmentality and the rise of 
voluntarism,” I explore the ways in which neoliberal governmental rationale has been grafted 
onto the existing regime of “good” citizenship practice. While this chapter may appear to be a 
departure from the discussions of linguistic, cultural and racial calculations discussed here and in 
relation to the language of autochthony, the role and self-image of the Dutch as a civilizing force 
and gidsland (guiding nation) to the rest of the world has also had important repercussions for 
how moral and affective sentiments are tied today to social service provision, voluntary labour, 
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and notions of “active” and sociaal participation in Dutch society. As I have done for questions 
of race, culture and language, in the next chapter I trace some of the key threads through which 
an array of discourses, objectives, and regulatory regimes have redirected Dutch moral and 
cultural frameworks to align with the desires, habits, aspirations and beliefs associated with 
neoliberal “active” citizenship practice (Li 2007a:275). While certain practices may be rejected, 
others are consented to or accommodated, showing the power of governmental projects to direct 
people to act in particular ways via their own self-interest (Li 2007a:275). The ways in which the 
ethic of voluntarism has become embedded in commonly shared ideas of “active” citizenship 
illustrates how governmental power is not the purview of a monolithic state. Rather, it operates 
through an assemblage of socially-situated subjects, objectives, knowledges, discourses, 
institutions, etc. that must resonate in relation to a specific technical field: “good” citizenship 
practice. 
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Figure 5.1 Zwarte Piet (Black Pete) Figure 5.2 Zwarte Pieten (Black Peters) 
 
     
 
Photos by author: Schiedam, the Netherlands, 14 November 2009 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Stereopiet’s poster for Zwarte Piet 
(Black Pete) 
Figure 5.4 Stereopiet’s poster for Sinterklaas 
(St. Nicolas) 
 
     
 
(www.stereopiet.nl) 
Photos by author: Rotterdam, the Netherlands, 29 November 2009 
 
     In Abbass’ image of Zwarte Piet (5.3), the white model with soot on his face and hands 
removes his tunic to reveal a variation of the lyric of a popular holiday song. Across the 
model’s torso is written “zwarte van roet” (black from soot). In the traditional song Zwarte 
Piet sings that his intentions toward children are good, even though he may be “zwarte als 
roet” (black as soot). 
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6. Activating citizens: Neoliberal governmentality and the rise of voluntarism 
 
As the tensions and divergent readings of Zwarte Piet’s ‘blackness’ reveal, many 
differently positioned subjects are involved in the assemblage of processes, relations and 
practices that regulate the conditions of life (cf. Dean 2010; Li 2007b). These actors and 
institutions variously pull from existing modes of perception, practices of calculation, 
vocabularies, forms of judgement, authority, etc., even as new practices, meanings, and ways of 
knowing are adopted or negotiated by the agents of the assemblage (Li 2007a:276). The case of 
Zwarte Piet shows the messiness of processes of problematization, and what happens when 
“[f]uzziness, adjustment and compromise” are possibly no longer able to redirect, correct, or 
hold an assemblage together (Li 2007b:279). In this chapter, I examine the ways in which 
contemporary understandings of voluntarism and neoliberal “active” citizenship practice 
represent “awkward continuities” (Dean 2010:57) with the past. The successful grafting of 
elements of neoliberal governmentality onto existing regimes of practices in the Netherlands is 
the result of self-correction and reassemblage in relation to particular processes, events, and 
savoirs. The affective and moral connections that research participants, policy makers, scholars 
and politicians draw between labour, charity, and community can be traced genealogically to 
notions of the Dutch as an historically ‘civilizing’ influence and ‘guiding nation’ to the rest of 
the world (Kuitenbrouwer 1991:322; cf. McClintock 1995; Smedley 1999; Thorne 1997; 
Comaroff 1997; Chakrabarty 1997; Conklin 1998; Colonna 1997; Wildenthal 1997). In addition 
to the “common sense” categories of difference and Dutchness developed through empire, the 
deeply moralized connections between historical practices of religious charity, socioeconomic 
status, and labour are important for making sense of the notions and experiences of 
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contemporary Dutch citizenship practice that have been expressed by my research participants. 
Mapping the genealogical connections between voluntary labour and morally and culturally 
attuned citizenship practices draws attention to the ways in which liberal governmentality 
developed in the Netherlands, and has been transfigured and reassembled through processes of 
neoliberalism (Holmer Nadesan 2008:7-8; Dean 2010:10-11, 65). 
This chapter opens with a discussion of the long history of religious mission and charity 
among the Dutch, and how these practices and attendant ways of knowing contributed to the 
nature and ethic of “social uplift” as a part of how this (national) community was imagined 
(Anderson 1991). These practices are intimately entangled with the role that remunerative labour 
played and continues to play in “educating desires and configuring habits, aspirations and 
beliefs” (Li 2007a:275) of citizens. As I show, the relationships developed historically between 
labour, “social uplift” in the form of (religious mission and) charity, and citizenship practice 
resonate with the ways in which volunteers, as “active” and “good” citizens are called upon 
today to fill the gaps in social service provision and relieve the burden of others on the state.  
On the ground, the impact of neoliberal logics have had profound effects on the ways in 
which citizens are called upon to remedy the problems of Dutch society (Tonkens 2006), 
including the now pressing problem of (non-Western) immigrant integration. Volunteer Dutch 
language coaches work in the capacity of front-line citizenship educators for newcomers, 
drawing together traditions of social uplift and care, neighbourhood- and nation-building, and 
notions of citizenship practice that require members of Dutch society to participate in 
particularly “productive” or “active” ways, reflecting neoliberal logics. Yet, as I show in the 
concluding section of this chapter, the contemporary discourses around “activating” Dutch 
citizens, “social cohesion” and “integration” nonetheless reflect long-standing notions of cultural 
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difference and distance that single out ‘non-Western’ newcomers and allochtonen as in need of 
targeted intervention and discipline.  
 
“Social uplift”: religious charity and liberal governmentality in the Netherlands  
 
Through monitoring and identifying a specific set of relations to be directed and 
improved, ‘native’ Dutch of lower socioeconomic status have long been framed as posing 
potential dangers for the rest of Dutch society. Reflecting administrative anxieties over the 
intersectional, essentialist categories of difference developed in the colonies (e.g. the threat 
posed by white, and impoverished verindische in the East Indies), the moral degeneracy of 
working class Dutch in the Netherlands was also described using the language of racial 
degeneracy (Stoler 2009; cf. Thorne 1997; Colonna 1997; McClintock 1995). Understood as 
threatening to degrade, even ruin, Dutch civilization as embodied by middle class (burgerlijk) 
society in the Netherlands, around the turn of the twentieth century the poor ‘at home’ 
(sometimes framed as asociaal, antisocial or unsocialized) became targets in need of 
governmental intervention.1 
In the struggle for the moral and social ‘uplift’ of the lower classes in the Netherlands, 
religious institutions played a key role. This was especially notable during the verzuiling 
(pillarization) period beginning in the late nineteenth century, which resulted in the effective 
segregation of people belonging to the different consociational pillars across all aspects of social 
life in the Netherlands well into the 1960s. Under verzuiling, the Dutch churches and religious 
leaders were given authority by the emerging liberal state over important social welfare issues, 
such as the family, education, charity, social housing, and hospitals (James and Schrauwers 
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2003; Lijphart 1968). Protestants, Catholics, secular Liberals and Socialists all lived virtually 
separate lives through voluntary social segregation along these lines. In the provision of these 
important social services, the middle-class within each pillar was called upon by their elites to 
“uplift” the working classes through moral reform, accomplished (just as in the colonies) 
especially through childcare and education (Stoler 1997:201). This is also visible in the 
establishment of denominational labour unions (to counter the secular union movement), and 
how religious leaders further organized the working class through their provision of education 
and poverty relief (James and Schrauwers 2003:57). In this way, government was rendered both 
internal and external to the state “by limiting the scope of activities viewed as within the state’s 
competence” and redistributing them in the private spheres of everyday life (Holmer Nadesan 
2008:23). Through these calls and ways of organizing, the lines between the ‘governed’ and 
‘governors’ were blurred, as socially-situated actors occupied intersecting positions of power in 
Dutch society (Dean 2010:38; Li 2007a:276). 
This dynamic importantly shaped the ways in which the Dutch state assumed and 
transformed the function of ‘pastoral’ power to suit the program goals of the developing liberal(-
welfare) state. Bringing populations under the paternalistic guidance of religious institutions, 
pastoral power addressed both individual and community from the cradle to the grave, seeking to 
assure the salvation of the soul. The transformation of this form of power, as it was assumed by 
the liberal state and its institutions, was vital to the legitimization of the state and its extension of 
governmental forms of social control into the ‘private sphere’ of the population. This was 
accomplished in part through appearing to limit the role of the state; by calling upon the work of 
public institutions and private benefactors the state was in fact able to “‘act at a distance’ upon 
the desires and social practices of citizens” (Holmer Nadesan 2008:27). In the context of Dutch 
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liberal governmentality, the officials of pastoral power included not only religious leaders, but 
also those working through the myriad institutions of the various pillars, religious and secular 
organizations such as schools, police, welfare societies, and private benefactors. These officials 
legitimated the program of the modern state, and extended its power “to ensure national 
prosperity and social welfare … into the intimacies of everyday life decentering liberal 
operations of government” (Holmer Nadesan 2008:24). The distinct influence of verzuiling 
promoted the establishment of a “conservative-corporatist” welfare state in the Netherlands, 
where state services and social security were provided through a hybrid mixture of providers 
both public (state) and private (“corporatist” institutions, including religious organizations) 
(Knijn 1998:85). While social services were frequently provided by the institutions of the various 
pillars, funding nonetheless came from the state for services that were available to all citizens. 
 The shift from sovereign forms of power to liberal technologies of government built upon 
historical forms of socialization and morality, including the provision of religious charity. As the 
Protestant Diaconate of Amsterdam (Protestantse Diaconie Amsterdam, formerly the Diaconate 
of the Reformed Church, Diaconie van de Hervormde Gemeente) indicates, they have given 
charity to Amsterdam residents since 1578: providing “housing for orphans, widowers, widows, 
elderly and sick, and they gave money, bread, peat, oil, soup and beer to the poor. This is the 
Diaconate’s centuries’ old tradition of helping where there is no helper” (Protestantse Diaconie 
Amsterdam 2012; my translation). All Dutch Christian churches share in this tradition of giving 
charity and support to those in need, both within the reach of their parishes in the Netherlands 
and through worldwide missions. This ideal of Christian charity and stewardship continues to be 
the wellspring that sustains the contemporary social and economic outreach of these religious 
institutions and their members. While aid for the poor and vulnerable members of Dutch society 
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remains a focus of these organizations’ charity, the ways in which recipients are helped, as well 
as the character of these groups and individuals, has shifted and broadened over the past four 
centuries. This much is clear from the Evangelical Lutheran Diaconate of Amsterdam's 
description of their charitable projects: 
 
We support projects with and for people who are homeless, refugees, addicts, 
excluded. Especially in Amsterdam, but also all over the world. Our faith inspires 
us in this. Key words in our work are community involvement, charity, 
sustainability and justice. We try to make these words concrete. We do this from 
the Lutheran community and together with you. (Diaconie Evangelisch-Lutherse 
Gemeente Amsterdam 2012; my translation) 
 
Similar messages are given voice by other churches and religious organizations in Amsterdam 
and elsewhere in the Netherlands, which directly controlled and organized social services and 
provisions for most of the twentieth century.  
The shifts in Dutch social values away from religious authority during the latter half of 
the twentieth century (especially during the 1960s) have by no means lead to these religious 
organizations’ erasure from social support work in the Netherlands. These shifts are 
acknowledged by many of these organizations themselves, for instance in the mission statements 
of some of the charitable foundations sponsoring different language coaching projects in 
Amsterdam.2 Today, religious groups often provide funding and voluntary support to 
independently organized projects and programs with similar goals, such as in support of the 
elderly or disabled. An example of this is clear in the financial and organizational support of the 
KNR (Konferentie Nederlandse Religieuzen, Dutch Religious Conference) in their charitable 
work. This Catholic group indicated that the members’ and organization’s religious faith  
 
does not mean that we only give money for ‘faithful’ projects. Many of ‘our’ 
projects have nothing to do with the church. It means that we look for projects 
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that we identify with religious inspiration. Simply said: PIN [Projecten in 
Nederland, Projects in the Netherlands] pays for projects that could be religious. 
(KNR 2012; my translation)  
 
Importantly, religious and secular organizations alike have framed a new population in the 
Netherlands as in need of charity and emancipation from their socially marginalized position in 
Dutch society and from within their own communities: ‘non-Western’ newcomers and their 
descendants. 
 While traditional voluntary or charitable organizations or societies (those organized 
around religion, but also politics or labour) have seen their membership fall off since the 1960s, 
new organizations (e.g. environmental, animal or human rights, sports and consumer groups) see 
growing support. Secular foundations and named trusts – such as the royal Oranje Fonds 
(Orange Foundation) 3 – reflect the changing conditions for social behaviour and categories of 
belonging in the Netherlands (Devilee 2005:35). Frequently, these funding bodies’ mission 
statements and promotional materials echo the recent goals and attitudes set out by the 
government with regard to volunteering and building a sociaal (socially oriented) civil society 
full of self-reliant citizens (cf. Tonkens 2006).  
 
Whose responsibility? neoliberal developments in state service provision 
 
 In recent decades, the Netherlands – as well as many European Union countries, the 
USA, Canada – has experienced a trend away from a strong welfare state tradition toward the 
incorporation of more market principles in the provision of social service (cf. Ong 2006; Lechner 
2008; Muehlebach 2012; Erickson 2012; Hemment 2012; Milligan and Conradson 2006). The 
Dutch “conservative-corporatist” welfare tradition described by Knijn (1998) has shifted ever 
188 
 
farther toward a neoliberal corporatist framework in which the state places increasing 
responsibility for the funding and provision of welfare and social services on non-state actors, 
from traditional welfare providers to private organizations, lower levels of governme nt, and 
individual citizens. For the Dutch, these changes have come to reflect a shift “from protecting 
labor to promoting work, from social support to social inclusion, from guaranteeing universal 
entitlements to selective targeting of deserving groups” (Lechner 2008:197). In terms of 
government policy, the understanding of social cohesion as something produced through shared 
values and civic duties among citizens was championed over the long-held idea of social 
cohesion that turned on shared rights and obligations within the welfare state (cf. Holmer 
Nadesan 2008:31).  
 These policy shifts occurred in highly moralized spaces that affect the role of the state, 
notions of citizenship, society and social relations formed under the welfare state model and 
expressed through liberal governmentalities (cf. Muehlebach 2012). By the 1990s, these 
transformations reoriented the Dutch government’s stance regarding citizenship. The government 
now sought to “foster active citizenship, to prevent exclusion from full participation, and to 
promote responsibility by all groups in civil society” (Lechner 2008:201). This shift has been 
discussed by scholars such as Ong as part of the processes of neoliberalism; that is, as an 
expression of governmentality drawing on market principles, and hinging on notions of 
“individual active freedom” (Ong 2006:13; cf. Holmer Nadesan 2008:29-30). In the context of 
the “shrinking” welfare state, Ong explains that 
 
neoliberal logic requires populations to be free, self-managing, and self-
enterprising individuals in different spheres of everyday life – health, education, 
bureaucracy, the professions, and so on. The neoliberal subject is therefore not a 
citizen with claims on the state but a self-enterprising citizen-subject who is 
obligated to become an “entrepreneur of himself or herself” (Ong 2006:14). 
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The incorporation of neoliberal market rationale has important implications for the ways in 
which these technologies of government circulate and spread across the social system. These 
technologies, with their market-defined categories of risk and opportunity, extend their reach 
beyond economic spaces, across geographical and cultural borders, permeating and inflecting 
“common sense” in all areas of social life (Holmer Nadesan 2008:211). 
 It is important to consider that while aspects of this logic have been adopted by many 
governments in recent decades, the processes by which neoliberal logics take root is informed by 
the particular histories of individual nation-states (cf. Hemment 2012; Ong 2006; Muehlebach 
2012; Tsing 2005; Li 2007b). The ways in which these logics unfold in the Dutch context have 
been shaped by many factors, including: the country’s distinct history of social service provision, 
voluntarism, and charity through the tradition of verzuiling; the impact of social policy 
developments and the role of the welfare state; as well as the meaning attributed to different 
forms of labour. An important circumstance that influenced the Dutch incorporation of neoliberal 
governmental rationality was the crisis of the welfare state during the 1980s. As Lechner 
indicates, the early 1980s was for the Dutch “a bleak period in which [economic] growth 
languished, unemployment rose to over 10%, and welfare costs spiralled out of control” 
(2008:183). In part, the implosion of the Dutch welfare state by the 1990s and the subsequent 
movement towards neoliberal forms of governance was the result of one of its own mechanisms: 
the liberal, but poorly managed and monitored labour disability laws enacted in 1966 (WAO, Wet 
op de arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering; Law on Disability Insurance). According to Lechner 
(2008:186), with workers, employers, doctors, insurance boards, and even government 
administrators in the Social Insurance Council taking advantage of the generous payouts and 
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“fuzzy standards for disability” outlined by the system, the welfare state was widely considered 
as heading toward fiscal ruin by 1993 when the Buurmeyer Commission reported on the decades 
of WAO abuses. The WAO scandal was therefore a decisive spur toward revising the Dutch 
welfare commons, where individuals would be required to take on more responsibility for their 
own well-being and that of the welfare system (Lechner 2008:186-206).  
  Following the case of elder care (home and residential care) is particularly useful, as it 
was marked by the Dutch government as a test case in the movement towards a new hybrid 
structure of service provision since the end of the Second World War, one Knijn (1998) calls a 
“mixed economy of care.” Elder care, like other social services such as education and welfare, 
“first evolved from a service provided by denominational organizations into a regular state-
governed provision during the postwar years” (1998:88). In the case of elder care, however, 
budget reductions during the 1970s sparked both a centralization and de-professionalization of 
care services, and finally a retrenchment of those services by the state throughout the 1980s. By 
the 1990s, there was a clear trend toward reliance on market principles in the service sector, 
with, for example, approximately half of all elderly dependents cared for “on an informal basis 
by relatives, partners and volunteers” (Knijn 1998:97). Changes to the General Law on Specific 
Sickness Costs (1968; Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten, AWBZ) in 2003, and the 
introduction of a new law (Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning, Wmo, Social Support Act, 
2007) shifted all responsibility for the provision of these services to the municipalities, who in 
turn, have often leaned heavily on the market in their service delivery. According to a report 
from the City of Amsterdam, this new law (Wmo) shifts the responsibility onto the municipalities 
not only to care for people with physical or mental disabilities, but to promote their active 
participation in social life (Lindeman et al. 2011:fn 22, p 49). In Amsterdam, these 
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responsibilities have been further decentralized as responsibility for the provision of some of 
these healthcare services are downshifted onto the individual city boroughs. 
 Although this has been a general trend regarding the provision of all types of social 
services in the Netherlands, it is important to note that these developments have not been 
uniform in how they affect the provision of these different services. The strong professional 
organizations in fields of education and medical care have prevented the deskilling of these 
services in the same ways experienced by the elder care sector (e.g. at home or nursing home 
care) (Knijn 1998:98-100). Even so, responsibility for providing specific services has been 
selectively downshifted to regional or local governments, which increasingly rely on private 
companies, non-governmental or non-profit organizations, as well as volunteers (cf. Milligan and 
Conradson 2006:1). Another such example is in the field of education.  
While primary and secondary education remains the responsibility of the state, since 
1996 the Adult and Vocational Education Act (WEB, Wet educatie en beroepsonderwijs) has 
shifted responsibility for the provision of adult education to the municipalities (Dutch Ministry 
for Education, Culture and Science 2012:218). This has meant that the first ‘civic integration’ 
(inburgering) program for adult immigrants established in 1998 (Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers, 
Civic Integration of Newcomers Act) has been subject to these new, decentralized strategies for 
service provision. Although the guidelines and regulations for these ‘civic integration’ courses 
were developed at the federal level, the provision of this service immediately devolved onto 
municipalities and has been delivered through Regional Centres for Vocational Training (ROC, 
regionaal opleidingencentrum). These educational centres receive funding from both the federal 
and municipal levels, but are independent organizations that are contracted by municipal 
governments to provide these courses (Dutch Ministry for Education, Culture and Science 
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2012:114). This shift has also contributed to the service gap identified by the voluntary 
organizations at heart of this ethnography that developed free Dutch language coaching services 
for newcomers. The withdrawal of the state in this area of social service provision and others has 
been important in the related rise and support for voluntarism in the Netherlands, and the 
connections drawn between voluntarism and moral citizenship practice. By tracing the rise of 
voluntarism in the Netherlands, it is clear that the incorporation of neoliberal governmentality 
continues to “operate, as far as possible, through rather than against the desires and interests of 
their target population” (Li 2007b:269). 
 
The rise of voluntarism 
 
 Voluntary labour has long been connected to notions of moral behaviour. In the 
Netherlands, and across many different national contexts this has often had strong religious 
undertones. Dutch religious organizations, whether the charitable wing of a parish or an 
independent foundation with a religious orientation, have been a fixture in the landscape of 
voluntary work for centuries. As Bekkers has noted, religious individuals in many different 
countries (e.g. the Netherlands, Canada, the USA, Belgium) continue to be “more likely to 
participate in voluntary associations, as members, volunteers, or donors” than those who do not 
identify as religious (2011:3). Moreover, religious organizations continue to be important 
financial supporters of voluntary projects across the country, even though many of the volunteers 
involved do not necessarily identify as religious. As Muehlebach has observed, some Italian 
volunteers used discourses tied to the Catholic church in explaining their work, drawing on the 
language of sacrifice and religious virtue (Muehlebach 2011:68). This included voluntarism as 
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“an expression of the spirit of gifting,” “personal,” “free,” and “spontaneous” (Muehlebach 
2011:66). Yet, extending beyond this specific context, there is a widely shared belief that 
voluntarism is a morally- inflected form of relational labour. What is more, not all unpaid labour 
is considered voluntary work or attributed the same moral value (Muehlebach 2012).4 Although 
understood as qualitatively different than paid work, voluntary labour reflects the role and 
affective sentiments connected to remunerative labour as a technology of government (Li 
2007a:275).  
 The moral implications connected to voluntarism have also long been connected to 
notions of civil society, liberal democracy and evolving notions of “active” citizenship practice 
(Kidd 2002:330; cf. Putnam 1995; Parsons 2006:232-233; Milligan and Conradson 2006). These 
connections have been strengthened and transformed during the latter half of the twentieth 
century as the welfare state has been subject to global shifts toward market principles and 
neoliberal reforms. These changes, particularly the increasing impact of neoliberal 
governmentality, have affected the meanings of civil society and citizenship practice. While 
citizenship has always been a formal status communicating belonging within the polity, be this 
the city-state (as in seventeenth century Amsterdam), the nation-state (the modern country of the 
Netherlands), or a supranational body (such as today’s European Union), it has also always been 
steeped in often unspoken culturalized ideas of legitimate bodies and behaviours (cf. Mosse 
1985; Stoler 1995; Cattelino 2004; Beriss 2004; Bunzl 2004, 2005; Mackey 1999; Mandel 2008). 
While these conditions of belonging are varied and dynamic they also operate within certain 
discourses of citizenship practice, which are in turn connected to broader political and economic 
processes. In contemporary liberal democracies, the values of individualism, freedom and 
progress that are normalized and prized by the mechanisms of neoliberalism have also come to 
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be seen as synonymous with Western culture, as in the Netherlands. The regulatory aspect of 
neoliberalism has affected the norms and expectations with regard to moral and cultural 
standards of citizenship practice (Ong 1996:739).  
Voluntarism has gained renewed interest as a mode of “good” citizenship practice among 
scholars, policy makers, and politicians in the Netherlands and elsewhere since the mid-1990s. 
This trend has been influenced by the work of Putnam (1995), who has argued for strong 
connections between community participation (which produces forms of ‘bonding’ social 
engagement, such as through voluntarism) and the health of civic society (maatschappelijk 
middenveld) (cf. Dekker 1999; de Hart 2005; Hurenkamp et al. 2006; Hurenkamp et al. 2011). 
With such strong moral implications, it is important to consider how voluntarism has been 
defined. A number of different measures have been taken on the question of voluntarism in the 
Netherlands by different social research organizations, such as the national Sociaal en Cultureel 
Planbureau and the Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek  (respectively, SCP, Netherlands Institute for 
Social Research, and CBS, Central Bureau for Statistics). Dekker and de Hart (2009) show that 
the discrepancies in different figures on participation in voluntary work emerge from the 
ambiguity of ‘volunteer work’ in the literature, and questions posed in the surveys from which 
this data comes (cf. Milligan and Conradson 2006:3).5 Most surveys focus on performing 
voluntary work for organizations (through formal membership in a club or association), whereas 
other questions ask about general, or occasional volunteering (such as for a school, or residential 
care facility). Still other survey questions may ask about providing informal help and care, such 
as cooking or shopping for a sick neighbour or relative. During my research, participants usually 
described voluntarism by discussing their formal connections to organizations through/ for which 
they worked (such as SamenSpraak, or the organization through which I was introduced to 
195 
 
them). These were frequently the types of unpaid labour considered in the social science 
literature, by governments, and my informants as “formal” or “real” volunteer work. Yet, some 
participants responded to my questions by describing less formal unpaid work, such as with their 
church, at their children’s schools or clubs, or caring for elderly relatives. For others, 
involvement in these less formal types of unpaid labour – sometimes alluded to as acts of being a 
good neighbour or caring relative, an active church-goer or involved parent – was not considered 
voluntarism, and was only mentioned after more direct questioning on my part during our 
interview.  
 It is clear that the people surveyed by the aforementioned research institutes, the 
researchers conducting the surveys, and my own research participants have many different 
associations with the concept of voluntary work. For the purposes of this dissertation, I conceive 
of voluntary work as a form of unpaid labour6 in line with the most common descriptions that 
have emerged from my research participants and the organizations through which volunteer work 
is formally organized. My research focuses on formal volunteering. This does not include 
informal care activities, such as parenting or caring for ill relatives or neighbours, unless those 
activities have been mediated by an independent project or institution, such as a parent-teacher 
association or nursing home. While all of these activities, for example, are generally considered 
as socially valuable, not all are (considered by my informants or in the literature as) “voluntary 
work” (cf. Muehlebach 2012). This is in line with how the Volunteer Centre in Amsterdam 
(Vrijwilligers Centrale Amsterdam) describes voluntary work as 
unpaid work that you do with a social organization, an organization that is not 
commercial. That is foundations, associations, neighbourhood initiatives and 
institutions. You contribute as a volunteer to a societal goal that is important to 
you, such as a cleaner environment, the welfare of refugees, a film festival in the 
neighbourhood. (VCA.nu 2012; my translation)  
 
196 
 
It is precisely the moral implications connected to voluntarism, which are in turn tied to morally-
charged notions of citizenship that makes defining voluntarism in relation to other forms of 
(unpaid) labour, important. 
 Public, state-funded education is considered key to the process of civil enculturation for 
most members of Dutch society and for migrant youth (cf. Schiffauer et al. 2004). It is perhaps 
unsurprising then, that efforts to build a culture of voluntarism in the Netherlands are nowhere 
clearer than in the establishment and support by the government of ‘service learning’, that is, 
volunteer work among high school students as a way of stimulating civic participation 
(Maatschappelijke Stage 2012). This move on the part of the Dutch government is reflected in 
the implementation of similar requirements for high school or post-secondary students in many 
different Western countries, such as Canada.7 The view of these states is that voluntary work and 
cultivating an ethic of voluntarism among youth helps to build and reinforce positive values and 
behaviours within the (national) civil society (cf. Putnam 1995; Sander and Putnam 2010).8 
During the 2008-2009 school year, this approach to civic enculturation was further stimulated 
through a pilot project which included twenty different regions across the Netherlands. In 
Amsterdam, thirty-five schools (some 3500 students) participated in this pilot, which required 
students to give at least thirty hours of their time to volunteering (Maatschappelijke Stage 
2009:10). This program was originally set out by the federal government in 2007 under the motto 
“Samen leven kun je leren” (roughly, living together can be learned). The intention of the 
government was to educate students through informal, unpaid work experiences (the 
maatschappelijke stage, or social internship) to better participate in the formation of a “socially 
cohesive society” (OCW 2007:24, 29).9 
Throughout the year and beyond the parameters of youth service learning, recruitment of 
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volunteers in the Netherlands is facilitated by a number of regional online volunteer centres. In 
Amsterdam the comprehensive website Vrijwilligers Centrale Amsterdam (Volunteer Centre 
Amsterdam, VCA, www.vca.nu), compiles information for volunteers, businesses, organizations, 
the government, and schools in order to facilitate the connection between potential volunteers 
and voluntary positions.10 These initiatives and organizations are supported by a wide variety of 
funders. For instance, the royal Oranje Fonds is now a major source of funding for programs that 
strive to improve and build social infrastructure and activities in the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands. In keeping with the outlook of the government, social cohesion at the 
neighbourhood level (especially with an eye to considerations of cultural and linguistic 
diversity), “active” citizenship and civic participation in Dutch society are explicit goals of this 
organization (Oranje Fonds 2012a). The foundation invests in some 1500 organizations and 
projects on an annual basis, most of which are driven by volunteers (Oranje Fonds 2012b).11  
 Voluntarism has received further financial and social support from all levels of 
government in the Netherlands as well as from the European Union. An example of this was the 
2011 European Year of Volunteering (European Commission 2011). The stated goals of this EU 
initiative were to facilitate and improve the quality of volunteering through easier access to 
opportunities, improved training for volunteers, and to formally recognize the social and civic 
value of volunteering within the EU. This supranational focus on volunteering for the year 2011 
was also taken up at the national and local levels in the Netherlands. The City of Amsterdam 
(Gemeente Amsterdam) launched their own campaign in April 2011, with a new website 
(www.amsterdam.nl/vrijwillig) and the motto, “Vrijwilligerswerk, goed voor jou, goed voor de 
stad” (Volunteer work, good for you, good for the city). Through this campaign the city’s goal 
was to encourage and facilitate voluntary work across all sectors in a number of ways. As the 
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director of Gilde Amsterdam discussed with me during our interview, this included additional 
funds for special volunteer projects,12 and organizing monthly platforms for the thematic 
showcasing of voluntary work in the city.13 These government supported efforts and special 
initiatives underscore the increasingly prominent role of voluntarism in providing services that 
might otherwise come under the purview of the state. In addition, the connections between 
citizenship, morality, and service made by the state are overtly expressed. This is clear, for 
instance, in the motto of the campaign sponsored by the Amsterdam municipality.  
 These connections between voluntarism and moral citizenship practice are also expressed 
by voluntary organizations, as is clear in the media used to promote volunteering by groups such 
as Gilde Amsterdam and the VCA. Such groups share in the explicit message that volunteering is 
a valued task that contributes to social cohesion through positive engagements between members 
of society. Moreover, it is a task that everyone can (or should) take up, as is clear in the 
promotional slogan on the VCA website: “Want in ieder mens schuilt een vrijwilliger!” (Because  
a volunteer hides in everyone!). The website’s volunteer stories and experiences section features 
narratives that support this call to action, with volunteers from all different backgrounds, age 
groups, and with many different interests and reasons for involvement. For instance, originally 
from Peru, Zenovia Tijleman Calderon, 61, explains that she had lived in the Netherlands for 28 
years, and worked with two women in the Slotervaart neighbourhood through the 
Vriendendiensten Amsterdam (Friends Services Amsterdam). Her story speaks to many of the 
thoughts expressed on the website, regardless of area of volunteer participation: 
 
I do voluntary work because I think it’s nice, I do something for others and I find 
pleasure in it myself. You meet all sorts of people, with different backgrounds, 
ideas, cultures. You discover that people are very different than they come across 
in the first instance, you get to know people, how they live their lives. (VCA.nu 
2011b; my translation) 
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 While policy directives or funding groups may speak about “active citizenship” and 
“social cohesion,” volunteers are more likely to discuss their involvement and outcomes of their 
work in less formal terms as Zenovia’s comments show. Significantly, volunteers’ less formal 
expressions about voluntarism both resonate with and rearticulate how voluntary work is framed 
by government and diverse funding bodies. This includes volunteers’ ideas about the positive 
contributions voluntarism can provide for the neighbourhood or community, for the target groups 
involved, and for individual volunteers. In interviews and informal discussions with volunteers 
during my fieldwork in Amsterdam, I often heard their experiences and goals spoken of in terms 
of creating productive or friendly connections between neighbours, fellow citizens, as well as 
newcomers, of giving back to the community, sharing or learning new skills, or simply having a 
good feeling from helping others (cf. Muehlebach 2012; Stoler 2009). In resonating with both 
neoliberal rationale and older culturalized conceptions of moral citizenship practice, connections 
expressed between volunteers’ motivations, affective sentiments, and voluntary labour facilitate 
consent by these actors to the conditions of government (Li 2007b:269). 
 
Expressing “active” citizenship  
 
Although often discussed by volunteers as personally motivated in some way, these 
affective sentiments and goals align with the neoliberal expression of the responsibilities and 
“active” behaviours expected of the citizen by the state as social service provision is restructured. 
In the current political and economic climate in Europe and elsewhere, “good” citizenship has 
been described by scholars and policy makers as “active” citizenship. This notion of activity is 
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presented in opposition to ideas of passivity and entitlement that are now negatively connected to 
the welfare state (cf. Kidd 2002; Walzer in Cattelino 2004; Holmer Nadesan 2008). Just as the 
role of the state in service provision has been reshaped by neoliberal logics during the end of the 
twentieth century, so has the citizen’s relationship to the state. While “passive citizenship” is 
conceptualized as a mode of citizenship that forefronts access to and exercise of one’s rights 
(Cattelino 2004:119), “active” citizenship practice reflects the notion that the “worthy” citizen is 
someone who decreases their burden on the (welfare) state (Erickson 2012:167). Given the 
downshifting of social services by the state onto lower levels of government, non-governmental 
organizations, and individuals, voluntarism has become synonymous with “active” participation 
in civil society (Milligan and Fyfe 2005:418; cf. Tonkens 2006). Thus, voluntarism has been 
attributed significant meaning in recent years in relation to this question of the “worthy” or 
“good” citizen. Through the linkages between notions of citizenship and the growing role of 
volunteers in social service provision, voluntarism can be understood “as an exercise in statecraft 
that is as much directed at the volunteers themselves as the people they ostensibly assist” 
(Hemment 2012:534; cf. Dean 2010:38). Where volunteers may conceptualize their labour as a 
“gift,” their behaviours and expressions nonetheless neatly align with the neoliberal extension of 
economics “to cover all aspects of human behavior pertaining to citizenship” (Ong 1996:739). 
 Although the entanglements between citizenship, voluntarism and morality settle 
differently across different societies and are strongly influenced by local, historical contexts 
(Muehlebach 2012), there are a number of experiences and attitudes that are held to varying 
degrees in common. One central commonality is found in the role of labour, which is widely 
seen as key in the process of moulding individuals into “proper,” that is, “active” citizens 
(Erickson 2012:170; cf. Stoler 1997; Gouda and Clancy-Smith 1998; Kalb 1997). The 
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significance of labour in morally-attuned citizenship practice is distinctly shown in 
Muehlebach’s (2012) work. In an industrial region of Italy, the shift from liberal governmentality 
expressed by Fordist modes of labour to post-Fordist, neoliberal models produced widespread 
and often permanent unemployment, especially among older workers. Powerful connections 
between labour, morality, and citizenship practice lead many of Muehlebach’s research 
participants to experience the denial of their capacity to labour as discursive disenfranchisement 
from the national community. In response to this moral dilemma, these research participants’ 
engaged in processes that revalued voluntary labour participation as a moral expression of 
citizenship, claimed through their contribution to the (local and) national community. In filling 
the gaps in an elder-care sector left desperate after the withdrawal of the state, volunteers drew 
on a Roman Catholic religious ethic to rearticulate older connections between labour, rights, and 
obligations to the community through a renewed practice of “active” citizenship. In this case and 
in many other contexts, this notion of “activity” or “participation” hinges on ideas of what 
constitutes productive or socially useful work, which centres on remunerative work, but also 
encompasses voluntarism. 
Voluntarism is a valued form of labour because it is considered to produce and reaffirm 
social relations in civil society. Unlike waged labour, voluntarism is conceptualized by 
governments, policy makers and citizens alike as distinct from both state and market 
(Muehlebach 2012; Erickson 2012; cf. Milligan and Conradson 2006) and is widely thought to: 
stimulate social cohesion, solidarity or stability; constitute an expression of compassion or care 
between fellow citizens; promote “civic-mindedness,” individual and co-responsibility 
(especially where that concerns decreasing the burden on the state); instill a sense of belonging 
through “active” participation in society (Dekker and de Hart 2009; Bekkers 2005, 2009; 
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Cattelino 2004; Erickson 2012; Hemment 2012; Kidd 2002; Milligan and Fyfe 2005; 
Muehlebach 2011, 2012; Welty Peachey et al. 2011; Putnam 1995). I repeatedly heard and 
observed such expressions among my research participants, in Dutch policy and scholarly 
documents, and promotional and organizational materials from voluntary projects with which I 
worked. Through cultivating a culture of voluntarism, the Dutch government draws on these 
affectively charged understandings of voluntary labour to “activate” its citizens, engaging them 
in the overarching project of stimulating social cohesion and integration in civil society (cf. 
Parsons 2006; Milligan and Fyfe 2005; Roes 2008:32). In the intersections between government 
goals and the conduct of volunteers, we observe some of the ways in which regimes of 
government “elicit, promote, facilitate, foster and attribute various capacities, qualities and  
statuses to particular agents” (Dean 2010:43-44). Volunteers become particular citizens-subjects 
because they identify with and experience themselves through particular ways of knowing and 
judging, moral and cultural qualities, and statuses (Dean 2010:44). 
More than just expressing private virtue or notions of social solidarity, neoliberal 
interventions into the welfare state have rendered voluntarism as “a moral, civic, and state-
sponsored duty” (Erickson 2012:170). This duty, as many ethnographers have suggested, may 
fall heaviest on the shoulders of those members of society that have come to be considered (by 
government bodies, policy makers, scholars, and regular citizens) as passive, as dependant on or 
even draining of state and social resources. These so-called “passive” citizens are not actively 
employed in the labour force or in education (Muehlebach 2012; Erickson 2012; Hemmet 2012). 
When members of this population (such as the unemployed, youth, and retirees) participate as 
volunteers, voluntarism can take on a redemptive quality. As Muehlebach has discussed, 
voluntary labour “offers so-called dependent populations a form of public recognition in a 
203 
 
society that views them as a burden, and a means to purchase some sort of continued social 
belonging” (Muehlebach 2012:139; cf. Parsons 2006). However, among individuals who are 
already considered “active” participants in society – such as those still in school, or gainfully 
employed, especially those living middle- or upper-class lifestyles – voluntarism is 
conceptualized as a moral surplus to waged labour, a commendable and valued engagement in 
the public sphere of civil society (Erickson 2012:170). 
 
Activating citizens 
 
In thus framing voluntarism as a route to “good” citizenship practice, this type of labour 
becomes implicated in how the morally and socially charged calculations of “who and what 
constitutes a proper citizen” (Cattelino 2004:117) are conceptualized and deployed by a wide 
range of social actors. In situating voluntarism as part of a program of governmentality, this form 
of labour also helps to render the members of Dutch society as part of a technical field for 
governmental intervention. The practice of voluntarism helps to distribute and direct the 
affective sentiments toward the local and national community (cf. Stoler 2009). Voluntarism 
becomes an ideal expression of good citizenship practice in a context where various levels of 
Dutch government have increasingly pushed an agenda of support for citizenship through a 
broad approach to social integration, as in the (2007) Integration Memorandum 2007–2011 
(VROM 2007). The full title of this document clearly speaks to how citizenship has become a 
cultural obligation of the “responsible” or “active” citizen: Integration Memorandum 2007–
2011. Make sure you’re part of it! (Integratienota 2007–2011. Zorg dat je erbij hoort!). Included 
alongside support for voluntarism, the government also outlined efforts to reduce educational 
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disadvantages for students, improve “problem neighbourhoods,” and speed the integration of 
immigrants (Roes 2008:32). Through its focus on civic ‘integration’ (integratie) in a broad sense, 
the government claims to concentrate “in its citizenship policy on all citizens of our country. It 
addresses people not on the basis of their being different but on their active participation in and 
shared responsibility for society” (VROM 2007:98; quoted in Schinkel 2010:273-274). 
In this document, the entangled threads of culturalized and neoliberal discourse 
underlying contemporary citizenship practice in the Netherlands come to the fore. As the 
government addresses all Dutch citizens in their conduct, it becomes clear that it actually targets 
specific populations and relationships for improvement. Perceptions about important differences 
between ‘native’ Dutch (autochtoon) and ‘allochtoon’ Dutch citizens continue to inform how 
subgroups are subject to more directed interventions on behalf of the whole population. The 
cultural difference of allochtonen and their need for additional direction is clearly implied by the 
government in another passage from the memorandum: 
 
Just as is expected from autochthones, allochthones are expected to do their best 
to conquer [sic] a place in society by learning the language, having and finishing 
education, gain income and take responsibility in raising their children. It is also 
about curiosity with respect to the ways of Dutch society and the life-world of 
[autochthonous] co-citizens, especially where Dutch culture and history are 
concerned. By participating in society it becomes possible to increasingly identify 
with these. (VROM 2007:98; quoted in and translated by Schinkel 2010:274, his 
insertion) 
 
Similar appeals to “increasing public morality and the establishment of civilizing 
offensives” (Tonkens 2006:6; my translation) have also come from politicians across the political 
spectrum sitting in the Dutch parliament, on provincial and local city councils, scholars 
(associated with federal and independent research bodies, in academia), as well as through 
various non-profit initiatives. Tonkens has noted that through the proliferation of such projects, 
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“[p]ositive norms such as respect, tolerance, decency, culture or civilization [beschaving] and 
uplift [verheffing] have rung in our ears” (Tonkens 2006:6; my translation). These initiatives bear 
clear connections to the historical self-image of the Dutch as a moral (religious and cultural) 
civilizing force, or gisdland (guiding nation), that was explicit during the experience of empire 
and ways in which the early Dutch nation was imagined (Kuitenbrouwer 1991; cf. Anderson 
1991). Appeals to promote civil behaviour and uplift in contemporary Dutch cities are viewed by 
scholars as a reaction to perceived questions of “social cohesion” brought on by “too much” 
diversity from new, especially ‘non-Western’ Dutch citizens (Hurenkamp et al. 2011:210). For 
example, the Den Haag, Gouda, and Rotterdam city councils have all published rules and 
pamphlets promoting their “good citizenship” initiatives. Such civilizing offenses connect 
neoliberal rationality to the cultural norms and values of the contemporary Dutch mainstream, 
what Duyvendak (2004:10) has called progressive “moral majority.” 
The concern for cultivating “active” citizen-subjects and the connections between these 
neoliberal sentiments and Dutch cultural practice is more explicit in the ‘civic integration’ 
(inburgering) policy targeting adult newcomers. While eligibility for citizenship now appears to 
be the main outcome of passing these examinations, the inburgering policy was originally 
developed with the intention of facilitating newcomers’ economic integration. While Björnson 
(2007) deemed this aim an utter failure,14 the revised goals for inburgering have not erased the 
underlying connections between worthy citizenship practice and self-reliance that is tied to moral 
practices associated with labour (cf. Entzinger 2004b; Ong 1996). Whether intended specifically 
to produce self-reliant workers or generally to mould morally-attuned citizen-subjects, what is 
clear is that inburgering was always intended to “qualify immigrants for independent and 
autonomous functioning in their new environment” (Entzinger 2004b:22).  
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In the more demanding revised ‘civic integration’ laws (2006), the anxiety over 
mitigating the perceived cultural differences of especially ‘non-Western’ newcomers through 
their formal integration – including their orientation toward “active” civic participation – became 
even more explicit. In learning Dutch and in preparation for the inburgering test, students are 
given a very specific, distinctly cultural rendering of what it means to be Dutch and to live well 
in Dutch society that hinges on the norms and values of the progressive “moral majority.” This 
pre-arrival cultural orientation program was established to help potential immigrants (e.g. non-
EU spouses and fiancées) “develop a sense of individual responsibility” through “knowledge of 
the Dutch language, society and culture and knowledge of democratic values” (Council for 
Social Development (RMO) 2003, quoted in Entzinger 2004b:11; Björnson 2007:65). As with 
the ‘civic integration’ courses immigrants must undertake upon their arrival in the Netherlands, 
the intention of the various tests and training introduced in 2006 is the education of self-reliant 
citizens who decrease or eliminate their burden on the state. 
 Part of this responsibility also extends to newcomers’ ability to cover the costs associated 
with inburgering, including that of learning the language.15 These expenses have made free or 
low-cost, volunteer-run Dutch language coaching services an important part of the landscape of 
immigrant integration in Amsterdam, and across the Netherlands. As a way of extending the 
reach of government into the private lives of the population, voluntary language coaching 
projects are especially interesting. Against the backdrop of retreating social service provision as 
market principles erode the Dutch welfare state (Knijn 1998; cf. Ong 2006; Muehlebach 2012), 
volunteers have become influential non-state actors. Volunteers are positioned by the state and 
other actors in Dutch society as occupying an increasingly important place in how the nation-
state configures and promotes “good” citizenship practice. Alongside helping newcomers learn 
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to speak Dutch, language coaches also teach newcomers their ideas about how to live together 
well in Dutch society. Amsterdam’s language coaching projects and their volunteers therefore 
provide a unique window to consider how “[b]ecoming a citizen depends on how one is 
constituted as a subject who exercises or submits to power relations” (Ong 1996:738). Language 
coaching volunteers’ and other research participants’ perspectives underscore how dominant 
conceptions of citizenship and belonging in the neighbourhood and nation are variously 
reinforced and challenged at the level of the everyday. The informal practices of volunteer 
language coaches reveal the gaps between these governmental programs and their realization. 
Through the tensions, contradictions, and instances of consent revealed in these ethnographic 
moments, I discuss how citizenship practice operates through “a multiplicity of discursive 
elements that can come into play in various strategies” of the will to govern (Foucault 1990:100).  
 In the following chapters, my ethnography continues to trace the deep connections made 
between language learning, cultural behaviour, and highly moralized conceptions of citizenship. 
Ethnography has much to offer studies of governmentality precisely because the “relation of 
power to its others is not simply a contest of ideas─it is embodied in practices” (Li 2007:279). 
Chapter 7, “Citizenship as practice: volunteer ethics and Dutch sociality,” explores how language 
coaches conceptualize and engage citizenship as a practice in their everyday lives. In particular, I 
explore these understandings of citizenship as they are expressed in relation to local ideas of 
sociality, of being sociaal. As revealed through research participants’ perspectives, government 
policy, and non-governmental organizations’ initiatives to promote voluntarism in Amsterdam, 
neoliberal rationale promoting “active” citizenship practice has become “easy to think” in 
relation to local Dutch notions of sociality, of being sociaal.  
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7. Citizenship as practice: volunteer ethics and Dutch sociality 
 
The cultural ethic communicated through voluntarism and related forms of civic or social 
engagement is now a powerful way through which citizenship practice and community belonging 
have been framed and expressed in the Netherlands and elsewhere. Volunteers frequently work 
with projects or organizations that are now tasked with filling the gaps in social service provision 
left by the receding welfare state (Muehlebach 2012; Hemment 2012; Erickson 2012). While the 
very real need for their labour in these service areas may be acknowledged by volunteers, they 
often discuss other reasons motivating their involvement in particular initiatives and 
organizations. In Italy, Meuhlebach (2012) draws connections between volunteers’ Catholic faith 
or leftist political commitments to their national and local communities. In the Netherlands 
religious belief may be important (Bekkers 2011), but concerns for building social cohesion and 
a “more liveable” city or neighbourhood may be more important for individual volunteers. 
Volunteers I spoke with, or whose stories appeared through resources like the Vrijwilligers 
Central Amsterdam (Volunteer Centre Amsterdam) website, talked about motivations such as: 
personal enjoyment from the work they do; the social relationships they build through their 
labour; the positive outcomes of their involvement for individuals, the community or goal they 
serve; or their personal interest in supporting a specific cause or campaign. Whatever their 
motivations, volunteers are considered “active” citizens, “embody[ing] what both liberals and 
conservatives applaud: self-reliance and socially oriented civic participation” (Hurenkamp et al. 
2011:212; cf. Milligan and Fyfe 2005:418; Tonkens 2006; Ong 1996, 2006).  
This chapter explores how my research participants and others in Dutch society consent 
to, reaffirm, and contest the connections drawn between morality, sociality, and neoliberal 
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articulations of citizenship practice through their voluntarism in Amsterdam. The ways in which 
these connections are articulated is often subtle, and is connected to a complex web of lived 
experiences, observations, practices, and affective sentiments. The operation of power at a 
distance is clear in how voluntarism becomes an expression of consent to the conditions of 
government and the “exercise in statecraft that is as much directed at the volunteers themselves 
as the people they ostensibly assist” (Hemment 2012:534; cf. Dean 2010:38). 
 
Finding the right register to speak about Dutch citizenship 
 
In spite of recurring and well-known discussions about the meaning of citizenship in the 
news,1 I found that most ‘native’ Dutch people I spoke with had not really given much thought to 
what their own citizenship meant to them. This has been the case even among those who work 
closely with new citizens and immigrants, as do volunteer language coaches. When I asked 
people what citizenship or being Dutch meant, I frequently encountered two types of responses. 
Clear in these responses was the long history of conceptualizing the nation as the site of affective 
sentiment, whereas the state and sentiment are thought to be distinct. Citizenship was connected 
to rights and obligations, the rule of law. People talked about the freedoms accorded to Dutch 
citizens, such as ease of international travel, freedom of speech, a strong democratic tradition,2 
the right to sexual or gendered self-expression, and liberal legal provisions regarding euthanasia, 
abortion, prostitution or soft drug-use. Alternatively, people responded to ideas of Dutchness 
with joking responses, rhyming off as many stereotypical cultural images as possible, or by 
pointing to emotionally-meaningful traditions or phenomena. While these two veins of response 
seemed distinct, they were very much entangled. As Stoler has discussed, since the colonial era it 
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has been the state’s responsibility to direct and harness affect to serve the interests of the public 
good (2009:71). The powerful connections between state, nation and affect became clear in 
discussions over the place of minority cultural practices and beliefs brought to the Netherlands 
by new citizens in an overarching Dutch national culture based on norms and values of the 
‘native’ Dutch progressive moral majority. 
The taking stock of Dutch traits and tropes that I encountered during my year in the field 
through various media in the Netherlands highlighted the question of Dutch (national) identity as 
one of broad appeal and concern. For example, in my first few weeks in the Netherlands, I 
stumbled across a 1999 publication in a second-hand shop: a book entitled Typische Nederlands: 
Vademecum van de Nederlandse identiteit (Typically Dutch: Guide to Dutch identity). The book 
does not promise the reader a “grand schema” on Dutch identity. Rather, it presents an 
alphabetical list – from aardappeleters (potato eaters) to Zwarte Piet (Black Peter) – of items 
and experiences considered “typically Dutch” by the Dutch themselves (Vuisje and van der Lans 
1999:8-9). That books3 presenting ‘Dutchness’ to readers in the Netherlands and foreign 
audiences exist is significant in itself. Yet, concerns for defining (and defending) a Dutch 
national identity or character have taken other forms since the early 2000s. The emergence of a 
populist Right in the Netherlands around this time benefited from (and stirred) these anxieties 
about Dutch national identity. Politicians like Pim Fortuyn gained a significant voice on the 
national stage by appealing to concerns about the cultural difference of non-Western newcomers 
and the potential erosion of distinctly Dutch values and character (cf. Sunier and van Ginkel 
2006). Reflecting on public education policy, the Dutch Education Council identified a number 
of problem areas, especially in relation to social ‘integration’ issues among Dutch youth. In 
response to these concerns, the Dutch Minister of Education, Culture and Science commissioned 
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a committee to develop a Dutch history canon in mid-2005 (van Oostrom 2007:18). Yet, these 
concerns over Dutch identity seemed to reach a crisis point for many in Dutch society when the 
Argentinian-born crown princess of the Netherlands gave a short speech as she presented the 
WRR’s report, Identificatie met Nederland (Identification with the Netherlands) to the 
government in 2007.  
Having lived in the Netherlands for seven years as a dual Dutch and Argentinian citizen, 
Princess Máxima commented on her own experience in trying to understand the public debates 
over Dutch identity and what she referred to as the “national psyche” (mentaliteit). The report, 
which advised the government on dual citizenship and the question of national loyalty, stated 
that “in recent years the concept of national identity has been dealt with too simply” (NRC.nl 
2007; my translation). Máxima agreed with this conclusion, stating that “one Dutch identity” 
does not exist. In her speech, the crown princess related a discussion she had had with her father-
in-law, the German-born Prince Claus:  
 
To the question of how it felt to be Dutch, he answered: “I do not know. I feel 
myself to be a world citizen, European, Dutch.” Those words I will never forget. 
The Netherlands is a large window with open curtains, but also a privacy fence. 
The Netherlands is one cookie with your coffee, but also an enormous sense of 
hospitality and warmth. (Trouw.nl 2007; my translation) 
 
While Máxima’s intent was to convey that “the Netherlands is too multifaceted to fit into a 
cliché,” many politicians took issue with her statement. Populist Right politician Geert Wilders 
fobbed her speech off as “well- intended politically correct claptrap” (NRC.nl 2007; my 
translation), whereas more mainstream politicians felt that although the princess had a right to 
her opinions, a Dutch identity certainly does exist. A member of parliament for the CDA 
(Christian Democrats) commented, citing the Royal House as illustrative of his point: “Naturally 
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there is pluralism, but we have a collective history and national symbols that unite the Dutch” 
(NRC.nl 2007; my translation).  
 The impact of this speech and the “crisis of identity” it signalled continued to resonate 
across Dutch society during my research in 2009. The national newspaper De Volkskrant began 
publishing a popular column, “Encyclopedie van Nederland” (Encyclopaedia of the 
Netherlands), dedicated to showcasing things considered typically Dutch.4 Running weekly from 
2009, the early articles opened with explicit reference to Princess Máxima’s 2007 comments on 
Dutch identity. In our interview in early 2010, José agreed with the princess on the Dutch 
identity crisis. José was retired and spent some of her time volunteering for Gilde Amsterdam 
and other initiatives in the city. She had spent her adult life in Amsterdam, was active in her 
neighbourhood, and was a self-proclaimed busybody. “And now,” José laughed as she read down 
my list of questions during our interview, “we come to the identity crisis! What in the world is 
my identity?! I have asked Máxima and she doesn’t know either.” She laughed warmly at this 
joke. “Hey, that is true,” she said alluding to the well-known controversy.  
 
What is my identity? My god! What is yours? Now, everyone has their own 
identity; does that mean then that there is a Dutch identity? No. There are the 
identities of seventeen million Dutch people. There are seventeen million 
identities here. And the one is stronger and the other is weaker. The Dutch identity 
doesn’t exist, cannot exist. How in god’s name could you define it? 
 
In spite of the many clichés that invariably sprung to mind when I talked to people about 
what it meant to be Dutch, the discussion usually ended on a similar note to José’s, asking how 
something like national identity, or any identity, might be defined. It appeared to be much easier 
for people to talk about their ideas of when and how someone might belong as member of 
society, than to talk about an abstract concept like national identity. This came out clearly not 
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only in my informants’ discussions, but also in the “troubling” speech of Máxima. Rather than 
focusing on ideas of what she called a “Dutch mentality,” Máxima had encouraged the 
government and Dutch citizens to look to the feelings that bonded people to the country and to 
one another. “This is very simple,” stated the princess. “Learn to understand one another through 
a shared interest, for example a sports club or the neighbourhood. This is good because you will 
not focus on the differences between people, but on a shared goal” (NOS 2007; my translation). 
Among my informants, participation in Dutch society – as through paid or voluntary work – was 
also viewed as the key to connecting with one’s neighbours and fellow citizens, to making a 
place for oneself. This appeal for people to come together around a shared goal neatly reflects 
Li’s (2007b) discussion of how the successes of assemblages are unstable, operating through the 
agency of their actors, in relation to material content and enunciations. Critiques must be 
contained through compromise and adjusting techniques. Máxima’s subsequent discursive appeal 
to elements of Dutch sociality – such as sentiments undergirding the poldermodel of governance, 
where the “interested parties come together and jointly work out solutions to benefit the 
collective” (Martineau 2006:38) – enables these critiques to be absorbed, and compromises 
reached among the assemblage. 
 
Shared interests: citizenship as practice 
 
Bart was a ‘native’ Dutch man in his sixties who volunteered with Gilde Amsterdam’s 
language coaching projects. He had been born and lived almost his entire life in Amsterdam. 
When we met he had been retired for some years from his job in the medical profession. 
Although retired, he continued to be active in his field, lending his expertise as a volunteer to 
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different projects related to his former profession, in addition to his work with Gilde Amsterdam. 
I met with Bart through our connection to Gilde Amsterdam’s Dutch language coaching 
programs in which we both participated, he as a coach and I as a non-native speaker.  
Bart offered to conduct our interview in English, a language in which he was fluent. He 
responded to my query about the meaning of citizenship vaguely, not unlike many other research 
participants. “You know,” he said relatively early during our interview, “it’s a very difficult 
question. No, the question isn’t difficult, but the answer. Well, you have the strictly legal side of 
course, but that’s not what you mean, I think.” Like many others with whom I had spoken, the 
conversation turned to trying to pin down what could be considered “Dutch,” or what he felt was 
important to emphasize in relation to such a question, such as aspects of social values and 
historical achievements of which he was proud. Bart commented on the strong civil society and 
republican tradition of the Dutch, especially in Amsterdam. While Bart was resistant to 
definitions of “Dutchness,” he felt that being a Dutch citizen nonetheless had something to do 
with making claims to this history and cultural tradition. 
In our interview, Bart had pointed to a distinction in how he understood the meaning of 
his citizenship, which was reflective of many of the other discussions I had with research 
participants on this topic. He highlighted the formal aspects of citizenship, as well as the 
substantive side: the personal meanings, ideas and behaviours attributed to citizenship as lived 
experience. Many other informants expressed similar ideas in their discussions of what 
citizenship meant to them. For instance, Gerrit, a ‘native’ Dutch language coach in his 70s, said: 
“Well, citizenship is a formality. Nationality is a formality. And citizenship is that you have 
something to do with the society. In my opinion.” While he did not elaborate on how citizenship 
was connected to society, José had much to say on this point.  
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Citizenship is actually a completely, totally different thing [than Dutchness]. You 
have a passport citizen, a juridicial understanding of Dutchness― I am Dutch 
because I have a Dutch passport. Thus, I am a Dutch citizen. But, a citizen means 
for me also that I am active in the society in a more formal manner than what― 
this manner, living. I mean: I go vote. And I pay taxes. And I expect something 
from my government, but I support my government too. It has to do with the 
social contract, I will say. ... You can better form an active society, and everyone 
becomes better because of that.  
 
“And in that vein I think you are also a citizen. As a part of,” José switched from Dutch into 
English briefly “‘civil society’ shall I say.” To be a citizen is to be part of this civil society for 
José, and this is something that she viewed as the same across different national contexts. As she 
said, “So if you are a part of a society then you also build it. I happen to be Dutch. But, yes, it 
would be the same if I lived in France or Germany. The same in England.” 
The day after we met, I received an email from José. Reflecting on our interview, she had 
given the question of what citizenship meant to her more thought and felt that it was important to 
add to what she had told me during our interview. What she had described about the citizen in 
relation to civil society she called the “state citizen.” The state citizen, she repeated, was 
someone who is a 
 
resident of a country with a passport from that country, and who upholds the laws 
and the most important norms. The citizen pays their taxes, but will also vote and 
is concerned to have a dialogue with the government – and the government must 
also listen to the citizen. The core meanings for me regarding the state-citizen 
are: freedom, equality, fundamental rights, and law and order. 
 
What her message added to the meaning of citizenship that we discussed the day before was her 
idea of the citizen as a “culturalized” and moral category, as an ethic and engagement with others 
in society, rather than simply a formal relationship with the machinery of the state. José wrote: 
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The other side of citizenship I discussed less in our interview, also because that 
part is implicit in the answers and came out in some of the other questions. That 
part can be called the “good citizen.” That is a person who to the best of their 
ability participates in the social and economic life. She wants to trust her fellow 
citizens, and finds a good upbringing, education and living environment important. 
He is mindful of his own behaviour and that of others in the public domain. The 
core meanings here are: solidarity, respect and ethics, including the idea that you 
treat others in the same manner that you would like to be treated. 
 
This notion of the “good citizen” was, as José herself noted about our conversations, 
something that seemed to be implicit in many of my informants’ ideas on social participation in 
and integration into Dutch society. This participation, an expression of the processes of “subject-
ification” described by Ong (1996:737), was articulated in many different ways. It was seen by 
informants as to do with behaviours that were considered positive or productive in society, such 
as having (legal) employment, pursuing education, being active in your children’s education, or 
participating in voluntary work. It was also tied to having good social relationships with the 
people you came into contact with on a regular basis, such as neighbours. Most of my 
informants, who were active or had past experience as volunteers for a number of different 
organizations or activities, considered volunteer work as a way of productively engaging in 
society, of being a “good citizen” or “good neighbour,” of being sociaal.  
 
Being sociaal: communicating Dutch sociality 
 
 Behaving in a sociaal way is foundational to local conceptions of living together well in 
Dutch society. Encompassing positive or productive social and societal (maatschappelijk) norms, 
practices and relationships, sociaal behaviour is part of the “easy to think” grammar of 
difference; it is an expression of the rituals and rules of governmentality, where individuals and 
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populations come to conduct their conduct in the interests of the community (cf. Cooper and 
Stoler 1997; Stoler 2011; Ong 1996; Li 2007a). Several common idioms expressed the 
importance of conformity, or not intruding on others via the practice of sociaal behaviour. For 
instance, over the course of my fieldwork I often heard informants respond to my questions 
about the meaning of being Dutch or fitting into Dutch society by saying that it had to do with 
“just being normal, because that’s crazy enough” (doe maar gewoon, dan doe je gek genoeg), or 
not “sticking your head above the field” (je kop boven het maaiveld steken). The idea of asociaal 
(“not social” or “anti-social”) behaviour emerged at the turn of the twentieth century in relation 
to “unacceptable” or “socially backward” families; that is, largely in relation to classed concerns 
for hygiene, parenting, and household practices strongly related to poverty (De Regt 1982). In 
the current context, the obligations of Dutch sociality are extended from the local community of 
one’s neighbours to the national community and the welfare state. Behaving in an asociaal 
manner describes socially disruptive actions and attitudes, threats to the social body: such 
behaviours are considered selfish or overly individualistic, an inconvenience or bother to others, 
or they may block the ability to communicate between members of civil society (Martineau 
2006:298-299). People often described asociaal behaviour to me as things considered lastig 
(usually translated as “nuisances”) such as the behaviour of hangjongeren (hang-around youth), 
or inconsiderately noisy neighbours. Seriously asociaal behaviour is draining on civil society or 
the state (e.g. petty crime or vandalism, welfare fraud). My experiences living in the Netherlands 
illustrated to me that being sociaal is also about notions of fairness and reciprocity in relation to 
others, from a party of family and friends, to the city or neighbourhood in which one lives, or the 
state. 
When I first arrived in the Netherlands in the summer of 2009, a street-side billboard in 
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Utrecht caught my interest. Pictured on the poster (figure 7.1) was a bus-shelter in Amsterdam, 
where a ‘native’ Dutch youth wearing a hooded sweater and headphones lounged on the small 
bench, with his large bag occupying the remaining seat. Standing next to the bench and 
apparently unseen by the youth is a heavily pregnant white woman, carrying both her shopping 
and a small child in a winter coat. This poster was part of a media campaign against onbewust 
asociaal (unknowingly anti-social) behaviours organized by SIRE. This campaign sought to 
make the Netherlands a more sociaal place by reminding people to keep others in mind as they 
went about their daily lives, e.g. picking up after their dogs, offering elderly people or mothers 
seats on public transit, refraining from spitting in public or littering. In everyday life, sociaal 
behaviour is part of how people, like my informants, talked about living together well. 
This idea that many newcomers to Dutch society were socially isolated from Dutch 
society, in part due to their inability to converse in Dutch or hold down employment, was 
prevalent among my research participants. Moreover, this social isolation or marginalization was 
considered by those I spoke with as breeding asociaal behaviours among these groups. These 
discussions drew, often in subtle ways, on a discussion of cultural competency that allow certain 
differences to be “easy to think” and marked newcomers as targets for policy intervention by the 
state (cf. Stoler 1995:82-83). When I returned to the field in May 2011, I spoke with Sterre and 
her friend Chloe about my research.5 Both of these women were ‘native’ Dutch, in their late 
twenties, and well-educated. Sterre was pursuing graduate studies, whereas Chloe was practising 
family medicine. I had recently met Chloe and she had asked about my research, which led into a 
discussion of Chloe’s experiences and opinions about integration among immigrants. She 
focused on what she felt was the prevalence of asociaal behaviour among those commonly 
called allochtonen.  
219 
 
Chloe said that her time during university had changed her ideas about allochtonen for 
the worse. She had lived in a neighbourhood that she described as “not the best;” located one 
neighbourhood over from the “notoriously bad” neighbourhood in that city, a so-called “problem 
neighbourhood.” Such neighbourhoods were known for their residents’ problems with 
unemployment, criminality, and often, isolation from mainstream/ ‘native’ Dutch society. 
Usually, these were among the poorest neighbourhoods in a city and were largely inhabited by 
non-Western immigrants and their descendants. Sterre pointed out that this experience has 
negatively impacted Chloe’s ideas. For Chloe, the thing that she most noticed and was bothered 
by was when allochtonen “just take. They want everything from you,” she said. What made this 
behaviour and attitude grate, was that she also observed that “they don’t give anything back,” or 
do anything to, in a way, earn the right to take, like working people do. Although she had first 
seen this during her university years, she continued to see it now through her work as a medical 
professional, where she came into contact with many different people. Chloe and Sterre echoed 
the opinions of many with whom I had spoken when they agreed that you should contribute to 
the group or system (here, the welfare state) to the best of your ability, and then it is acceptable 
to take out of that same system. But, commented Chloe, these men—and “it is mostly men,” she 
assured me, “because you never see the women”—“just take, take, take,” and then “you see them 
standing around on street corners all day smoking and drinking coffee and not working.” It was 
implied in this conversation and many others I witnessed over my fieldwork, that non-Western 
women, also behaved in an asociaal manner. Through their isolation from mainstream Dutch 
society these women did not (have the chance to) participate as “active” or “good” citizens. In 
large part because they cannot speak or understand Dutch (as language coaching projects like the 
women-only ABC allude), these women pose an extra burden on the state, not even being able to 
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act as “active” parents helping their children through their education.  
The extent of these concerns and their unintended consequences was evident in several 
different discussions with informants, such as Ilse, a ‘native’ Dutch woman in her thirties whom 
I met through her voluntary work at the nursing home where we both volunteered. During our 
interview, Ilse discussed what she felt was the wider impact of the failure of newcomers to learn 
the local language. In the context of this discussion, I told her about the Native Speaker Project I 
volunteered with as an English language coach. This program recruited English-speaking 
volunteers to hold an extra hour of conversational English with “at risk” students in their first 
year of secondary school. The project was situated in what were commonly referred to as zwarte 
scholen (black schools), where the majority of the pupils were allochtonen. The coordinators of 
the program advised new volunteers during the orientation session that many of the students 
struggled not only with English, but also with Dutch. Other Native Speaker Project volunteers 
mentioned that their students seemed to speak Dutch in their classrooms, but spoke other 
languages at home. This was considered a common problem by many people with whom I spoke, 
and a sign of inadequate integration and participation in Dutch society. In speaking with Ilse, I 
mentioned how even though my students’ parents were from places such as Morocco, Turkey or 
Surinam my students all seemed to speak Dutch in the classroom. “I don’t really hear them 
speaking anything else except Dutch.” While Ilse had been nodding in agreement throughout my 
description of the classroom, at this point, she interjected: “Except at home.” This exception was 
something that I had heard described by several informants, and something I had yet to ask the 
students with whom I worked. Ilse elaborated on this point: 
 
Most of the time they speak Dutch in school. And at home they speak their own 
language. And it’s really common that these kids are coming in with their parents 
if they have a, we say ‘10 minutes conversation’ with the teacher. Because the 
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parents don’t understand the Dutch. And the kids have to translate. For the teacher 
and the parents. And if the teacher says, “Well, this is that,” and the kids don’t 
really always tell the translation right to their parents. But some of these kids also 
need to translate if the parents go to the doctor. Or the hospital. And well, I think 
it’s really tough for those kids to have [to do] those translations. 
 
That children of immigrants were burdened with having to translate (including in difficult or 
very personal situations) for their parents due to their superior command of the Dutch language 
was a common sentiment I observed among informants, as well as in the media. It also served as 
an example of the extent that not learning Dutch impacted one’s ability to navigate Dutch society 
as a responsible and self-sufficient citizen. 
These types of asociaal behaviour made my informants visibly annoyed, if not angered. 
It had even emerged as the topic of a contentious national debate during my fieldwork, as Geert 
Wilders (PVV, Freedom Party) pushed the Dutch parliament to produce an audit on the question 
of whether allochtonen cost the country more than they contributed (Rijlaarsdam and Staal 
2009). While costs for inburgering courses and education would be made available, the 
government coalition, then lead by Prime Minister Balkenende (CDA, Christian Democrats), 
refused to produce the report demanded by the PVV. Minister for Integration, Eberhard van der 
Laan (PvdA, Labour) responded to Wilders’ request, saying that the government does not keep 
information pertaining to specific groups in Dutch society, and further: “We are not interested in 
what an individual costs, whether a Friesian, an Amsterdammer, a senior citizen or someone with 
blue eyes” (NU.nl 2009; my translation).6  
Van der Laan’s response pointedly takes issue with the xenophobic and racist undertones 
expressed by members of the Dutch populist Right in their provocation of grounds for “worthy” 
citizenship. Even so, citizens and newcomers who are generally considered allochtonen have 
indeed become targets for governmental intervention, as is clear in the 2007 memorandum, 
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Integration Memorandum 2007–2011. Make sure you’re part of it! (Integratienota 2007–2011. 
Zorg dat je erbij hoort!) discussed in the previous chapter (VROM 2007). This is clear not only 
in how integration policy has targeted these marginalized groups (Entzinger 2004b; Björnson 
2007), but also for how they have been framed as clients for social initiatives supported by 
religious organizations, charitable trusts, and voluntary projects (cf. Diaconie Evangelisch-
Lutherse Gemeente Amsterdam 2012; Protestantse Diaconie Amsterdam 2012; VCA.nu 2011a, 
2011b; Devilee 2005; Tonkens 2006). In addition to programs like Dutch language coaching that 
aim to help newcomers integrate through language, the online Amsterdam volunteer resource, 
VCA, developed an initiative to stimulate voluntarism specifically among allochtone 
Amsterdammers. In 2007 the Duizend en één Kracht (Thousand and one Strength) project was 
launched to encourage and facilitate the participation of allochtone women in volunteering and 
further in the city. The program was extended to include allochtone men in 2011. The program's 
information page pitches voluntary work to allochtonen under the slogan, “Vrijwilligerswerk 
helpt je verder!” (Volunteering helps you go farther!). It describes voluntary work as “a nice way 
to practice speaking Dutch, to help build your portfolio for your ‘civic integration’ course, and to 
get work experience. At the end of the inburgering course volunteering is especially good for 
going a step further” (VCA.nu 2011a:1; my translation). Thus, newcomers may not only benefit 
from the work of volunteers providing social services, but are encouraged and stimulated to 
become “active” citizens through also contributing their own labour to voluntary causes in Dutch 
society.  
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Directing and improving: the role of voluntarism in contemporary citizenship practice 
 
The connections that are “easy to think” between being sociaal, voluntary labour, and 
“active” citizenship practice are made not only be people like my research participants, but are 
explicit in the initiatives and projects of charitable organizations (i.e. the royal Oranje Fonds, 
campaigns like the annual NL Doet, NL Does, and Vrijwilligers Central Amsterdam, Volunteer 
Centre Amsterdam) and governments at various levels (i.e. the 2007 memorandum and 
establishment of ‘service learning’ for secondary students, and the 2011 European Year of 
Voluntarism). These connections are especially clear when voluntary work provides social 
services that help to facilitate potentially asociaal groups’ integration as active participants in 
mainstream society. This is the case with Dutch language coaches, who help integrate 
newcomers through teaching valuable Dutch language skills and social etiquette. 
Echoing the attitudes of voluntary, charitable or government organizations and initiatives, 
many of my informants who worked as volunteers discussed how their work was useful, even 
necessary, to making Dutch society a better place in which to live. This was clear in my 
interviews with two ‘native’ Dutch women, Ilse and Anna,7 who volunteered at a nursing home. 
While they chose to volunteer at the home due to personal connections (the home was the 
residence of a loved one), they also found their work personally fulfilling and saw their voluntary 
participation as filling a significant labour gap in the home. They felt that their volunteer work 
helped to provide a better quality of life for the home’s residents, since those tasks no longer 
needed to be done by staff. Ilse first became involved with the home after her father moved into 
their care facility:  
 
Well I thought, you can see people need volunteer work because the nurses can’t 
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handle it. So, every morning, they deliver the people in the dining room and I start 
making breakfast for them and if the nurses have to do that also then it would be 
too much. So, they need spare hands to help. ... My mother does the same, on a 
different day and different floor, but the same work. ... I see it’s needed here. 
 
Anna, an elderly Dutch woman, had been a volunteer for many years at her church. She 
explained that she worked there “together with ten other women and we visit older people. ... I 
have volunteered for the church for 45 years. ... That is very good work, rewarding work.” At the 
time we met (spring 2010) she had recently begun volunteering at the nursing home. Her 
husband’s illness then required a higher level of care than she could provide, and he was 
eventually moved into the nursing home. It was after this change that she began volunteering at 
the home. Anna confided that she started working at the home so that she “did not fall into a 
deep hole.” While her work at the home was needed, it was also a way of keeping busy: “So, I 
thought ‘Hello, do [something].’ Whatever I can do, I can do. Then I have no time to worry [over 
my husband’s health].” 
While volunteering at this particular nursing home made sense for these women due to 
their personal connections to the home and their observations that their help was needed, myriad 
volunteering opportunities exist in Amsterdam to suit diverse interests and motivations. With so 
many opportunities to participate in volunteer work, it is important to consider some of the 
motivations for choosing to become a language coach. Anouk8 told me about how she found 
many different opportunities for volunteer work online: “I saw helping in a nursing home, or 
helping out— But I was like, ‘Nice, but... it reminds me of my work,’ because I work with older 
people. I was like, ‘Nah, I want to do something else.’” After thinking about what kinds of work 
she might be interested in, she decided that teaching, such as teaching Dutch to foreigners, really 
appealed to her. Anouk described her interest in helping allochtone women to learn Dutch, which 
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she hoped would allow them to better participate in Dutch society, to help build a “bridge” 
between their culture and life in Amsterdam and mainstream Dutch society. 
In the discussions of Anouk and other language coaching volunteers, the Dutch language 
itself emerged as a tool of Dutch sociality and “good” citizenship practice. Like Anouk, many 
other language coaches’ motivational narratives evoked their ideas of how volunteering in this 
way is an important contribution that helps people live together well in contemporary Dutch 
society. Casper, a ‘native’ Dutch man in his sixties and volunteer for Gilde Amsterdam, told me 
about how he first became involved with the SamenSpraak program: 
 
I read the advertisement then, where they called for volunteers to help with 
language. And I found it nice to do ... because I enjoy language. And I think it’s 
nice for people that I guide, that I teach. The Dutch language is really important to 
find a job, or to integrate into society. So, I think that yes, that is important for 
someone— If you want to stay in the Netherlands, and you want to work and live 
here then it is important that you can speak the language well. And if I can help 
with that, yes, I think that is enjoyable. I find that useful. 
 
Other volunteer language coaches also talked about how these particular voluntary 
activities appealed to their personal interests as well as to addressing a problem they saw in 
Dutch society with the social isolation of immigrants. Susanne talked about how she was 
interested in learning more about newcomers to Dutch society, and getting a better understanding 
of how they live in Dutch society.  
 
I thought, I wanted to do something for somebody else, and then you know, we 
used to talk about the huge problems we have with the foreigners. I thought, I just 
want to know what kind of people come here, and what they do, and how they 
live. ... I just went to the website of the Vluchtelingenwerk [refugee centre], and I 
thought, “Well, I’m going to try this.” 
 
These sorts of motivations among volunteer language coaches seem to be born out in the 
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observations of José in her capacity as volunteer coordinator at Gilde Amsterdam, and in 
arranging partnerships between volunteer coaches and language learners. She noted the different 
motivations shared by most people who show an interest in becoming a volunteer language 
coach.  
 
Well, everyone [who volunteers for SamenSpraak] thinks that language is 
important. Everyone also thinks it’s important to help outsiders that are new in the 
society. And they do not all have to think that foreigners are sweet and nice, but 
they have to manage. Yeah, you have people coming who also find other people 
interesting. That also has something to do with it. But this is also something that 
naturally occurs; that you are not averse toward other people. ... That describes 
my colleagues, and in any case the language coaches, the people that really do it. 
And now I am at the office of Gilde: It is a sort of interconnecting, the non-native 
speaker and the language coach, from all the language coaches I am sure that this 
is the most important motivation; the sort of ‘language’ plus ‘helping strangers’, 
so that they are no longer strangers. 
 
Most of the volunteers I spoke with felt that speaking Dutch would help newcomers to 
participate in Dutch society, to get out of their homes and to communicate with people beyond 
their own ethnic group. Anouk elaborated on how she felt that her volunteering as a language 
coach helped to form a social bridge between ‘native’ and new Dutch. In talking about her 
experiences with the ABC program she said, “Well, I really like it. Because I really like the 
connection I have with my participant. And I learn their values and how they live. And I think 
it’s interesting for them also to hear what I do and how I live.”  
For many of my interlocutors, it appears that fluency was less important than building 
competency and the confidence to speak Dutch with others. This was a problem that particularly 
affected migrant women, who were seen by my research participants (as well as policy makers, 
social researchers, and language coaching organizations) as the most isolated from the Dutch 
mainstream. My research participants shared a feeling that these women had very different life 
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experiences and motivations than other participants in language coaching programs. This is 
exemplified in the discussion I had with Anouk. The ABC program spoke to Anouk’s interest in 
teaching, but also appealed to her concern for helping allochtone women: 
 
When I was younger, when I was a student, I used to give students— guide them 
in their homework. And I really liked that. Being, you know, some kind of teacher 
or coach. So I was like, “Ah, maybe I can teach Dutch to foreign people.” 
Because I think that may help them to, you know, also have Dutch friends, and 
not focus only on their own people. So, I like the idea of teaching, and I like the 
idea of specifically helping women, because well, I have an idea that most of the 
time they have to— They are inside the house, with maybe more problems 
connecting with the Dutch community because they’re so, in such a— Well, I’m 
generalizing of course. But there are women that are like that. They’re very 
limited to their possibilities to, you know, have a bike and go out, so you know. 
So, I’m like maybe I can, you know, narrow that gap. Bridge. 
 
Similarly, José felt that communication, in this case through knowledge of the Dutch 
language, was a skill that she could help newcomers to acquire. José had described languages as 
among her hobbies, and felt that being able to help others through her love of language really 
was a gift. It helped not only newcomers themselves, but also in making Amsterdam and the 
Netherlands a better place for everyone. This was also evident in the words of a language 
coaching project leader connected to a Vluchtelingenwerk (refugee network) located in the east 
of the Netherlands. She felt that 
 
The great majority of people who immigrate to the Netherlands experience Dutch 
culture as cold and distant. Dutch people are not open to chatting with strangers 
and are, in contrast with other cultures, not as hospitable. This is for Dutch people 
a normal way of getting along with each other. But foreigners very often come to 
the conclusion that the Dutch want nothing to do with them/ discriminate. Projects 
like the Language Coaching Project provide safety and support contacts between 
both parties. There are many Dutch who want to get to know them and get in 
touch with our target group [of language students]. The fact that they do it on a 
volunteer basis speaks to their interest and good will. ... The participants and 
language coaches become “ambassadors,” who promote understanding and 
tolerance of others within their own networks. The Language Coaching Project is 
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about much more than only language. (van de Graaf 2012:13; my translation) 
 
These remarks followed on the heels of a national three-year initiative (2008-2011) to establish 
language coaching programs in the larger cities across the Netherlands. The project was 
organized by Gilde SamenSpraak (the umbrella organization under which the Gilde language 
coaching projects, such as Gilde Amsterdam’s SamenSpraak, operate), Humanitas (a charitable 
organization lending support to socially-oriented voluntary projects across the Netherlands), the 
Dutch Red Cross, the Landelijk Netwerk Thuislesorganisaties (National Network of Home 
Lesson Organizations, which provides support specifically for voluntary language coaching 
projects), and VluchtelingenWerk Nederland (the national refugee network organization). Arising 
from the previous Het begint met taal (It begins with language) campaign organized by the 
national Gilde Nederland organization, this initiative’s goal was to establish 20,000 language 
coaching couples over the course of the three years. The slogan of this campaign is telling of the 
attitudes cultivated around such projects: De Nederlandse taal verbindt ons allemaal (The Dutch 
language connects us all). 
 In the spaces and relationships I examined, voluntarism proved to be a powerful 
technique for forging alignments across an assemblage that coheres around citizenship (Li 
2007b:265). Voluntarism has likewise proven highly successful in this context as a way to render 
particular problems technical for governmental intervention. The success of this governmental 
program, as I have shown, has occurred at a specific time and place, and has been dependent on a 
constellation of conditions that includes infrastructure, ways of knowing, and distribution of 
affective sentiment among the population (cf. Li 2007a:276). Through the ways in which notions 
of “active” citizenship practice have been connected to an ethic of voluntarism, governmental 
rationale has effectively defined a set of social relationships though which a problem and 
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intervention can be launched to direct and improve the population in its own best interests. For 
instance, concerns over the health of Dutch civil society have been approached through the 
promotion of voluntarism. 
 Importantly, although the successes of this governmental program imply the consent of 
volunteers to an expression of the will to govern, this does not mean these actors are stripped of 
their agency. Rather, my research participants are socially-situated subjects in a complex field of 
power relations in which agency is, as Li indicates drawing on the work of Deluze and Guattari, 
diffuse and rhizomatic (2007b:265). The ways in which the elements of an assemblage cohere is 
not linear, but is played out in a mutual and reciprocal manner across the assemblage as its 
various elements exercise their agency in relation to these shifting, even ambiguous alignments. 
While these social actors may be drawn together as elements of an assemblage through their 
conduct and desires with regard to “active” citizenship practice, they may also reject elements or 
require adjustments as the shape of the assemblage changes – such as in its goals, discursive 
techniques, or “angle of vision” (Li 2007b:265). This chapter has explored some of the ways in 
which people like my research participants make sense of citizenship, less as a status than as a 
practice. In their everyday lives, connections to their neighbourhoods, city, and the nation-state 
are meaningfully expressed through norms, behaviours and attitudes that reflect culturally 
significant ideas about sociality – ideas that are now “easy to think” through language and 
practices associated with the neoliberal ethic of “active” citizenship (Ong 2006:14). In thinking 
through the ‘problems’ posed by the marginalized, culturally diverse (especially ‘non-Western’ 
or Muslim) population of immigrants and allochtonen in Dutch society, research participants flag 
communication as a key technique for teaching these groups the technology of “good” 
citizenship. 
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 In the next chapter, I focus on how my research participants’ understandings of 
citizenship as practice impact different actors’ expectations for immigrants’ integration into 
Dutch society. As it does historically through colonial calculations of ‘Dutchness’, the Dutch 
language represents an important thread of continuity between the conceptions of integration 
articulated by the federal inburgering policy and language coaching volunteers and their 
organizations. Following this thread ethnographically, through the web of entangled discourses, 
modes of calculation, disciplinary techniques, human capacities, and affective sentiments draws 
attention to the important ways that my research participants consent to, reconcile, and challenge 
programs of government in their everyday lives (Li 2007b:279-284). In particular, Chapter 8 
explores how through an articulation of “good” citizenship practice that privileges practices 
resonant with neoliberal rationale, language coaches downplay and contest calculations of Dutch 
citizenship that continue to draw on exclusionary discourses of cultural difference.  
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Figure 7.1: Onbewust asociaal: SIRE campaign 
 
.  
 
Photo by author. July 2009, Utrecht. 
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8. On the front lines of citizenship education 
 
As with the language of autochthony, ethnographically tracing notions of ‘integration’ 
has been key to understanding how people make sense of social difference, and the processes 
undergirding efforts to mould newcomers into moral citizen-subjects in Dutch society. In this 
context, learning to speak Dutch has almost become synonymous with notions of newcomer 
integration. With the establishment of ‘civic integration’ (inburgering) legislation in 1998, the 
federal government had developed an important measure through which it could direct and 
assess newcomers’ integration into Dutch society. Successful completion of these courses and 
associated tests have been in turn used to justify immigrants’ access to Dutch citizenship. 
Although these examinations require newcomers to undertake social orientation training with 
regard to the most important aspects of Dutch history and cultural norms, the main emphasis has 
been on Dutch language training. The high value placed on the relationship between Dutch 
language competency and integration has not been limited to federal policy advisors, but is 
shown to resonate with politicians, media commenters, scholars, and in the public among citizens 
such as my interlocutors. This shared valuation echoes the importance of the Dutch language 
historically as a way of speaking about and judging which colonial subjects, as in the East Indies, 
might be considered ‘European’ or ‘Dutch’ in a legal and cultural sense. As such, knowledge of 
the Dutch language signifies a key thread of continuity linking historical ways in which 
membership in the national community was problematized and how contemporary elements are 
engaged through an assemblage that coheres around citizenship practice. 
Dutch language facility is a skill that is not necessarily seen by individuals like my 
research participants, policy makers, media commenters, politicians, and even scholars as being 
– now and historically – highly politicized. Rather, language competence is described by my 
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interlocutors as a matter of common sense that should be exercised by those wishing to make 
claims to resources and identification with the nation-state. Learning to speak Dutch is seen as 
enabling many other forms of valued social participation as “active” members of Dutch society, 
such as holding a job, completing an education, or volunteering. Through the acquisition of 
Dutch language skills, the newcomer is configured as part of the population at large that is 
rendered technical through the technology of government, the assemblage of diverse institutions, 
discourses, ways of measuring, and applications of moral authority (cf. Li 2007b:264). 
Communication – enabled through Dutch language acquisition – renders the newcomer to do as 
they ought: to reduce their burden on the state, becoming self-sufficient and responsible for their 
own well-being (and that of fellow citizens) in the various spheres of everyday life. Moreover, 
“common sense” ways of understanding moral and cultural participation in Dutch society 
underscore how communication enables the newcomer to freely choose to do as they ought by 
following what must be in their own self-interest (cf. Li 2007a:275; Ong 1999, 2006; 
Muehlebach 2012). Thus, Dutch language learning qua integration is revealed as an important 
technique in teaching the technology of government, a skill by which newcomers’ connection to 
and position in the nation-state can be measured, evaluated, directed and improved. Through an 
analysis of the notion of ‘integration’, this chapter examines the impact of neoliberal 
governmentality on the everyday practice, conception, and expression of Dutch national culture 
by differently situated social actors. This vision of newcomer integration strongly resonates with 
how voluntarism and related ethics of participation have become valued as an expression of 
“good” citizenship practice among ‘native’ Dutch. It also reveals the complex connections drawn 
between belonging, individual behaviour, and an ethic of social participation. 
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What does it mean to integrate? 
 
There was a general consensus among almost everyone with whom I spoke, echoed by 
media commentators, academics, politicians and policy makers, that the Netherlands had done a 
poor job of integrating newcomers into Dutch society, especially since the arrival of non-
Western guest workers during the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, what was widely discussed as a 
failure on the part of the government during these earlier decades was viewed by my informants 
and others in Dutch society as having produced a number of serious social problems among 
ethnic minority groups who arrived in the Netherlands during this period. Informants, media 
commentators, politicians, policy makers and academics habitually framed the higher rates of 
unemployment, dependence on the welfare state, criminality, lower educational achievement, 
and isolation from mainstream (‘native’) Dutch on the part of immigrants as creating problems 
for social cohesion within Dutch society, especially between allochtone and ‘native’ Dutch 
citizens. These outcomes had generated a widespread feeling across Dutch society that 
immigrant integration policies’ failure to adequately integrate newcomers to the Netherlands had, 
in fact, failed Dutch society at large.  
 The greatest of these policy mistakes was often flagged by informants as granting Dutch 
citizenship to people who did not learn how to live in Dutch society, which at the very least 
requires basic competency in the Dutch language. This was the concern at the heart of Paul 
Scheffer’s controversial op-ed, “Het Multiculturele Drama” (The Multicultural Drama; in the 
national newspaper, NRC Handelsblad), published in 2000. Many people with whom I spoke 
(including Dutch scholars) considered this piece as a watershed moment that brought such 
questions into the open and up for debate in the Netherlands. Scheffer wrote about his concerns 
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that the government’s failure to adequately integrate the waves of newcomers since the 1970s 
into the social and economic life of the country has produced many social problems, specifically 
with employment, educational achievement, and criminality. By the time I conducted my 
fieldwork, the expression of such sentiments regarding immigrant integration and the negative 
effects of this failure seemed to be regularly expressed in the media, by politicians, and by my 
research participants. 
The ‘civic integration’ legislation implemented by the Dutch government was intended to 
bridge the gap and remedy the policy “mistakes” of the past with regard to immigrant 
integration. By emphasizing knowledge of Dutch and through the attempts to evaluate basic 
knowledge about living in Dutch society the ‘civic integration’ tests were the government’s 
answer to the dilemma of immigrant integration. With its goal of readying newcomers to take up 
Dutch citizenship and participate in Dutch society, the Dutch ‘civic integration’ policy has drawn 
powerful connections between notions of social or cultural integration and citizenship. These 
connections have been reiterated by many different people in Dutch society.  
Yet, during our interview when I had asked Bart whether or not citizenship could be 
considered the same as being culturally integrated, he balked. “No, no. Not at all. These are very 
complicated words in these days you know.” In talking about how complicated ideas of 
integration and citizenship have become, Bart implicitly referenced a number of broader 
discussions that had been occurring in Dutch society on these topics. During our interview and in 
interviews and discussions with other informants some of these considerations came to the fore. 
Since the early 2000s, the rise of the populist Right in the Netherlands and the mainstreaming of 
their xenophobic and anti-Islam rhetoric and agenda was frequently commented upon. Many 
people also referenced the anxieties expressed by politicians, media commentators and policy 
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makers about the place of newcomers in Dutch society. Several discussions brought up the 
meaning of “integration” in relation to immigrants and ethnic minorities in Dutch society, 
including how to go about integrating immigrants, and questioning at what point someone might 
in fact be considered integrated. The question of citizenship and the meaning of “Dutchness” or 
Dutch national culture was also part of the social landscape Bart referred to as complicating 
concepts of integration and citizenship in the Netherlands.  
Although my informants favourably considered the acquisition and testing of skills 
through inburgering, notably knowledge of the Dutch language, there was a general feeling that 
passing these ‘civic integration’ tests was not equivalent to really being integrated into Dutch 
society; ‘civic integration’ (inburgering) and integration (integratie) were viewed as qualitatively 
different. José, a ‘native’ Dutch language coach commented, “I am an official citizen. Yes, now,” 
she broke into a laugh. “My neighbour across the street is also an official citizen, and he’s there 
farming, and sawing, and carpentering, and making me crazy!” She laughed again, “I wish that 
he was less integrated! But he is just provincial Dutch,1 so―” 
 
But in any case, I do not know what it means to say: ‘civicly integrated’ 
[ingeburgered zijn]. I do know what it is to say someone is integrated 
[geintegreerd]. To ‘civicly integrate’ [inburger] is an etiquette. You get a sticker 
on your forehead: naturalized [ingeburgered]. So what? Integration, you see, 
integration is about seeing how you behave. And that has nothing to do with 
‘civic integration’. ‘Civic integration’ is very flattened, very arbitrary criteria too. 
I have looked over the questions from such an exam. I really don’t understand 
them. Really. That is one of the reasons that I say, “I am not ‘civicly integrated’.” 
I would never pass the exams. 
 
When I spoke with language coaches about inburgering, I found that many were like 
José: quite critical of aspects of this course, particularly as they related to the question of social 
integration. While most applauded the language component, many felt that the test on Dutch 
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culture that declared the immigrant sufficiently integrated and thus eligible to apply for 
citizenship bordered on absurd. Some of this disapprobation may have stemmed from the 
different ideas about these tests as well as the “practice tests” circulating in the media. For 
instance, in 2005 the topic of inburgering was presented as a television event, broadcast as De 
Nationale Inburgering Test (The National Civic Integration Test). The program was produced by 
Teleac (Televisie Academie, Television Academy), one of the educational radio and television 
programmers, and broadcast on the public channel, Nederland 1. The one and a half hour live 
broadcast presented a test based on the federally mandated Kennis Nederlandse Samenleving 
(Knowledge of Dutch Society) test that ‘civic integration’ students (inburgeraars) must pass in 
order to qualify for citizenship. The stated goal of the program was to acquaint ‘native’ Dutch 
people with the things that those applying for Dutch citizenship must know, and asked for viewer 
feedback on the content presented.2  
Some of the questions asked in this televised quiz did closely adhere to those of the 
official inburgering test (e.g. on the topics of social services and laws, and some on social 
etiquette). Meanwhile, other questions on social behaviour as well as Dutch traditions reflected 
the kinds of things that my informants viewed as less pertinent to judging one’s integration into 
Dutch society. After reading the list of questions that inburgeraars may be asked in their final 
exam, José had formed some opinions about the inburgering process. She stated, “I think that 
[the tests] are in themselves good. Oh, yes, the course is also rather strange. Look. I think that the 
language aspects are required. But whether I now need to know what a “buurtbakkie” is?!” 
Puzzled by this term, José explained, “It’s the little thing that you have at the Albert Heijn 
[grocery store] that you put between your groceries and the groceries of someone else. That is a 
buurtbakkie.” José continued, “I didn’t know that either. Very Dutch! No...  
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That is one of the questions that is on the ‘civic integration’ course exams. ... 
Look, there are some things that are very clearly culturally inspired. For example, 
the acceptance of gays. The acceptance of equal rights for women. How you raise 
your children. The death penalty or not. You have those sorts of things. I think 
that is important.  
 
“But,” José laughed heartily, “what a buurtbakkie is? Good grief!”  
Another problem that was pointed out by one of my research participants in relation to 
these quizzes (and by extension in the inburgering exams and courses) was that often, multiple 
answers seemed correct, or at least reflective of people’s actual behaviour or attitudes. One 
informant, a ‘native’ Dutch woman in her thirties, commented that there was a question about 
what to do if your neighbours had a baby. The possible answers, she said, were to give flowers or 
a present, to give a card, or to do nothing. In her opinion, any of those answers could have been 
acceptable, but only one was the correct test answer. What, she wondered, did this mean for the 
larger question of the social integration of immigrants?  
What seemed to trouble my informants more than the content of these exams was the 
underlying idea that integration into Dutch society was determined by one’s ability to pass a test. 
Although most agreed that the granting of Dutch citizenship to newcomers should require some 
sort of integration process, and that there were indeed good things about the inburgering 
program and policy, the tests were inadequate to judge whether someone was really integrated 
into Dutch society. Similarly, in my discussion with Bart, he felt that there was a problem with 
saying that integration and inburgering were the same thing. “The difficulty for me too,” he said, 
“is when you say something is typical Dutch. You almost say that for integration you must learn 
this or that, or imitate. And I don’t want to.” It was the idea of pinning down a set of values or 
ideas or behaviours to form a single notion of Dutchness that Bart objected to throughout his 
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discussion with me. He related it to his childhood experiences during the verzuiling period, and 
further to the movement (supported by the government) to make an official Dutch history canon 
and museum (which he felt was “nonsense”). Bart explained, 
 
Civilization is developing and, yes, what is Dutch today is no more Dutch 
tomorrow. That was it yesterday. I thought as a child, there were fights between 
Catholics and Protestants, neighbours or streets of people, children. It’s 
unthinkable in these days, but it’s not long ago. My mother didn’t want— I’m 
from Protestant heritage. ... I’m an atheist now. But my mother didn’t want to buy 
in shops owned by Catholics or Catholic organizations. Some brands. You didn’t 
do that! 
 
Bart laughed. “But it’s ridiculous nowadays. Ridiculous.” Implicit in my conversation with Bart 
and many other informants was the idea that culture was dynamic. Being a good citizen or 
neighbour should be judged more by how one acts in relation to other members of society (being 
sociaal ) than remembering a potentially arbitrary catalogue of things framed as “typically 
Dutch.” 
 
“Seeing how you behave”: everyday practices of “good” citizenship 
 
As I learned throughout my fieldwork, the ways in which informants talked about 
citizenship and belonging in Dutch society in the context of everyday life was often subtly 
connected to their conceptions of how newcomers navigate Dutch social norms, values and 
behaviours. In my interview with Bart, the complexity behind understandings of citizenship and 
social or cultural integration emerged as he spoke of Dutch citizenship, of being Dutch, as a 
thickly layered concept incorporating daily experience, behaviour, attachment, as well as legal 
status.  
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I know personally allochtonen who are Dutch. Ja. We have neighbours here from 
Croatia. Friends. ... Yes, they are vluchtelingen, fugitives, refugees. Were. From 
1992, or something. Yes, and fully integrated here. Learned Dutch very quickly. 
She is a psychologist and he is a technician. They both have work here. Are they 
Dutch? Ja, they have Dutch passports. They speak Dutch. They have a daughter 
in school here around the corner. They have a double feeling, of course, but I 
don’t object to people having two or more passports. And their home country in 
their heart. Why not? Aboutaleb, who has two passports3― many people opposed 
that, but Moroccan is special case because you cannot abolish your Moroccan 
passport. It’s impossible. But when he— I don’t find he would be obliged to stay 
with only one passport. It’s so normal now. ... It’s so normal now to— like you!— 
to live and study and work everywhere. 
 
This nuanced image of citizenship as practice both contrasts and reflects that held by others in 
Dutch society, from policy makers to politicians.  
All of my informants, whether language coaching volunteers or not, shared Bart’s ideas 
about the importance of learning Dutch as the basis for other important modes of social 
participation (e.g. employment, education). Throughout my discussions with her, José 
emphasized the importance of communication to living well and participating in Dutch society, 
especially for people who choose to settle in the Netherlands from elsewhere. At the most basic 
level José talked about communication as the ability to speak with and understand one another. 
Although José spoke English fluently, she encouraged me to conduct our interview in Dutch, 
only occasionally switching into English to ensure I fully understood her meaning. In discussing 
what she described as the “social aspects” (which she opposed to the strictly legal aspects) of 
citizenship, José felt that 
 
There, the language comes out very strongly. If you live here, and you want to 
continue to live here, and you want to be part of society in a social 
[maatschappelijke] way, then you must know the language. And you don’t have to 
know it very well, but you must be able to express yourself well. You don’t need 
to be able to speak or write Dutch academically or attractively, but you do need to 
just be able to ask for an endive in a shop. And you should be able to have a chat 
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with your neighbours. I think that’s very important. Period.  
 
Observable among other language coaches and projects, these social connections were 
equally as important and could only be built through communication. According to one 
coordinator for the neighbourhood-oriented SamenSpraak Oost group,4 the ideal outcome for 
Dutch language learners in their program was simply: 
 
learning to speak better Dutch and especially to dare to speak it: becoming more 
self-assured in speaking Dutch. A side effect of this is contact with a Dutch 
neighbour and through this contact learning about the neighbourhood, local habits 
and ways things are done. 
 
The importance of language coaching partnerships in helping newcomers understand the kinds of 
banal expectations for social etiquette expected of them as Dutch citizens is echoed in a 
comment of Bart’s, that “when learning the language, you automatically pick up many Dutch 
things.” In our discussion, Anouk further illustrated these connections between “active” 
participation in Dutch society and language learning. The role of the language coach appears 
here as someone who can guide and help improve newcomers’ relationships in and with 
mainstream Dutch society.  
 
I have something to add, actually. Because I also tried to activate [my participant] 
more, because she’s so limited to her house. I called, you have these meeting 
houses [buurthuizen, community centres] for allochtonen, for both women and 
men, but also for women, like courses they can follow. So Dutch language, but 
also sewing and some creative arts. Stuff like that. And then it’s also encouraged 
to talk Dutch. So I introduced her to this house. ... And now she goes there twice a 
week to this buurthuis. ... And she really likes it. She also receives Dutch 
language there now. (Anouk) 
 
Besides the ability to speak with others and make oneself understood, another important 
outcome of learning to speak Dutch was flagged by research participants as conveying meaning 
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across cultural differences. This deeper understanding of communication was implicit throughout 
my discussions with informants. The importance placed on language learning as a tool of 
communication and social integration was an important motivation for José’s participation as a 
language coach. After telling me how important it is to “just be able to ask for an endive in a 
shop,” and to “be able to have a chat with your neighbours,” she continued: 
 
And that is a main reason why I am busy with SamenSpraak. I want to help the 
people who live here to have that within their reach. And there is, in the past there 
was nothing for all the immigrants who came here. One thing that the government 
reacted to very poorly was the language aspect. The government can ask of its 
citizens that they act in a social [sociaal] manner. That doesn’t mean— Because 
the government has nothing to do with what I do in private. But there is a great 
deal that is not private. In public, in contact with others you must be able to make 
yourself clear. You must make yourself understandable. The government may ask 
that of you. So, I find that, indeed, the government made grave mistakes regarding 
that. That all the people that came here were not just obligated to learn Dutch. 
 
When I raised the issue of how potential citizens must currently pass the inburgering (civic 
integration) courses established by the federal government, José responded that this requirement 
was still quite new, especially the language component of these courses.  
 
Language as key to “good” citizenship 
 
Many of my informants commented that the lag in establishing such mandatory language 
courses for newcomers is what has created so many problems for Dutch society since the 1960s 
and 1970s. Prior to the legislation of mandatory inburgering and Dutch language courses (1998), 
some private courses were on offer but the waiting lists were very long (Entzinger 2004b:7; 
Björnson 2007:78, n15). Two years after language certification became mandatory for 
newcomers (especially those pursuing citizenship), there were approximately 20,000 students 
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participating in such courses. Meanwhile, the waiting lists for Dutch as a second language 
courses across the Netherlands were still over 10,000 names long.  
The initial Gilde Amsterdam volunteer language coaching program (1999) and most of 
those that followed were seen as complementary or secondary to formal lessons. In my interview 
with the director of Gilde Amsterdam, she described the program’s origins as “not completely 
related to inburgering. It was started as a need for people coming from other countries, trying to 
speak Dutch.” The Gilde program was launched as a volunteer initiative, independent of the 
government, although it now receives funding from various levels of government. The language 
coaching initiative grew out of the organization’s mission to make the city of Amsterdam a better 
place for everyone to live through voluntarism. 
 It was firmly established in the minds of my research participants, as well as in 
mainstream political and policy discussions that many of the present problems traced to 
immigration are deeply entangled in past policy that failed to require immigrants to learn Dutch. 
This line of argumentation hinges on language as a learned skill and tool to integration. It was a 
view reflected among all of the language coaches I spoke with, on their organizations’ websites, 
as well as the title of a small book published to celebrate a decade of voluntary language 
coaching projects in the Netherlands: Taal als sleutel: 10 jaar Gilde SamenSpraak  (Language as 
key: 10 years of the Guild Speaking Together program) (van der Ven and Weggemans 2009).  
That the contemporary problems associated with (non-Western) immigrants and their 
descendants was due to their social and economic marginalization, which was compounded by 
their Dutch language deficit was generally opposed to the contentions of the populist Right. In 
their understanding of the current situation vis-à-vis newcomers, the populist Right maintained 
that the failure of immigrants to integrate into Dutch society was due to the incommensurability 
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of their “culture” (usually meaning Islam) with that of the liberal and tolerant Dutch. This 
fundamental difference of opinion emerged very clearly during my discussions with José. “But, 
here is now a huge problem with the past generation,” said José, as she elaborated on the failures 
of the Dutch government’s lack of integration policy. “All those Moroccan bastards 
[Morokaanse klootzakken].” José noticed me flinch slightly. “Yes, really just criminals.”  
 
The issue is now to make it safe. They don’t have a cultural problem. They have a 
social problem. They couldn’t finish school because their language was not good 
enough. So, they could not follow a training course for a job. They do not have 
any work and that’s why they start to deal drugs; to earn money in a normal 
manner, because they do want money. So, they do it in a wrong way. But that is 
for the most part due to their lack of education. It is really not a cultural problem. 
 
The perspective that allochtone youth – Dutch citizens – were disadvantaged in the 
labour market because of linguistic deficiencies was widespread among my informants, and has 
connections to the trajectory of educational policy. The consensus among most people I spoke 
with and visible among policy makers was that earlier Dutch policies of educating the children of 
guest workers in “their own language” (Onderwijs in Eigen Taal en Cultuur, OETC; Education 
in Minority Language and Culture) had effectively prevented integration for many ethnic 
minority groups throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Björnson 2007:67-68; cf. Van Lier 1971:193).5 
This policy was repealed during the neoliberal shift of the early 1990s, as Third Way policy 
regimes took root across Europe including in the Netherlands. Through the lens of the new 
approach which sought to “to produce the individualized, self-regulating, late-modern citizen” 
(Björnson 2007:66), policy makers asserted that allochtone students’ inadequate understanding 
of Dutch left them unable to succeed in the workforce and in Dutch society more generally 
(Björnson 2007:67-69).  
These policy failures were echoed in how research participants and other ‘native’ Dutch 
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viewed the Dutch language in relation to the perceived effects of immigration in Dutch society 
(cf. Scheffer 2000). Susanne and I spoke in English at a café near her home in Utrecht. Susanne 
was a ‘native’ Dutch woman in her late twenties. When we met she was pursuing her graduate 
studies, and had been a language coaching volunteer for over a year. Before she began her 
studies, she had worked as a high school teacher in a region in the north of the Netherlands with 
a predominantly ‘native’ Dutch, that is, white population.6 “Dutch people tend to speak about 
foreigners—” Susanne began, “Like some of the people are like: ‘It’s a problem. It’s a huge 
problem.’ ‘They do not even speak Dutch,’ and ‘what are they doing here?’ ‘They didn’t have 
work.’ Stuff like that.” Susanne began volunteering as a Dutch language coach through an 
organization for refugees because of these sorts of comments she read circulating in the 
newspapers at the time. She wanted to know more about the experiences and lives of the people 
that were thought to cause so many problems for Dutch society. She had gotten in touch with the 
Vluchtelingenwerk (Refugee network) in Utrecht, and had been partnered with a woman in her 
mid-fifties whose family had come from Chechnya a decade before.  
 
Well, for me it’s really interesting to see like what their life was about, what 
they’re doing here. How did they try to manage. Because sometimes it’s trying to 
manage. ... They also learn from us. So our culture, stuff they do not know about. 
And they keep in their own circle. Like they all stay with people who spoke 
Russian, so I was like the only Dutch people they knew. Well, the woman knew, 
because the children went to school and that’s different. She only knew me. 
(Susanne) 
 
Susanne commented that integration into Dutch society is often much easier for children than 
their parents. Since these children are now enrolled in the Dutch educational system, they learn 
to speak Dutch and are exposed to many aspects of Dutch society that their immigrant parents 
might not have learned about or experienced. Susanne commented, “Well I think it’s easier for 
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children who come and go to school, to meet other Dutch people. It’s a lot easier. And then it’s 
okay. But for the other people it’s hard, I think.”  
That the descendants of immigrants were frequently better integrated than their parents 
was mentioned by other informants as well. Having grown up in the Netherlands they were more 
likely to speak Dutch well, and therefore considered able to better participate in Dutch society. 
Noting the “costs of immigration” debate introduced by Wilders that focused on the place of 
non-Western guest workers in Dutch society, Bart commented about the children of newcomers. 
 
You heard of course, the discussion about did they cost more or bring more 
economic profit for us. And this is an undecided question. But the children of 
those people, in general, are doing well. Just like Dutch people. And sometimes 
better. 
 
While it might be easier for children to pick up the language and succeed in Dutch 
society than for their parents, adults’ poor Dutch language skills were nonetheless thought to 
potentially hamper their children’s chances of success. Even though Bart felt that some 
immigrant and non-Western Dutch youth were doing very well, he still connected immigrants’ 
poor Dutch language skills to the creation of social problems from an early age. Like José’s 
comments about those “Moroccan bastards,” Bart did not see this problem as rooted in culture. 
Rather, Bart located these problems in specific newcomers’ failure to act as “free, self-managing, 
and self-enterprising individuals in different spheres of everyday life” (Ong 2006:14). 
 
When you hear or see, for instance, young Moroccan people for instance, that’s 
yeah— You think, what do the parents do to influence their children? And we 
know that parents from Moroccan or Turkish children don’t like contact with the 
schools from their children. Like Dutch people do. It’s important to be there, to be 
in contact with the teachers and the school. And to do, to do the things for feests 
[parties] or voorlezen. What’s voorlezen? I don’t know. To read for children in 
schools. For children, especially for children from Moroccan and Turkish people 
who know not enough Dutch when they start at school, that’s very important to 
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do. But you can’t ask it of their parents, of course. I’ve, from my private 
standpoint, I find it— I don’t understand why all those many immigrants didn’t 
learn Dutch. But we wanted the less educated people from Morocco. Or the 
industry wanted. And the other side is that it’s no wonder that they didn’t learn 
Dutch. But I can’t imagine when I’m an immigrant in another country that I don’t 
learn the language. (Bart) 
 
 Bart’s frustration with the failure of many non-Western immigrants to learn Dutch over 
the preceding decades was present in the discussions of many of my research participants. Part of 
the frustration expressed by my participants at the problems faced by Dutch society stemming 
from the marginalized position of many immigrants and their descendants was connected to their 
ideas about a difference of ethics around citizenship and social participation (cf. Scheffer 2000). 
For many of my interlocutors, it seemed obvious that communication enabled or limited 
participation in many aspects of social and civic life in the Netherlands. The first step in 
newcomers’ practice of active citizenship in Dutch society therefore becomes acquiring the 
foundational skills that allow one to overcome one’s dependency on the state, and instead act as 
a responsible and “self-enterprising citizen-subject” (Ong 2006:14). However, alongside these 
discussions of an ethic of participation, many pointed to how the failures of both past policy and 
individual immigrants to learn Dutch left immigrants trying to manage rather than succeeding.   
In this chapter, I have examined how what people ought to do, and judgements about who 
has the capacity to meet these expectations are differently articulated by myriad agents in Dutch 
society, from volunteer language coaches to other research participants, in policy, through the 
media, and by (populist) politicians. Where members of the Dutch populist Right, for example, 
blame newcomers’ failure to integrate on their “backwards” cultures (meaning Islam), language 
coaching volunteers dismissed cultural explanations in favour of structural issues (i.e. poor 
educational policy, lack of integration policy, few affordable or free language courses). Even 
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where language coaches saw cultural norms playing a role in hindering language learning and 
social integration (i.e. for migrant women), they advocated structural solutions, such as legal 
requirements to complete language training or government and civil society supports for 
accessible services, such as volunteer-run language coaching projects. In spite of these different 
approaches to the question of newcomer integration, language competence, as a way to condition 
people to do as they ought, is a key thread that runs through these multiple considerations of 
integration and citizenship. For the language coaches with whom I spoke, judgements about 
whether someone is integrated into Dutch or Amsterdamse society should consider citizenship as 
a practice, as an expression of sociaal behaviour, etiquette, and attitudes. Participating in ways 
that contribute to building the community – as through employment, education, engaged 
parenting, or voluntarism – are valued as “good” citizenship practices. Importantly, these 
practices resonate with a neoliberal rationale of “active” participation. In considering integration 
in this way, these language coaching volunteers contribute to how citizenship practice and 
integration are problematized by critiquing both the ‘flattened’ criteria of government 
inburgering tests, as well as the cultural essentialism promoted by the populist Right in their 
calculations of “worthy” citizens.  
Extending from language coaches’ understandings of meaningful citizenship practice and 
notions of integration, I have shown how the Dutch language has become a key technique in 
teaching the technology of government among newcomers (Dean 2010:269-270). As many 
research participants have discussed, communication – the ability to be understood both in a 
literal sense and across cultural differences – is necessary to have a chat with your neighbours, 
ask for specific items in a shop, receive medical attention, speak with your children’s teachers, to 
work, and understand the law of the land. In short, communication is understood as a cornerstone 
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in the foundation of the contemporary sociaal society. In the following chapter, I explore some 
of the tensions in the complex relationships identified between communication and morally and 
culturally attuned citizenship practice through the realities of communicating in English in 
Amsterdam. In examining the exception to the rule that English speakers present, the effects of 
the “awkward continuities” around racial, religious, classed, and other ‘cultural’ differences that 
many of my participants reject or contest come to the fore.
 
 
9. Exceptions to the rule in the Dutch language of integration 
 
 As “the key technology of the Dutch state’s integration program” (Björnson 2007:65), the 
Dutch language is a central symbol of sociality in the context of increasingly culturally diverse 
neighbourhoods in Amsterdam and across the Netherlands. Speaking Dutch in the public sphere 
is understood by many ‘native’ Dutch as an expression of commitment to Dutch society on the 
part of non-Western Dutch citizens and newcomers. Operating in an affective register, the 
presence of the Dutch language is one way of demarcating public space as part of the national 
community and open to Dutch forms of sociality. Speaking Dutch allows citizens not only to 
literally understand one another, but also signals the possibility for cross-cultural communication 
and understanding between Dutch religious and cultural minorities and the ‘native’ Dutch 
progressive moral majority.  
In ways similar to how Foucault has analyzed sexuality, throughout my dissertation I 
have addressed how language is situated as a “dense transfer point for relations of power,” and 
has become a key technique of governmentality “capable of serving as a point of support, as a 
linchpin, for the most varied strategies” (1990:103) in the cultivation of the “good” or “active” 
citizen. Language choice in Amsterdam and elsewhere in the Netherlands has become an integral 
mode of perceiving who belongs in Dutch society. It has come to signify a wide array of habits, 
beliefs, and norms in relation to “good” forms of social participation and “active” citizenship 
practice. For many ‘native’ Dutch, whether a newcomer speaks Dutch in the public sphere or 
“their own language” is a potent sign of their conduct in and relationship with mainstream Dutch 
society. While speaking Turkish, for example, may be considered a symptom of an individual’s 
lack of integration or cultural distance from the moral majority, and create asociaal (anti- or un-
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social) public spaces for ‘native’ Dutch, this is not the case for all foreign languages in 
Amsterdam. Through the opinions of research participants, as well as my experiences in 
Amsterdam and elsewhere in the Netherlands, I show how the English language operates as an 
exception to the rule that all newcomers must learn Dutch in order to participate as “active” or 
“good” citizens. In doing so, this chapter illustrates one way in which various discursive threads 
configuring contemporary citizenship practice interweave powerful “ideologies of racial 
difference with liberal conceptions of citizenship … in popular notions about who deserves to 
belong in implicit terms of productivity and consumption” (Ong 1996:739). 
The unique status of the English language as a second lingua franca, especially in 
Amsterdam, draws to the fore a number of assumptions about the socioeconomic class, 
citizenship and/or visa status of the English speaker in these spaces. The assumptions about the 
relationships that English-speaking foreigners have with labour, culturally progressive norms and 
values, historical experiences, and morally-attuned citizenship practice underscores the impact of 
what Dutch scholars have discussed as the “culturalization of citizenship” and its connections to 
neoliberal “active” citizenship practice. Finally, the very different understandings of language 
used by non-Dutch speakers call attention to the ways in which historical processes of 
problematization – including the development of racial or civilizational difference – continue to 
play a role in calculations of belonging in the Netherlands today. The English language is shown 
to be the exception that proves the rule of Dutch citizenship, highlighting the role of language as 
a key strategy in identifying and rendering technical areas for intervention, in teaching the 
technology of government, and assessing consent to governmental programs. 
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More than just communication: sociaal spaces and making sense of difference 
 
 On my last evening during my year of fieldwork in Amsterdam, in early August 2010, I 
visited a café in my neighbourhood with a ‘native’ Dutch friend, Noel. On this quiet Monday 
night, there were a couple of Dutch patrons chatting away at one of the long wooden tables, a 
couple more at the bar, the enormous orange café cat, the bartender, my friend and I. As Noel 
and I sat at a little table by the door, our conversation switched between English and Dutch, 
which had become our habit, especially during my last months in Amsterdam. As the evening 
wore on, the crowd thinned even further, and we began to chat with the bartender, an elderly 
'native' Dutch man. While we had been making occasional small chat with him in Dutch 
throughout the evening, we eventually began on the topic of learning to speak Dutch.  
 “It’s difficult, hè?” commented our bartender. That Dutch was a difficult language to 
learn was a sentiment that I had often heard from Dutch people I spoke with over the course of 
the year. This impression among Dutch people I had met made it all the more interesting to me, 
given the importance most people and policy makers placed on its role in the civic and social 
integration of newcomers (cf. Björnson 2007; Vasta 2007; Entzinger 2004a). 
 “Yes,” I agreed, speaking in Dutch. “But what is more difficult is that if you speak 
English no one in Amsterdam will speak Dutch with you. It is very difficult to practice. I studied 
a three-week intensive course when I first came to Amsterdam. Now I find it not so difficult to 
read, but the hardest thing is to practice speaking.” As I recounted my story about learning the 
language in Dutch, the bartender asked me how long I had been living in the Netherlands. He 
was surprised that I had learned Dutch so well for having only been in the Netherlands for a year. 
“There are people who have lived in the Netherlands for forty years,” he confided, both of us 
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knowing full-well the people he meant, “who don’t speak Dutch as well as you.”  
This was a conversation I had had many times over the course of my fieldwork. More 
than anything else, this script about learning (or failing to learn) Dutch reinforced the position of 
the Dutch language as a touchstone for discussing not only issues surrounding immigration and 
integration, but also other tensions, such as around culture, race, class, or religion that play into 
notions of participation and “active” citizenship in Dutch society. Language use in cities and 
neighbourhoods across the Netherlands has come to signal spaces where ‘native’ Dutch may feel 
at home in the national community, or excluded by newcomers (cf. Duyvendak 2011). These 
feelings of exclusion have been connected to ideas of a “crisis of Dutch identity” (still 
reverberating through Dutch politics during my time in the field), as well as resentment toward 
the government for its policy failures and non-Dutch speaking newcomers who despite their 
Dutch citizenship status are not seen as active or productive contributors to Dutch society.  
Many people in the Netherlands speak more than one language. Even in the lowest 
stream of the Dutch education system (VMBO), students learn English, French, and German. 
Many of my informants spoke multiple languages, as was especially the case among language 
coaches who often cited language as a hobby or special interest. Among the language coaches 
and other ‘native’ Dutch I spoke with, commonly understood languages included: English, 
French, German, Spanish, Italian, as well as Papiamentu. According to a Eurobarometer poll 
conducted in 2005, in addition to Dutch, 91% of Dutch citizens reported knowing at least one 
other language well enough to carry on a conversation (Eurobarometer 2006:9).1 This is much 
higher than the EU25 average, where 56% of EU citizens claim to speak a foreign language well 
enough for conversation. In spite of the general breadth of language skills among ‘native’ Dutch, 
the non-European languages spoken by non-Western allochtonen were not commonly 
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understood. As such, when languages like Turkish, Arabic or Berber were spoken or used in 
public spaces, they effectively created and marked spaces that ‘native’ Dutch might avoid or feel 
uncomfortable in.  
The power of language to shape social space is clear in Bart’s discussion of a grocery 
shop in his neighbourhood. “There’s a shop here, around the corner, from Turkish people,” Bart 
commented. “It took a long time before we entered the shop.” 
 
There was a Dutch dairy shop and a vegetable shop owned by a Dutchman, who 
were better. That’s true. But those shops are closed, and he, and the Turkish one 
remains. Well it’s not typical in the sense that they sell stuff typical for Turkish 
people because there are not so much here. This is a white street.  
 
When I asked Bart why it took him so long to venture into this shop, he paused briefly, 
thoughtfully, before saying, “True. Yeah. There is something strange— You don’t know if they 
speak the language, the Dutch, for all products. They don’t have some typical Dutch vegetables. 
For instance.” What is a typical Dutch vegetable, I asked. “Bloemkool.” “Oh. A cauliflower,” I 
laughed. Smiling, Bart countered, “Which we don’t eat every week, but just for example.” 
As Bart alluded to in his story of the Turkish shop, how language shapes social 
landscapes is incorporated into the grammar of difference. For many of the people with whom I 
discussed questions of integration and belonging, it was the Dutch language that was seen as key 
to accessing Dutch society in a sociaal manner, particularly for non-Western immigrants. This 
was, perhaps, especially the case for people connected to the language coaching programs. 
However, this idea was in my experience widespread among the many ‘native’ Dutch with 
whom I spoke in Amsterdam. Learning Dutch was considered by my informants to demonstrate 
a commitment to Dutch society. The connections between language, education, positive 
participation and belonging in Dutch society were commonly made in discussions I had with 
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language coaches and the programs through which they volunteered.  
Later in my discussion with Bart, his comments again outlined the powerful connections 
and tensions around his ideas and impressions of being a “good” citizen and the asociaal spaces 
created by the presence of immigrants who did not speak Dutch. 
 
Well, what I recognize myself is that you can feel unease with people you don’t 
understand at all. Not the language, not heritage, customs. It gives some paranoia, 
or—And a feeling when there are too much— I don’t live in Amsterdam West, 
but when you live there and subsequently all neighbours become Turkish and 
Moroccan whom you don’t understand, that’s not fine. But then about ten or 
twenty years ago, they said, “People stink,” because they were different. That’s 
what you don’t hear anymore. 
 
In Bart’s experience, the ways in which Amsterdammers and other ‘native’ Dutch have reacted 
to the cultural differences of their neighbours and changing neighbourhoods has shifted over 
time. While he no longer reads in the newspapers the same sorts of objections against non-
Western immigrants that were common twenty years ago, he continues to observe significant 
tensions between these groups of newcomers and long-resident ‘native’ Dutch in Amsterdam and 
elsewhere. In these discussions, communication, especially through the Dutch language is 
viewed as key to moulding newcomers into moral citizen-subjects (cf. Ong 2006). Not speaking 
Dutch appears to have the effect of amplifying other categories of difference, making cultural 
practices or beliefs feel even more foreign, unacceptable, or threatening to ‘native’ Dutch. These 
ideas have become an important part of how Dutch citizenship practice has been problematized, 
and how this has been expressed and evaluated through the contemporary grammar of difference.  
Although Bart does not agree with the many negative opinions he hears about non-
Western Dutch, he feels that he understands how such sentiments have become rooted in the 
discourse that populist Right-wing politicians, like Fortuyn and Wilders, capitalize upon. 
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Disliking immigrants, Bart said, has become “for some people ... like an occupation. 
 
I can understand. Foreigners in Amsterdam. But they didn’t learn Dutch. They 
only knew each other. Yeah. Where it all comes from...? Well, another source is 
of course that most of the first generation foreign labourers who came here are 
without work since a long time. And they live from our social security. And that 
makes people jealous. And I agree that people who imported foreign labour didn’t 
think about that. They didn’t realize. They didn’t see the consequences. And you 
know, government and industry thought, “Well, we take those people temporarily 
and they go home again.” But they imported their brides, family. And they get 
rights here. Social security rights. (Bart) 
 
Echoing sentiments expressed by other informants, in the media, among politicians, and policy 
makers, Bart clearly linked a Dutch language deficit with burdening the welfare state. Another 
important thread that emerges from this discussion is the way in which language coaches’ 
understandings of citizenship are impacted by both established ‘culturalist’ discourses and more 
recent neoliberal disciplinary mechanisms. The motivations behind newcomers’ decision and 
efforts to learn Dutch become important for gauging their orientation to the expectations of 
Dutch citizenship practice. 
 
Communicating “active” citizenship through language choice(s) 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, learning to communicate through the Dutch 
language was seen by my interlocutors as building the foundation for all other avenues of 
“active,” morally-attuned participation in Dutch society. Even seeking out a language coaching 
program was viewed by my informants as an expression of the types of “active” citizenship 
practice that language could facilitate. This was clear in José’s explanation of the motivations of 
language learners with the SamenSpraak. 
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There are two major groups that undertake it. One group is relatively young, 
somewhere between twenty-five and forty-five. They work here, they live here. 
They want to stay here and they want to study, to raise their children. Work. They 
are often very motivated. They come to us, because it is something that they want 
for themselves.  
 
The other group of participants were described by José as “oldcomers.” These were  
 
people who have been here for a very long time, and have really done nothing 
about language. That is often older Moroccan and Turkish women. They have 
come to a point in their lives. Their children are out the door. They have really 
nothing more to do and they must now ‘civicly integrate’. That is very difficult 
for us. They are just now beginning to follow the ‘civic integration’ courses. And 
they have great problems with it. Living here there are people fifty or sixty years 
old. They have almost never spoken Dutch, certainly not the women. And they 
learn that they also never will. Because they are too old to learn languages. They 
have also never had the motivation to do it. And now, suddenly, they must. This is 
very difficult. 
 
José considered all of these language learners to practice aspects of what she would later 
describe to me as “good” citizenship, practices that worked to build society: studying, working, 
raising their children. These socially-oriented activities taken up by the first group of language 
learning participants that José described, underscore how motivations for learning Dutch align 
with the values of “good” citizenship practice. On the other hand, it was clear that José felt that 
the latter group’s ability to learn the language and the volunteer language coaches’ ability to help 
them succeed was hindered by their coming to this task so late in life. José’s censure toward this 
group’s past non-participation in Dutch society was more sharply expressed by Bart: “And at 
SamenSpraak we meet of course with many, especially women, who are here, who lived here for 
thirty, forty years. And have their first course of Dutch in these days. Terrible.” It is only now, 
after their children have grown and the city has begun to stimulate language learning through 
free or affordable options, that Bart said that these women have finally begun to learn Dutch. It 
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was clear from discussions with other language coaches that the kinds of free voluntary programs 
that they participated in were viewed as key in the contemporary landscape of immigrant 
integration in Amsterdam for how they put “active” or “good” citizenship practices within the 
reach of these citizens and newcomers.  
Many volunteers often expressed the hope that through learning to speak Dutch their 
speaking partners would learn more about the society in which they lived. For instance, as José 
elaborated, many of the older female language students she and other language coaches had 
worked with would 
 
never really get the hang of the language, but they are suddenly very outwardly 
focused. Listen; they carry the burdens of the world on their backs. But they 
discover the world where they have lived for thirty years. And we help them do 
that. It is always about the language, naturally. But it is also about where you 
really live. How is it here, and have you— do you have the self-confidence to 
move out of that place [of social isolation]. That mostly happens.  
 
According to my research participants, Dutch integration policy makers, and politicians, moving 
out of that place of social isolation, discovering and participating in Dutch society is made 
possible by learning the Dutch language. Learning to speak Dutch is discussed by these 
informants as synonymous with learning how to communicate in and with Dutch society, and 
therefore becomes key to active societal participation and ultimately with the practice of “good” 
citizenship. It is in the context of the discourse of “active” citizenship that English language 
fluency has emerged as a remarkable exception to the rule that the Dutch language is key to 
integration in Dutch society.  
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Code-switching: English in Amsterdam  
 
Throughout my fieldwork, I observed the widespread acceptance of English as a lingua 
franca in Amsterdam, as well as elsewhere in the Netherlands. I was able to speak English with 
nearly everyone. In fact, as I later learned was the case in many cities in the Netherlands, when 
people noticed my accent (hesitancy, or confusion) they almost automatically code-switched into 
English. Interviews and conversations with people employed at the international corporations 
located in Amsterdam revealed that English was often the day to day language of operation and 
business within these organizations. Many important government reports are also published in 
English, or include an English- language summary (cf. Dekker 1999; Dekker and de Hart 2009; 
Roes 2008). In my experiences with academic reading groups through research clusters at the 
Universiteit van Amsterdam and the Meertens Instituut (Meertens Institute), the presence of even 
one non-Dutch speaker would be enough for participants to agree to shift the discussion into 
English. The materials we read in preparation for these meetings were always presented in 
English. Most graduate studies programs in the Netherlands are taught in English. Proposals first 
introduced in 1990 to change the official language of university instruction across the 
Netherlands to English argued that, especially in the sciences, universities needed to operate in 
English to compete internationally for students (Hagers 2009). Nearly two decades later, in 2009, 
this proposition had firmly taken root; for instance, at “the University of Amsterdam... 105 of the 
170 master’s are given in English. Dutch has been all but banished there” (Hagers 2009). While 
the use of English might be anticipated in these internationally-oriented spaces, the prevalence of 
the language extended much further. 
In 2008 there was a debate among the Amsterdam city council over a proposal to make 
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English the second official language of the city. The measure was forwarded by Jan Paternotte 
(D66, Democrats 66) as a way to show Amsterdam was a true “world city,” to make it a more 
attractive place for tourists and for international businesses (Het Parool 2008). He noted that 
while English was undoubtedly the second language of the city in terms of usage, residents were 
required to deal with city hall only in Dutch. While budget costs were a deciding factor in the 
rejection of this proposal, others, such as Carlien Boelhouwer (SP, Socialistische Partij, Socialist 
Party), told the Amsterdam daily Het Parool that she considered the proposal “Ridiculous. Why 
not Moroccan or Turkish [as Amsterdam’s second language]? Expats can also learn a bit of 
Dutch” (2008; my translation). In the end, the motion was defeated by a majority. Labour party 
(PvdA) member Daniël Roos, was quoted as saying that, “In my opinion, the city is already 
English enough. ... It would be too much hassle if English became the official second language. 
Then everything would have to be done in two languages. That is a bit ridiculous” (Het Parool 
2008; my translation). In spite of the defeat of this proposal, I observed that many government 
services are de facto available in English. Even where information on service websites is not 
completely available in English, most civil servants speak fluent English. The city's official 
website (http://www.amsterdam.nl/), has an English- language sister-site 
(http://www.iamsterdam.com/) that, in addition to providing tourism information, also provides 
detailed information on living and working in the city similar to the Dutch site. Thus, even as 
these proposals with regard to English were ultimately dashed, the prevalence of the English 
language in Amsterdam, across the Netherlands more generally, and indeed within the context of 
the European Union cannot be argued.  
The Eurobarometer poll cited earlier shows that English is the most widely spoken 
language (after one’s mother tongue) in 19 of the 29 EU countries polled (including Romania 
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and Turkey). In the Netherlands, 87% of those polled listed English as a language they knew 
well enough to carry on a conversation, whereas the average across EU citizens for 
conversational (or higher) knowledge of English stands at 38% (Eurobarometer 2006:12, 13).2  
Conversational (if not professional) knowledge of the English language is a valued and 
widespread skill among the Dutch. Not only common across professional and internationally-
oriented spheres, English- language media is also prominent in daily life. Foreign television 
programs, film, music, and print media from North America, the United Kingdom, and Australia 
are widely available via foreign as well as domestic television channels, radio stations, cinema, 
newsstands, and the Internet.3 Even Dutch language media appears to use more and more 
‘Anglicisms’ – English language turns of phrase or words – in its regular content.4 The 
popularity and prevalence of the English language in Amsterdam makes it a sociaal language, or 
at least not an asociaal one. 
 
An exception to the rule 
 
Some of my informants commented on the special status of English in the Netherlands, 
often alluding to the consequences it had for integration. A young man in his twenties when we 
first met, Nadir had moved to the Netherlands with his family from Iran when he was thirteen. 
For Nadir, the first two years of school in the country were spent learning Dutch, though he was 
already fluent in English and Farsi. Upon graduating from high school (HAVO) Nadir qualified 
for Dutch citizenship, which he chose to adopt. He had volunteered overseas during his gap year 
after high school, but was not volunteering as he completed his post-secondary education. On the 
topic of language learning, Nadir noted that the situation in the Netherlands was very different 
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than in other countries in Europe, such as Germany where an uncle of his lives. 
 
I think in countries like Germany, as an immigrant you have to actually, at the 
moment you get into the country you have to know the language because 
everything is in German. I mean, everybody speaks German. And the ads, the TV 
commercials, the programs, the movies, everything is dubbed. Everything is in 
German, so you kind of feel forced to know German. Otherwise, you kind of like 
can’t participate in the community. But here, like, everybody speaks English. 
Some people speak German and French. So there is no need, actually, to learn 
Dutch. You can get along with speaking English.  
 
 Nadir’s personal experiences with English in the Netherlands were echoed in my daily 
experiences in Amsterdam, as well as in the opinions of Anouk, a ‘native’ Dutch language 
coaching volunteer in her late-twenties. Notably, for Anouk, while the Dutch language was an 
important tool for immigrant integration, it was actually a broader understanding of 
communication that made active social participation possible. 
  
Well, if you cannot speak English, then it’s a problem if you don’t speak Dutch 
either. So either you have to speak English, then I think it’s no problem, because 
everyone speaks English. ... But either you speak English or Dutch. It doesn’t 
matter. But if you, well, if you only speak your own language then it’s very hard 
to communicate. So then, I think it’s pretty necessary to at least learn the basics, 
to order stuff in the grocery shop and stuff. But if you really want to mingle, and 
have friends, then you have to learn English or Dutch. (Anouk) 
 
Whether one decided to communicate in English or Dutch, was for Nadir and Anouk less 
important than the fact of communication. As Nadir said, “It doesn’t have to be that you speak 
Dutch, I mean, if you know English. There has to be a common language where you can 
communicate with each other.” Being able to communicate enabled not only the ability to 
participate in Dutch society, but the possibility for dialogue between members of Dutch society, 
especially across cultural divides.  
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I think that everyone should participate in the community. Either it’s working, 
either it’s going to school, and respecting the values of that country, and 
respecting its freedom. And it doesn’t have to be that you do the same things what 
Dutch people do, and spend the time at the places where they go, but it’s more 
like respecting each other’s opinions. And it has to be from both sides. I mean, 
when you are in a country and you kind of, like, try to integrate with them, by 
speaking their language and learning about their culture. It’s gonna have to be 
like, from two sides, that they also try to understand where you’re coming from 
and why you’re acting the way you’re acting. So, I think that integration is like a 
two-way street. Yeah. It’s a two-way street. (Nadir) 
 
This broader notion of communication and the positive social relationships that extend 
from it was implicit in many of the interviews I undertook with Dutch language coaches. What 
was also implicit in the conversations I observed about the connections between communication 
and active citizenship practice was the assumption that English speakers did not need to be 
taught about expectations for living in Dutch society. In contrast with the strong opinions that 
non-Western immigrants must learn Dutch, most informants felt such language and social 
training was generally unnecessary for English-speaking “expats.” English speakers were 
assumed to be already ‘integrated’ enough, to already exhibit a close enough cultural fit with the 
Dutch, in spite of regularly speaking little or no Dutch. 
 The term “expat” or “expatriate” is colloquially used to describe Western immigrants or 
migrant labourers, for instance from the EU, Canada or Australia. The term weaves together 
notions of socioeconomic class, citizenship status and practice, as well as cultural fit – which 
often, but not always, subsumed ideas of racial, religious, or ‘civilizational’ similarity to the 
‘native’ Dutch. Expats are usually highly skilled labourers, students in post-secondary 
institutions, or their families. Often, these individuals only stay in the Netherlands temporarily, 
such as the length of a work contract or degree. The prevalence of English in their spheres of 
work and socializing, coupled with their short stay in the country was considered by my 
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informants as a key reason why these individuals did not and need not learn Dutch. These 
commonly shared views about English-speaking expats represent quite a departure from the 
frustration Bart expressed when he commented, “I can’t imagine when I’m an immigrant in 
another country that I don’t learn the language.” 
The potential for creating sociaal spaces and relationships is certainly part of what makes 
English an exception to the rule that all newcomers must learn Dutch. Yet, this is only one aspect 
of how the language is situated in a whole constellation of experiences and ways of knowing. 
This complex of savoirs draws in practices of calculation, forms of judgement, modes of 
perception, and historically-informed techniques of governmentality to render English (as in the 
context of Amsterdam) as a symbol of shared cultural capacities and experiences that the non-
Western languages spoken by allochtonen simply do not signify.  
The extent of the English exception – and what it communicated – became clear as I 
reflected on my own privileged position in the Netherlands as an “expat” in comparison to, for 
instance, my students in the Native Speaker Project. This privilege and the cultural fit it 
conveyed was reflected by my reasons for being in Amsterdam (conducting research for my 
doctoral degree in Canada), as well as by my own work as a volunteer. In addition to these 
activities, my desire and efforts to learn Dutch were considered favourably by most Dutch people 
I met. From the reactions I habitually received from my interlocutors, these efforts were 
considered especially favourable because my knowledge of English and my short stay in the 
country seemed to make such an endeavour unnecessary. For my interlocutors, my learning 
Dutch demonstrated my interest and commitment to learning about and participating in Dutch 
society, even though I was only planning to live there for a year. Thus, my English fluency was 
already seen to communicate positive social traits about my life experiences, norms, values, 
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behaviours, attitudes, and decorum that were akin to their own.5 
This assumption of cultural fit or similarity was also communicated to my interlocutors 
by my body. Indeed, as a young white woman, living in a student house in the centre of 
Amsterdam, I found that I often passed for Dutch in most short interactions. This is supported by 
an incident with a woman who worked in the shop below my house, someone whom I greeted 
nearly every day. She thought I was Dutch until we actually had occasion to speak at length eight 
months into my year in the field. A heavy rain had damaged some goods in her shop as the 
ceiling had given way during the downpour due to a problem with the flat above. Catching me 
off-guard as I unlocked my bike across the street, she was surprised to find that I asked her to 
repeat her question. She switched immediately into English, saying “Oh, I thought you were 
Dutch!” When Dutch people realized I was not ‘native’ Dutch, they consistently assumed that I 
was an expat and would speak English. This was born out daily in my experience, and those of 
others I met, such as Bridget. I had met Bridget in my intensive Dutch language class when I first 
arrived in Amsterdam during August 2009. She was a white Australian woman in her mid-
twenties, who was working on her Master’s degree at the Universiteit van Amsterdam. She was 
learning Dutch, in part, so she could better communicate with her ‘native’ Dutch partner’s 
parents, who did not speak English. As was my experience, Bridget was often frustrated by the 
inability to practice speaking Dutch in public in Amsterdam because whether at a grocer’s stall, 
in a café, or elsewhere people automatically replied in English to our questions or orders posed 
in Dutch. 
 The English exception also came to bear on the question of who was considered an 
allochtoon in everyday discourse. Fluency in English often signalled visa status and labour 
participation in the Netherlands as an expat. These connections often appeared to alter the impact 
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of assumptions drawn from racial or religious difference that have been important in situating 
non-Western migrants in relation to the ‘native’ Dutch moral majority, and signalling who is in 
need of citizenship education. Jean, originally from Ghana, had come to Amsterdam several 
years before I met him. My flatmates and I paid Jean twenty euros a week to clean our flat. He 
spoke French fluently and English better than some Dutch people I had met. Jean's situation was 
rather typical of recent non-Western immigrants who were the target of ‘civic integration’ 
legislation. When I knew him, Jean was learning Dutch, which he found very difficult, in order 
to secure Dutch citizenship. While he told me that he would have liked to move back to Africa, 
there were no opportunities to earn enough and have a good life there. He wanted Dutch 
citizenship since it would allow him to stay in the Netherlands, and give him much more political 
and economic security than his work visas. We always spoke in English, and it was clear that 
Jean was able to get by in Amsterdam speaking English and French. Jean’s experience contrasted 
with that of Charles, whom I met through our voluntary work with the English- language 
coaching project in a school in Amsterdam West, the Native Speaker Project. The only black 
Native Speaker Project volunteer with whom I worked, Charles was by far the most popular 
volunteer among the students in my classrooms. He was originally from Nigeria but came to the 
Netherlands via the United Kingdom. When we met he was working as a highly skilled migrant 
for a large international company in Amsterdam. He decided to participate as a volunteer with 
the Native Speaker Project through his company's corporate social responsibility initiative. 
Charles’ respected position as a highly-skilled worker in an international business, his English 
language skills, and his voluntary work marked him as an expat among the Dutch and other 
expats we met through the Native Speaker Project. Had Charles arrived in Amsterdam as a low-
skilled labourer, he would certainly have been considered an allochtoon rather than expat, and 
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been required to undertake ‘civic integration’ training like Jean. The contrasting experiences of 
these men also call attention to the ways in which English is not always an exception to the rule, 
but is used to flag other often unspoken markers in a complex field of social difference.  
In many ways the constellation of signifiers signalling belonging discussed in this chapter 
– which variously draw on language use and ability, cultural fit or similarity, orientation to 
labour, education or parenting – echoes how Stoler discusses colonial processes whereby 
“[r]acial membership was as much about the cultivation of culturally trained moral virtues and 
character as it was about the hue of the skin” (Stoler 2009:64; cf. Oostindie 1990:238). The ways 
in which these signifiers assemble and support a complex of savoirs connected to culturally and 
morally attuned citizenship practice in the Netherlands is part of a non-linear and problematic 
genealogy. The shifting and slippery markers of difference engaged in the contemporary context 
underscore how powerful and complex a technique, practice of calculation, and mode informing 
perception language has become in the technical field of citizenship practice. Understanding the 
clustering and interweaving of the discourses around social difference in the Netherlands help to 
make sense of the ways in which ideas of cultural fit – flagged in the everyday by language use 
and ability – have been able to gain such traction in relation to Dutch ideas of “active” 
citizenship practice.  
In the ways in which practices around language use operate, my ethnography points to 
how the working of government is uneven as it targets a population that is always in motion. 
This has been shown throughout this dissertation in relation to some of the many key terms in the 
contemporary grammar of difference. The messiness of how government attempts to direct and 
correct the conduct of the population surfaced repeatedly in how different actors identified 
groups and individuals as “good,” “active” or “worthy” citizens. The nuanced differences 
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between the ways in which people negotiated the criteria for belonging in the local and national 
community, the seeming contradictions and tensions connecting interwoven discourses of 
citizenship and belonging, elucidate how governmental interventions and their reception are part 
of a set of processes and relations that government engages. Discourses, such as those engaging 
language, are shown through my ethnographic observations to be 
  
tactical elements or blocks operating in the field of force relations; there can exist 
different and even contradictory discourses within the same strategy; they can, on 
the contrary, circulate without changing their form from one strategy to another, 
opposing strategy. (Foucault 1990:101-102) 
 
The vast array of markers of difference that emerge in the practices that form in, around, and 
through governmental programs point to the ways in which the governmental programs can 
exceed their scope, producing powerful unintended effects and generating points of tension or 
contradiction for how the national community is imagined and experienced in the everyday. 
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Speaking of belonging: conclusions for the study of citizenship practice  
 
 I have used citizenship practice as a lens through which to explore what it means to be 
‘Dutch’ in contemporary Amsterdam, and more broadly in the Netherlands. From a theoretical 
perspective informed by governmentality, I have traced some of the ways in which these 
questions have been considered and framed by Dutch policy makers and politicians, by scholars, 
media commentators, and in the everyday through the experiences, opinions and actions of my 
‘native’ Dutch interlocutors. In following the intricacies of how citizenship is conceptualized and 
enacted as a practice, my research participants articulated an understanding of belonging that 
resonates from the neighbourhood to the nation, and arguably beyond. This understanding of 
citizenship emerged from a context that is (over)determined by myriad factors: current and 
historical events, intimate and “imagined” encounters with people, places, and ideas both near 
and far, and ways of knowing that draw on an array of strategies and techniques. While the 
image of “good” citizenship practice articulated by Amsterdam’s voluntary Dutch language 
coaches in my ethnography by no means provides a definitive answer to what it means to be 
Dutch or to integrate into Dutch society, it does illuminate important tensions and issues on this 
point that resonate across wider Dutch society.  
 In this dissertation, I have made the case for locating this ethnographic exploration of 
governmentality at the unique point of entry offered by studying voluntary Dutch language 
coaches and their projects in Amsterdam. These research participants are situated at a point of 
confluence that brings into view the relationships between, and lived experience of contemporary 
processes of nation-building, the impact of recent migration patterns and growing cultural 
diversity, as well as new market-oriented approaches to the meaning and practice of citizenship. 
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For many, including scholars and populist politicians, these recent developments – such as the 
impact(s) of globalization in the Netherlands – are seen to threaten the role and integrity of the 
nation-state as the quintessential organizing force for social, political, and economic life, and key 
site of identity politics (cf. Appadurai 1996, 2006). Yet, building upon the growing 
anthropological literature addressing the nation, I have argued that these and other shifts and new 
dynamics present rich sites through which anthropologists may continue to examine how 
national cultural boundaries are built, imagined, and continue to matter in the everyday 
experiences of socially-situated subjects (cf. McDonald 1989:308).  
 The strength of ethnography is to show how local understandings and practices exist in 
relationship to the broader social and political processes that shape lives at the level of daily 
experience. Located at a point of convergence across these negotiated, contested, and invented 
(national) cultural boundaries, I use citizenship as a lens to examine many interesting points of 
tension and “common sense” in my exploration of  how questions of citizenship practice, 
belonging, and Dutchness have been problematized across Amsterdam, and the Netherlands. 
Citizenship serves as a valuable point of entry to trace government’s “attempt to direct conduct 
and intervene in social processes to produce desired outcomes and avert undesired ones” (Li 
2007b:264). The ways in which citizens are called upon by state actors to regulate the conditions 
of life, as through their “active” involvement as volunteers in civil society, draws attention to 
how citizenship, as a key mode of making claims to the nation-state, operates as “a discursive 
practice in the sense that citizens actually talk citizenship into being – by defining, including, and 
excluding certain people and practices” (Hurenkamp et al. 2011:211). Directing this lens to the 
experiences and opinions of language coaching volunteers offers important insights into broader 
processes of nation-building. 
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 As an anthropologist studying citizenship, many people – including colleagues in Canada 
and the Netherlands – assumed that I would study the experiences of immigrants (cf. Ghorashi 
and van Tilberg 2006; Mosher 2006; Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001; Beriss 2004; Ong 1999, 
2006). Contrary to these assumptions, in conducting this research I chose to focus on the 
experiences and viewpoints of those considered ‘gatekeepers’ to the national community. This 
choice has yielded new insights for questions of citizenship, nation-building, and belonging. In 
working with informal, volunteer-driven integration projects, I have shown some of the 
complexities of how governmentality operates in everyday life, extending its reach to target the 
entire population through the work of non-state actors: volunteer Dutch language coaches. I have 
discussed some of the ways in which these volunteers consent to, (re)articulate, and challenge 
contemporary notions of “good” Dutch citizenship practice. As national ‘gatekeepers’, volunteer 
language coaches help to set and disseminate the conditions of the question: what is it that 
newcomers are being asked to integrate into? 
 Another contribution of my ethnography is that it offers a study of governmentality in the 
context of the Dutch nation-state. In contemporary European and Western states, the disciplining 
of the individual body emerges in various forms: “the optimization of its capabilities, the 
exhortation of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into 
systems of efficient and economic controls” (Foucault 1990:139). This has been clearly observed 
in formal processes of citizenship education, for instance, through universal and mandatory 
education for minors, or in mandating adult immigrants to undertake and prove themselves 
through ‘civic integration’ training (Schiffauer et al 2004; Björnson 2007; Entzinger 2004a). A 
study of formal integration practices provides an important analysis of how these disciplinary 
processes are envisioned by the state, and their reception in practice by those they target. An 
272 
 
ethnographic approach to these institutions and processes has been taken in Marnie Björnson’s 
(2007) work with the inburgering programs, their teachers and students, Oskaar Verkaaik’s 
(2010) study of citizenship ceremonies in the Netherlands, and in the cross-national study of 
‘civil enculturation’ in public schools undertaken by Schiffauer et al. (2004). These studies 
provide important insights into what happens in the gaps between how these processes of 
educating citizens are considered by those conducting them, and those they target. Yet, the 
disciplinary techniques used in these institutions, such as language learning, are also deployed as 
techniques for shaping the conditions for conduct of the Dutch population at large. These 
disciplinary techniques are part of specific governmental interventions that have much broader 
reach, as I have shown through my ethnography of informal integration projects that depend on 
the voluntary labour of non-state actors. 
 Beyond the particular spaces of the language classroom or ‘civic integration’ testing, it is 
the people in the spheres of everyday life –  including neighbours and fellow townspeople like 
language coaching volunteers – who articulate the conditions for newcomers’ participation in the 
community. Language coaches answer the question of what it means to participate, to integrate 
and belong in Dutch society mainly through their benign, everyday encounters with newcomers, 
as the speaking partners meet to practice speaking the Dutch language. Language coaching 
sessions and the topics discussed occur at the discretion of the partners, often in the homes of one 
partner or in an otherwise agreed upon location, such as in the partners’ shared neighbourhood. 
Through these informal meetings, language coaches and their organizations strive to create a 
trusting and open space where the non-native speaker can feel comfortable, and increasingly 
confident, in expressing themselves in Dutch. While the main goal of these projects is to help 
newcomers learn the language, as Bart importantly noted, “when learning the language, you 
273 
 
automatically pick up many Dutch things.” These many Dutch things include powerful 
expectations for social behaviour and etiquette, ways of acting in an sociaal manner, including 
ideas about how to participate in Dutch society as morally- and culturally-attuned citizen-
subjects.  
 The expectations expressed by language coaches resonate in many ways with the criteria 
for language and social-orientation training that newcomers must meet in order to be eligible for 
Dutch citizenship status – even as my research participants took issue with aspects of these same 
‘civic integration’ programs, policy language, and their effects on the role and place of these  
newcomers in Dutch society. Unlike civil servants or teachers employed in state schools or to 
teach ‘civic integration’ courses, volunteer language coaches are non-state actors situated at a 
convergence point for multiple processes and programs pertaining to citizenship practice. As 
non-state actors, they are not subject to the same kinds of state supervised requirements to 
deliver a program as those studied by Björnson, Verkaaik, or Schiffauer (et al). Volunteer 
language coaches are free to convey their personal ideas about citizenship, social etiquette, and 
behaviours to those with whom they act as front line citizenship educators. These non-state 
actors are highly effective in imparting powerful expectations for “good” citizenship practice by 
bringing their services as language coaches into the private spheres of these target groups. 
Significantly, language coaches indicate that these criteria for belonging and cultivating “good” 
forms of participation and social relationships in Dutch society are important for judging the 
citizenship practice of all Dutch citizens. 
 In taking a theoretical approach to citizenship practice informed by governmentality, it 
has been necessary to trace the genealogy of some of the key discursive threads that powerfully 
inform ideas of difference and Dutchness today. As Dean has discussed, a Foucauldian 
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genealogical approach seeks to trace the processes of problematization, to make strange the 
present and the very things that are “common sense” and “easy to think” (2010:56-62; cf. Stoler 
2011). By locating and analyzing the “awkward continuities” with the past, the task of genealogy 
is not to reconstruct lost worlds, but to “attempt to discern which of these problematizations 
indicate the lines of fracture and transformation and which indicate a consolidation of regimes of 
government” (Dean 2010:56; cf. Li 2007b). I have therefore provided a detailed analysis of how 
governmental programs, and some of their key organizing techniques have made certain 
relationships “thinkable” or “common sense,” as they rendered fields technical for governmental 
intervention.  
 Especially as articulated through the idiom of the Dutch language, calculations of cultural 
fit or distance from the Dutch represent an important, enduring element in the Dutch grammar of 
difference from the mercantile and imperial era to the time of my field research. Through this 
web of powerful signifiers and processes, religion, race/ ethnicity, sexuality and gender, 
civilization, ideas of education/ upbringing, and affective sentiment have come to be thought 
through the language of cultural commensurability. The essentialist categories developed 
through the experience of empire reverberate through the ways in which cultural racism impacts 
policy, politics, and the experience of the everyday in the twenty-first century Netherlands. The 
language of culture is also observable in the ways in which neoliberal rationale has settled in the 
Netherlands, building upon established structures and moral expectations connected to the Dutch 
as a ‘guiding nation’, social service provision, and labour. By engaging and redirecting these 
elements of the assemblage, neoliberal restructuring has been an important factor in the rise of 
voluntarism as a vaunted form of “active” citizenship practice in the Netherlands. The reworking 
of existing ways of knowing, forms of judgement and human capacities through neoliberal 
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rationale has effectively extended the reach of and consent to the will to govern among ‘non-
state’ actors. In tracing these programs and some of their effects, it is clear that government is 
powerful but not totalizing; the continued success of government relies on an heterogeneous 
assemblage, including an array of differently situated subjects. 
 In following these genealogies of citizenship practice as a boundary site for national 
culture in the Netherlands, it becomes clear that volunteers are as much subject to the processes 
of governmentality as the newcomers with whom they work as front line citizenship educators 
(Hemment 2012:534; Dean 2010:38). The ways in which voluntarism has been implicated in 
contemporary ideas of neoliberal “active” citizenship draws attention to an important entry point 
for thinking about citizenship practice as part of governmental interventions to direct the 
wellbeing of the population at large. The ethic of civic and social engagement cultivated through 
a culture of “active” citizenship, as through the state promotion and support of voluntarism, has 
been important for defining the boundaries of Dutch national cultural practice. Yet, how 
Dutchness comes to be considered and experienced in the everyday does not unfold neatly, or 
according to plan. In my work, I have explored what happens in the gap between the 
governmental program and its realization in the everyday “practices that form in, around, 
through or against the plan” (Li 2007a:279). Attending to the banal subject-making processes 
that occur through the politics of the everyday points to the ways in which the discontinuous, 
fragmentary nature of state governmentality can be conducted or interrupted by the very non-
state actors called upon to enculturate newcomers in their adaptation to the norms, expectations, 
and behaviours of “good” Dutch citizens. The methodological choice to focus on voluntary 
language coaches draws out these connections, and points to how immigrant integration is part of 
a comprehensive program of governmentality where citizenship practice is a key technical field.  
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 The challenges that language coaches issue to elements and competing practices of 
governmental programs around citizenship are ethnographically important because they operate 
through, not outside of these structures of power relations. Language coaches’ critiques of the 
federally-mandated ‘civic integration’ program, the exclusionary language of autochthony, and 
the populist Right discussions about defending Dutch culture and tradition expose some of the 
ways in which these complexly situated agents challenge discursive terms and governmental 
processes that have become “easy to think.” For people across the Dutch political spectrum, legal 
status has emerged as less important for making claims to belonging in the Netherlands than 
aspects of culture – that is, norms and values, behaviours, decorum, traditions and cultural 
symbols – associated with Dutchness. While voiced very differently, this is as clear in the ways 
that Dutch language coaches talked about integration as being about “seeing how you behave,” 
as it is in the populist Right’s disparagement of the “backwards culture” of ‘non-Western’ and 
Muslim Dutch. 
 My research has revealed some of the interesting interconnections and processes that 
impact ideas about belonging in the context of local and national communities, raising questions 
about how similar processes have shaped the experience and expression of citizenship in other 
contexts. For instance, the withdrawal of state services and growing reliance of social service 
provision by non-governmental organizations, private institutions, and volunteers is a pattern that 
is far from being isolated to the Netherlands (cf. Muehlebach 2012; Hemment 2012; Erickson 
2012). While the impact of neoliberal restructuring has unevenly affected different nation-states, 
the growing interconnections in many countries between citizenship education and voluntarism 
may point to novel avenues for the study of the changing meanings and experiences of 
citizenship, civic enculturation, and nation-building beyond the Netherlands. As in the Dutch 
277 
 
context, different levels of government in Canada have been similarly concerned about building 
or renewing a culture of civic engagement. This is clear in the incorporation by many school 
boards of ‘social internships’ or ‘service learning’ (like the Dutch maatshcappelijke stage) that 
require secondary students to complete a number of voluntary work hours to fulfill their 
curriculum requirements. It also surfaces in the demand for volunteer-run non-governmental 
initiatives. Two such programs operating in Toronto include mentoring programs to help skilled 
immigrants succeed in their integration into the Canadian job market (one example is arranged 
by the Toronto Regional Immigrant Employment Council), or literacy programs that frequently 
work with newcomers, even when these groups are not specifically targeted (e.g. the Toronto 
Public Library’s Reading to Leading youth literacy program). Comparative research may provide 
insights into the role and organization of volunteer-based and civil society groups in informal 
immigrant integration in Canadian or other contexts. Such a comparison in Canada may be 
especially interesting considering the changing policy around immigration and citizenship 
acquisition, which places increasing emphasis on knowledge of official national languages. 
 A second interesting point of entry for future study is to examine the experiences of 
newcomer-clients participating in the kinds of voluntary projects at the heart of my ethnography. 
Many studies have already provided important insights into the views of newcomers in multiple 
contexts, including the Netherlands, but many of these have done so through the lens of formal 
integration projects. For instance, the works of Björnson (2007), Verkaaik (2010), and Schiffauer 
et al. (2004) have addressed similar questions through the viewpoints of newcomers, the subjects 
of state integration initiatives and ‘civil enculturation’ processes. Insights into the ways in which 
integration and citizenship practice differ in the lived experience of language coaching 
volunteers from the goals and definitions outlined by state actors and programs prompts the 
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question of how these issues are understood from the perspective of language-learners 
participating in these voluntary projects. Often inburgeraars (‘civic integration’ students) and 
language learning clients of voluntary coaching projects are the same target group. While 
Björnson’s work has shown inburgeraars to be rather cynical of the goals of state ‘civic 
integration’, it is not yet clear how the language students of voluntary coaching projects perceive 
their coaches’ views about “good” citizenship practice. How do these language learning partners 
understand the role of these voluntary projects in their lives? What do they take away from these 
partnerships in terms of the particular rendering of important cultural norms, values, and 
behaviours conveyed by their coaches? In what ways do the views of Dutch society and 
participation expressed by volunteer language coaches resonate (or not) with their own goals and 
strategies for living in Amsterdam, or the Netherlands? Further, is there a difference in the ways 
in which these programs are experienced and used by clients with ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ 
backgrounds, and what do these constructs mean, how and in what ways do they emerge in the 
configuration of difference?  
 Through my ethnography, the many tensions and contradictions between competing and 
intertwined discursive threads about the meaning and experience of belonging and “good” Dutch 
citizenship practice already suggest some of the ways in which nationalism is being contested 
and reconfigured in the early twenty-first century. These challenges reverberate across Western 
(European) societies, especially as the ‘cultural’ diversity of national populations grows through 
international migration and settlement (cf. Beriss 2004; Mandel 2008). From a perspective 
informed by governmentality, the processes and relationships of power undergirding nation-
building in Western societies appear to not have substantially changed in spite of recent 
upheavals and concerns over national identity. My ethnography suggests that what has changed 
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are the elements of the assemblage that direct “the goal to be accomplished, together with the 
rationale that makes it thinkable, and the associated techniques and strategies” (Li 2007a:279). 
Where explicitly racial, religious or linguistic markers were, in the colonies, vital to calculations 
of who was ‘Dutch’ (‘European’) or ‘native’, these strategies and techniques of boundary-
making and nation-building have been subject to adjustment and compromise as conditions in 
the polity have changed. Current discussions framing allochtonen as targets for Dutch policy 
intervention reveal that colonially- informed discourses continue to matter even as they have been 
reworked for new purposes (cf. Stoler 2011). Thus, the divergent and even opposing worldviews 
and expressions of citizenship articulated by language coaches and the populist Right each draw 
on a long and complex history that has shaped the nature of the Dutch nation-building project, as 
well as the conceptualization and management of social difference (cf. Anderson 1991; Cooper 
and Stoler 1997). 
 It remains to be seen how these current calculations for belonging and notions of “good” 
citizenship practice will affect broader processes of Dutch nation-building in the coming years. 
What is clear is that the ways that practices and people are defined as Dutch or not is emerging 
as an important question for debate in ways that have not been discussed in the past. This is 
especially visible in the wake of the “Zwarte Piet discussion” which has brought strong national 
and international attention to the intersections between racial difference and full membership in 
Dutch society. Is belonging really about being sociaal or seeing “how you behave” in Dutch 
society through the adoption and expression of Dutch etiquette, values, and norms? Or is 
belonging still tied to essentialist categories such as race or religion, putting the recognition of 
full membership in Dutch society perpetually out of reach of a growing number of Dutch 
citizens? Reflecting some of the ways that Dutch language coaching volunteers speak about what 
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it means to be a “good” citizen, new voices – particularly those of young, Dutch people of colour 
– are raising questions about the powerful, “common sense” sentiments and practices around 
belonging in Dutch society. These dissenting voices pose new challenges for the assemblage that 
coheres around Dutch citizenship practices. It will be interesting to learn more about how these 
critiques may become as normalized and internalized among the Dutch progressive moral 
majority as those of the once marginalized voices of the populist (far) Right (cf. Li 2007b:279).  
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Endnotes 
Introduction 
 
1 In the Netherlands, a special Professor (bijzonder hoogleraar) is a post paid by external 
funders, rather than the university. In the case of the bijzonder hoogleraar Actief Burgerschap 
(special Professor of Active Citizenship), this research chair is supported by a number of 
organizations through the Stichting Actief Burgerschap (Active Citizenship Foundation), 
which in turn is “funded by the VSBfonds, Aedes association of housing corporations, the 
healthcare facility Cordaan, Gamma Dienstverlening (Gamma Foundation Services), and the 
housing associations Mitros, Stadgenoot and Rentree” (Stichting Actief Burgerschap 2009; 
my translation). 
2 The call to exercise deliberation is tied to the idea of “deliberative democracy” (Tonkens 
2006:13). This approach values consensus building through informed consultation between 
involved parties, here, members of civil society. 
3  The notion of being sociaal is rooted historically in the experiences of: the waterschap (water 
societies); the poldermodel of building political consensus through negotiation; and the 
particular expression of social tolerance bred by verzuiling (pillarization). The oldest 
democratic institutions in the Netherlands, waterschappen brought together land and building 
owners within a polder (the area of land reclaimed from the water) to care for this 
precariously positioned land and keep the water at bay through a grassroots approach to 
administration. The waterschap model is considered the precursor to the contemporary 
poldermodel of governance, where the “interested parties come together and jointly work out 
solutions to benefit the collective” (Martineau 2006:38). 
4  Personal communication 30 October 2009. 
5  Over the course of my research, language has emerged as key to making sense of these 
questions – not only the Dutch language, but how language is used in everyday speech to 
mark or challenge social boundaries between national or local insider and foreigner. For this 
reason, throughout this dissertation I indicate people who identify or are identified as Dutch 
by heritage as “‘native’ Dutch,” rather than simply as “Dutch.” While I draw the word 
‘native’ from ongoing discussions of social belonging in mainstream Dutch society, as 
observed among my informants, scholarship on such questions, and popular culture (via news, 
television, internet, popular magazines, public events), I do so conscious of its political 
charge. In describing these Dutch people, many of whom are my primary research 
participants, as well as figures in the media, politicians and others as ‘native’ Dutch, I intend 
to flag and trouble the (frequently banal) processes of social difference making and belonging 
in the contemporary Netherlands (cf. Stoler 2011).  
 
Chapter 1 
 
1    In reality there are of course many more nuanced gradations of belonging on this scale. For 
instance, permanent residents, or denizens granted partial rights as in the case of the EU lie 
somewhere in between being full citizens and foreigners in the host country. 
2   Dagmar Soennecken, personal communication, 14 September 2015. 
 
Chapter 2 
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1 This program began in 2007 and ended when Hart voor Amsterdam shut its doors 1 October 
2011. Hart voor Amsterdam closed when long-time director Daphne Grimmelikhuijse left for 
a new position (Mug Magazine 2011). It appears that the Native Speaker Project continued 
independently of Hart voor Amsterdam in at least one of the schools in which it was 
previously established, funded through the not-for-profit Amsterdam Cares organization. A 
volunteer with the Native Speaker Project at this remaining program (personal 
communication, 22 February 2012) indicated that there were plans in the works on the part of 
Amsterdam Cares to expand this successful program into other schools during the 2012-2013 
school year.  
2   Although I had greatly improved in terms of my written and spoken Dutch, I still had the help 
of a ‘native’ Dutch contact in correcting my writing. All of the recruitment messages and 
some of the further communication was proof read by Mena, my flatmate. This may have 
given José an inflated sense of my language skills. 
3  Two of these programs also provided basic lessons including writing help for marginalized 
learners who might not have access to regular language classes. These projects were a 
women-only organization and the Amsterdam regional branch of the Dutch Council for 
Refugees. Their target population included people who may be unable to afford or attend 
regular classes, including undocumented migrants or asylum seekers. 
4  Although titled Handbook for Language partners of Mixen in Mokum (Handboek Voor 
Taalmaatjes van Mixen in Mokum), this is not a large document. Printed on five, single-sided 
pages of 8.5 x 11 inch paper, this document contains information to orient volunteers to the 
project and the task of language coaching. Following the cover page containing the 
organization’s information, the first two pages describe the Mixen in Mokum program and 
frame the participants. The last two pages are devoted to rules and tips for coaching, ideas for 
activities and topics to promote conversation, and a list of further resources. This handbook 
was complemented by a 52-page booklet of index-sized cards, the strippenboekje. 
5  The volunteer who conducted this initial interview with me at SamenSpraak explained that 
many of the people who sought out language coaching help at the Gilde were non-Western 
immigrants, and many only wished to speak with someone of their same gender. The 
importance of feeling comfortable with one’s partner was emphasized across all of these 
programs, and by the end of my meeting it was clear that were either my partner or I 
unsatisfied with the match, we would be able to ask the Gilde for a new partner. 
6  By 2007 nearly 20% of the population was not ‘native’ Dutch, and of this group 
approximately 10.6% of the population was of “non-Western” origin (Roes 2008:13). Among 
the “non-Western” group, about two-thirds traced their heritage to “Turkey, Morocco, 
Surinam (each accounting for around 2% of the population) and the Netherlands Antilles and 
Aruba (just under 1% of the population)” (Roes 2008:13). In the city of Amsterdam, these 
numbers are even higher, as nearly half of the Amsterdamse population is now considered to 
be of ‘non-Western’ heritage – of this group 28.5% are themselves immigrants (Gemeente 
Amsterdam 2010). The most common non-‘native’ groups by ‘ethnic origin’ are Surinamese 
and Moroccans. Each group makes up approximately 9% of Amsterdam’s residents 
(Gemeente Amsterdam 2010). 
7  This coordinator, Casper, José (both quoted below) and I communicated in Dutch. 
8  Recruitment of new volunteers is done on an on-going basis, and occurs through a number of 
different methods including: press releases to Amsterdam-wide or neighbourhood 
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newspapers, poster campaigns, word of mouth (especially as suggested by teachers of formal 
language education classes), information sessions and public events, information on the 
organizations’ respective websites, as well as through the central volunteering and language 
coaching websites (Vrijwilligers Centrale Amsterdam,Volunteer Centre Amsterdam, 
www.vca.nu; Taalcoachwijzer Amsterdam, Language coach compass, 
http://www.taalcoachwijzer.nl). These recruitment methods are intended to reach a broad 
population. 
9  Houben-van Harten and te Riele provide the following figures for 2010 in Amsterdam 
(corrected for age and gender): ‘native’ Dutch 48.0%, ‘non-native’ Dutch or migrants with 
Western heritage 38.1%, ‘non-native’ Dutch or migrants with non-Western heritage 28.5% 
(2011:10). 
10   In 2009, the national umbrella organization Stichting Gilde Nederland (Foundation Guild 
Netherlands) ran SamenSpraak programs in more than 65 different locations across the 
Netherlands (van der Ven and Weggemans 2009:7). 
11 A report from Gilde Amsterdam (2010:10-11) provides the nationality/ national origin of the 
main groups of non-native speaking participants. These over three hundred participants 
represent 88 different nationalities from all over the world. During 2010, the most commonly 
represented countries were Morocco and Turkey (26 participants each), followed by: Brazil 
(18), China (15), Egypt (12), England (11), and Ghana (8). Of these, the majority (67%) were 
women. Approximately half of all non-native speaking participants were highly educated, and 
only 8 male and 19 female participants during this year had a low level of education. 
12 Some of these externally partnered initiatives include the “Language Lounge” and “School’s 
Cool” programs. The Language Lounge program, partnered with the Regional Centre for 
Vocational Training (ROC), helps students ages 14 to 18 with presentation skills in Dutch, as 
well as helping with language development for exams. The School’s Cool initiative similarly 
aims for adult volunteers to help students, but from elementary through to high school. 
13  The Mozeshuis organization closed its doors in March 2014 after forty-five years of service in 
Amsterdam. An article on the organization’s homepage indicates that the closure was in large 
part due to growing financial constraints since city funding was halved in 2010 (Mozeshuis 
2014). 
14 In practice, language coaches at Gilde Amsterdam and Mixen in Mokum, do often help their 
partners in tasks that they find difficult to navigate, such as dealing with officials and forms. 
The focus in these programs is on speaking. 
15 The name marked the city of Amsterdam as a relative safe-haven for Jewish people and other 
(especially wealthy) migrants since the sixteenth-century. During this early period, Jews were 
widely discriminated against across Europe. Although Amsterdam was no exception, with 
sanctions that strictly limited the employment of Jews in the city to certain industries, these 
were discriminatory yet bearable conditions for many when compared to neighbouring cities’ 
and states’  active pogroms and other overtly sanctioned acts of violence (Lucassen and 
Penninx 1997). 
16  It was this early economic, political, and cultural dominance of the province of Holland in the 
Netherlands and in the overseas territories (e.g. the Dutch East Indies), that accounts for the 
confusion in English where “Holland” and “the Netherlands” are treated as synonyms. My use 
of the terms “Holland” and “the Netherlands” follows the Dutch usage, indicating the 
province(s) and country, respectively. 
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  The historical eminence and authority of the provinces of Holland (North and South) in 
the governing of the united country is important, but should not be equated with homogeneity 
across the Netherlands. Historical regional differences still exist and are felt quite strongly by 
contemporary Dutch people (Bossenbroek 1996; Kalb 1997; James and Schrauwers 2003). 
17 The development and spread of Algemene Beschaafd Nederlands (Standard Dutch) – where 
the North Holland city of Haarlem is taken to be the ‘neutral’ or ‘purest’ accent in Standard 
Dutch – in combination with increased literacy through mandatory schooling, and the growing 
reach of mass media, served to diminish regional differences. Even the implementation of 
standard time, based on Amsterdam’s location, spoke to a particular sense of national unity 
with Amsterdam as the official point of reference for the entire nation (Bossenbroek 1996:19). 
18 Bart and I spoke in English during our interview. 
19  In the language most Dutch people I spoke with would employ, nearly half of Amsterdam’s 
population is now considered allochtone (allochthonous). This policy terminology denotes 
someone who not Dutch in terms of ethnicity, but in doing so ties ideas of ethnic-heritage to 
the rights of the first comer or ‘native’. This language and informants’ responses to it are 
discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this dissertation. 
20 At this time, ultra-modern plans for a traffic corridor, parking garage and series of office 
blocks were being pushed forward by the City. These redevelopment plans were intended to 
rejuvenate the lagging post-war economy in this district, and the city more generally. Dating 
from the fifteenth century, and until the Second World War when its residents were deported 
under the Nazi occupation, the Nieuwmarkt was main Jewish quarter in the city. As one of the 
oldest neighbourhoods in Amsterdam, many citizens viewed the area as a symbolic political 
battleground. 
21 As mayors in the Netherlands are federally appointed rather than elected, their role is to rise 
above political and social division. Cohen, then a professor at Maastricht Universiteit 
(Maastricht University), was chosen as the best man for this job in Amsterdam in 2001. 
22  Cohen’s mixture of soft and hard approaches to tackling issues of criminality in Amsterdam 
have been ridiculed as “drinking tea”  and “coddling” the city’s allochtone residents by 
opponents like Wilders, in spite of their effectiveness (Luyendijk and Berkhout 2010). 
Similarly, Cohen’s response to the emotions and tensions which erupted in Amsterdam 
following the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City portray a practical and level-headed 
approach to the perceived problems of the city’s cultural diversity: “Islam is here to stay, in 
this country, in this city. ...We have to deal with Islam as a fact, not whether we like it. So the 
real question is how to get on with each other” (Simons 2005). 
23 This terminology is drawn from the sources of these figures, which use ‘ethnicity’ as a 
category for differences among the population. ‘Ethnicity’ here is linked to ‘nationality’ 
(citizenship status), producing numbers of ‘Turks by nationality’ and ‘Turks by ethnicity’ 
rather than ‘Kurds’ or other identifications that might have more currency among the 
population being listed. 
24  These continuities are discussed in greater detail the chapter “Activating citizens: Neoliberal 
governmentality and the rise of voluntarism.” 
 
Chapter 3 
 
25  These centuries-old historical differences along the lines of religious and political belief map 
relatively easily onto regional geography in the Netherlands even today. The north and west 
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of the country, although predominantly Protestant, has also been historically religiously 
mixed. Since the 1960s, people living in this region, which includes Amsterdam and the other 
large western cities (Rotterdam, Utrecht, Den Haag) have increasingly subscribed to 
secularism. From the southwest to the northeast of the Netherlands lies a mostly homogenous 
Protestant middle-zone, including the Dutch (orthodox Calvinist) Bible-belt. The regions to 
the south and east of the middle-zone, below the great rivers and bordering Belgium, remain 
the politically and economically peripheral Roman Catholic regions (Kalb 1997:1). 
26  The Inquisition of Jews in Spain and Portugal in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, brought 
many Jews, Roman Catholic converts and their descendants (accused by the ruling bodies of 
Spain and Portugal of ‘cryptojudaism’) to the Netherlands during the early 1600s (Lucassen 
and Penninx 1997:34-35). At the end of the seventeenth century, fifty to sixty thousand 
French Huguenots sought refuge from Catholic France in the Protestant Netherlands as well 
(Lucassen and Penninx 1997:33). 
27 Holland was home to five of the six cities where the Verenigde Oostindische Compangie 
(VOC; Dutch East Indies Company) had offices: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Hoorn, Enkhuizen, 
and Delft. (There was also one office in Middleburg, in the coastal province of Zeeland. VOC 
Kenniscentrum - KITLV 2013). 
28   This was not necessarily the experience for other European nation-states, as the case of 
France illustrates: The relationship between linguistic minorities, such as Bretons, and the 
French majority shows that language was a key marker for nation-building in Europe, adding 
another layer in the estimation of who was worthy of citizenship (Colonna 1997; McDonald 
1989). 
29   In the case of Surinam, plantation owners and government policy only sought the conversion 
of the vast slave population to Christianity after the abolition of slavery in 1863 (Oostindie 
and Paasman 1998:354; Van Lier 1971:191-192). However, as early as the 1740s, the 
adoption of Christianity was understood to have a ”whitening” effect for free creoles in the 
Caribbean colonies (Oostindie 1990:234). 
30   As Thorne (1997) discusses in her work, the language of racial degeneracy became linked 
with problems associated with poverty in England during the late eighteenth century. For 
evangelical missions, the ‘heathen races’ at home were in as dire need of Christian mission as 
those in the colonies. 
31   In Surinam, the abolition of slavery in 1863 had major repercussions on how the colony was 
governed that reflect and differed from the practices and anxieties over Dutch culture in the 
East Indies. Unlike the East Indies, Surinam had never been considered an “overseas 
settlement,” and as Van Lier (1971) explains, with the exception of an early wave of 
Sephardic Jewish settlers, there was a negligible white/ European presence in the plantation 
colony. After emancipation, the Dutch government and Administration of Surinam became 
concerned with maintaining the colony’s character as culturally Dutch. The new population of 
free blacks had been granted citizenship without adequate knowledge of Dutch or a Western 
education, which these governing bodies sought to remedy through “means of Western 
education in order to preserve the Dutch character of the territory” (Van Lier 1971:191). By 
1876, Western style, Dutch language education became compulsory for children 7 to 12 years 
old and a clear assimilationist policy was established that included conversion of slaves to 
Christianity and eradication of African customs (Van Lier 1971:191-192). It was in this 
context that increasing numbers of Surinamese, first members of  the creole elite but followed 
by those in the larger black population, pursued professional education in the Netherlands as a 
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way to climb the social hierarchy in Surinam, which was still very much undergirded by a 
racial hierarchy (Oostindie 1990:235-236). While the “Dutch language and culture 
community” (Van Lier 1971:193) envisioned by these assimilationist policies enabled well-
educated and higher-class Surinamese to mostly meet Dutch expectations for behaviour and 
cultural norms in the Netherlands, racial difference nonetheless continued to mark Surinamese 
as ‘strangers’ to Dutch society into the twentieth century (Oostindie 1990:238). 
32  The Japanese, whose powerful empire was an important trading partner for the Dutch, were 
accorded the legal status of ‘European’. 
33   The problematization of Dutch cultural forms (including behaviour, etiquette, language 
choice, religious practice) that underlay these legal distinctions also affected the reception of 
the small numbers of elite and educational Surinamese migrants to the Netherlands prior to 
the 1960s (Oostindie 1990). As Oostindie suggests, for ‘native’ Dutch “skin colour didn’t 
matter much as long as [migrants’] conduct lived up to Dutch standards” Oostindie 
1990:238). 
34 Across Dutch society and among nationalist supporters of charitable organizations established 
to promote the Boer cause, the development of these Boer republics was viewed as a last 
chance for the establishment of Dutch/ Hollandsche influence in world history, and a way to 
keep Dutch culture, language and race alive. These campaigns were motivated by the worries 
of the Dutch in the Netherlands that they were in danger of being absorbed by larger 
European neighbours (Bossenbroek 1996:245-246; Kuitenbrouwer 1991:193). Kuyper’s 
influence in this cause was foundational in spreading the theological nationalism of the Dutch 
churches in the Boer-dominated territories. Ultimately, is was through these religious 
techniques of control that apartheid (in Dutch, literally ‘apart-ness’) began (James and 
Schrauwers 2003:53). 
35 These blocs or pillars emerged over the course of the nineteenth century in response to a 
number of different concerns over the place of differing religious and political ideologies in 
the operation of the Dutch state. Following the changes to the Constitution of 1848, religious 
communities (other than Protestants) were able to organize, and religious groups – Catholics 
and orthodox Protestants – formed strong voices in regional and local political spheres.  As 
Lijphart indicates, during the heyday of verzuiling (1878 to 1917) the leaders of these pillars 
cooperated in the spirit of accommodation with particular attention paid to the relationship 
between church and state (especially of importance in the matter of education), the franchise, 
and labour (Lijphart 1968:104). These pillars received state funds to establish religious 
schools and universities alongside secular institutions. Newspapers and other media were 
oriented to specific pillars, as well as the later radio and television stations (the latter 
operating predominantly along state-controlled, denominational lines into the 1970s) 
(Bossenbroek 1996; Lechner 2008:209-211). Political parties, labour unions and other trade 
associations were likewise established along denominational lines (cf. Kalb 1996). 
 
Chapter 4 
 
1  Following the surrender of Japan at the end of the Second World War and the end of its 
occupation of the Dutch East Indies, Indonesian nationalists declared their independence from 
colonial rule on August 17, 1945. This began a war of decolonization that only ended when 
the Dutch government officially acknowledged Indonesia’s independence in 1949 (Pattynama 
1998:106). 
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2 This was exemplified by the extreme cases of the Hunger Winter – Hongerwinter, the famine 
in the German-occupied northern Netherlands (1944-45) that killed some 18,000 people – and 
the North Sea Flood in 1953 (Watersnoodramp, flood disaster) that severely affected Zeeland 
province (as well as parts of South Holland and North Brabant) killing over a thousand 
people, displacing tens of thousands, and destroying dwellings and farmland across the 
region. 
3  An early notable wave of ‘non-Western’ migrants were the Calvinist Christian Moluccan 
soldiers who had served in the Royal Dutch East Indies Army (KNIL, Koninklijk Nederlands 
Indisch Leger). Having fought for Dutch interests during the Japanese occupation and against 
Indonesian nationalists following the war, decommissioned soldiers and their families 
(approximately 12,500 people) were permitted to come to the Netherlands on a strictly 
temporary basis in 1951, as the terms of an independent South Moluccas was negotiated with 
newly independent Indonesia (Pettigrew 1998:79; Lucassen and Penninx 1997:42). 
Remaining on the social periphery in the Netherlands for decades, many became dependent 
on the Dutch welfare system (Pettigrew 1998:79), and increasingly frustrated about their 
situation in the Netherlands. These frustrations culminated in several terrorist attacks during 
the 1970s, which catalysed discussion around this group and pushed questions of immigrants’ 
place in Dutch society onto the political agenda (Scholten and Holzhacker 2009:88). 
4 After years of waiting for a decision, some applicants denied asylum were not actually 
deported. The crisis of asylum fed into a crisis of illegal immigration in the Netherlands and 
across the EEC (Penninx 2006:249; Lucassen and Penninx 1997:85). It was only in the mid-
1980s that the EEC and individual member states implemented policy to severely restrict the 
number of asylum applications by narrowing the criteria and tightening the procedures for 
making asylum claims (Martiniello and Rea 1999:166; Pettigrew 1998:81; Andeweg and 
Irwin 2002:39). 
5   The consociational pillars (zuilen) that organized Dutch society along the lines of religion and 
class affiliations dominated social, political, and economic life during the early twentieth 
century. Yet, during the 1960s Dutch culture underwent many profound changes, most 
notable being the widespread shift away from religious affiliation (cf. Vuijsje 2000). Figures 
from the 1899 census showed that just 2 percent of the Dutch population did not have a 
religious affiliation. By 2002, this had drastically changed: 65 percent of the Dutch population 
no longer identified as religious (Bekkers 2002:8).  
6 For a number of years during the late 1970s and into the 1980s, the children of these workers 
were subject to a policy of education in their own language and culture (OETC, Onderwijs in 
Eigen Taal en Cultuur), isolating them further from mainstream Dutch society (Lucassen and 
Penninx 1997:150). This to a certain extent mirrored what was happening in other Western 
European states (cf. Rietsteig 1994, Grillo 1985). The OETC policy explicitly reflected 
educational and integration policy directed at Indies migrants to Surinam during the late 
nineteenth-century. These policies were also repealed when these migrants were shown to be 
permanent settlers in the colony (Van Lier 1971:193). 
7  The term allochtoon (allochthon) finds its counterpoint in autochtoon (autochthon), which 
means “sprung from the earth” (from the Greek autos ‘self’ + khtōn ‘soil, earth’). 
8  Although how this language has been employed has been the subject of some contention, 
particularly among Francophones, as Geschiere attests (2009:19-20). 
9 While achterstand can be translated as “disadvantaged,” as in achterstandssituatie, it can also 
appear as another form of lack or lag, as in the concept of taalachterstand (language deficit). 
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In other situations, achterstand is translated literally as “backward.” Björnson has translated 
achterstand in her work as “structural marginalization” (2007:68).  
10  VMBO (voorbereidend middelbaar beroepsonderwijs) or lower vocational professional 
education, is the lowest of the three academic streams in the Dutch secondary education 
system. Students in this stream enter the job market directly upon graduation, although they 
can study to enter one of the other streams, and pursue higher education. The Dutch secondary 
educational system is composed of three main streams: VMBO, HAVO (hoger algemeen 
voortgezet onderwijs) higher general continued education, and VWO (voorbereidend 
wetenschappelijk onderwijs), preparatory scientific education, which prepares students for 
direct entry to university. 
11  An analogous example from Canada occurred when dual Canadian-Lebanese citizens caught 
up in the violent conflict sparked between Israel and Hezbollah during the summer of 2006. In 
this highly politicized and racialized context, Citizenship and Immigration Minister Monte 
Solberg’s comments that “Canadians want to know that citizenship means something, that we 
are not just a port in the storm” (CBC 2007:1), brought the true loyalties of these Canadian 
citizens abroad into question. 
12  Aboutaleb was then a federal cabinet minister, and later was appointed as mayor of 
Rotterdam. Aboutaleb holds both Dutch and Moroccan citizenship. Albayrak held Dutch and 
Turkish citizenships.  
13  In relation to this specific case, Wilders called on parliament to pass a motion prohibiting dual 
nationality among cabinet members (which was unanimously rejected by all other members of 
parliament, Volkskrant.nl 2007). After Aboutaleb left federal politics and was appointed 
mayor of Rotterdam, Wilders contested his appointment with statements such as: “A 
Moroccan as the mayor of the second city of the Netherlands is just as crazy as a Dutchman as 
mayor of Mecca.” He also stated that Aboutaleb had much better become mayor of Rabat in 
Morocco, since Rotterdam would become, “with him in the position ... Rabat on the Maas 
[river]. We might as well get an imam to be archbishop. Ridiculous.” (Volkskrant.nl 2008; my 
translation) 
14  José and I spoke mostly in Dutch. 
15  Margriet chose to conduct our interview in English, saying that it would be good practice for 
her since she did not have the opportunity to speak the language very often. Casper, quoted 
below, spoke with me in Dutch, 
16  In an affective register, these expletives could be translated as “Moroccan bastards” and 
“fucking little Moroccans,” respectively.  
 
Chapter 5 
 
1  Van Gogh had been cycling through Amsterdam on his way to finish the final edits on a film 
dedicated to the late Fortuyn when he was shot repeatedly, had his throat slit, and a note was 
stabbed into his corpse containing further death threats to a number of prominent Dutch 
politicians, including Hirsi Ali (Hajer and Uitermark 2008:1). Van Gogh’s murder has also 
served to solidify the “image of the delinquent Moroccan [which] now dominates, more or 
less explicitly, many political discussions about criminality, multiculturalism and religion” 
(Uitermark et al. 2005:634). 
2 The Dutch (orthodox) Jewish community was also affected by this proposal in their practices 
surrounding kosher meat. This aspect of the debate raised a number of tensions in relation to 
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religious communities in the Netherlands, especially given the fraught history of Jews in the 
Netherlands and in relation to the aftermath of the Second World War. However, the likely 
effects on the Jewish community were overshadowed in the media coverage by the focus on 
Muslim halal practices. 
3  Far right parties were elected or gained significant support during this time in Germany 
(Republicans), the United Kingdom (British National Party), Switzerland (Swiss Democrats, 
formerly ‘National Action’), France (Front National), and in the northern, Flemish-speaking 
region of Belgium (Flemish Block) (Koopmans et al. 2005:180; 203). 
4  The Council of Europe’s “Common European Framework of Reference: Learning, Teaching, 
Assessment” designates six different levels of proficiency: Basic User (A1 and A2), 
Independent User (B1 and B2), and Proficient User (C1 and C2). The A2 level required in 
preparation for the Dutch civic integration exam stipulates that students:  
 
 Can understand sentences and frequently used expressions related to areas of 
most immediate relevance (e.g. very basic personal and family information, 
shopping, local geography, employment). Can communicate in simple and 
routine tasks requiring a simple and direct exchange of information on familiar 
and routine matters. Can describe in simple terms aspects of his/her 
background, immediate environment and matters in areas of immediate need. 
(Council of Europe 2012) 
 
5   The inburgeraar is also required to assemble a portfolio of twenty “proofs” to determine 
whether the student can use and understand Dutch in practical situations they are likely to 
encounter, such as registering with the local city council, speaking with a child’s teacher, 
meeting a doctor, paying bills or dealing with one’s bank (DUO 2012b). This may include 
meetings endorsed by an authority figure, such as a teacher, doctor, or civil servant; a formal 
assessment during four “practical situations;” or a combination of ten portfolio proofs and two 
formal assessment examples. 
6  The first law requires people wishing to immigrate to the Netherlands (targeting those who 
seek to do so via family reunification) to acquire a residency permit and undertake a version 
of the ‘civic integration’ course and exam prior to arrival. The 2006 Civic Integration Act 
required ‘oldcomers’ (previously exempt) as well as ‘newcomers’ between the ages of 16 and 
65 without Dutch or EU citizenship to undergo this training. This law was effectively 
extended to encompass certain, ‘problematic’ groups of previously naturalized citizens (e.g. 
former guest workers), such as “those who receive welfare benefits, or those that practise a 
religious profession” (Vink 2007:347; (cf. Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007:19). These 
individuals are now required to successfully fulfil this duty within five years or face fines. 
7  Many academics were critical of this piece, noting that by this time, policy had already moved 
away from being or aiming to be ‘multicultural’. Detractors also claimed that Scheffer 
stereotyped all immigrants (including some that had lived in the Netherlands for generations) 
as Muslim fundamentalists who rejected liberal democracy. Just as Scheffer ignored the 
realities of the diversity among immigrants, framing them as a homogenous group, he also 
failed to acknowledge real progress of members within this population in terms employment 
and education outcomes (Entzinger 2006:128-129). 
8  Two weeks before the 2002 federal elections where his new party was expected to – and did – 
win numerous seats, Fortuyn was murdered as he left an interview in the media park in 
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Hilversum. Although Fortuyn was murdered by a ‘native’ Dutch man, part of the killer’s 
motivation stemmed from an idea of defending the weak and marginalized in Dutch society, 
i.e. Muslims. The party foundered without its charismatic leader and has since dissolved. 
9 The PVV decided against running any candidates in the 2010 municipal elections in 
Amsterdam. During the 2010 federal election, the PVV received 9.4% of the total vote within 
Amsterdam (up from 4.5% during the 2006 elections). Elsewhere, the PVV made significant 
inroads in Den Haag (19%), and gained the most seats of any party in Almere (21% of the 
vote). At the federal level, the PVV became the third largest party in parliament and a 
necessary partner in governing (Kiesraad 2013).  
10  This program brought a panel of ‘native’, that is “white” Dutch together to discuss issues of 
allochtonen integration at the neighbourhood level: white flight, criminality, neighbourhood 
nuisances (overlast), racism, and, as suggested by the episode title, feelings of being turned 
into a stranger in your own neighbourhood and country. This program was broadcast on the 
public station Nederland 2, but produced by the Christian network NCRV. It originally 
broadcast live from Felix Meritis in Amsterdam, on 31 October, 2009.  
  I owe many thanks to Irene Stengs of the Meertens Instituut in Amsterdam for her 
explanation of the nuances of this discussion. 
11  Ilse and I met through her work as a volunteer at a nursing home. She chose to speak with me 
in English. 
12  In Amsterdam Noord the PVV won 21.6% of the vote in 2010 (up from 9.4%). The city 
district of Nieuw-West the support for the populist Right party rose from 7.4% in 2006 to 
15.3% in 2010. City-wide, the support for Geert Wilders’ party remained below 10% 
(Gemeente Amsterdam, Dienst Onderzoek en Statistiek, 2010b:7-9). Ilse told me during our 
interview that while an online ‘vote compass’ indicated that her beliefs most aligned with the 
PVV, she did not plan to give the party her support. 
13  Gerrit and I spoke in Dutch.  
14  Carolien and I spoke in English. She expressed at the start of our interview that these were her 
personal views and experiences, and did not represent those of the Committee. 
15  Clarisa and I spoke in English. She was still in the process of finalizing her permanent 
residency visa when we met in 2010, but had been living in the Netherlands for some months. 
Clarisa was learning Dutch independently, and was volunteering in the elder care sector while 
she was still ineligible to pursue employment. 
16  According to the NOS (2010b) article, in early 2008, 86% of perpetrators nationally were 
either ‘native’ Dutch or of unknown ethnic/ national background. Figures from research 
conducted by the Universiteit van Amsterdam on anti-gay violence in Amsterdam showed that 
perpetrators were evenly ‘native’ Dutch and Dutch from Moroccan heritage (each group 
committed about 36% of these attacks). However, the smallness of the Moroccan-Dutch 
population in Amsterdam (16% of the city’s population) compared to the ‘native’ Dutch 
population (39%), was used by commenters to point to an overrepresentation of Moroccans 
committing anti-gay violence (NOS 2010b). 
17  This holiday has been celebrated in the Netherlands at least since the fourteenth century, as 
city records from 1360 in Dordrecht “describe a church-sanctioned St. Nicolas celebration for 
the children” (Blakely 1993:40). Similar records from across what has since become the 
Netherlands suggest that the Sinterklaas holiday was widely celebrated as a children’s holiday 
at least since this period, withstanding Calvinist attempts to eradicate the popular (Catholic) 
Saint’s Day festival during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Blakely 1993:43-44).  
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18  The society applied to the Het Nederlands Centrum voor Volkscultuur en Immaterieel 
Erfgoed (The Netherlands’ Centre for Folk Culture and Intangible Heritage), under the 
UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, which the 
Dutch ratified in 2012. Citing the “Zwarte Piet problem” the adjudicators chose not to give 
such privileged status to the holiday at this time. 
19  In portraying these figures, many people would use soot or ashes to darken their faces, and 
many wore chains with which the saint controlled them. In the Netherlands, Belgium, the 
early German states and in Switzerland these dark companions to the saint played the role of 
bogeyman to scare and discipline children. Across these regions, the origins of the character 
are traced to pagan tradition, and the Germanic/ Norse god Odin. As Christianity overtook the 
Netherlands, the darkened character was frequently associated with the devil. For example, in 
the Catholic south of the Netherlands, the saint’s companion had many different names, often 
also names for the devil.  
20  Similar, enduring tropes of racialized otherness in the Netherland include the Gaper or 
Moor’s head in heraldry and decoration, and the “Smoking Moor” (Blakely 1993). 
21  John Helsloot, an ethnologist at the Meertens Instituut (Meertens Institute) in Amsterdam, is 
renowned as an expert on Dutch festival and ritual, with his earliest published work on the 
Sinterklaas celebration dating to the mid-1990s. Helsloot’s extensive research on the 
celebration became increasingly critical of the role and place of Zwarte Piet in the holiday 
during the early 2000s.This critique was clear in his 2002 publication in Skript Historisch 
Tijdschrift (the Universiteit van Amsterdam student journal in history). Rather than rejecting 
the changes proposed by antiracism activists out of hand, Helsloot indicates that in his 
personal opinion, these developments should be celebrated as part of Dutch culture. 
22  In 1934, an extensive survey of Dutch cultural heritage indicated that the various regional 
specificities of the celebration had given way to a dominant set of symbols strongly 
influenced by the tradition in the Holland provinces. One of the most notable of these was the 
country-wide acceptance of Zwarte Piet as the companion of the saint, supplanting a diverse 
coterie of other characters (cf. Helsloot 2001:112; Blakely 1993:45) Since the standardization 
of the Zwarte Piet character in the holiday, all of the saint’s ‘helpers’ have shared the name 
Piet. It was only in 2004 that the national broadcaster began presenting these characters as 
individuals, albeit distinguished by their primary tasks, such as the Transportation Pete or 
Packing Pete. 
23  This project was Abbass’ final exam at the Koninklijke Academie van Beeldende Kunsten 
(Royal Academy of Art) in Den Haag. Abbass’ pseudonym is an anagram of stereotiep 
(stereotype) (Personal Communication, 8 Dec 2009). His posters displayed the web address to 
his project (which has since migrated to different social media platforms): www.stereopiet.nl 
24  The campaign gained more notice after the events during the Intocht. Standing alongside the 
parade route wearing their stencilled shirts, members of the group answered the questions of 
passersby about their slogan and campaign. The police demanded that the group leave, and in 
confrontation with the police Gario questioned: “Why must I leave, what have I done? Don’t I 
have a right to free speech?” (AT5 2011; my translation). The police cited the demonstration 
as a public disturbance, and after refusing to leave, Gario was arrested. A bystander captured 
the excessive force used in Gario’s arrest on YouTube, with the title Mishandeling??? 
Sinterklaas Intocht Dordrecht [Abuse??? Saint Nicolas’ Arrival in Dordrecht] 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q-Wf89f0I0M&feature=youtu.be). The success of this 
campaign in creating discussion has made Gario a prominent target for pro-Piet ire. 
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25  This conversation and the following text was in English. 
 
Chapter 6 
 
1  This is clear in the extreme example of the asowoningen (anti-social housing) mentioned in 
Chapter 3. Scholarly research on the historical asowoningen has shown that this social 
experiment was deemed a complete failure in terms of creating “ladders out of 
impoverishment.” Instead isolated housing created social apartheid, and acted more like 
“slides” deeper into misery and anti-social behaviour (Steyaert and van Lanen 2011:36). 
2 Some of these include the Stichting RCOAK (Roomsch Catholijk Oude Armen Kantoor, 
Roman Catholic Old Poor Foundation), the Diaconie Evangelisch-Lutherse Gemeente 
Amsterdam (Evangelical Lutheran Diaconate of Amsterdam), the Protestantse Diaconie 
Amsterdam (Protestant Diaconate of Amsterdam), and the KNR, (Konferentie Nederlandse 
Religieuzen, Dutch Religious Conference).  
3 This foundation was established in 2002 by then Crown-Prince Willem-Alexander and his 
wife Máxima, incorporating under its banner the older Juliana Welzijn Fonds (Juliana 
Welfare Trust) established in 1948.This foundation’s funding predominantly comes from 
revenue generated by national lottery programs, such as the BankGiro Loterij, or the 
Nationale Postcode Loterij. 
4  Interestingly, this includes the devaluation of informal care activities exchanged between 
families, friends, and other “survival networks” that are especially important for lower-
income groups (Erickson 2012; Muehlebach 2012). 
5 Dekker and de Hart are the editors of the fifth and final study in a multi-year SCP-funded 
project on voluntarism, Vrijwilligerswerk in meervoud. Civil society en vrijwilligerswerk 5 
(Voluntary work: a diversity of forms. Civil society and voluntary work 5). Dekker and de 
Hart take their figures from a combination of different questionnaires, noting that the ways in 
which questions about volunteering are asked will play a role in the final figures (2009:280). 
This may account for why Lindeman et al (2011) remark that Amsterdam has a lower than 
national average participation rate in formal voluntary work (33%). However, they note that 
Amsterdam also reports a higher than average rate of informal help, with about half of the 
population reporting that they were engaged in this kind of unpaid labour. 
6 Although voluntary work is unpaid, the Dutch government does allow for some monetary 
compensation to be given to volunteers. This compensation is minimal, and may cover the 
costs incurred while volunteering, e.g. the cost of transit to and from the place of volunteer 
work. In addition, some institutions require that volunteers be insured in order to work. This 
was the case when I volunteered with a residential care facility for the elderly. The Cordaan 
organization, which ran the nursing home, paid for the costs of my insurance. 
7 For instance, in the Canadian province of Ontario high school students are required to 
complete a mandatory 40 hours of “community involvement activities” in order to graduate 
(Schwarz 2011; cf. Sander and Putnam 2010). 
8 In the Netherlands, this strategy may have also been a response seeking to counter a trend of 
lower levels of youth involvement in voluntary work. Bekkers (2002:3) shows that in 1985 
31% of the Dutch under-30 population was involved in voluntary work, compared to just 18% 
in 2000. 
9 This aspect of the curriculum was expanded and implemented across the country during the 
2011-2012 school year. All high school students in the Netherlands are required to conduct a 
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number of voluntary service learning hours, depending on their level of study. For those in the 
highest academic streams (VWO), this commitment is 72 hours; for those in the middle 
(HAVO) and lower (VMBO) academic streams, the number of hours required is 60 and 48, 
respectively (Vrijwilligers Centrale Amsterdam 2012). 
10 The website features a volunteer job bank for use by volunteers as well as organizations 
seeking volunteers. In addition to the job bank, the website also provides frequently updated 
news on volunteering in Amsterdam, as well as stories and experiences shared by current and 
past volunteers that provide context and encouragement to those considering involvement in 
voluntary work.  
11 NL Doet (NL Does) is a national organization for voluntary work supported by the Oranje 
Fonds. The major initiative of NL Doet is the organization of two annual national volunteer 
days of action to promote voluntarism in the Netherlands as an integral part of society, and to 
encourage more citizens to consider volunteering on a regular basis. Volunteers participating 
in these days of action come from all levels of Dutch society: from Dutch celebrities and 
members of the royal family (including the monarch), to regular Dutch people of all ages, 
sociocultural and economic backgrounds (Oranje Fonds 2011, NL Doet 2012). 
12 For Gilde Amsterdam this included some extra funding from the municipal council 
department responsible for inburgering (Dienst Werk en Inkomen, Work and Income). With 
this money the organization was able to support the recruitment of an extra 100 speaking 
partnerships (200 people) for the year, at a cost of €150 for each couple. The director of Gilde 
Amsterdam also noted that a further 100 couples and other aspects of this campaign were 
supported by funds from a partnership with the aforementioned RCOAK. 
13 With the theme for June 2011, language coaching and mentoring, Gilde Amsterdam, along 
with the support of their corporate partners and the VCA, staged events throughout the month 
to showcase volunteering opportunities and ongoing programs in this vein. One notable event 
was the Vrijwilligerskoppelfestival (Volunteer-couples festival) on 22 June. Volunteer 
language coaches (for non-native speakers), mentors (for university or college students), and 
interested individuals were invited to attend the festival with or without their partners. The 
event featured free food, a concert with some well-known performers (including the popular 
Dutch rapper of Moroccan descent, Ali B.), and a space for informal chatting, connecting with 
others, and recording short videos of their experiences (on the babbelbank, or chatting sofa). 
Drawing more than 300 visitors, the goal was to publicize the language coaching and 
mentoring programs that were ongoing in the city, to encourage others to become involved, 
and to show current participants that their work was appreciated. The event was publicized in 
a number of ways, for example on the VCA website, on the city’s volunteer site, as well as 
through emails sent to current participants. Gilde Amsterdam received funds to create a short 
video advertisement for the event, which was also featured on the VCA website.  
14 While good Dutch language skills are necessary to navigate the mainstream job market in the 
Netherlands (assuming one is not a highly skilled, English-speaking migrant), other factors 
also inhibit inburgeraars and other allochtonen from finding employment. This includes 
things such as a lack of appropriate skills training on the part of the applicant, as well as 
discriminatory hiring practices on the part of Dutch employers (cf. Ghorashi and van Tilberg 
2006). 
15  Since the inception of the inburgering courses funding for the program has been partially 
provided by the federal government. Students were able to apply for loans or bursaries, and to 
recoup some or all of the costs upon successful completion of the exams (DUO 2012; Het 
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begint met taal 2012). On 1 January 2014 the federal department for Work and Income 
stopped financing for the inburgering courses, and any program funding now comes from the 
municipalities (Ministrie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2013:3). For immigrants 
granted their residence permit after 1 January 2013, the government eliminated access to the 
reimbursements previously available upon completion of their courses and exams. Financial 
aid is now only available through the Dienst Uitvoering Onderwijs (DUO, Service for 
implementing education in the Dutch Ministry for Culture, Education, and Science) in the 
form of loans. These loans are only available for those unable to cover the costs incurred 
while undertaking civic integration courses and tests (DUO 2013). 
 
Chapter 7 
 
1  Some of these incidents were raised by my interlocutors. An example of which is a 2007 
controversy over the dual nationality of two federal cabinet ministers discussed in Chapter 5. 
2   For example, Bart discussed what he called a strong republican tradition, especially in 
Amsterdam, as something in which he took particular pride. 
3   I was also directed to other popular books that catalog ‘typical’ Dutch traits by some of my 
informants. These include the humorous observations on Dutch culture and language use: The 
Undutchables. An observation of the Netherlands: its culture and its inhabitants 
(2006[1989]), written in English and directed to an international audience of ‘expats’, but 
well-received by Dutch readers and critics (including at the reputable papers Het Parool and 
NRC Handelsblad); the bilingual I always get my sin: het bizarre Engels van Nederlanders 
[the bizarre English of the Dutch] (2012) which pokes fun at how Dutch turns of phrase do 
not always translate into English; and the popular Dutch-language Taal is zeg maar mijn ding 
[Language is really my thing] (2012[2009]) where Paulien Cornelisse comments on some of 
the foibles of the Dutch through typical expressions and practices. 
4  Later entries typically showcased two or three items, expressions or phenomena considered 
typically Dutch, not unlike the Typische Nederlands book that had been published a decade 
earlier. An example from the tenth part of this weekly series, published 5 June 2010 discussed 
the Dutch soccer team in anticipation of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, as well as celebrating 
“Hollandse Nieuwe,” the first catch of the season of Dutch herring. 
5  Sterre, Chloe and I mostly spoke in English. Neither of these women were language coaches, 
but Chloe was an active volunteer in a life-saving society. 
6  Wilders then commissioned the research institute Nyfer to produce a study, Budgettaire 
effecten van immigratie van niet-westerse allochtonen (Bugetary effect of the immigration of 
non-Western allochthons). This study, whose full results were published in May 2010, 
concluded that non-Western immigrants cost the Netherlands some €7.2 million annually 
(NRC.nl 2010). 
7  Anna and I spoke in Dutch. 
8   Anouk chose to conduct our interview in English. Casper, quoted below, spoke with me in 
Dutch. 
 
Chapter 8 
 
1  José’s exact words were “Maar hij is gewoon Nederlander van een boer, dus―” I have 
translated it here to give a better sense of her meaning for the English reader. 
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2  It is unclear whether anything was done with viewer feedback from this television program. 
Rather, I speculate that it was produced and broadcast in order to raise public debate and 
discussion on a serious issue, the process of inburgering, among the wider Dutch population. 
This program was later followed by the production of similar Dutch television quiz events on 
controversial issues; dramatized reality-format programs whose production aimed to bring 
awareness to particular issues and move them (back) onto the national political agenda. A 
2007 program, De Grote Donorshow (The Big Donor Show), sought to highlight the shortage 
of organ donations in the Netherlands. Contestants (three patients on real organ donation 
waiting lists) “competed” for a kidney from an actress posing for the program as a terminally 
ill woman. Viewers were invited to text the program from their mobile phones to help the 
“donor” choose who should get her kidney. It was only revealed to the audience at the end of 
the program that the event was staged to publicize the social issue of organ donation. 
Similarly, a program broadcast in 2011, Weg Van Nederland (Out of the Netherlands) sought 
to underscore the plight of some 11,500 (many years’ resident) asylum seekers whose 
applications had failed and expected to be deported. The contestants were themselves failed 
asylum seekers, who answered trivia questions on Dutch history and culture – highlighting 
their level of social integration in the Netherlands – to win €4000 toward covering the costs of 
their deportation. Similar to De Nationale Inburgering Test program, viewers were invited to 
answer the quiz questions online, in competition for a vacation to the Dutch Caribbean island 
of Curaçao. 
3  The 2007 controversy over Dutch Labour politician Ahmed Aboutaleb’s dual citizenship is 
discussed in greater detail Chapter 4. 
4  Correspondence with SamenSpraak Oost was in Dutch. 
5  The intention of this policy had been for “ethnic minority children ... to develop a positive 
self-concept through the attention to their own language and culture, with a view to improving 
their educational opportunities in Dutch society” (Rijschroeff et al. 2005:424). The logic 
behind this policy shifted from a belief that these children would eventually return to their 
“mother country” when their parents’ visas expired, to the belief that having a strong 
foundation in one’s mother tongue would facilitate these students’ learning of Dutch. 
Problems in the implementation of the policy often effectively isolated these children even 
further from mainstream Dutch society.  
  It is worth noting that this policy echoes educational policy instituted for British and 
Dutch East Indies indentured labourers in the colony of Surinam at the end of the nineteenth 
century. In this context, the policy to educate in language of the supposedly temporary 
migrants, rather than in Dutch, was repealed when it became clear that these groups had 
settled permanently on Dutch soil (Van Lier 1971:193). 
6  She had described her workplace as “a white school, but there was one Arabic” student in her 
class. 
 
Chapter 9 
 
1  After English, German was the next most commonly known language (70% of those polled), 
followed by French (27%) (Eurobarometer 2006:13). Another interesting figure from this 
study indicated that 75% of those polled in the Netherlands felt that they were able to hold a 
conversation in at least two foreign languages (Eurobarometer 2006:9). 
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2  Only in Sweden (89%) and Malta (88%) was English more widely understood than in the 
Netherlands (Eurobarometer 2006:9). 
3  In cinemas, other foreign language films were also shown in their original language with 
subtitles rather than being dubbed, which was common in Germany and France. 
4  Not everyone agrees with the use of English in Dutch media, as is clear from the concern 
expressed in October 2010 by the ombudsman for the national Dutch daily newspaper, NRC 
Handelsblad. Gerrit, a retired teacher in his seventies and a language coach at SamenSpraak, 
who spoke multiple languages himself (including English) shared in the concerns of the NRC 
ombudsman. During our interview it was clear that he was critical of what he saw as the 
increasing prevalence of English in Dutch society. Gerrit saw the creeping of this language 
into Dutch media, daily life, and conversation as a “poor work”: “English, I find that 
appalling. ... The language. There is more and more English used in everyday society.” 
5 Additionally, as a Canadian most people had some knowledge about my country, and shared 
positive opinions about it. Often these good feelings were connected to the liberation efforts 
of Canadian soldiers during the Second World War. Many people had relatives living in 
Canada, or had visited themselves.  
